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Introduction 
Heritage has become a trendy catchword in South African society, conjuring 
up a plethora of emotional associations and notions of benefits on multiple 
levels for different stakeholders and ‘communities’. For the previously 
marginalised black majority, heritage is presumed to signal empowerment: 
the valorisation and preservation of their cultural beliefs and values; the 
honouring of their heroes and contributions; the authentication of their 
neglected stories and memories; the official acknowledgement of their 
suffering and sacrifices. Members of the white minority, motivated by 
anxieties over disempowerment and alienation, tend to demonstrate a strong 
emotional attachment to contested facets of their embattled heritage, even if 
they no longer identify with the specific symbolic values each of these 
represent. For the state, heritage is arguably an opportunistic means to fulfill 
the social needs of the electorate, while simultaneously fostering the political 
goals of nation-building, reconciliation and unity, as well promoting the 
economic imperatives of development, employment creation and income 
generation, mostly through tourism.  
Heritage is also a loaded discursive mark of our times, one of the 
‘keywords’ that is now widely understood to define South African society, 
along with race, culture, gender, tradition, or truth and reconciliation 
(Shepherd and Robins 2008). Because heritage is a malleable, ambiguous 
concept, full of paradoxes, it lends itself to be utilized in multifarious ways, 
supporting sometimes contradictory political, economic, social and cultural 
agendas. Since 1994 heritage discourse has emerged as one of the principal 
sites for negotiating issues of culture, identity and citizenship, suggesting 
what is authentic, what constitutes the deep roots of cultural identity and the 
essence of a sense of nationality (Shepherd 2008: 124). Heritage is difficult 
to define not least because it is all-encompassing, containing tangible 
artefacts and structures of the past, as well as landscapes and intangible 
aspects of culture, such as traditions, customs and oral memory. Heritage 
relates both to the past (‘history’) and the present (‘living heritage’). 
This study focuses on the former aspect, notably the official represent-
ation, commemoration and memorialisation of selected persons and 
‘memorable’ episodes of the past. Commemoration manifests itself, among 
other ways, in the (re)naming of streets, cities, and public buildings; the 
construction of new museums, documentation and interpretation centres; the 
reenactment of battles and historical events; the identification and official 
marking of new heritage sites; and the installation of memorials, monuments 
and public statuary. The recent flurry of activity in the public heritage sector 
is propelled by a dual dynamic. A global trend towards commemoration, 
spurred on by a quest for identity through recourse to public memory, has 
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been manifesting itself internationally within the last three decades, 
especially in liberal democracies. In South Africa, this tendency has been 
reinforced by the fundamental change of the socio-political landscape after 
the first general democratic elections on 27 April 1994 formally ended 
apartheid. Under the watchful eye of the international community, the post-
apartheid order, established as a result of the much celebrated ‘soft 
revolution’ and ‘negotiated solution’, attempted to engrain new value 
systems in South African society and forge a new national identity. To 
ensure a peaceful transition, successful economic development and 
international recognition, this youthful, still fragile dispensation had 
constantly to negotiate transformation and progressive change against the 
resistance of the now marginalized but still powerful conservative forces.  
This book investigates how these challenges have manifested themselves 
in the symbolic realm, namely in commemorative monuments, memorials 
and public statuary as society’s most deliberately designed, official, lasting, 
and emblematic cultural products codifying memory. Their role is to induce 
purposeful remembrance in the interest of forging a particular historical 
consciousness and shaping collective memory upon which group identity can 
be based. It will be shown how new monuments attempt to redefine the 
nation’s existing landscape of memory and condense societal forces around 
symbolically charged readings of the past, resulting in complex and 
sometimes contradictory identity discourses. Monuments are public 
‘institutions’ through which selected narratives and associated groups can 
gain visibility, authority and legitimacy, but they are also sites of 
contestation where perhaps previously invisible differences can become 
evident. They are the loci of private contemplation and mourning, as well as 
of public rituals of commemoration and staged performances of paying 
tribute, hence (in theory) serving as sites of the trans-generational 
transmission of valued memories. In a tenuous, transforming society, 
monuments, like other identity symbols, warrant attention owing to their 
ability to invoke deeply-felt sentiments and moral imperatives, to inflame 
powerful emotions, and even to lead to violence.  
Public pronouncements by government officials about the politics of 
public representation through monuments and the extensive media coverage 
of the monument issue are implicitly informed by the emancipatory 
postmodern and postcolonial discourses of the previously oppressed margin 
as it comes to the fore and expresses its identity. New monuments and 
statues are necessary to ‘tell the other side of the story’; to expose 
suppressed histories and preserve narratives of the past previously written 
out of the official historical record; to counter biased interpretations 
disseminated through the existing symbolic landscape; to celebrate the 
identity and achievements of societal groups previously marginalised; and 
lastly to acknowledge suffering and pay tribute to individuals or groups who 
lost their lives through acts of resistance. 
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Driving the current flurry of activity in the field of public memorialisation is 
a distinct sense of urgency about the need to counter a long legacy of 
absence and suppression. Social identities and political positions, expressed 
in specific memories and treated largely as given and uncontested, must be 
enshrined in the official heritage landscape for the sake of present and future 
generations. Public monuments, constituted as discursive formations that 
pose a direct response and challenge to hegemonic discourses and contested 
ideologies, are important mechanisms in the project of reshaping public 
memory and ‘rewriting the past’. This book argues that post-apartheid 
monuments – their very existence, their setting, their content, their design, 
their intended meaning, their discursive strategies – are intricately bound to 
and determined by the literal presence, metaphorical power and specific 
physical properties of the commemorative markers inherited from the old 
order. New monuments are a way of signifying both rupture from the past 
(emphasising the novelty and difference of the new order) and continuity 
with the past (connecting with established systems which may, however, be 
interrogated and re-evaluated).  
  This study is focused on newly installed monuments as the least 
compromised manifestation of official commemorative intentions, but it 
must be pointed out that the field of public monuments also includes some 
memorial markers established by previous socio-political orders that have 
been subjected to a process of re-modelling and re-interpretation under the 
aegis of the post-apartheid government. The dynamics of power and the 
discursive manoeuvres are very different in such cases, not least because the 
modification must be negotiated with communities that remain attached to 
the monument and sometimes its original intention. As will be discussed 
later, a change of inscription officially renders a contested monument 
politically correct – the old text is erased with the disappearance of the 
hegemonic discourse that created it – but the originally intended meaning of 
such markers may still linger on. As Mills and Simpson (2003: xxv) cogently 
put it in the context of contested monuments in the United States, one can 
see monuments as palimpsests, as slates on which history can be layered: 
‘[t]he old message is not erased, but new language is written over it or beside 
it’. 
The relationship between old and new monuments, the dependency of 
new on old monuments, is not unique to South Africa. Indeed it has become 
increasingly common, especially in Western liberal democracies, to 
acknowledge, rather than deny, burdensome legacies and contentious 
episodes of the past, and this attitude has affected both the treatment of 
contested existing monuments and the design of new commemorative 
markers. But in many countries, monuments representing now reviled ideo-
logical positions have already been removed by previous generations (one 
might think of Nazi symbols in Germany), hence conveniently obliterating 
the need to ‘deal’ with them today. In other societies, for instance the United 
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States, some monuments, despite presumably having offended specific 
communities for ages, have officially become controversial only relatively 
recently as a result of demographic trends, shifting socio-political power 
relations, new discourses about cultural representation and the global trend 
towards the ‘democratization of history’ (Nora 2000: 2). Here we can 
observe – as in South Africa – to some extent the juxtaposition of old 
monuments with new monuments designed to critically engage with the 
legacy of the past and open up alternative perspectives. 
What makes South Africa’s current politics of memory and strategy of 
public memorialisation in bronze and stone unique in my view is the 
systematic, self-conscious, deliberate, and methodical manner in which new 
monuments engage with the legacy of the past. In that sense, the new 
commemorative markers constitute a tangible manifestation of larger socio-
political dynamics and state-promoted strategies of reconciliation and 
nation-building as they were defined during the immediate post-apartheid 
period. The monuments featured in this book hence testify to all of those 
‘good intentions’, lofty ideals, and genuine concerns for the representation of 
the previously neglected, but they also testify to the challenges and 
contradictions, the hidden political agendas, the power struggles, and the 
contestations ‘from below’ that characterise this seminal period in South 
Africa’s history. At the present moment there are indications that the 
country’s political landscape and socio-political climate may undergo some 
changes in the future, and heritage will no doubt be influenced by this 
dynamic in due course. Indeed, even some recent monument initiatives could 
be interpreted to suggest implicit shifts in policy and attitude, but such 
developments are beyond the scope of this book and will need to be 
investigated in future research.  
Interdisciplinary perspectives on monuments  
The preoccupation with heritage, commemoration and public memory has 
firmly established itself in academia internationally in the past three decades, 
often in conjunction with an interest in issues of identity and place. Within 
South Africa, heritage has become a prominent subject of both academic and 
public debate only since the late 1980s or early 1990s, mostly as a result of 
the socio-political changes of the time. Publications in the new academic 
fields of heritage studies and memory studies include critical engagement 
with memory-linked identity discourses; the psychological and political 
aspects of officially endorsed commemorative activity; theoretically 
grounded distinctions between the terms heritage, historical consciousness, 
history and memory; and theoretical, sometimes philosophically sustained, 
differentiations between monuments and memorials. By drawing on an 
interdisciplinary range of theoretical frameworks this book explores the 
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multifaceted dimensions of monuments and provides alternative conceptual 
perspectives for their interpretation. The aim is not to develop a singular new 
approach to the understanding of monuments, but to promote a more 
nuanced engagement with these cultural artefacts in a context often 
dominated by simplistic dichotomous positions. Most importantly, the book 
aims to tease out the ambiguities and contradictions that characterise the 
newly emerging memory landscape and illustrate how the symbolic 
representation of cultural and political values reflects tensions within post-
apartheid South African society today. 
  One of the most frequently cited and influential theoretical analyses of 
memory in recent years was developed by the French historian, Pierre Nora 
(1989; 1996; 1997; 1998), who investigated the historical roots of the current 
fascination with memory and forged the link between memory and place. 
Nora argues that in European societies before the 19th century, only the 
aristocracy, the church and the state saw a need for monuments, while for 
ordinary people memory was a pervasive part of life. They lived in a ‘milieu 
de mémoire’ or ‘environment of memory’. Through the process of industrial-
isation and the associated social changes these milieux began to erode, thus 
necessitating the establishment of ‘lieux de mémoire’, memory sites, such as 
archives and monuments. In Nora’s opinion, such memory sites are just 
‘exterior scaffolding or outward signs’ (1989: 13) to cover for the fact that 
memory is no longer experienced from the inside.1  
Although Nora’s work has not remained without criticism or qualificat-
ion, especially with respect to its applicability in the non-European context,2 
there are indeed compelling parallels between his analysis of memory in 
19th and 20th century European societies and present-day South Africa. 
Migration, the fragmentation of traditional family units and the destruction 
of community cohesion as a result of political and socio-economic pressures, 
as well as more recent social changes induced by the HIV/Aids pandemic, 
have impacted negatively on the tradition of oral history. John Gillis’ (1994: 
14) observation that ‘[g]randparents are no longer doing the memory work 
they once performed’, is particularly pertinent in the South African context, 
where it is frequently lamented how little youngsters know about significant 
                                                     
1  ‘There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer 
milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory. Consider, for example, the 
irrevocable break marked by the disappearance of peasant culture, that 
quintessential repository of collective memory whose recent vogue as an object 
of historical study coincided with the apogee of industrial growth’ (Nora 1989: 
7). 
2  Lambek and Antze (1996: xv), for instance, doubt that there ever were ‘un-
troubled, homogeneous milieux de mémoire’ and point out that ‘the European 
perspective may not fit either the understandings of the life course or the 
historical experiences of non-European people’. Various contributors to Ben-
Amos and Weissberg’s (1999) book also contest or qualify Nora’s work. 
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persons and events even from the recent past. Monuments and statues are 
called upon to fill the gap. 
Contrary to Nora’s (1989: 22) claim that monuments as lieux de mémoire 
owe their meaning to their intrinsic existence and could easily be relocated 
without altering their signification, many scholars stress the importance of a 
site as a contextual factor impacting on the meaning of any commemorative 
marker (e.g. Johnson 1995). This finding is particularly relevant for the 
current study, because the physical repositioning of statues and smaller, 
movable monuments away from highly official, prestigious places (e.g. in 
front of a city hall) to less prominent locations and ‘community spaces’ has 
been recommended (although rarely implemented thus far) as a way of 
rendering the content of their ‘message’ less universal, authoritative or 
offensive. Relocating disputed monuments extends the principle of 
signalling both a break from and a continuity with the contested past, to the 
treatment of existing heritage. 
  From the perspective of a cultural geographer or visual anthropologist, 
monuments can be understood as articulated spaces, as signifying landmarks 
which inscribe the surrounding environment and its people with meaning. 
Especially in the colonial context, monuments were often linked with 
cartographic practices and notions of mapping, implicitly legitimating claims 
to ownership of the land or supporting ideologically stereotyped assertions 
about its native inhabitants. In the South African context, Bunn (1999; 2002) 
has applied a similar cultural-topographic paradigm to African grave sites 
and colonial/apartheid era monuments (e.g. settlers’ monuments in the 
Eastern Cape). This approach constitutes an interesting departure point for 
post-apartheid monuments as strategic measures taken for the reclaiming of 
space and re-inscribing symbolic identity.  
A significant amount of recent international scholarly research focuses on 
war memorials, notably those dedicated to the victims of the two world wars, 
and on memorials for the victims of the Holocaust (see for instance 
anthologies by Ashplant, Dawson and Roper (2004); Forty and Küchler 
(1999); or Young (1994)). These studies are important for this book, because 
memorials dedicated to the victims of apartheid violence and to those who 
lost their lives in the liberation struggle can to some extent be compared with 
war memorials, both in terms of their diverse functions and their visual 
design. Ashplant, Dawson and Roper (2004:7-14) explain that the study of 
war memory and commemoration has traditionally been dominated by two 
main approaches. The first paradigm emphasises the political significance of 
war memorials as a key element in the symbolic repertoire available to the 
nation-state to promote processes of collective national identification. The 
second approach views memorials as psychologically motivated expressions 
of mourning, a human response to death and suffering. Partly due to 
disciplinary divisions, analyses tend to be focused on either paradigm – 
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privileging either politics or death and suffering, either the state or civil 
society – as if those were largely unrelated alternatives.  
Bridging this dichotomy, a third body of scholarly work uses oral-history 
and life-story methods to investigate the meanings attached to war and its 
remembrance that individual subjects express in their own words and stories. 
This ‘popular memory approach’ entangles public and private memory, 
positioning personal memory and individual subjectivity in relation to 
national memory. This is highly significant for the present study in the South 
African context, where the personal testimonies of victims of apartheid 
violence presented at the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) have become an important alternative source of 
knowledge about the past (TRC 1998). Officially recorded, widely 
disseminated through the media, and published in the seven volumes of the 
TRC report, these oral histories and personal memories have implicitly 
attained authorisation and they are now further endorsed through the process 
of their memorialisation. 
But no attempt by the state at creating a smooth merger between 
(selective) private and public memory ever remains completely uncontested. 
The fluid, multifaceted and unpredictable nature of memory ensures that the 
more commemorative monuments draw on oral history, victim testimony 
and popular memory, the more likely the chance that other memories and 
alternative versions of the past will come to the fore to contest what the state 
has endorsed and turned into ‘history’. As Nora aptly puts it ‘memory 
remembers and history forgets’ (2000: 3). Hence the relationship between 
old and new monuments is rendered more complex on account of its being 
overlaid by subliminal and sometimes overt tensions within the post-
apartheid commemorative project itself. Contesting voices indicate the 
surfacing of new fault lines and hegemonies, thus reflecting the culturally 
diverse and ideologically fragmented nature of post-apartheid society, but 
also perhaps signalling the emergence of public debate and contention in 
civil society as beacons of a successful democratic order.  
Another interesting and highly significant aspect of the popular memory 
approach must be mentioned here, namely its concern with the ways in 
which personal experience is often structured and understood in terms of 
larger cultural (e.g. national) narratives, which in turn are inspired by similar 
narratives that have gone before. Burke (1989) argues that societies 
remember in terms of templates or schemata, where new heroes are often re-
castings of earlier figures and commemorative practices purposefully relate 
recent traumatic experiences to historical traumas of the past. The relevance 
of this position will become evident throughout this book, as post-apartheid 
commemorative projects are shown to be contingent on existing monuments 
whose ideological agendas and identity discourses they contest and 
challenge but also mimic and rework.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
8 
An obvious although not prominent approach to the academic study of 
monuments emanates from the discipline of art history, which considers the 
artefacts as works of public commemorative art. Fusing aesthetic and 
discursive practice, art historians understand monuments as visual analogues 
of culturally specific ideas about nation, human suffering, individual 
greatness or societal achievement. One of the most useful insights to be 
gained from Michalski’s (1998) seminal survey of public monument projects 
in the western tradition since the late 19th century pertains to the common 
trend of recycling the formal vocabulary of monument design across time 
and space, thus contributing to the conventionality of the genre. While 
conventionality diminishes the monument in the eyes of art historians and art 
critics, it may in fact enhance the monument’s symbolic power in the eyes of 
its initiators and many viewers. This can constitute a dilemma for designers 
of post-apartheid memorial markers, as will be shown, because new 
commemorative projects must simultaneously be different from and similar 
to public monuments in the older, Eurocentric tradition.  
Another art historical study of tremendous influence on the field is Kirk 
Savage’s (1997) work on monuments dedicated to the American slaves. 
Savage aptly demonstrates that monuments and public statues are not shaped 
only according to aesthetic principles, but they are discursive objects, whose 
design arises out of contests over the meaning of specific past events. 
Monuments can be representational battlegrounds on which a variety of 
stakeholders, including artists, initiators, victims, descendents of deceased 
personalities, leaders and members of local community organisations, 
political officials, representatives of heritage management structures and 
even members of tourism boards may contest questions of visual appearance. 
Discussions about style, architectural and sculptural form, iconography and 
symbolism, while on the surface concerned with aesthetic issues or matters 
of personal taste, can in reality reflect deep-seated ideological differences in 
the interpretation of the past. The monument as visual end result may then 
reinforce or challenge particular readings of historical events; signal 
inclusions or exclusions; and represent a propagandistic piece of kitsch or a 
meaningful heritage asset and unique tourist attraction.  
As against earlier studies, which focused on the intrinsic characteristics of 
monuments, their initiators and their intended meaning, more recent 
scholarship shifts attention to the viewer and the reception of monuments in 
different contexts and by different audiences. Monuments and indeed 
cultural products in general can be subject to a gradual, accidental accretion 
of meaning over time, and sometimes meanings emerge that nobody could 
have ever predicted. A monument may be designed as a particular discursive 
address to an imagined subject, but it is impossible to design any symbol that 
carries only its originally intended meaning. Especially if the political 
landscape, cultural norms or societal value systems in which the audience is 
embedded change over time, the perceived meaning of the monument may 
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also vary, although the intended interpretation often remains residually 
present and can be revived in particular circumstances.  
To the extent that the viewer is influenced by semiotics and theoretical 
frameworks derived from media studies, monuments (and other types of 
heritage ‘products’) can be viewed as visual signifiers communicating 
ideologically charged ‘messages’ to diverse audiences in different contexts. 
While the process of meaning making can never be fixed, controlled or 
entirely predicted, Stanley Fish (1980) observed that viewers sharing certain 
social background characteristics form ‘viewing communities’ who tend to 
apply similar ‘interpretive strategies’ and derive similar interpretive readings 
of a cultural artifact, heritage display or monument site. In the South African 
context, Grundlingh’s (2001) and Coombes’ (2003) historical investigation 
of the changing symbolic meaning and societal role of the Afrikaner 
nationalist Voortrekker Monument (VTM) in Pretoria, arguably South 
Africa’s most eminent and contested commemorative structure established 
by the old order, highlights the propensity of monuments to be appropriated 
by different constituencies in support of specific ideological agendas. 
One aim of this book is to extend this approach to monuments of the 
post-apartheid era. Monuments and memorials serve important social and 
psychological needs for individuals and groups (e.g. the need for mourning; 
or the need for group identification), which are not always compatible with 
the political needs of the state or the initiators to memorialise persons and 
events in specific ways. Some societal forces promote monuments as a way 
of defining ‘imagined communities’ around newly introduced or authorized 
discourses and value systems. For the South African government, for 
instance, monuments are often linchpins in the project of envisioning a 
unified national identity based on reconciliation, non-racialism and gender 
equality. But other groups may utilise monuments as framing devices for the 
expression and even construction of ‘community’ along racial and ethnic 
lines, sometimes reinforcing colonial and apartheid-era notions of ‘fixed’ 
identity categories. Irrespective of the intended meaning, individual viewers 
and different audiences may interpret monuments to support their own 
preferred identity discourses. The reader must keep in mind that the 
interpretations offered in this book are my own (unless otherwise indicated) 
and that other viewers might rightfully differ in their reading of the same 
monuments and their significance.  
This book interlinks with Coombes’ (2003) seminal History after 
apartheid in the centrality of its focus on representing the past and the 
controversies surrounding such representation. Coombes investigates a 
number of specific sites, notably museums, but also intangible or non-visual 
sites such as the TRC, and highlights their role in the current South African 
politics of (re)writing history and producing culture, which is characterised 
by tensions around issues of race and ethnicity, community and nation 
(Coombes 2003; Okoye 2007: 116). Apart from a brief discussion of the so-
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called Mandela Hand proposal, the National Monument for the Women of 
South Africa in Pretoria, and the Gugu Dlamini memorial in Durban, post-
apartheid monument initiatives are excluded from Coombes’ book. Hence 
the present study will take up some of the issues identified by Coombes, but 
add to them concerns specific to the genre of the public monument. 
Although Hewison’s (1987) influential and provocative book, The 
Heritage Industry, drew attention to the economic impact of heritage and the 
rapid development of heritage products for the ‘tourist gaze’ (Urry 1990), 
the relationship between monuments and economics through tourism is still 
a neglected area of research. Yet this perspective is of particular significance 
in present-day South Africa, where one can hardly find a new memory site 
that is not expected to attract scores of tourists and bring about a multitude 
of material benefits and developments for impoverished communities. 
Perhaps ironically, tourism is also perceived as a life-line for controversial 
‘white heritage’, including Afrikaner Nationalist monuments, some of which 
– ideologically repositioned as cultural rather than political icons – are 
indeed thriving as popular tourist spots. Monuments and statues assist in the 
establishment of a unique marketable identity by symbolically inscribing 
cultural landscapes with selected meanings that underscore the chosen theme 
upon which the destination branding is based. Heritage-supported marketing 
processes often interlink closely with state-directed identity projects and 
socio-political goals. Because destination branding must be both new 
(offering ever new reasons to visit) and continuous with the past (building 
upon the established reputation of the destination), old and new monuments 
supporting the branding and marketing must once again signal both rupture 
and continuity. 
Monument and memorial 
In South Africa the term ‘monument’ is often understood to refer to a 
historical building officially declared a National Monument by conservation 
authorities in the past on the basis of its age and its architectural merit or 
cultural significance. Even extraordinary features of nature or prehistoric 
rock art sites have been declared national monuments. In a different usage of 
the term, ‘monument’ refers to all commemorative markers officially erected 
on public land or by public subscription. These are automatically protected 
by conservation legislation irrespective of their age. In this book, the term 
monument does not refer to historical buildings and features of nature 
declared national monuments. 
 With regard to monuments as public commemorative markers, the 
distinction between the terms ‘monument’ and ‘memorial’ has elicited some 
debate both locally and internationally. Consultation of common dictionaries 
reveals much overlap and no clear boundaries of distinction. The terms tend 
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to be used interchangeably in South Africa, especially in common language 
practice and in the media. Internationally, the most frequently cited and most 
influential definition of the terms was developed by the art historian and 
philosopher, Arthur Danto, in the context of his discussion of the Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial in Washington DC. Briefly, Danto declares triumphalism 
and celebration to be key features of monuments, whereas memorials are 
about healing and reconciliation. ‘Monuments make heroes and triumphs, 
victories and conquests, perpetually present and part of life. The memorial is 
a special precinct extruded from life, a segregated enclave where we honour 
the dead. With monuments we honour ourselves. (Danto 1987: 112)  
This distinction has become very influential in South Africa and multiple 
variations thereof can be found in local scholarly work. For instance, while 
acknowledging the virtual interchangeability of the two terms, Dubow 
(2004) considers memorials to be structures and institutions whose essence 
is reflective and contemplative, while monuments are historical markers as 
well as structures that are predominantly celebratory and potentially self-
aggrandising. ‘Monuments outwardly proclaim something. Memorials invite 
introspection and interpretation’ (ibid.: 375). On the basis of this distinction, 
many scholars criticize the present development of the commemorative 
sector in South Africa, arguing that the country needs memorials not 
monuments (e.g. Dubow 2004; Maré 2002; 2002a; Nettleton 2003). 
  Although I do not want to contest this position, I qualify it by suggesting 
that the distinction between monuments and memorials is much more 
complicated, ambiguous and often impossible to draw. Rowlands’ research 
on nationalist war memorials shows that such markers often turn the memory 
of traumatic individual deaths into acts of national celebration and heroic 
assertions of collective values. Most memorials, argues Rowlands (1999: 
130), are actually monuments in Danto’s sense. Adding the dimension of 
time to this equation, a historical analysis of the shifting meaning of 
commemorative markers over longer periods is likely to reveal that many so-
called memorials turn into monuments over time in response to processes of 
appropriation and society’s changing socio-political and psychological 
needs.  
I will engage with this question in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
Throughout this book the terms monument and memorial will be used in 
accordance with the official names of the respective sites and otherwise 
largely interchangeably. It is important to keep in mind, though, that some 
individuals, including scholars, heritage officials, artists, architects, and 
interested members of the general public hold strong and often divergent 
views about the distinction between the two terms, and that this fact 
invariably colours their reading of the respective memory markers and 
perhaps the current post-apartheid commemorative effort as a whole. 
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Structure of this book 
The public debate about monuments in South Africa, as it is driven by 
political officials and reported in the media, is implicitly based on two key 
assumptions. The first is that people actually care about monuments. 
However, in many informal conversations with individuals from different 
backgrounds and discussions with (mostly African and Indian) students over 
the past years, my experience is that many people don’t care in the least 
about commemorative markers. Some whites often insist that they wouldn’t 
mind at all if some statue in town was removed, whereas others will have 
never noticed it in the first place. Many black residents, too, evidently don’t 
care – neither about existing monuments installed by the old order, nor about 
newly designed monuments intended to represent ‘their’ heritage. Many 
consider such symbols an unnecessary luxury as long as the basic needs of 
marginalized communities are far from met. 
 The second assumption is that monuments inherited from the previous 
order represent the values of ‘the whites’, pictured as a homogeneous 
community, and therefore constitute symbols of oppression, which need to 
be dealt with in some way. There is a lack of differentiation both of 
monuments and of people, which is particularly inappropriate in a South 
African context marked by historic fragmentation and especially opposition 
between Afrikaans and English speakers. For instance, no recognition is 
accorded to the fact that many monuments installed by Afrikaner nationalists 
during the apartheid era would have been reviled by many English-speaking 
South Africans, as well as some Afrikaners. Hence it is important to point 
out that when I refer to the existing memory landscape in homogenising 
terms in certain contexts of the analysis, this is to be understood as 
representing the perspective of the dominant discourse, and not as a denial or 
disregard of the real complexities and divided allegiances. 
Before delving into the discussion of specific new monuments, this book 
begins by providing the legal frame work for the conservation and 
development of heritage, which forms the reference point for all other 
chapters. Significantly, South Africa has thus far not emulated the example 
of many other African countries which, following their attainment of 
independence from colonial rule, immediately proceeded to remove or 
replace symbolically charged colonial monuments – often in publicly staged 
acts of triumph and celebration of a new beginning. Chapter One, 
concentrating on conservation policies and the development of the new 
national heritage legislation, explains that by and large the presence and 
integrity of colonial and apartheid-era monuments remain respected and 
protected. The importance of this continuity cannot be overestimated, 
because it legitimates the need for new monuments and it crucially impacts 
on the specific development of the post-apartheid heritage sector, which 
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defines itself in relation to the existing landscape of public memory by 
expressing ‘difference’ and counter-discourses. 
While heritage legislation and policies took years to be debated, finalised 
and implemented, some commemorative initiatives began to emerge 
spontaneously and modest markers were installed at significant sites even 
before the formal end of apartheid. The very first public memorials paying 
tribute to fallen cadres of the liberation forces appeared in the townships in 
the early 1990s, when fundamental changes of the socio-political order were 
on the immediate horizon, following the release of Nelson Mandela, the un-
banning of the anti-apartheid movements and the repeal of various apartheid 
laws and regulations. Chapter Two focuses on the Solomon Mahlangu 
Memorial, a modest yet historically extremely important marker set up by 
the African National Congress (ANC) in Mamelodi township outside 
Pretoria in 1991. It serves as a focal point for discussing relations of power 
not only between the centre and the margin but also between different forces 
within the margin, itself on the verge of attaining power. I argue that in a 
context characterized by fierce competition between the ANC and the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), a public memorial mobilising the memory of the 
dead, pointing to the sacrifices made in the past and celebrating martyrs who 
died in the name of an organisation can become a strategic tool to forge 
group identity and legitimate a claim to power in the embryonic new order. 
If the second chapter is therefore concerned largely with political 
perspectives, in accordance with the predominant approaches to the study of 
monuments, Chapter Three focuses on the social, psychological and 
emotional needs that such markers can possibly fulfill, firstly for those 
directly affected by past suffering and loss and in a wider sense for a 
community or society which identifies with memories of trauma. ‘Trauma’ 
has also become a keyword in contemporary South African society, as well 
as internationally, and the significance of this discourse in relation to 
memorialisation will be explored in this chapter. The TRC’s recommend-
ation that memorials be built as symbolic forms of reparation to the victims 
of apartheid provides a strong moral imperative for the current proliferation 
of such markers throughout the country and their significance for the process 
of individual and societal healing and reconciliation must not be 
underestimated.  
Yet, irrespective of their psychological benefits, I argue that such 
memorials – their delivery and their specific visual design – are never quite 
separable from socio-political agendas and strategic appropriation for wider 
societal and political goals. Resistance against apartheid took place on an 
infinite variety of fronts, involving manifold strategies and multiple role 
players who did not necessarily agree with one another’s methods, and who 
did not always work towards a truly common goal. Yet today the school 
history curriculum, the media and the heritage sector entrench the popular 
notion of ‘the Struggle’, a teleological narrative, implying coherence and 
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unity, a more or less concerted effort towards liberation, led by the ANC and 
supported by its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), ‘Spear of the 
Nation’. In this context, the memory of some victims is more opportune than 
others and the post-apartheid process of memorialisation is accompanied by 
significant silences, the forgetting of uncomfortable memories, and a 
hierarchial ordering of victims, which continues to divide survivors and 
communities to the present day.  
Chapter Four investigates the increasing trend towards the institutionalis-
ation of traumatic memory and resistance narratives through ever more 
ambitious heritage developments and the ‘upgrading’ of earlier memorials, 
including the one for Solomon Mahlangu discussed in Chapter Two. A 
detailed analysis of the Hector Pieterson memorial in memory of the June 16 
Soweto Uprising illustrates how aesthetic issues such as conceptualisation, 
design, style, iconography, and symbolism impact on the process of 
meaning-making, generate empathy and guide the viewer’s understanding of 
the historical event and its symbolic significance. While the state’s 
investment in memorial markers and heritage sites occurs ostensibly for the 
benefit of ‘the people’ and the furthering of national goals, such monuments 
also invariably authorise preferred readings of the past and assert party-
political ownership of icons of the Struggle.  
This produces critical edges for debate and contestation, sometimes 
leading to outright rejection and boycott by opposition forces and those 
supporting alternative narratives of the past. But there is another, not overtly 
politically motivated dynamic of rejection, which manifests itself in the high 
level of vandalism, misuse and neglect affecting all types of public 
memorials and heritage sites in South Africa, including those installed by the 
post-apartheid government. This type of rejection – not always deliberate 
and malicious, but sometimes casual and neglectful – is potentially more 
significant for this study, because it raises critical questions about public 
identification, community ownership and even notions of citizenship. 
Indeed, I argue that new monuments, rather than building a shared sense of 
nation, can become, in unexpected ways, notably in their failure to sustain 
monumentality, precisely the sites at which the fractures in post-apartheid 
society perform themselves.  
Reconnecting with the legal framework presented at the outset, Chapter 
Five explores how post-apartheid society has in practice been dealing with 
the vastly unbalanced commemorative legacy of the past. Although the new 
heritage legislation emphasises conservation and essentially promotes 
continuity rather than rupture, the relocation, re-interpretation and (in 
exceptional cases) removal of selected monuments may be recommended 
following a process of consultation. Focusing on key examples, I critically 
discuss the possibilities and limitations of investing existing monuments 
with newly defined significance. Ultimately, I argue, it is precisely the 
continued presence of older monuments and the limited effectiveness of the 
INTRODUCTION 
 
15
process of re-interpretation that makes the construction of new monuments 
necessary in the eyes of those who aim to effect a transformation of the 
existing memory landscape.  
Following this trajectory, Chapter Six concentrates on the National 
Legacy Project as a strategic intervention in the heritage sector intended to 
‘redress’ existing bias by commemorating neglected or marginalised aspects 
of the past. The Legacy Project draws it legitimacy from ‘below’, but is in 
fact entirely conceptualised, funded and directed from ‘above’ through the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST). Although a 
panel of academic experts was ‘consulted’, it represents the most systematic, 
institutionalised and politically motivated reconfiguration of the heritage 
sector in post-apartheid South Africa. Each project considered for or adopted 
as part of the National Legacy Project – most of which contain monuments – 
is meant to illustrate key events in a ‘shared history’ and reflect core values 
of the new nation. In examining the origins of the Legacy Project I will show 
that the selection of projects and the framing of their symbolic significance 
define an officially sanctioned grand-narrative of resistance and ultimate 
triumph that serves as a foundation myth for the post-apartheid order. 
Unfortunately, the Legacy Project also represents many lost opportunities 
and has arguably stifled the emergence of a truly community-driven 
approach to memorialisation, which could have resulted in a very different 
kind of memory landscape.  
Chapter Seven examines the most ambitious component of the National 
Legacy Project, namely Freedom Park, which is still under construction at 
Salvokop, outside Pretoria. Apart from constituting the post-apartheid 
ideological counterpart of the apartheid era VTM on the opposite hill, it 
clearly emulates, yet professes its conceptual difference from, the 19th 
century Eurocentric tradition of the national monument as a pseudo-spiritual 
site of pilgrimage or ‘shrine of the nation’, presumed to embody the essence 
of national identity and symbolic final resting place of the nation’s greatest 
heroes. A careful analysis of the conceptualisation of Freedom Park, its 
individual structural and symbolic elements and the contestation already 
surrounding the site provides insight into the state of the nation and the 
competing imaginings of a new national identity in South Africa today.  
The contrasting relationship between the new, inclusive Monument for 
the Women of South Africa at the Union Buildings in Pretoria (another 
component of the Legacy Project) and the old, exclusive Afrikaner 
Nationalist Women’s Monument in Bloemfontein echoes in many respects 
the dichotomous VTM – Freedom Park relationship, but adds an important 
dimension. In Chapter Eight a detailed examination of the National 
Monument for the Women of South Africa provides the basis for a critical 
consideration of gender issues within the larger post-apartheid commemo-
rative project. I maintain that the Women’s Monument plays a token role in 
a national context of memorialisation heavily skewed towards the enshrining 
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of a patriarchal ‘ancestry’ and masculine value systems, despite the South 
African government’s professed commitment to gender equality. In the final 
analysis, the Pretoria Women’s Monument constitutes an important yet 
ambiguous effort which throws doubtful light on the post-apartheid vision of 
a non-racial and gender-inclusive national identity underpinned by selective 
remembrance of the past.  
While in Chapters Seven and Eight the comparison between the new 
monuments and the related apartheid era monuments was meant to highlight 
similarities and crystallise differences, Chapter Nine argues that the 
conscious juxtaposition of a new commemorative marker with a specific 
(contested) monument of the previous era has become a popular and 
increasingly systematic strategy in the state-directed post-apartheid politics 
of public memory. Starting with a detailed investigation of the genesis of the 
Ncome/Blood River monument, it will be shown how new monuments are 
often erected as ‘critical responses’ to the existing body of monuments, 
which they complement, interrogate or critique. This strategy is intended to 
gesture towards dialogue and open up discursive readings of the past, while 
simultaneously respecting the commemorative integrity of the existing 
monument upon which the meaning of the new marker is partially 
contingent. 
No discussion of new monuments can ignore their function in the 
promotion of tourism, because heritage and tourism development go hand in 
glove in post-apartheid South Africa. The country’s new heritage legislation 
stipulates that the conservation of both natural and cultural heritage must be 
coupled with tangible benefits and economic empowerment for previously 
disadvantaged communities, and tourism is perceived as a central 
mechanism through which this can be accomplished. Chapter Ten explores 
tourism as a key force impacting on the conceptualisation, positioning and 
design of monuments. Monuments provide intangible heritage with tangible 
substance, and satisfy the tourism sector’s need for visual experiences and 
ever new attractions; but – I argue – the reference to economic benefits 
through tourism also conveniently serves to disguise other motivations and 
especially political agendas pursued by key supporters of the monument 
initiative.  
Structuring a book into chapters is an artificial device that assists the 
process of analysis and organisation, but that also impedes an understanding 
of the full complexity of the potential issues at stake, because specific issues 
are foregrounded in each chapter. The reader should remember that an 
important assumption underlying this study is the inextricable nexus between 
the psychological needs of individuals and communities (notably the need 
for identity, dignity, mourning and acknowledgement of suffering); the 
tendency of powerful socio-political agents to appropriate public memory 
discourses in pursuit of larger societal, political, and sometimes economic 
goals; and the (sometimes neglected) role of visual signifiers in communicat-
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ing discourses of inclusion and exclusion, which invite identification and 
provoke contestation.  
Because I am primarily interested in the public role of monuments and 
their impact on larger societal processes, this book will not include private 
commemorative markers initiated by individuals, community organisations 
or commercial enterprises on their premises. While the distinction can be 
blurred, I understand public monuments to be more or less authoritative, 
official objects which are either initiated or endorsed by various agencies of 
the state and addressed to the general public. The vast majority of them 
furthermore institutionalise political memory. Although installed in the 
public arena, notable exclusions from consideration in this book are 
HIV/Aids memorials (of which only a small number exists), the work of ad 
hoc forums and citizens’ groups which may on occasion result in a public 
memorial,3 and private sector initiatives, notably the Sunday Times 
Centenary Heritage Project,4 a unique initiative involving commemorative 
public art works, which raises a host of new questions and may deserve a 
separate study when all of the works have been installed. However, the list in 
the annex to this book, which I hope will become a useful reference for the 
reader, includes all memorials belonging to the Sunday Times project, as 
well as all other post-apartheid monuments, memorials and statues in South 
Africa that I was aware of at the time this manuscript was completed. 
 
                                                     
3  Writing not specifically about monuments, but about heritage projects more 
generally, Shepherd (2008: 122) cites as examples of such groups the District Six 
Foundation and the Hands Off Prestwich Street Committee in Cape Town, which 
are concerned to develop more radically inclusive and broadly accountable 
approaches to public heritage discourse.  
4  The project was initiated by the Sunday Times in 2006 to celebrate the centenary 
of the foundation of the newspaper. The concept is based on commemorating the 
country’s most remarkable newsmakers and stories. The project was officially 
launched with eight commemorative art works in Johannesburg on 24 September 
(Heritage Day) 2006. At the time of writing, over 30 projects have been 
completed in four provinces (Gauteng, Western Cape, Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal), most of which are concentrated in Johannesburg and Cape 
Town. All projects are eventually supposed to be featured on the project website 
(http://heritage.thetimes.co.za/). See also Corrigall (2007). 
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Cultural Heritage Conservation 
and Policy 
Introduction 
In November 1497, the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama and his party 
landed on the South African coast in the area of what is now called Mossel 
Bay. He immediately erected a monumental memorial cross (padrone, 
padrão) following the practice of his predecessor, Bartolomeo Dias, who 
had established such monuments as symbolic markers of Christian outreach 
and Portuguese presence and as pragmatic navigational beacons along the 
West African coastline. This cross was the first monument in the Western 
sense of the word installed on South African soil and quickly became the 
symbolic focal point of contestation and conflict. Although the Portuguese 
had initially established amicable contacts with the indigenous population of 
Khoekhoen1 herders, with whom they traded and fraternized, a disagreement 
broke out short before the Europeans left. As the situation escalated, da 
Gama’s men are reported to have discharged a cannon and the Khoekhoen 
knocked down the monument in a gesture of defiance (Welsh 2000: 6).  
The Khoekoen may not have comprehended the symbolic meaning of the 
memorial cross as conceived by the Portuguese, but they did understand the 
massive stone object to be an important symbolic representation of the 
unwanted Portuguese presence. More than five centuries have passed and 
public monuments representing contested value systems are once again the 
object of contention and debate in what is now post-apartheid South Africa. 
In the urban centres, previously defined as white reserves, now dominated by 
black visitors and inhabitants, many people arguably don’t share a 
sentimental attachment to the city’s colonial architecture: buildings which 
they were in the past prevented from entering, from which they remember 
                                                     
1  Also spelled Khoi-Khoi. The term KhoiSan or Khoe-San refers to the indigenous 
population in Southern Africa, which includes San or ‘Bushmen’ people who 
integrated and merged with Khoekhoen herders. Both spellings are used 
interchangeably in this book, largely in accordance with the respective source 
text or document under discussion.  
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repressive administration being dispensed, or which they generally associate 
with the wealth, taste and values of the white minority. More importantly in 
terms of this book, the black majority can hardly be expected to identify with 
the city’s accumulated contingent of statues honouring white leader figures; 
the multitude of war memorials paying tribute to white combatants in 
various local and international conflicts, and the many public monuments 
commemorating the heroic victories, events and achievements of white 
settlers and colonial officials. At the same time, these monuments are 
perhaps more important than ever to the embattled white minority as general 
symbolic representations of their cultural heritage and identity, even if the 
average person hardly knows who these statues represent or which historical 
events they commemorate.  
This chapter focuses on the contested nature of the public memory 
landscape in a changing South Africa and the development of new policies 
and legislative frameworks to regulate and guide both the identification of 
the ‘new heritage’ and the treatment of the existing heritage. Following a 
brief consideration of South Africa’s history of conservation practices, I 
investigate the public and political debate around heritage representing the 
old order during the transition and immediate post-election period. It will 
become evident that key points of this debate later influenced the 
formulation of the new national heritage legislation. 
I believe that in the fragile context of the South African transition of 
power, the radical removal of symbols of the ‘white heritage’ would have 
been politically and economically unwise, if not impossible. Publicly, 
however, as reflected in media reports and statements by various officials 
and community leaders, the decision to preserve colonial and apartheid era 
monuments was defended primarily on the basis of moral arguments around 
reconciliation and the need for public reminders of a painful past ‘to 
remember where we are coming from’. Such argumentation assigns agency 
to the representatives of the new order, concealing hard-core political and 
economic realities, but it also allowed the emerging government to capture 
the moral high ground, underscoring nationally and internationally the 
generous spirit and non-confrontational, forgiving and peaceful nature of 
Nelson Mandela’s ‘rainbow nation’. 
Biased heritage landscape 
South Africa’s cultural heritage conservation legislation dates back to the 
Bushman Relics Act of 1911, which focused on the protection of archaeo-
logical sites and indigenous rock art. Inspired by the Historic Monuments 
Board in Britain, this early legislation was amended in 1923 to include 
historical sites and the built environment (Natural and Historical Monuments 
Act). Increased development during the economic boom period of the 1960s 
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raised public concern about heritage conservation and the need for extended 
legislative measures. As a result, the National Monuments Council (NMC) 
was established in terms of the National Monuments Act (No.28 of 1969), 
amended in subsequent years to make provision for new categories of 
protection (Pistorius 1996; Deacon and Pistorius 1996). 
By the end of the 20th century, the NMC had declared approximately 
3500 sites or buildings throughout the country as National Monuments, most 
of which included British colonial and Cape Dutch architecture and sites 
associated with the Afrikaner struggle for self-determination (Hall 2006). 
According to Frescura’s (1992) calculation, in 1992 97 percent of all 
declared national monuments related to the values and experiences of the 
white minority. The remaining three percent covered the heritage of all other 
population groups combined, much of which was taken up by San/Bushmen 
rock art sites. This imbalance was due to the NMC’s prevailing heritage 
conservation principles which, being rooted in European and specifically 
British practices, focused primarily on tangible objects of artistic signi-
ficance and architectural merit.  
To this record one must add the vast, as yet uncounted assortment of 
commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary, much of it 
erected by public conscription or donation, virtually all of it representing 
history from the perspective of the white minority. The unmistaken 
implication of this extremely skewed heritage landscape is that non-white 
people never produced any material culture of note or worthy of conser-
vation; that they were generally deficient in a record of achievement; and 
that they have in fact ‘no history’. This certainly affirmed racist beliefs about 
black inferiority and lack of civilization, which were commonly held by 
whites from the time of their first contact with the indigenous people of 
South Africa and which became official discourse during the apartheid era, 
thus justifying discriminatory government legislation. Similar trends and 
implied value judgements about different cultural groups prevailed in the 
structure, classificatory systems and strategies of display within the South 
African museum sector.2  
Discussions about the need for a radical democratisation and multi-
cultural adjustment of the South African heritage landscape began in the late 
1980s and intensified in the early 1990s as a predictable consequence of the 
                                                     
2  As Rankin and Hamilton (1999: 3) pointed out, museums were based on a 
classificatory division between cultural history and ethnology/ethnography. 
While the former dealt with the material culture and progress-oriented history of 
‘civilised’ western societies, the latter focused on the life and customs of the 
indigenous people, presumed to be primitive and static in their culture and 
historic development. The contrast between the two (often housed in the same 
museum on different floors) underscored the level of achievement of the Self in 
relation to the Other, thus helping to define the identity of the Self as superior. 
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gradual rejection of apartheid legislation and the impending political changes 
in South Africa. During the immediate post-election period, reflecting the 
democratic spirit of the new dispensation, the heritage debate became 
increasingly public, resulting in a surge of conferences and workshops, 
articles in newspapers, magazines and academic journals.3  
Heritage here refers to a variety of genres, sites and cultural practices, 
including buildings, museums, archives and libraries; language, literature, 
poetry, and story-telling; art, music and drama; festivals, performances, and 
rituals; ‘living monuments’ in the form of named buildings or institutions; 
names of streets, towns, places and landmarks; and, of course, commemo-
rative monuments, memorials and public statues. Not all of these genres 
received equal public attention: the push for the renaming of streets and 
cities, for instance, has only gained serious momentum since the late 1990s 
and is most topical at the current moment.4 The issue of monuments, 
memorials and statues, on the contrary, which included both the call for new 
commemorative structures and the question about the fate of existing ones, 
was pursued with a sense of urgency right from the beginning of the debate. 
In fact, monuments – being the most deliberately erected, purely symbolic, 
discursive objects – were often central to that debate and, as will become 
evident, the new socio-political order’s treatment of the old order’s symbolic 
landscape and specifically commemorative monuments can be understood as 
a metaphor of political action.  
Monuments and the ‘Soft Revolution’ 
Like the Khoekoen herders encountered by Da Gama, most contemporary 
passers-by (both black and white) do not know the (intended) meaning of all 
                                                     
3  For instance, the issue of national monuments was central to the 56th annual 
conference of the Southern African Museums Association (SAMA), held in 
Durban in 1992. For the first time in the history of the conference, experts from 
other African countries, notably Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi and 
Namibia participated to share the experiences of their own countries 
(Anonymous 1992). In the same year, a history workshop entitled ‘Myths, 
Monuments, Museums. New Premises’ was held at the University of Witwaters-
rand. 
4  The drive for name changes was initially most pronounced in the Northern 
Province (renamed Limpopo Province), where a considerable number of towns 
and cities have been renamed (e.g. Pietersburg has become Polokwane, and 
Messina is now Musina) (see Hooper-Box 2002). The controversial proposed 
name change of the country’s capital from Pretoria to Tshwane has drawn much 
debate, criticism and legal action since 2005. Most recently (May 2007) the 
process of renaming streets and landmarks in Durban and the Ethekwini 
municipality has led to protest action and threats of violence. See also Jenkins 
(2007). 
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of the monuments they encounter in the public arena or the specific history 
and significance of the persons commemorated in bronze statues.5 Yet many 
black people, when prompted, will readily express their dislike or demand 
the removal of ‘white monuments’, which at best they may feel indifferent 
about, but which more often than not they tend to negatively associate with 
white minority domination or think of as symbols of past oppression and 
humiliation. It is interesting to note that the media on the contrary sometimes 
report cases of black individuals who raise their voice in support of a 
monument erected by the previous order.6 While this constitutes important 
evidence that not all black South Africans share the same attitude, the fact 
that the lone voice is reported as newsworthy certainly supports the 
assumption of majority opposition.  
Public opinion tends to construct the presumed target audience of 
apartheid-era monuments as homogeneous, but many of the so-called ‘white 
monuments’ only ever represented one specific group (e.g. Afrikaner 
nationalists), and – as mentioned earlier – a considerable portion of the white 
population presumably never identified with these markers. A parallel trend 
can be noted today, when many conservative whites summarily dismiss the 
commemorative products of the post-apartheid order as ‘black monuments’, 
although many of these are explicitly designed to be inclusive.  
In a frequently cited passage, the Russian art critic, Viktor Misiano, 
claims that ‘[a]ll successful revolutions end with statues coming down’.7 
Without putting this contention to a methodical test of its truth, one might 
more correctly say that all successful revolutions end with some statues 
coming down. A cursory glance at the historical evidence suggests that a 
radical, iconoclastic treatment of inherited public statuary has rarely been 
applied in a systematic and comprehensive manner. However, one can 
observe that in the aftermath of both the French and the American 
Revolutions, for instance, public forms of commemoration expressed a 
desire to radically break with the past, and to create as great a distance as 
possible between the new age and the old order (Gillis 1994: 8).  
In the nascent post-apartheid South African context the debate about the 
abundant existing body of commemorative structures and sculptures 
                                                     
5  This was established, for instance, through community participation conducted 
by SAHRA in Bloemfontein (see further below) (SAHRA Monuments Project 
Report 2003, Bloemfontein section). 
6  The Volksblad (Smith 2003) reported public dissatisfaction from unexpected 
quarters about the removal of the children’s monument at the Sunday School in 
Bloemfontein: a black viewer had apparently commented that the monument was 
very nice and it displayed the history of the Voortrekkers. Originally unveiled in 
1959, the monument was titled ‘The children of South Africa’. It was removed to 
Oranje Girls High School for safe-keeping in 2003.  
7  This statement was made in a film called Disgraced monuments (directed by M. 
Lewis and L. Mulvey) and quoted in Forty and Küchler (1999: 10). 
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accumulated during the colonial and apartheid eras preceded concrete 
suggestions for the construction of new monuments – in part, it could be 
suggested, because it is easier, faster and less costly to ‘make a difference’ in 
the monumental record by removing an existing monument than by building 
a new one. The simplest and for many people perhaps most obvious way of 
dealing with monuments representing the hated values of the old order 
would be their destruction or removal – a position that regularly resurfaces 
in contemporary debate (see e.g. Anonymous 2003). 
The fact that the ‘new’ South Africa was the outcome of a negotiated 
transition of power, rather than a violent revolution, bore significant 
consequences for the national and local politics of memory and the 
(re)shaping of the existing landscape of memory. The historical background 
to the emergence of the post-apartheid era will be detailed more in 
subsequent chapters, but I briefly want to sketch some key developments on 
the political front that refer to the so-called ‘negotiated solution’.  
From the mid-1980s, preliminary talks took place in secret meetings 
between the ruling National Party (NP) and the imprisoned Nelson Mandela 
to discuss the terms of future negotiations. When President P.W. Botha 
suffered a stroke in 1989, Frederik W. de Klerk became president – an event 
that turned out to be instrumental in the political transition to majority rule. 
During a speech on 2 February 1990, De Klerk announced the release of 
Nelson Mandela (implemented on 11 February), ending his 27-year period of 
imprisonment, as well as the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP). Political prisoners were soon released, 
the safe return of exiles guaranteed, and the remaining restrictions under the 
five-year state of emergency lifted. In return, Mandela announced an end to 
the armed struggle in August 1990. A difficult and fragile three-year period 
of negotiations followed, involving many hurdles and set-backs, against a 
backdrop of growing community violence (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 
559-64; Bauer and Taylor 2005: 245-8).  
The official political platform for negotiations was established when the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was first held from 
20-21 December 1991 at Kempton Park, Johannesburg, although not all 
members of the liberation movements supported this process. The PAC in 
particular refused to attend, hence rebuffing the ANC’s attempts at 
reconciliation between the two parties. Nevertheless, CODESA brought 
together representatives of eight mainstream parties and drew up a 
Declaration of Intent to ‘bring about an undivided South Africa with one 
nation sharing a common citizenship’ under a liberal democratic constitution 
(Davenport and Saunders 2000: 560). De Klerk called for an immediate 
referendum among white voters in March 1992 to ascertain their support for 
the CODESA process, thus suggesting that political power was the sole 
prerogative of white South Africans, an assumption which angered many 
black South Africans. The referendum yielded a two-thirds majority of white 
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voters in favour of continuing negotiations towards a transition of power. By 
the end of 1993, when a draft constitution was agreed upon and the date for 
the elections was set for 27 April 1994, it was evident that the initially 
tenuous balance of power had clearly shifted towards the ANC (Davenport 
and Saunders 2000: 559-69; Bauer and Taylor 2005: 245-8). 
  While the negotiation process was ostentatiously about the transfer of 
power from the white minority to the black majority, the violence of the 
period – described in more detail in the third chapter – testifies to the 
divisions within the black majority. Different constituencies – partly defined 
along racial and ethnic lines, more importantly along ideological and 
political party lines – sometimes shared competing visions about the future 
and the role they should be playing in the emergent socio-political order.  
Different parties and stakeholders also held competing views about the 
future of the existing heritage landscape. In the summer of 1991, 
RESTORICA, official journal of the Simon van der Stel Foundation, South 
Africa’s oldest conservation body, asked representatives of the liberation 
movements and different political bodies about their views and policies 
regarding the preservation and conservation of the country’s heritage. 
Acknowledging the Eurocentric bias of existing conservation practices, it 
was evident that the values, priorities and preferences of other cultural 
groups would have to be taken into consideration in an emerging democratic 
dispensation in South Africa (Anonymous 1991 (Restorica): 8-11), but the 
overwhelmingly white conservation fraternity addressed by the journal was 
understandably concerned about the future of monuments and sites protected 
under the current and past heritage legislation. The ANC reacted cautiously, 
not revealing any clear position. Oupa Ramachela, media officer in the 
party’s Department of Arts and Culture, explained that the ANC did not yet 
have a firm cultural policy, but that any such future policy must be informed 
by democratic, non-sectarian, humanist principles and emerge in discussions 
with all relevant groups (ibid.: 9). 
According to its cultural representative, Fitzroy Ngcukana, the PAC 
understood ‘culture as the ideological reflection of the social, political and 
economic situation in a country’ (ibid.: 8). Any cultural work, including 
monuments, should therefore be linked to the people’s material life and 
represent the population as a whole, as opposed to a certain section thereof. 
Nevertheless, the PAC did not intend to demolish existing buildings and 
monuments, because they were needed ‘to show our children how our 
oppressors lived’ (ibid.). Rather, new monuments must be built to ‘show our 
children that we were part of history and not only spectators’ (ibid.). 
Dr K. Rajoo responded on behalf of the Solidarity Party of South Africa, 
a party representing South Africans of Indian descent. His party rejected 
‘any form of iconoclasm’ and ‘firmly believe[d] in the restoration and 
conservation of the cultural heritage of all peoples who constitute the 
permanent population of this land …’ (ibid.). Foreseeing the challenges 
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faced by the Indian minority in the context of future African domination, he 
added that his party would ‘consider it an injustice if, on the national level, 
the ruling political party imposes its cultural and historical conceptions on 
the rest of the population’ (ibid.). This statement appears uncannily prescient 
when considering the emerging tendency towards the hegemonic framing of 
memories and the government-directed institutionalisation of selected 
narratives.  
The only opinion expressing a more radical stance was posited by 
Tommy Abrahams, MP for Wentworth, a ‘coloured’ township south of 
Durban, who responded on behalf of the Minister’s Council in the House of 
Representatives. ‘There is no place in a new South Africa for the existing 
symbols’ and there must be ‘a total break with the racist past’ (ibid.: 9). In a 
new, non-racial democratic society, explained Abrahams, the hurt felt and 
offence taken at the veneration of monuments and place names honouring 
only the role played by whites must be taken into account. He fell short of 
explicitly stating what should be done with these monuments.  
If this early canvassing of policies and opinions about the preservation of 
symbols of cultural heritage reflects the anxieties of conservation authorities 
and stakeholder groups, similar fears existed about the conservation of the 
country’s natural heritage. Because the creation of South Africa’s game 
reserves and national parks during the colonial and apartheid eras had often 
necessitated the removal of people settled on the land or utilising it for 
farming and hunting, the parks were widely associated with discrimination 
and dispossession. As the issue of land redistribution was (and still is to the 
present day) an emotional and hotly debated one, fears emerged that an 
ANC-dominated government would dismantle the national parks and resettle 
people on the land (McEachern 2002: 118). This has not occurred, but new 
conservation policies emphasise the ‘use value’ of national parks, i.e. the 
need for natural heritage conservation (like cultural heritage conservation) to 
be allied to development and/or other tangible benefits for marginalised 
communities. The parks, like the monuments, remain contested.  
During the time of transition and the early years of the new South African 
dispensation, a significant factor shaping public opinion on the monument 
issue was that a number of influential personalities among the emergent 
political elite publicly voiced their opposition to a radical iconoclasm: ‘I 
believe it was wrong and infantile to hurl down and destroy the political 
symbols of the Soviet Union just as it was wrong for Stalin to destroy the 
works of those with whom he disagreed’, said Mewa Ramgobin, Chairman 
of the Arts and Culture department of the ANC’s southern Natal region, as 
early as 1992,8 implying that a new government in South Africa should not 
                                                     
8  Ramgobin even explicitly defended the preservation of South Africa’s most 
highly politicised and ideologically charged monumental structure, the VTM, ‘as 
a symbol of the white Afrikaner’s socio-economic culture’ (Leeman 1992). 
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make the same mistakes. Similarly the then Minister of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology, Lionel Mtshali (1997), explained that the new 
South Africa was not about rejecting the ‘old’ and replacing it with the 
‘new’.9 Constitutional Court Judge Albie Sachs (1997) placed the issue in 
the context of South Africa’s long legacy of dispossessing people: ‘… you 
don’t preserve the heritage of all by destroying the heritage of some. Merely 
to erase the past of the privileged would leave blank spaces and add one 
extra dispossession to the historical dispossessions’.10 
Considering these recurrent conservationist attitudes, it comes as a 
surprise to note that the ANC as the dominant liberation movement had in 
fact developed a policy advocating a much more radical treatment of old 
monuments short before officially coming to power. A year after 
RESTORICA published its survey, immediately following De Klerk’s 
referendum, the ANC began to develop a policy on issues of arts, culture and 
heritage. The process started with a workshop held at Maselspoort outside 
Bloemfontein and ended with the approval of the policy document at a large 
cultural conference in April 1993 (Hall, personal communication 2006 and 
2007).  
Developing conservation policy in a ‘new’ South Africa 
After the seminal 1994 First General Elections and the formation of the 
GNU, Dr Ben Ngubane, a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 
became minister of the newly formed DACST. Towards the end of that year 
Ngubane set up the Arts and Culture Task Group (ACTAG), a widely 
inclusive team of experts and stakeholders, which was mandated to advise 
the minister and make recommendations for strategic changes in the fields of 
arts, culture and heritage. Public meetings were held in all provinces and a 
large number of written submissions were also received from various 
stakeholders and members of the public (Hall 2005; Deacon and Pistorius 
1996).  
In an attempt at being proactive about impending decisions on issues of 
monuments and cultural heritage conservation, which had the potential to 
                                                     
9  ‘This concept of the new South Africa means many different things, and it has 
sometimes been used in ways which suggest that the “old” has to be rejected and 
replaced by the new. This, surely, is precisely what the concept of a new South 
Africa does not mean’ (Mtshali 1997: opening paragraph). 
10  There are interesting parallels between the debate around monuments as an 
aspect of cultural heritage and the debate around national parks, as an aspect of 
natural heritage. ‘Precisely because the parks had been associated with discrimi-
nation and dispossession under colonial and apartheid rule, there were fears that 
an ANC dominated government would dismantle them and redistribute the 
lands’ (McEachern 2002: 118). 
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impact on the core functions or the very raison d’être of the NMC, the 
conservation authority internally engaged in debates and workshops. An 
official report was submitted to the ACTAG, outlining the NMC’s position 
and recommendations. It cautioned against a process of large-scale 
deproclamation or re-evaluation of existing national monuments as ‘counter-
productive’ and recommended that rather than ‘denuding the cultural 
landscape’ controversial monuments should be re-interpreted by stressing an 
inclusive reading of the historical facts. This could be achieved over time 
through an educational process, but also through concrete interventions at 
specific monument sites. Furthermore, ‘the disproportionate bias towards 
Eurocentric values’ should be rectified as soon as possible in a proactive 
way (Anonymous 1995; Hall, personal communication 2006).  
In 1995 ACTAG produced a Green Paper outlining prevailing problems 
and setting out a vision for the future. This eventually led to the publication 
of the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage in 1996, while the section 
on heritage later became the basis of the 1999 National Heritage Resources 
Act (NHRA). Paralleling these developments, in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) 
members of the former KwaZulu Monuments Council (KMC) and the Natal 
Regional Office of the NMC developed their own provincial heritage 
legislation. The first draft was submitted at the end of 1995, i.e. years before 
the national heritage legislation came into being. KwaZulu had been the only 
one of the former ‘homelands’ with a fully-fledged conservation authority, 
well supported by the homeland government. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, 
Leader of the KwaZulu Bantustan, Founder and Chair of the IFP, and related 
to the Zulu royal house, took a great personal interest in the KMC, which 
was strongly focused on preserving the cultural heritage of the Zulu people 
(Deacon and Pistorius 1996; Hall 2005; Hall, personal communication 2006 
and 2007; Walker and van Schalkwyk 1996).  
Although the GNU was strongly dominated by the ANC, it is interesting 
to note that the progressive and rather radical stance of the ruling party’s 
own arts and culture policy did not really come to bear on the existing 
monument landscape in the newly founded post-apartheid South Africa. In 
fact, it markedly contrasts with the cautious and conservation-oriented 
practice implemented through the various authorities of the post-apartheid 
dispensation from national to local levels.11 Contrary to the common lament 
of many conservative whites today, the government has always recognised 
the sensitivity of the issue and has thus far strictly abstained from radical 
changes to the existing monument landscape. Throughout the country only a 
                                                     
11  Hall believes that the conservative and conservation-oriented approach towards 
existing monuments pursued by the DACST during the second half of the 1990s 
may also have been influenced by the fact that the first two ministers in charge of 
the DACST – Ben Ngubane, followed by Lionel Mtshali – were both members 
of the IFP (personal communication 2006 and 2007). 
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minimal number of public monuments have been removed from their 
accustomed places, the most notable, well-publicised and controversial 
example of which is the dismantling of the over life-size bronze statue of 
Hendrik Verwoerd in Bloemfontein, which will be discussed in Chapter 
Five.  
Respecting the symbolic markers of the old order  
In the context of the uncertainties and vulnerability of the new South African 
dispensation during the transition period, the cautious and conservation-
oriented approach towards the symbolic representations of the previous order 
without doubt eased the process of socio-political transformation. The 
‘generous’ treatment of the existing landscape of memory can be interpreted 
as a direct reflection of the spirit of inclusiveness, nation-building and racial 
reconciliation, which characterised many aspects of the new multicultural 
democracy during the immediate post-election period. This spirit of respect 
formed the ideological foundation of the much touted ‘rainbow nation’ 
during the Nelson Mandela era and may, in fact, to some extent have been 
influenced by Mandela himself. On many publicly staged occasions, 
Mandela was seen to extend symbolic gestures of reconciliation to key 
representatives of the old order and former enemies, as well as express his 
respect for the Afrikaners, their struggle for freedom, and their contribution 
to building the country.12  
Respecting the symbolic markers of the old order can be considered not 
only a tactical political move by the new dispensation to emphasise the 
peacefulness of the political transition and gain international respect, but also 
a wise economic decision to prevent ‘rocking the boat’ with international 
investors. These were presumably important factors for consideration at a 
time when South Africa was politically and economically repositioning itself 
within the international community of nations. Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 112-
21) would call this an attempt by the new order to accumulate ‘symbolic 
capital’ by behaving honourably in its dealings with other groups. Symbolic 
capital, according to Bourdieu, is at least in part a disguised, mystified form 
                                                     
12  For instance, in March 2002, Mandela unveiled a statue of the Boer fighter Danie 
Theron at Fort Schanskop, part of the VTM heritage precinct. Speaking in 
Afrikaans, Mandela expressed his high respect for the Afrikaners and their role 
in building the country, claiming furthermore that his own formation as a 
freedom fighter was deeply influenced by his knowledge of the life and work of 
Afrikaner freedom fighters. Acknowledging the sensitivity of such issues as 
name changes, he expressed his confidence that South Africans, who have 
managed to avoid a bloodbath through peaceful negotiation, will also find a way 
to accommodate each other’s aspirations and fears (Rademeyer 2002). 
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of economic capital and may be ‘cashed in’ for various sorts of economic 
credit and assistance, thus literally being converted into material benefits. 
The tolerance of commemorative formations representing an old order or 
contested values is a hallmark of many western democracies. In Germany, 
for instance, although radical, anti-imperialist forces within the student 
movement in the 1960s pushed for a drastic elimination of monuments 
celebrating Germany’s brief period of colonial ventures around the turn of 
the previous century, state policy (especially since the 1980s) favours their 
conscious conservation as material evidence of an undeniable aspect of the 
country’s past and a reminder of its victims. Equipped with new, critical text 
panels, the colonial monuments’ function is being re-directed towards anti-
colonialism.13 In the United States, Confederate Civil War memorials in the 
‘Deep South’ are as controversial to many sections of the population, 
especially African-Americans, as are Afrikaner nationalist monuments to 
black people in South Africa (largely for the same reasons). Yet, despite 
protests and lawsuits, there has been no systematic effort to remove such 
objects. ‘In modern America, there is, after all, a strong government-
supported desire to provide space for groups of many different identities, 
origins, and ethnicities’ (Mills and Simpson 2003: xxv). Even when 
damaged accidentally, these controversial monuments tend to be repaired if 
possible and reinstalled.  
Closer to home, it is useful to consider the exemplary case of South 
Africa’s neighbour, Namibia, formerly (German) South West Africa, which 
had gained independence in 1990. After the formal end of the German 
colonial period (1918), the country was administered by British forces, but 
was later handed over to South Africa for ‘protective administration’, 
becoming essentially a South African colony or province. Many people of 
German descent had remained in the country throughout this time. Eager to 
protect their language and customs and nurture their cultural heritage, they 
took good care of the numerous monuments set up during the colonial 
period, including the equestrian statue commemorating the German 
Schutztruppe in Windhoek, ‘the most aggressive colonial symbol in all of 
Namibia’ (Zeller 2000: 175).14 They even added more to the record, notably 
the monument to Adolf Lüderitz (1953) in the coastal town named after him.  
                                                     
13  Such re-interpretation/rededication as an anti-colonial monument occurred, for 
instance, in the case of the colonial monument in Bremen (depicting a large-scale 
stone elephant). See Zeller (2000: 221-5).  
14  The bronze statue was unveiled in 1912. According to Zeller (2000: 175-7), ‘the 
German committee in charge of creating the monument after the 1904-08 war 
rejected proposals for statues showing wounded or fallen soldiers, since their aim 
was to demonstrate triumph and readiness. The statue is located on the site of the 
first concentration camp created during the German-Ovaherero war of 1904’. 
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When the country gained independence in 1990, following the election 
victory of Sam Nujoma of the South West Africa People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO) in November 1989, the question about the fate of these colonial 
monuments and the future of heritage conservation in the new nation arose. 
In contrast to many other African countries, which largely dismantled the 
insignia of the old order after attaining independence from colonialism, the 
new Namibian government decided against a radical, iconoclast policy. This 
was done in the spirit of reconciliation, but also – very importantly – to 
avoid alienating the economically important white sector of the population. 
Some streets were renamed, especially in Windhoek, and some colonial 
monuments were re-interpreted, but by and large, statues and monuments 
remained untouched. In 1995, new heritage legislation was drafted under the 
guidance of two UNESCO-sponsored experts, utilizing a process of broad 
consultation among heritage practitioners and other interested parties, which 
later became an important reference point for South Africa. Subsequent 
discussions of the monument issue in parliament advocated not the 
wholesale destruction or removal of older monuments, but their re-
contextualisation and particularly the addition of commentary or explanatory 
text panels, which would take cognizance of the ‘other side of the story’ 
(Zeller 2000; Hall 2005: 37). 
As much as the Namibian example was important for the post-apartheid 
government’s politics of commemoration, one must not forget an important 
precedent within South Africa’s own history. When Afrikaner Nationalists 
came to power in 1948 they carefully refrained from destroying older 
monuments erected by Anglophone South Africans. In the interest of unity 
and nation-building, they preferred to add their own monuments to the 
record, in some cases even showing particular caution not to offend the 
British (Tomaselli et al. 1996; Tomaselli and Mpofu 1997). Here again, it 
was political and perhaps economic considerations that contributed to the 
decision, as the National Party could not afford to further divide the white 
population minority and ultimately needed the cooperation of British South 
Africans for the smooth implementation of apartheid policies. In parallel 
fashion, it appears that the new post-apartheid government needed the 
cooperation of the white minority for the successful implementation of a 
peaceful transformation process. Recent proposals for a more radical dealing 
with the symbolic remnants of the old order might thus suggest that the sense 
of dependency on such cooperation has diminished, as the new socio-
political order has established itself, having gained confidence and 
international recognition during the course of the past one-and-a-half 
decades. 
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The need for old monuments as points of reference  
I have suggested above that there may have been a number of (largely 
unacknowledged) factors and pressures that ultimately contributed to the 
decision to preserve colonial and apartheid-era monuments, but high-level 
officials from political and heritage management circles always stressed one 
particular view in their public statements about the issue. Older monuments 
should be retained, albeit depoliticised, recommended André Wessels (1994: 
283), for instance, so that they can become ‘symbols of a chequered past’ 
and ‘the basis for a better common future’. ‘We’ve got to be able to live with 
our heritage, as bad as it was ...’ stated Themba Wakashe (1994: 35), 
national co-ordinator for Arts and Culture South Africa (ACSA). ‘The most 
crucial reason why we should preserve history, is to avoid memory losses. 
Through the preservation of our monuments, we ensure that we do not forget 
the past’ (ibid.). These sentiments are echoed by media reports and 
newspaper headlines such as ‘Stuck with apartheid’s monuments. Offensive 
sites should serve as reminders of our turbulent past’ (Jordan 1997). Even for 
members of the international community and foreign tourists it is important 
to ‘see the dark side of our history’, argues Jayiya (1999) in the context of 
Thabo Mbeki’s inauguration as president in 1999, when the colonial and 
apartheid era statues on the grounds of the Union Buildings in Pretoria had 
been covered up in black cloth for the occasion.15 ‘We will never achieve 
public closure without recognising our past’, said Noziswe Madlala-
Routledge (2001), then Deputy Minister of Defence, summing up the debate. 
In other words, the legacy of the past, its discourses and meta-narratives 
must be confronted, not erased. Monuments representing the old order 
should be retained to keep the memory of the past alive – however painful 
that might be – in order to define the present and the future.  
Not only do such arguments legitimate the preservation of existing 
monuments but, what is more, they encourage the conscious and persistent 
conjuring up of the past. The memory of oppression presumably triggered by 
such symbolic objects constitutes an important aspect of nation-building and 
validates the present socio-political order, especially as such memories are 
inextricably intertwined with those of resistance. The symbolic represent-
ations of the past are thus appropriated for the purposes of the new order. 
The recent international interest in heritage and the preservation of the past 
transcends nostalgia, argues Lowenthal (1988 [1985]). It is motivated by the 
fact that the past provides a ‘legion of benefits’, the most essential and 
pervasive of which is to help us make sense of and give meaning to our 
                                                     
15  Covering up statues of the old regime with dark cloth is a common reaction in 
times of radical socio-political change. Compare, for instance, the covering of 
the Marx-Engels Monument behind the Palace of the Republic in Berlin in 
August 1990 (Koshar 2000: 5). 
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experience of the present. In short, it is integral to our sense of identity 
(ibid.: 36, 39, 41).  
Lowenthal’s writings and those of other prominent scholars in the 
emergent field of heritage studies are primarily informed by the European 
context and specifically the British experience of a growing obsession with 
heritage, or what Hewison (1987) calls the ‘heritage industry’. The past 
referred to in Lowenthal’s book is ’a well-loved past’ (ibid.: 47), the ‘good 
old times’, represented through romanticised images that encourage positive 
identification, provide enrichment, escape and guidance. But from the 
perspective of the South African majority, it would appear, the past is 
instead associated with memories of suffering and humiliation. Paradox-
ically, in the context of much contemporary talk about moral regeneration, 
even a tainted past can be invoked as the ‘good old times’, when brave 
ordinary people died for their ideals of freedom and human rights at the 
brutal hand of the state’s ‘security’ forces, as opposed to members of today’s 
morally corrupt society, who die for their cell phones at the hand of 
unscrupulous criminals.  
I want to demonstrate in the following chapters that the conscious 
conjuring up of the past through various institutionalised forms of public 
commemoration, the deliberate drawing of attention to existing monuments 
by juxtaposing them with new ones and the tactical appropriation and re-
contextualization of older monuments for the purpose of reconciliation and 
nation-building have all become integral and defining aspects of the current 
politics of memory in post-apartheid South Africa. As much as heritage 
tends to be associated with a romanticised, sanitised past, heritage can also 
prevent us from reliving ‘the burdens of history, the atrocities, errors and 
crimes of the past’ (Graham et al. 2000: 40). It could be argued that some of 
the older monuments have been left unaltered not primarily out of respect for 
the heritage of a minority group, but to serve as examples representing those 
‘burdens of history’. They are valued precisely for their ‘oppressive 
associations’. They function as ideologically charged beacons with which 
new monuments, representing new values, can effectively be juxtaposed.  
New heritage legislation 
Inspired by the Namibian experience and assisted by one of the two 
UNESCO-sponsored experts (Richard Crewdson), a new South African 
Heritage Resources Bill was drafted in late 1996 and early 1997, using a 
widely consultative and transparent approach. Hall (2005) provides a 
detailed account of this process, which involved a series of meetings among 
several hundred individuals from the heritage sector and other interested 
parties over a period of several months to discuss the provisions of the draft 
bill, its structure and specific content. A six-person drafting committee was 
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appointed, which conducted research, consulted the legislative frameworks 
of other (especially emerging) countries throughout the English-speaking 
world, and took into account the close to 1000 submissions solicited from 
members of the general public and various stakeholders. After an almost 
two-year period in limbo, the bill was submitted to Parliament in late 1998 
and eventually became law in 1999, being gazetted on 28 April as the 
NHRA. Effectively, the Act was implemented only the following year, when 
the NMC was dissolved and replaced with a new statutory body, the South 
African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), on 1 April 2000.  
The new Act combines the established framework of previous conservat-
ion practice with innovative elements gleaned from the heritage legislation 
of other countries and some original aspects based on the specific traditions 
and needs of the local context. In addition to conserving the built 
environment as provided for in previous conservation practice, the new 
legislative framework seeks to address the needs of populations whose 
culture traditionally prioritises orality, ritual performance, ephemeral objects 
and symbolically charged features of the landscape over solid, built 
structures. The NHRA’s emphasis on ‘living heritage’ reflects and extends 
international trends towards the increasing acceptance of ‘intangible 
heritage’. This category refers to aesthetic, spiritual, symbolic or other social 
values that ordinary people associate with an object or a site as opposed to 
the expert-defined architectural or historic significance of tangible artefacts. 
Section 36 of the NHRA, on burial grounds and graves, is of particular 
importance for this study. It acknowledges the strong attachment of most 
African cultures to ancestral burial places. All graves older than sixty years 
are automatically protected, and consultation and agreement with 
descendants is required if such graves are affected by development. While 
the previous legislation protected the graves of military casualties from 
South Africa’s long history of colonial wars, the new Act explicitly includes 
the graves of the victims of the Liberation Struggle even though they are less 
than sixty years old (Hall 2005: 38-9; Deacon 2004: 310-11; NHRA 1999).16 
A politically important aspect of the new NHRA was its decentralisation, 
relegating control over the identification, conservation and management of 
                                                     
16  This went hand in glove with a re-orientation of museums throughout the 
country. Much discussion took place, especially during the 1990s, about the 
relevance of museums in South Africa under a new dispensation. New priorities, 
such as serving the needs of previously marginalised communities, catering to a 
much broadened and more diverse audience, and reflecting the values of 
different cultural groups, posed major challenges for the country’s public 
museums. These were further aggravated by curtailed state subsidies and the 
legacy of the past, for instance, major gaps in the collection which had resulted 
from decades of following an acquisitions policy that reflected the state ideology 
of that time. See Odendaal (1994); Pauw (1994); Solani and ka Mpumlwana 
(2001). 
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heritage to the provinces. This was a strategic political move to allow for a 
balancing out of specific regional identities. It was intended to prevent the 
failure of nation-building through its perceived threat to diverging identities 
(Graham et al. 2000: 122). It was also, to some extent, a concession by the 
ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) to opposition political 
forces concentrated in particular regions, notably the IFP in KZN and the 
New National Party (NNP) in the Western Cape, the only two provinces 
where the ANC did not attain control after the 1994 General Elections. 
During the following years, all provinces were supposed to establish their 
own provincial heritage resources authority (PHRA), while in KZN the 
regional NMC office formally merged with the KMC to form Amafa 
aKwaZulu-Natali (Amafa). 
Having abolished the previous category of ‘national monument’, the new 
Act established an alternative system of formal classification for the 
protection of the country’s cultural heritage assets. In coming years, all 
existing declared monuments, as well as all newly declared heritage sites, are 
meant to be classified as belonging to one of three categories. Grade 1 sites 
are those of national significance, which will be administered by SAHRA. 
Grade 2 sites are of provincial and Grade 3 sites of local significance, and 
will fall under the responsibility of the provinces and municipalities 
respectively. This means that all ‘monuments’ in the country will, over time, 
be assessed and possibly reclassified. All National Monuments proclaimed 
under the previous legislation will automatically be reclassified as Provincial 
Heritage Sites while National Heritage Sites (with a few exceptions) will 
have to be motivated afresh. For all listed sites, the outcome of this 
assessment process and resultant categorisation will form the basis of their 
future heritage management plan, including recommendations for changes, 
relocation, or further development (NHRA 1999; Hart and Winter 2001; 
Itzkin, personal interview 2003; Hall, personal communication 2006).  
The most important implication of the new grading system is the 
complete re-evaluation of the existing heritage landscape according to 
partially new criteria (some of which are still in the process of being 
developed), and the reconsideration of the relevance and significance of each 
heritage site in terms of new political and social value systems and 
demographic changes. Although continued protection is ensured for all 
previously declared sites, their potential ‘downgrading’ will inevitably affect 
the positioning of their significance in official heritage discourses (from 
school books to tourism brochures) and the allocation of resources for their 
upkeep or future development. Combined with the strategic proclamation of 
new heritage sites, the reclassification will – in the long run – reshape the 
South African heritage landscape and provide it with a new ideological 
imprint.  
The preservation of heritage is invariably a politicised and culturally 
biased process, both in terms of which sites and artefacts are preserved, 
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whose cultural heritage is deemed worthy of preserving for future 
generations, and in how an object is conserved and presented. Influenced by 
the Afrikaner nationalism that prevailed during the apartheid period and its 
focus on commemorating an heroic Afrikaner past, the National Monuments 
Council declared many sites National Monuments that testify to victorious 
battles of Afrikaners over indigenous people, as well as to the Afrikaners’ 
suffering at the hands of the British during the Anglo-Boer War (Hall 2006). 
In the face of the existing evidence, it is rather ironic to note – as Hart and 
Winter (2001) have done – that the NMC had an official policy not to 
declare ‘directly political’ sites to be commemorative monuments or 
memorials. Although the authors acknowledge that there were some obvious 
exceptions to the ‘directly political’ rule (e.g. Dr Verwoerd’s holiday cottage 
at Betty’s Bay in the Western Cape) and that the underlying cultural bias of 
the so-called ‘non-political’ declarations is unarguable, they maintain that 
the proclamation criteria of the new NHRA are much more overtly political 
in comparison (ibid.: 90). Newly declared sites have generally become more 
contemporary in nature, often associated with the liberation struggle and the 
recent transformation. They are not necessarily focused on physical objects, 
but on intangible heritage (notably events and people), posing new 
challenges for heritage conservation.  
As much as one might agree with this assessment, the more contemporary 
and more overtly political nature of sites nowadays deemed worthy of 
protection and commemoration is an inevitable result of the focus on 
resistance and the liberation struggle as the foundation myths of the post-
apartheid nation. The key historical events in the Afrikaner ‘struggle’ – their 
subjection of the ‘natives’, the ‘grand-narrative’ of the Great Trek, and the 
Anglo-Boer war – simply happen to date further back in history and are not 
associated with the strategic moves of specific political parties. However, 
where the new conservation practice clearly differs from the old is that 
commemorative monuments and memorials can now be included for 
declaration as national heritage sites, and – what is more – SAHRA, the 
PHRAs and municipal heritage departments are even involved in construct-
ing such monuments. ‘Heritage conservation is clearly moving from the 
recognition and conservation of artefacts of the past, towards the 
construction of artefacts in order for the future to remember the present and 
contemporary past’, conclude Hart and Winter (2001: 90). 
To the relief of some and the dismay of others, the NHRA ensured the 
conservation of existing monuments but also mandated SAHRA to formulate 
and coordinate policy on the transformation and management of heritage 
resources, which opened the door for future changes in response to specific 
political directives. This happened as early as September 2000, when 
Cabinet formally requested the DACST ‘to develop a policy document about 
the replacing of apartheid monuments’. One might interpret this rather 
radical-sounding brief as an affirmative resurgence of the bold transform-
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ative agenda embedded in the ANC’s earlier policy on arts and culture. But 
Sifiso Ndlovu, formerly CEO of SAHRA, insists that – on the contrary – the 
request for policy guidelines was rather aimed at preventing any hasty 
decisions, uncontrolled interventions or even destruction of controversial 
monuments, following the furore caused by the removal of the Verwoerd 
statue (personal communication 2007). In actual fact, the specific context 
prompting Cabinet’s request appears to have been the perceived need for a 
reshaping of the identity of the Union Buildings, where Cabinet wanted to 
see statues and busts of former heads of state replaced with leader figures 
representing the new democracy (e.g. the removal of the Hertzog statue in 
the Union Building Gardens and its replacement with one of Lilian Ngoyi). 17 
Be that as it may, the Minister, Dr Ben Ngubane, promptly instructed the 
chairperson of SAHRA, W. Kuse, ‘to compile a register of all apartheid and 
colonial monuments that inhabit the South African public space’ as a matter 
of urgency and to draft a policy document which ‘should motivate for the 
removal, reconfiguration, and re-interpretation of the colonial-apartheid 
monuments and should also advise me on the commissioning of new 
monuments to address historical imbalances’.18 In response, Kuse sought 
clarification: ‘… if I understand your letter correctly, it is not the declared 
“national monuments” formally protected under the old legislation that is of 
primary concern to the Cabinet, but rather the many statues and memorials 
from the colonial and apartheid period that dot the landscape of our 
country’.19 He also requested financial assistance from the DACST and an 
adequate timeframe to complete the task. 
Although the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC)20 eventually 
allocated a substantial budget to the mammoth task,21 it was only in 2002-
2003 that SAHRA embarked on a pilot project of compiling an inventory of 
public monuments and memorials, which was limited to a sample of three 
cities: Bloemfontein, Cape Town and Pretoria, the country’s judicial, 
legislative and administrative capitals respectively. The overall project was 
                                                     
17  Shaping a new identity for the Union Buildings, Pretoria, Cabinet Memorandum, 
14 September 1999, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 4, file 6/16/7. 
18  ‘Notes from Cabinet Committee Meeting of 16 August 2000: DACST to develop 
a policy document about replacing apartheid monuments’, Letter Director-
General to Minister, 4 September 2000, DACST, Legacy Project and General, 
Vol. 7, File 6/16/7. Letter Ngubane to Kuse 7/9/2000. 
19  Letter W. Kuse (SAHRA) to Minister Ngubane, Cabinet Directive: The 
Development of a policy document about replacing apartheid monuments’, 28 
September 2000. DAC. New Legacy Projects No Vol. #, File 6/16/7. 
20  In 2002, the DACST split into two departments, namely the Department of Arts 
and Culture (DAC) and the Department of Science and Technology.  
21  An amount of R500 000 was mentioned in a letter (fax) from R.M. Adams 
(DAC) to P. Madiba (SAHRA), undated, ‘Policy on Apartheid Monuments’, 
DAC, New Legacy Projects, No Vol. #, File 6/16/7. 
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headed by Pumla Madiba, CEO of SAHRA and coordinated by Joanna Marx 
from the SAHRA Head Office in Cape Town, but individual surveys were 
awarded via public tender to different project teams in each city. The task 
included the visual documentation and recording of researched base data 
about each commemorative marker, as well as various processes of 
community participation and consultation to gauge public opinions about the 
monuments. The compiled report and policy recommendations were 
submitted to SAHRA Council in November 2003 and subsequently to the 
Minister of Arts and Culture (SAHRA Monuments project report 2003; 
Viney, personal communication 2007; Marx, personal communication 
2006). 
Significantly, the SAHRA Annual Report (2002-03: 20) describes the 
purpose of the survey project as seeking 
… to facilitate development of policy for the creation and erection of monuments 
and memorials in a manner that observes the principles of the Constitution and 
the White paper entitled All our legacies, our future. The policy will also be in 
the spirit of the National Heritage Resources Act that, among other things, aims 
to conserve the heritage of communities, define national cultural identity, affirm 
cultural diversity, shape national character and build our nation.  
There was no mention of a policy aimed at the ‘removal and reconfiguration’ 
of apartheid and colonial monuments, as originally requested. On the 
contrary, each individual report emphasises the importance of conserving the 
surveyed monuments and statues – all of them – as cultural heritage items 
and as historical testimony to a chequered past.22 The installation of new 
monuments, located in appropriate places, was once again recommended as 
a key strategy to achieve a more balanced heritage landscape.  
Andrew Hall, CEO of SAHRA at the time, recalls the conservation 
body’s reluctance to transform and the impact of staff turnover, where many 
individuals with visionary approaches left the organisation and their newly-
appointed replacements were inducted by remaining staff members into 
entrenched value systems and established conservation practices. To some 
extent, he concludes, the vision that had guided the development of the 
NHRA was corrupted by the processes of its implementation (personal 
interview 2006). However, one might also see benefits in SAHRA’s 
conservative, conservationist approach, because changes in the heritage 
landscape that are likely to be permanent should perhaps not be based on 
emotional decisions made under political pressure ‘in the heat of the 
moment’.  
                                                     
22  Only in exceptional cases can one find a cautious suggestion that some action 
should be taken, notably in the case of the Bloemfontein Children’s monument 
(see next chapter), although it is not clear whether its removal occurred in 
response to the SAHRA project.  
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Before engaging (in later chapters) with the application of the new heritage 
legislation and associated local policies, I now want to take a step back and 
explore what happened in practice, ‘on the ground’, in the field of public 
commemoration during the transition and early post-election period. It will 
become evident in the following three chapters that concurrently with the 
process of establishing policy frameworks, various agencies of the state, 
non-governmental organisations, political parties and individuals began to 
initiate or support the identification and commemoration of key events and 
persons through public markers of various kinds. Largely driven by a desire 
to pay tribute, the increasing material presence of these spontaneous new 
monuments represented a dynamic of its own, which may implicitly have 
impacted on the policy development process itself.  
Because these early commemorative markers often materialised in a 
policy vacuum, without substantial funding, artistic expertise and pro-
fessional heritage management guidance, they were invariably primarily 
inspired by existing monuments and memorials that ordinary people were 
familiar with and surrounded by. These early monuments imitate the 
established vocabulary and time-honoured formulae of public commemorat-
ion, but decisively counter the ‘message’ of the inherited landscape of 
memory by endorsing new perspectives on a contested past. 

  
2 
Paying Tribute: The First Public 
Memorials to the Victims of the 
Liberation Movements 
Introduction 
Monuments and memorials are not erected for the sake of the dead, who 
demand our respect, but for the sake of the living, who ‘need’ such markers 
for a myriad of psychological, societal and political reasons. A memorial can 
facilitate the process of mourning and assist the families and friends of the 
deceased in attaining a sense of healing and closure. For communities a 
dignified public memorial constitutes a way of honouring those in their 
midst who made sacrifices for their ideals and a better life for all. Political 
organisations in whose name the victims fought and lost their lives use 
memorials to pay tribute to the dead and emphasise the purpose and ultimate 
societal benefit of the sacrifice. For those in society who are not directly 
bereaved, notably later generations, the memorial serves as a transmitter of 
memories and associated value systems, while for outsiders, including 
tourists, memorials are meant to evoke empathy and instil a sense of respect 
– both for the victims of the past and by extension for all members of the 
present society, as descendents of the heroes of the past. 
For those who initiate it, a memorial to a departed leader or a select group 
of victims establishes and publicly advertises a lasting, visible link with the 
dead they have chosen to honour. In times of political transition, the public 
commemoration, especially through public monuments and memorials, of 
deceased heroes, victims or fallen comrades can be a strategic move to 
legitimise the emergence of a new socio-political order. The recognition of 
the use value of specific ‘dead bodies’ (Verdery 1999) is part of a larger 
process of appropriating the past for the political, social, cultural and even 
economic purposes of the present – a key characteristic of ‘heritage’.  
This chapter focuses on the Umkhonto memorial (also called the ANC 
monument, MK statue or Solomon Mahlangu memorial) in Mamelodi, 
outside the capital city of Pretoria. Dedicated to the fallen cadres of MK, it 
was unveiled in what is now called Solomon Mahlangu Square on 6 April 
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1991. This somewhat make-shift commemorative sculpture is of immense 
historical importance as it constitutes perhaps the very first such memorial 
officially erected in a public space by one of the liberation movements. It is a 
cultural product testifying to a crucial moment in South Africa’s history, 
namely the fragile transition period of the early 1990s, when a fundamental 
transformation of the socio-political order was in sight, but the apartheid 
regime’s hold on power had not yet ended. It was a time of exceptional 
tension and political violence and simultaneously a time of negotiation – 
over a peaceful transfer of power from white minority to black majority rule, 
but also, I argue, over claims to political power in the new order and over the 
symbolic power of representing the past. 
To this day, the question of who really liberated the country is a 
contentious matter. Some resent the fact that the contribution of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF),1 formed in 1983 as a multiracial federation of anti-
apartheid organisations, to the anti-apartheid movement is habitually 
eclipsed by the prominent (state-endorsed) celebration of the ANC’s role. 
Others maintain that the effort of the non-violent yet persistent pressure 
exerted by the churches, the unions, and a variety of non-political 
organisations was far more decisive in the eventual collapse of the apartheid 
order than the forceful interventions of MK. The most vocal contender to the 
role of liberator, however, is the PAC, today a minute opposition party 
scarcely represented in the ANC-dominated parliament, but in the past an 
attractive option for many young black activists because it was far more 
‘radical’ than the ANC. But the PAC soon developed a poor public profile 
due to a lack of able leadership and dismally executed operations, which still 
overshadows its role as a political party today and especially its 
representation in the heritage sector.  
 
 
                                                     
1  The UDF was founded in 1983 as a ‘united front’ of various religious and 
cultural organisations, civic associations, trade unions, and student organisations 
in the immediate context of the apartheid government’s impending introduction 
of the Tricameral Parliament. The UDF became an extremely important anti-
apartheid force within South Africa at a time when the ANC and other liberation 
movements were banned and forced to operate underground and from exile. The 
UDF looked in many ways like an internal wing of the ANC, but as opposed to 
the latter, did not associate with the armed struggle. From the mid-1980s, 
however, some organisations within the UDF followed a more militant path. The 
UDF eventually disbanded in 1991, after the ANC had been unbanned and 
returned to the country (SA History Online, www.sahistory.org.za/pages/ 
governance-projects/organsations/udf/history.htm, retrieved April 2008). 
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Photo 2.1 Umkhonto Memorial (also called Solomon Mahlangu memorial), 
Mamelodi (Tshwane), unveiled 1991. 
Competition ANC – PAC 
The ANC was founded in 1912 as the South African Native National 
Congress to represent the interests of the marginalised African majority. 
From the late 1940s onwards, tensions and ideological differences within the 
organisation came to the fore. They were partly the result of the growing 
acceptance of Marxist ideas in a context of increasing disillusionment with 
liberal humanist thought among the African elite. Some parts of the member-
ship did not approve of the ANC’s proposed move towards multi-racial 
membership in alliance with the SACP, propagating Africanist or black 
nationalist values instead. In April 1959 the latter faction seceded from the 
ANC and formed the PAC under the chairmanship of Robert Mangaliso 
Sobukwe (1924-78), with Potlako Leballo as secretary (Davenport and 
Saunders 2000: 412; Karis and Gerhart 1997: 46; Mgxashe 2006; Pheko 
1994; Terreblanche 2002: 349; Welsh 2000: 454). 
For both of the now competing organisations the mass protest action 
against the pass laws, which led to the fateful shooting incident at 
Sharpeville in 1960, was a crucial campaign and rallying point, as will be 
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explained in the next chapter. After the Sharpeville Uprising, both the PAC 
and the ANC were declared illegal organisations in terms of new 
Government legislation, forcing them to operate underground. The PAC thus 
hardly had a year in which to build its organisation before many of its 
leaders, including Sobukwe, were jailed. Others managed to flee the country. 
Both the ANC and the PAC established headquarters in London and Dar-es-
Salaam, and offices in various other African countries. The ANC together 
with the Communist Party launched its armed wing, MK, in 1961, while the 
PAC sponsored the underground movement Poqo (‘We go it alone’). While 
the former confined violence to acts of sabotage, the latter was unequi-
vocally engaging in aggressive activities and assassinations, often attracting 
more militant activists (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 421; Karis and 
Gerhart 1997: 46).  
The rapid growth of the PAC in townships around Pretoria, especially 
Mamelodi, from the late 1950s to the early 1960s has been attributed to the 
failure of the ANC to accommodate radical elements and exploit specific 
campaign opportunities to promote a more militant approach. The local ANC 
leadership was perceived as old and out of touch, while the PAC leaders 
were young and aggressive, and therefore attractive to the young. Moreover, 
gangsterism and a prominent gang-culture, which too attracted the young, 
prevailed in Mamelodi from early on, imported there through the forced 
removals. When in December 1962 the PAC leadership issued a directive 
that by 1963 every PAC branch should have a minimum of 1000 members, 
Philemon Tefu, promoted from PAC cell leader to Task Force leader in 
1962, enthusiastically embarked on a vigorous recruitment drive in 
Mamelodi. He ensured that the tsotsies, gangsters and criminals were 
brought into the ranks of the PAC, because they were seen as brave and 
accustomed to killing, and hence well suited to play a leading role in the 
party’s plans for insurrection and violent attacks against the white enemy 
(SADET 2004: 305-15). 
Most of these planned campaigns, which were not confined to Mamelodi, 
were ill-conceived, erratically planned and disorganised, driven by 
impatient, poorly trained young radicals motivated by anger and hatred. The 
ranks of the PAC were also infiltrated by informers, and the security forces 
usually intervened well before attacks could be carried out. The PAC 
leadership of Mamelodi, as well as of Atteridgeville, was arrested on the eve 
of 21 March 1963. Tefu was charged with conspiracy to commit acts of 
violence and, following a short trial in June of that year, was sent to Robben 
Island. He was joined by many Poqo members from all over South Africa, 
who were the first apartheid-era political prisoners on the island (SADET 
2004: 315-18).  
In his recently published autobiography PAC activist Mxolisi ‘Bra Ace’ 
Mgxashe (2006) provides insight into the competition between the two 
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parties from a PAC perspective. Kwesi Kwaa Prah aptly observes in his 
foreword to Mgxashe’s (2006: 15) book that  
… [t]he writing of the PAC’s history is very much a poor shadow of the 
historiography we have seen of the ANC. Too little has been written about the 
PAC and much of this has to do with the relatively poor profile it has cut in 
comparison with the ANC.  
Although more literature is gradually emerging in this field, notably from the 
PAC leadership (e.g. Pheko 1994; 2001; 2002), I would argue that the under-
representation of the PAC story, both in the ‘writing of history’ and 
especially in its public representation through the heritage sector, is partly a 
reflection of unequal power relations, but more importantly perhaps driven 
by a desire to protect the inspiring narrative and heroic glory of the liberation 
struggle as a whole from being tainted or compromised by greater exposure 
of the PAC’s militant stance and especially the terrorist activities of Poqo.  
For a short while, from 1960-62, the exiled PAC and ANC were able to 
hold a United Front together, but this soon collapsed due to tensions within 
South Africa. The rivalry and ideological differences between the two 
organisations was further entrenched when the PAC, in opposition to the 
Soviet-supported ANC-Communist Party alliance, issued a pro-Peking 
statement in 1966 and superficially aligned itself with Maiost China. During 
the mid-1970s Steve Biko, leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, 
attempted to reconcile and reunite the PAC and the ANC. In his view 
differences over ideology and tactics should be set aside in the interest of a 
unified resistance movement. Despite Robert Sobukwe’s initial support for 
this stance, the rift between the two liberation movements continued to 
persist and the PAC has remained in opposition to the ANC up to the present 
day (Karis and Gerhart 1997: 39-40, 94,149; Davenport and Saunders 2000: 
421, 448; Omer-Cooper 1994: 246-8). 
In the volatile competitive context of the emergent post-apartheid order 
following the unbanning of the opposition parties and the release of Nelson 
Mandela, the ANC and the PAC each began to install a public memorial in 
Mamelodi, dedicated to their respective fallen comrades. It was a way of 
paying tribute, to show gratitude to those who – through their suffering and 
sacrifice – had helped bring the new order into being. But with the anti-
apartheid conflict virtually over, I argue, the commemorative effort was also 
a way of ‘coming out’ for the now unbanned liberation movements, for the 
establishment of a redefined, visible public profile, as a platform for political 
action and a legitimate place in the emergent new order.  
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Mamelodi township 
The area now covered by the township of Mamelodi once belonged to the 
farm Vlakfontein 329JR. It is located about 12 miles from the city centre of 
Pretoria in easterly direction, and was subdivided into three parts in 1874. 
Mamelodi was founded on 30 October 1945 when the Pretoria City Council 
bought parts two and three from the African and European Investment 
Company Ltd for the purpose of establishing a black residential area. 
Vlakfontein (‘Vlakke’) was officially proclaimed a township in June 1953 
and re-named Mamelodi, ‘place of joy’ in Tswana, in July 1962. When 
Mamelodi became fully occupied in the late 1950s, additional land was 
acquired to the east, specifically to house people who had forcibly been 
removed from Lady Selbourne, which was declared a white group area in 
1958 (Walker et al. 1991).  
This historical background of forced removals was an important factor to 
funnel the heat of political activism and resistance in Mamelodi, especially 
as many former landlords were turned into rent-payers. Philemon Tefu, who 
later became an important PAC leader in Mamelodi, deeply resented the 
move, which disrupted his schooling and his social network. According to 
him, the experience of forced removals played a direct role in the political 
organisation of Mamelodi residents and in the development of both the ANC 
and the PAC (SADET 2004: 304-5). 
The township was administered by the Mamelodi Town Council, 
originally established as the Mamelodi Community Council in 1977 (later 
called Mamelodi City Council). As there were no large taxable businesses in 
the area, the collection of rents was the only source of income for the council 
and decisions about rent increases were highly unpopular, often leading to 
protests and tensions. In the early 1980s the Mamelodi Civic Association 
was established as part of the greater Civic Association movement that 
spread throughout South Africa during this period, challenging the 
legitimacy of black urban councils. The Mamelodi Civic Association to 
some extent became a party in opposition to the Mamelodi City Council, 
pushing for the concept of one-city, one tax-base. Residents were 
encouraged to show solidarity against the council through rent boycotts, and 
Mamelodi, like other townships, became increasingly run-down as a result.  
As in other townships throughout the country, the period of the 1980s 
was marked by unrest and violence in Mamelodi. In 1985-86 riots broke out 
over rent increases. On 21 November 1985 a crowd of people gathered 
outside the Mamelodi Town Council offices with a number of grievances. 
Shots were fired and thirteen people, including a baby, were killed and many 
more injured in what became known as the Mamelodi Massacre (Webster 
1986). On 9 July 1990 another rent rally was held at the local Pitje Stadium 
and 230 people were injured when tear gas and rubber bullets were fired. 
Three Councillors and the mayor, A. Kekana, resigned from the Council in 
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1985. Eventually all councillors but one in both Mamelodi and Atteridgeville 
resigned (Walker et al. 1991; Jacobson, personal conversation 2004).  
Umkhonto memorial  
Marking an important new trend, the Mamelodi Civic Association decided to 
memorialise the victory of their organised rally against authorities 
considered illegitimate to commemorate the fallen cadres of MK. Although 
the Civic Association was not officially party-affiliated, Pasty Malefo, who 
was then in the association’s public relations office, recalls that all of its 
members were ANC supporters at the time (personal communication 2004). 
Local activist Richard Chauke became the chair of the monument 
committee.2 The initial plan was to set up a ‘proper’ monument and money 
was collected from the residents of Mamelodi, but as there were not enough 
funds, a local welder was eventually commissioned to make the present 
statue. Chauke claims he designed the sculpture himself, based on the 
elements of the ANC logo – the wheel, the shield and the spear, held up high 
by the stylized figure of a man made of square tubing (personal communic-
ation 2007).  
Ideologically and visually (in terms of its somewhat make-shift nature), 
the Umkhonto Memorial can perhaps be seen as a belated culmination point 
of the ‘People’s Parks’ phenomenon, which manifested itself in the mid-
1980s in Mamelodi and several other townships in the region. The short-
lived People’s Parks were linked to the ANC’s ‘operation clean-up’ 
campaign and encouraged township residents to actively take charge of the 
cleaning up and beautification – through creative, artistic statements – of 
their environment. It was meant to ‘conscientise’ people with the aims of the 
liberation movement and reclaim public spaces (Sack 1989).  
The significance of this phenomenon must be understood against the 
background of forced removals and especially the spatial layout of the new 
townships, which were deliberately designed as dormitory locations without 
major public spaces, partly because the latter might have encouraged public 
gatherings, a sense of community, organisation and political activism. Hence 
Mamelodi has a tradition of reclaiming public space and creatively marking 
resistance through sculptural productions on public display, which can be 
read in a wider sense as a way of claiming space in history. Although 
Richard Chauke was still imprisoned on Robben Island at the time of the 
                                                     
2  The history of this memorial and the circumstances of its inception appear to be 
completely undocumented. Apart from Pasty Malefo, I am grateful to Hlomane 
Khumalo, Chairperson of the current South African Civic Organisation 
Mamelodi, and Jabu Mailula from the Mamelodi Tourism Committee, who were 
very helpful in reconstructing some of this history in a personal interview in 
January 2003. 
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People’s Parks, other committee members had been part of that experience, 
be it as participants or observers, and may have been influenced by it 
(personal interview Mailula and Khumalo 2003). 
The memorial was set up adjacent to the site where the ‘Mamelodi 
Massacre’ had occurred in 1985, thus establishing the symbolic significance 
of the place, which has recently been powerfully reinforced through the 
upgrading and additional ‘framing’ of the site, as will be described in the 
fourth chapter. The surrounding square was renamed in honour of local 
activist Solomon Mahlangu, whose body was exhumed from its original 
burial place in Atteridgeville and reburied in the local Mamelodi cemetery 
on 6 April 1993, exactly two years after the unveiling of the Umkhonto 
memorial. Today his grave site there is easily identifiable: a prominent 
memorial stone topped by a cylindrical marker displaying the ANC logo. 
Solomon Kalushi Mahlangu (1956-1979) was born in Mamelodi and 
became involved in the liberation struggle in the context of the June 1976 
Soweto Uprising, which will be discussed later. He joined the ANC and left 
the country in October 1976 to be trained as a member of MK. In June 1977 
he returned to South Africa and was arrested by government authorities 
following a shooting incident in Johannesburg, in which two whites were 
killed. Although the court accepted that Mahlangu had not fired a shot, he 
was sentenced to death on 2 March 1978. On the eve of his hanging in 
Pretoria Central Prison on 6 April 1979, the United Nations Security Council 
held an emergency meeting to protest the execution and U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter made a personal appeal for commutation of the sentence. 
Mahlangu immediately became a martyr to the liberation struggle and an 
icon of the prevailing injustice. His execution prompted a new wave of 
international condemnation of the apartheid regime (Uwechue 1991: 431-2; 
Karis and Gerhart 1997: 282-6).  
The Umkhonto memorial was unveiled by Chris Hani, who had just taken 
over as the new Chief of Staff of MK, and Mahlangu’s mother, Martha 
(Anonymous 1991b), although the plaque mentions only the former. The 
presence of the mother linked the local hero to the unnamed group of fallen 
cadres that the memorial is dedicated to. It emphasises the human aspect of 
the occasion, allowing others to emotionally identify and empathise with the 
victim(s) through the mother’s personal grief. The presence of Hani, a 
ranking member of both the ANC military wing and the SACP, stressed the 
organisational aspect: Mahlangu’s symbolic significance as a courageous 
member and martyr of the liberation struggle, and the fact that the memorial 
is a tribute not only to him as an individual hero but also to all of those who 
died with him for the cause of liberation. It is a tribute to the ANC as an 
organisation and liberation movement in alliance with the SACP.  
It is worth emphasising that both Solomon Mahlangu and the victims of 
the Mamelodi Massacre, which provided the immediate context for the 
installation of the Umhhonto memorial, were fundamentally non-aggressive, 
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while the symbolism of the memorial clearly relates to the armed struggle 
and primarily honours MK. This may strike some as contradictory. It 
certainly underlines the opportunistic appropriation and symbolic coding of 
popularly rooted and emotionally charged past events and persons for the 
political needs of the present.  
Contestation 
Only days before the unveiling of the memorial, Hani had publicly remarked 
that a continuation of the ANC ceasefire would depend on ‘the behaviour of 
the regime’. According to a newspaper report in The Star, this reinforced 
‘Hani’s image among whites as that of the man to be most feared in the 
ANC, the dark side of the new South Africa’ (Johnson 1991). Hani had 
replaced Joe Slovo as ‘white South Africa’s bête noire’ (ibid.), and indeed 
Hani was assassinated by white extremists two years later. Only days after 
its unveiling, the contested nature of the new memorial in Mamelodi, this 
bold affirmation of black liberation values and tribute to MK, became 
evident. A newspaper report in the Sowetan on 9 April quotes Pasty Malefo 
as saying that the statue had been removed for ‘safe-keeping’. 
He could not, however, confirm reports that the statue was removed following 
threats by right-wing elements to deface it. Reports circulating in Pretoria 
yesterday suggested a minibus-load of armed men had gone to the statue. … The 
men were driven away by residents (Anonymous 1991 (Sowetan)). 
It is not clear precisely when this happened, but Hlomane Khumalo (ANC), 
Chairperson of the South African Civic Organisation Mamelodi, explained 
that short after the unveiling of the memorial a group of opponents 
clandestinely approached the statue during the night and fixed explosives to 
its middle section (personal interview 2003). Their presumed intention to 
blow up or melt down the entire sculpture failed, but the circular hole in its 
centre remains a lasting testimony to the incident. Although the remarkable 
regularity of the damage almost suggests that the statue may have originally 
been cast with the hole in it, early photographs show the statue intact (e.g. 
those published in the New Nation on 12 April and Beeld on 10 May 1991). 
The hole has unintentionally become a powerful signifier in its own right, 
supporting and dramatising the memorial’s implicit narrative. By 
impressively embellishing the force and extent of opposition, the statue in 
retrospect becomes a striking assertion of the liberation movement and of 
‘the people’s’ fortitude against the violent opposition of a minute but 
ruthless reactionary minority. 
But the Umkhonto memorial was not contested only by real or imagined 
white right-wingers. Beeld published a photograph of the memorial (on 10 
May 1991) covered in spray-painted PAC slogans (the incident reportedly 
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occurred on Workers’ Day). An anonymous pamphlet had been distributed 
in Mamelodi, accusing Richard Chauke of embezzlement in the context of 
the memorial’s installation. Chauke insisted that he did not believe the PAC 
to be responsible for the vandalism, but rather somebody who intended to 
cause friction between the ANC and the PAC (Anonymous 1991a). This 
must be understood in the context of the two organisations’ history of 
competition and sometimes violent outbursts of rivalry, but also in the 
context of persisting hopes of healing past differences at the dawn of a new 
era.  
 
 
Photo 2.2 PAC memorials, Mamelodi Cemetery (Tshwane Municipality), 
unveiled 1992. 
PAC memorial initiative 
The idea for the Umkhonto Memorial may have originated in response to a 
PAC initiative for a large-scale pyramidal stone memorial set up in a 
prominent position in the grounds of the Mamelodi Cemetery. Although it 
was unveiled only on 1 August 1992, more than a year after the unveiling of 
the Umkhonto memorial, its initiator and builder, Philemon Tefu, had begun 
to raise funds for this memorial some time after his release from 
imprisonment on Robben Island in 1986 (Khumalo personal interview 
2003). Along with the hard physical labour he had been subjected to on the 
island, Tefu had acquired some construction skills through his work in the 
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Building Group. Upon his release, he built the Mamelodi memorial with 
stones similar to those found on Robben Island (Pheko 2002: 26-31). 
Sarah Mandrup (2004) interviewed Tefu (whom she strangely never 
mentions by name, but only refers to as ‘the architect’) about the symbolism 
of the memorial. He explained to her that the pyramid shape was meant as a 
symbolic link with ‘the rest of the African continent’ and that he was 
inspired by the PAC manifesto with its Pan-African references to one 
African nation stretching from the Cape to Cairo. Some of the roughly hewn 
stones are apparently consciously positioned to allude to the geographical 
outline of the African continent. The similarity of the masonry work with 
that found on Robben Island was meant to establish a symbolic relationship 
between the forced labour of the political prisoners at Robben Island and the 
slaves who built the pyramids of Ancient Egypt (2004: 16).  
Unveiled by PAC president Mlamli Clarence Makwetu, the memorial is 
inscribed ‘in memory of the Poqo cadres executed by the racist minority 
regime and to Apla fallen combatants’, all of whom are listed by name with 
the place and date of their death. It is significant to consider, in this context, 
that the apartheid regime used to withhold the bodies of executed prisoners, 
and families were often not informed where these were buried (Ali 
Hlongwane cited in Mandrup 2004: 20). Many hanged PAC/Poqo members 
are apparently buried in mass graves (and without funerals) at this cemetery 
in Mamelodi. Tefu’s memorial is hence a collective tombstone intended to 
restore the dignity of the dead. But a memorial of this kind also impressively 
demonstrated to the families and the general public alike how the PAC as an 
organisation cared for its comrades and honoured those who sacrificed their 
lives in the name of the organisation. With plans for such a prominent tribute 
to PAC members under way, the ANC might have felt the need to similarly 
honour their fallen combatants. Although Malefo strongly denied that ‘the 
one was put up because of the other’ (personal communication 2004), I 
believe that the history of competition between the ANC and the PAC and 
the unique historical circumstances of the early 1990s support such 
speculation. 
Pointing to the dead 
Almost two decades have passed since the ANC and PAC memorials were 
installed in Mamelodi and the socio-political landscape has changed 
fundamentally. Many new heritage projects have since emerged and the 
process of commemorating the past through public monuments and 
memorials is firmly established and institutionalised, but the historical 
rivalry between the ANC and the PAC still impacts on this process. 
When the ambitious new Sharpeville memorial, initiated and funded by 
the ANC-dominated council of Vereeniging, was unveiled on 21 March 
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2002 by Deputy President Jacob Zuma (ANC) at a highly publicised 
function that included Nelson Mandela (ANC) and Gauteng Premier 
Mbhazima Shilowa (SACP) as dignitaries, the PAC was outraged. Since the 
Sharpeville massacre had resulted entirely from a PAC-organised resistance 
campaign, for many members of the PAC leadership the new memorial 
constituted just another incident in a series of attempts by the ANC to 
appropriate key icons of the liberation struggle. This included the naming of 
the new public holiday, 21 March, ‘Human Rights Day’ as opposed to 
‘Sharpeville Day’, as it was known and commemorated by the PAC and 
many others in the past decades.  
PAC leader, Motsoko Pheko, in his publication with the telling title The 
True History of Sharpeville Must be Told (2001), sarcastically expresses his 
gratitude to the ANC government for building the new memorial ‘with the 
taxpayers monies of this country’ (sic), and asserts that the PAC would 
certainly have built ‘an impressive national monument in remembrance of 
Sharpeville’ (ibid.) if, he implies, the party enjoyed an equal chance to help 
itself to such generous public funds. Pheko emphasises that it is now ‘of 
critical importance’ to let the world and the younger generation know the 
‘true’ historical facts about the Sharpeville Uprising, ‘because there are 
political opportunists and mischievous mutilators of history who have a 
vested interest in the falsification of events …’ (2001: 6).3 In protest against 
the new memorial, significantly not officially called the Sharpeville 
memorial but ‘Human Rights Precinct’, the PAC boycotted the public 
function and PAC officials unveiled a separate memorial at the local 
cemetery, where all of the victims of the Sharpeville massacre lie buried 
(Ngidi, Mntungwa and Sapa 2002).  
Verdery (1999), in her insightful book The Political Lives of Dead 
Bodies, highlights the role of politicised funerals and reburials, the claiming 
of specific symbolically charged ‘dead bodies’, as a way of legitimising a 
new socio-political order. The very concreteness, materiality or corporality 
of bones and corpses, coffins and cremation urns, she says, plays a crucial 
role in their effectiveness as political symbols, because they can be moved 
around, displayed or strategically located in specific places (ibid.: 26). 
                                                     
3  The dispute is really about the PAC’s perception that the ANC led government is 
distorting the history of the liberation struggle by not according the Sharpeville 
Uprising the significant status it deserves. As Pheko (2001: 24) puts it in the 
concluding sentences of his book, ‘when one day the true history of this country 
is written, the Sharpeville Uprising shall assume the prominence of an historical 
watershed’. The fact that the younger generation at present has considerable 
knowledge about June 16 but is only vaguely familiar with the historical events 
of the Sharpeville Uprising (a fact that I can certainly confirm from observations 
among my own students) suggests that these young people are acquiring an 
historical consciousness in which ANC-initiated campaigns loom large, whereas 
the PAC’s contribution is all but negligible. 
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Parallelling the Mamelodi case and almost suggesting the emergence of a 
geopolitical pattern of commemoration, the site of each memorial – a 
centrally located public place versus a cemetery at the periphery – 
significantly impacts on its visibility and status.  
 
 
Photo 2.3 Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct (Sharpeville Massacre memorial). 
Sharpeville, unveiled 2002. 
 
Photo 2.4 PAC Memorial at the grave sites of the Sharpeville victims. 
Sharpeville cemetery, unveiled 2002. 
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The ANC-initiated memorials at both Mamelodi and Sharpeville clearly 
score on this point. As in Mamelodi, the memorial structure at Sharpeville 
marks the historical site of the massacre and constitutes a focal point within 
the local urban fabric. The authoritative meaning derived from the 
significance of the site is furthermore compounded, in both instances, by the 
ambitious – in the case of Sharpeville – outright monumentality of the 
commemorative effort. The PAC’s memorial, conversely, draws legitimacy 
from the presence of the actual bodies in the cemetery. As Verdery (1999: 
27) points out, the presence or absence of real bodies may play a crucial role 
in lending authority and authenticity to any memorialisation of the dead. In 
fact the concreteness, the materiality, or the ‘thereness’ of actual bodies can 
be critical to their symbolic efficacy. Although the ANC-initiated memorial 
is only a symbolic site of commemoration, I suggest in Chapter Three that its 
design attempts to capture the atmosphere of a cemetery, hence conveying 
an illusion of the presence of the actual dead. 
While at Sharpeville both the ANC and the PAC implicitly lay claim to 
the same group of victims, at Mamelodi two separate groups of fallen 
comrades were at stake. By pointing to their respective dead, by parading the 
sacrifices each organisation had made, both the PAC and the ANC competed 
for credit in the attainment of freedom and legitimate their stake in a future 
claim to power. More than ten years after the advent of democracy, the old 
spirit of competition still persists and credibility is still seen to rest on the 
sacrifices of the past: “Our guerrillas died more than any other political party 
during the struggle. There were PAC members in prison long before Nelson 
Mandela and other ANC members”, said Motsoko Pheko, president of the 
PAC in refuting speculations that the PAC may join the ANC (August 2004). 
Similarly, much of Mgxashe’s (2006) autobiography referred to above reads 
like a personal tribute to his PAC comrades and their victimisation by the 
security forces. In his recounting of various PAC campaigns and activities, 
he places particular emphasis on individually naming those who were 
executed by the apartheid state justice system. The ideological rift between 
the ANC and the PAC also still runs deep through the Sharpeville 
community today and creates animosity whenever the issue is raised, 
concedes Eric Maringa, education officer at the Sharpeville Exhibition 
Centre (personal communication 2006).  
Rival stakeholders in the representation of the past  
One of the most visible sites, both nationally and internationally, where 
rivalry and contestation between the two liberation movements manifests 
itself, is Robben Island. This notorious island off the Cape Town coast, 
where many political prisoners, most famously Nelson Mandela, were 
incarcerated for their fight against oppression, is not only acknowledged as 
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one of the country’s most emotionally charged sites and a paramount 
national symbol of resistance, but its symbolic significance has been 
regarded as universal since UNESCO accorded it the status of World 
Heritage Site in December 1999. Yet the representation of the history and 
significance of the island has remained contested to the present day. The 
contestation began in the late 1980s when it became clear that the maximum 
security prison operated on Robben Island since 1961 would be closed (this 
took place in 1991). Various organisations and ‘stakeholder’4 constituencies 
began to lay claim to the island and widely differing proposals for future 
development surfaced, which became a matter of political and later public 
debate. The island is associated not only with a rich tangible and intangible 
cultural heritage on account of its long history of multifarious human 
interaction over many centuries, but its relatively untouched and unique 
ecology make it significant as a natural heritage site (Coombes 2003; 
Davison 1998; Deacon 1998 and 2004; Kruger 2000; Pheko 2002; Solani 
and ka Mpumlwana 2001). 
In 1993, Peace Visions commissioned a feasibility study to canvass 
opinions among various stakeholders and determine options for the future of 
Robben Island. Although the ANC’s and the PAC’s respective visions 
shared commonalities, notably the importance of preserving the history of 
the island and protecting it from proposed development, the two parties 
differed on how this history should be interpreted and what was most 
important about Robben Island and its infamous prison. The PAC was keen 
to foreground the educational aspect of the prison and wanted it to be known 
as ‘Makhanda University’ in memory of the Xhosa leader who was held 
captive on the island for his leadership role in the 1819 rebellion against the 
British. Coombes (2003: 58) suggests that the insistence on this name ‘is 
also perhaps an indication of the bitterness that erupted over what many in 
the PAC regarded as the ANC leadership’s wilful amnesia over non-ANC 
initiated activism in the liberation struggle’.  
The Robben Island Museum, the institution now charged with the 
recording and representation of the island’s past, has taken a principled stand 
that the entire history of the island must be recorded, but the prison period is 
clearly prioritised, especially in terms of public representation. Since January 
                                                     
4  The term ‘stakeholder’ has been problematised because such actors may have 
divided allegiances or conflicts of interest in their personal capacity, which 
implicates their role as mouth pieces of the constituency they supposedly 
represent. Kim Fortun (2001) prefers the term ‘enunciatory groups’. 
‘Enunciatory groups most often represent positions towards different entities, 
often enter into connections without sharing the goals of their coalition partners, 
while their own goals are often contradictory and temporary. This concept takes 
actual reality into account much more than the static one of stakeholders’ 
(quoted in Kraus 2008: 428).  
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1997, Robben Island has been open for public visits and important highlights 
of the standard guided tour include the prison buildings and most notably 
Mandela’s cell, as well as the notorious limestone quarry, where prisoners 
suffered through forced labour. In comparison, only scant attention is paid to 
Sobukwe, who was convicted to a three-year incarceration term on Robben 
Island in 1960 for his role in the pass law defiance campaign that led to the 
Sharpeville Uprising.5 In 1963, just the PAC leader was completing his 
sentence, the apartheid regime legislated a special Act of Parliament, the 
‘Sobukwe clause’, to keep him detained on the island for another six years, 
during which time he was housed in a specially designated isolation unit 
(Pheko 1994).  
Pheko’s (2002) book, The True History of Robben Island Must be Told. 
Robben Island Prisoners Speak, pays tribute to the experience of PAC 
prisoners who, the author claims, were generally treated more harshly and 
suffered greater abuse from prison authorities than members of the ANC, 
because the PAC was considered synonymous with its radical armed wing. 
According to Pheko (2002) the island became known as ‘POQO Prison’ and 
as ‘Sobukwe University’ from 1963, but these terms (along with Makhanda 
University) are marginalised or largely omitted in the official narrative of 
liberation dominated by the experiences and role of those affiliated with the 
ANC.  
The situation is echoed elsewhere in the country, where competing 
interpretations of the past, promoting different role players among the former 
opposition forces, crystallise in monuments and heritage projects. In the 
province of KZN, for instance, which has been politically contested between 
the ANC and the ethnic Zulu-dominated IFP,6 heritage is inevitably a 
battlefield and new monument initiatives tend to be embroiled in political 
debate and sometimes stalled in resultant bureaucratic processes. In the Port 
Elizabeth township of New Brighton, the Emlotheni Memorial Park, a 
heroes’ acre built in honour of six ANC-affiliated anti-apartheid cadres 
executed by the apartheid regime’s justice system, is challenged by members 
of the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO), whose role in the local 
struggle for liberation the new memorial implicitly erases (Hansen 2003).  
                                                     
5  This may have changed more recently and may also depend on individual tour 
guides. 
6  The roots of the IFP may be found in a Zulu cultural organisation called Inkatha, 
founded by the Zulu King Solomon in the 1920s, based upon which Gatsha 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, formerly a member of the ANC Youth League, esta-
blished the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement in 1975. In 1990 this 
organisation was formally turned into a political party, the IFP, with Buthelezi as 
president (IFP official website). The IFP has always been dominated by Zulu 
speakers and its political agenda has historically tended to emphasise Zulu 
nationalist values. 
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Such contestation is not usually part of the official narrative – as relayed in 
public commemorative addresses, publicity material and presumably many 
guided tours – which, on the contrary, tends to emphasise the significance of 
new monuments as symbols of black resistance to white oppression and as 
symbols of reconciliation and nation-building. But – as this chapter 
demonstrates – a careful investigation of their genesis, design and reception 
can reveal much more complex and multilayered readings in which tensions 
and fissures manifest themselves and the silenced voices of opposition 
suggest the emergence of new hegemonies in remembering and representing 
the past.  
Conclusion 
I have tried to show how, from the very dawn of the emergent new socio-
political era, both the ANC and the PAC have pointed to the dead in 
enhancing their public profile and legitimising their claims to sacrifices 
made in their contribution to the freedom struggle. Through the 
institutionalised remembrance of selected dead martyrs, victims and fallen 
comrades in the form of memorials, monuments and statues, both 
organisations not only complement the existing ‘white’ memory landscape 
with ‘black’ commemorative markers, but also engage in a competitive 
process of using heritage for their own political ends. 
This chapter has focused on two memorials erected by political parties in 
tribute to their members during the final days of the apartheid era. A few 
years later the ANC became the ruling party in a new, post-apartheid order. 
A vigorous drive towards establishing commemorative markers and 
reshaping the country’s heritage landscape immediately ensued, in large part 
initiated, sponsored and directed by the government for ‘the people’. Despite 
the officially proclaimed emphasis on processes of community participation 
and the inclusiveness of meaning, subsequent chapters will show that the 
ANC-dominated government consciously or inadvertently shaped the 
interpretation of historical events to coincide with the party’s own preferred 
reading of specific narratives and the significance of their protagonists.  
Crudely put, the ANC carries on building monuments in honour of their 
own leaders and their contributions, which they declare to be the heritage of 
the post-apartheid nation, while the PAC – now a minute opposition party 
within the democratically elected government – lacks the political clout to 
effectively impact on the physical shaping of the emergent landscape of 
public memory. The same is true for other minority groups and opposition 
political parties in different local contexts, who can resist the prevailing 
hegemonic force only through speeches, publications and performative 
action, often supported by the media.  
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The competitive process of taking control of the representation of the past 
and claiming key symbols, sites and icons associated with the liberation 
struggle – in short, the struggle over the Struggle – began at the very dawn 
of the post-apartheid era and has impacted on the shaping of the heritage 
landscape ever since. In the current South African context it is extremely 
important to understand the political and emotional significance that 
communities and political parties attach to specific events and persons 
associated with resistance against apartheid. Political parties and individual 
leaders derive legitimacy from their role in the liberation of the country and 
from their personal or organisational connection with revered iconic leaders 
of the past, hence fostering their link with the communities who constitute 
their primary electorate. For such communities and especially the victims of 
apartheid violence, the representation of the past that so fundamentally 
shaped their lives is a matter of primary emotional significance, deeply 
connected with their sense of identity, and not necessarily open to critical 
historical analysis. Hence, both private/individual and public/institution-
alized processes of remembrance involve some level of myth-making, 
enshrined as heritage, which fulfils specific psychological, political and 
societal needs and in relation to which academic historical investigation is 
easily perceived as threatening and counter-productive. 
 
  
3 
Coming to Terms with Trauma: 
The TRC and Memorials to the 
Victims of Apartheid Violence 
Introduction 
Memorials can be strategic tools in laying claim to symbolically important 
and potentially contested aspects of the past. Yet this political and 
functionalist perspective invariably obscures the psychological significance 
and the emotional fulfillment that many individuals, families, communities 
and party members may genuinely associate with the presence of a 
memorial. This chapter therefore starts out by investigating the installation 
of memorials as part of the personal, family-based, often religiously 
motivated desire for proper burial and community remembrance of deceased 
loved-ones. However, beyond the confines of private mourning and 
community remembrance, public monuments and memorials are always also 
addressed to a wider audience and become interwoven with larger, public 
processes of commemoration and societal discourses about the past and its 
relationship to the present.  
While the previous chapter highlighted the potentially divisive effect of 
public commemorative markers, this chapter affirms the possibility that they 
may indeed play a role in reconciliation. I will discuss memorials as a public 
acknowledgement of suffering and loss, which can restore a sense of 
personal dignity and lead to societal healing. This perspective received 
potent endorsement through the TRC’s recommendation that memorials be 
built for the victims of apartheid violence as symbolic measures of 
reparation and to promote national unity and reconciliation.  
Despite some criticism, the importance of the TRC – both as a process of 
historical research, upon which much of our understanding of the apartheid 
period relies, and as an instrument of healing – can hardly be overestimated, 
as McEachern’s (2002) insightful analysis shows. Like the TRC hearings, 
memorials to the victims of apartheid violations can be instruments of 
healing, but they also constitute lasting, tangible public representations of 
the stories uncovered by the TRC process. Some memorials are joined by an 
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adjacent museum or interpretation centre, while others are equipped with 
extensive text plaques or visual images, which provide information but also 
inevitably an interpretation of events. Often equipped with a catchphrase 
label – the ‘Pebco Three’, the ‘Cradock Four’, the ‘Gugulethu1 Seven’, the 
‘Trojan Horse’ incident – some such cases have been brought to much more 
prominence in the collective memory than others, both through media 
coverage and especially the establishment of an imposing memorial.  
On the one hand, post-apartheid memorials represent a formidable break 
with the commemorative practices of the previous order, precisely because 
they are directly inspired by and linked to the hearings of the TRC. They can 
be interpreted as representing ordinary black people’s experiences and 
acknowledging their suffering. They give a public voice and lasting 
representation in the official memory landscape to people who have been 
marginalised and humiliated for most of their lives. But on the other hand, 
the state-supported process of memorialising the victims of apartheid 
violence is also propelled by an ideologically-driven political dynamic that 
involves a hierarchical ranking of victims, the state-endorsed remembrance 
of certain victims, and the convenient forgetting of others. The practice of 
selectively remembering victims attests to a continuity with the 
commemorative pattern of previous South African governments, and is in 
fact found in most societies as a result of the ‘necessity’ to celebrate heroes 
and recount inspiring narratives in support of the nation’s myth of origin and 
newly defined identity discourses. This thought will be pursued further in 
Chapter Seven. 
Apartheid violence and its victims  
I want to begin with a brief historical sketch of the apartheid era, focusing 
generally on violence and resistance, and specifically on the events that have 
prompted the installation of memorials and monuments. The reader should 
recall that this book does not aim to investigate what really happened in the 
past, but rather how the past is represented and appropriated. In a deeply 
divided society characterised by the co-existence of different visions, 
ideologies and nationalisms, both popular perceptions of the past and the 
academic study and research of history are inevitably divided. During the 
apartheid period, many historical accounts and attempts at recording, 
describing and critically analysing past events were influenced by or 
constructed around the ideological drift of, for instance, white Afrikaner 
nationalism or a pan-South African black nationalism as the dominant 
political and ideological forces of the time (Marks and Trapido 1987). This 
often led to the emergence of polarised, contradictory narratives.  
                                                     
1  Sometimes also spelled Guguletu. 
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Even today, it is a problematic and easily contested undertaking to write ‘the 
history of South Africa’ or even the history of a particular period or event. 
As the recent media debate around the battle at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola2 
illustrates, it is not only the significance of the event for various stakeholders 
and the country at large that may be disputed, but even the very ‘facts’ of 
what actually happened. Hence, I’m well aware that the mere selection of 
events reflected in historical background information supplied in this and 
other chapters construct a specific ‘history of South Africa’ which some 
might find completely distorted. Even the choice of certain terms – e.g. ‘riot’ 
as against ‘uprising’ – introduces inflections and foregrounds a particular 
ideological interpretation. 
I have chosen to structure my account of history around events and 
personalities associated with the memorials discussed in this book. This is a 
fragmentary and arguably skewed representation of the past, but it mirrors 
the way in which historical knowledge about the apartheid era and the 
liberation struggle is increasingly mediated through the products of the 
heritage sector. Public ‘memory’ is shaped by the naming and framing of 
selected events in the official commemorative effort, both for the benefit of 
the younger generation and increasingly for foreign tourists. On occasion – 
as in this chapter – historical background information is somewhat expanded 
for the sake of an international readership less familiar with the local 
context. 
South Africa is internationally celebrated for its ‘soft revolution’ and its 
avoidance of violent conflict in favour of a peaceful, negotiated solution, but 
this perspective diverts attention from the violence of the preceding decades, 
the human rights abuses and loss of lives associated with the armed Struggle 
and the township violence, especially during the second half of the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. Resistance against repressive apartheid legislation 
initially consisted mostly of peaceful protest actions and demonstrations, 
some of which are now portrayed as milestones in South African history and 
celebrated through various products of the heritage sector as stepping stones 
towards the attainment of democracy and liberation. This includes, for 
instance, the Congress of the People, which led to the adoption of the 
Freedom Charter on 26 June 1955 at a multiracial mass-gathering on an open 
piece of land in the centre of Kliptown, a freehold area in the midst of the 
sprawling Soweto township conglomerate. The 1956 Women’s March was 
another example of such peaceful protest actions, to which the state 
responded with relentless persecution of the leadership, resorting to 
increasingly ruthless methods.  
                                                     
2  The battle occurred in October 1987 and involved the former South African 
Defence Force (SADF), who supported Jonas Savimbi’s Unita movement, and 
the Angolan government forces (Fapla) supported by a contingent of troops from 
Cuba. An example of the media debate around the event is Kasrils (2008). 
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In present-day South Africa, which is led by the ANC, the Freedom Charter 
is celebrated as a symbol of multiracial unity and considered the blueprint of 
the post-apartheid Constitution, as it sets out a vision for a free, non-racial 
South Africa. An ambitious commemorative monument and urban develop-
ment project was unveiled in Kliptown in June 2005 at the 50th anniversary 
of the adoption of the Freedom Charter, on the dusty vacant lot identified 
through research into oral history as the ‘Freedom Square’, now called 
Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication (Bremner 2004). But for the PAC, the 
‘Kliptown Charter’ or the ‘Fools Charter’ is reviled as a symbol of betrayal. 
According to Pheko (1994: 21-3 and 2001: 17), the ANC’s adoption of the 
contested document deceived the African people with respect to the land 
question and amounted to the ANC’s abandonment of the fight for self-
determination and national sovereignty. By stating that the country and its 
wealth belong to all who live in it, the ANC sold out the African people to 
their ‘white exploiter’ and ‘foreign oppressor’ (1994: 23). Many historians 
hold that the adoption of the controversial charter led to the open 
manifestation of latently existing ideological differences and eventually a 
formal split within the ANC. The subsequent opposition and rivalry between 
the ANC and the PAC have been discussed earlier. Both parties attempted to 
enhance their profile and increase their membership by organising strategic 
campaigns, often in direct competition with the planned actions of the other 
party (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 412; Karis and Gerhart 1997: 46; 
Terreblanche 2002: 349).  
Among the most inflammatory issues at the time was the resistance 
against the so-called pass laws. The Abolition of Passes and Coordination of 
Documents Act, passed in 1952 and commonly referred to as the ‘Natives 
Act’, stipulated that the numerous documents African men had been required 
to carry (such as residency permits, work permits, special entry permits, etc.) 
would be replaced by a single consolidated document, the reference book. 
The ‘pass-book’ or ‘dom pas’, which had to be produced on demand to the 
police or local authorities at any time and led to high numbers of arrests for 
failure to do so, curtailed an African’s freedom of movement and allowed 
the authorities to control the presence, movements and activities of the entire 
African (male) population with the ultimate aim of removing them from the 
‘white’ areas and confining them to designated locations (Schmidt undated). 
This was the context for the infamous ‘Sharpeville Massacre’ on 21 
March 1960. The commonly held view, disputed by Pheko (2001: 16), is that 
at its annual conference in Durban in December 1959, the ANC had decided 
to organise a mass protest action against the pass laws, along with a national 
campaign for a minimum wage of £1 a day, to be held on 31 March the 
following year. The PAC pre-empted this plan by announcing, on 18 March 
1960, its own anti-pass law campaign, to be staged on 21 March, along with 
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a slightly higher wage demand.3 On this fateful day Sobukwe and other 
leaders invited arrest by defying the pass law. In townships throughout the 
country crowds gathered in peaceful demonstrations and police reaction was 
largely non-violent. However, in Langa outside Cape Town three people 
were shot and at Sharpeville, a township outside Veereniging in the 
Transvaal, a massacre ensued when police fired into a dense cluster of 
protestors. 
Frankel’s (2001) compelling and nuanced book, initiated in the context of 
proposals for a more formalised heritage site development at Sharpeville, 
represents the first carefully researched and detailed account of the historical 
circumstances that led up to the Sharpeville Uprising and an attempt at 
objectively reconstructing the precise course of events on that fateful day. 
Among the large crowd that had gathered in front of the Sharpeville police 
station that day, some people had arrived without reference books, wanting 
to be arrested. Others were apparently under the impression that an 
important announcement about the pass laws would be made. Frankel (2001) 
found that there was a lack of proper planning and contingency plans on the 
part of the organisers. The crowd also contained criminals, some of whom 
had dragged people out of their homes against their will. The police force 
inside the fenced station premises was likewise improperly prepared for the 
occasion and largely undisciplined. Apparently no order to shoot was ever 
given, but when one shot went off the panicked police began frantically 
firing into the crowd, killing 69 people and injuring 180, many of them hit in 
the back as they tried to escape the carnage (Frankel 2001; see also 
Davenport and Saunders 2000: 412-14; Omer-Cooper 1994: 208-09).  
The Sharpeville Uprising on 21 March 1960 quickly became – and indeed 
was purposefully turned into – a national and international icon of the anti-
apartheid struggle. The dissemination and strategic use of selected oral 
accounts and specific photographic imagery which portrayed the local 
protestors as innocent, passive and ordinary people betrayed by the state 
galvanised the forces of the anti-apartheid movement and created an almost 
impenetrable mythology about Sharpeville. But the agents of the state, too, 
immediately embarked on appropriating the event for their own political 
purposes, portraying the police action as self-defence in view of the 
imminent danger posed by a violent, unruly mob. Without being 
unsympathetic to the victims, Frankel (2001: 12) concludes that both the 
efforts of the police and the apartheid state on the one hand, and the PAC 
and liberation forces on the other, to forge a coherent narrative around the 
                                                     
3  Pheko (2001: 16) claims that the ANC had planned no such campaign and that 
the PAC had already taken the decision for a campaign against pass laws at its 
December 1959 conference.  
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events of the Sharpeville Uprising do not stand the test of objective historical 
scrutiny.4 
The complex process of political appropriation and development of 
diametrically opposed narratives similarly occurred around the Soweto 
Uprisings and in fact arguably in all other events now celebrated as 
milestones in the process of liberation. Independent investigation and serious 
research that might lead to the discovery of historical evidence in 
contradiction of what various political actors see as useful was long 
discouraged not only by the agents of the state but also by the anti-apartheid 
forces. To some extent this attitude prevails today, as various people 
continue to hold a political or psychological stake in maintaining the 
mythologised accounts developed in the past. As Frankel shows with respect 
to the Sharpeville case, even the personal memories of survivors and eye-
witness reports of various observers tend to be consciously or unconsciously 
shaped by the dominant narratives. Any attempts at representing these events 
today – e.g. by historians, journalists, or the heritage sector – invariably 
operate within this inherited polarised framework and are overshadowed by 
new moral imperatives and socio-political agendas. This is precisely what 
makes the representation of Sharpeville and other iconic events in the history 
of South Africa in monuments, memorials and museums so problematic and 
contested. 
The violence of the Sharpeville Massacre was widely condemned 
throughout the world and is considered a major turning point in international 
attitudes towards the apartheid regime. The Security Council of the United 
Nations discussed the matter and officially condemned the South African 
government. Economically, a considerable outflow of capital from the 
country during this period has been attributed to the Sharpeville incident, 
eventually prompting the government to enact restrictions on currency 
movement. Thousands of people were detained under new emergency 
regulations and, as said earlier, the banning of the ANC and the PAC forced 
the two liberation movements underground, an act which could be 
represented as a temporary defeat for resistance (Davenport and Saunders 
2000: 412-14; Frankel 2001; Omer-Cooper 1994: 208-09; Pheko 1994: 31-
45; Pheko 2001).  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Black Consciousness 
Movement under the able leadership of the young and charismatic Steve 
                                                     
4  Neither was the massacre simply a question of the white police ‘getting at’ the 
people, as portrayed by the Left, nor was it a matter of the black community 
‘getting at’ the police, as perceived by the Right. ‘The Sharpeville massacre 
typifies the fact that we cannot divide political realities into neat poles – 
resistors, repressors, the guilty and innocent, the good and evil. My narrative, I 
hope, brings out the infinite gradations of responsibility, personal weakness and 
moral ambivalence that are part of the Sharpeville story’ (Frankel 2001: 19). 
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Biko constituted a significant new impulse for the resistance movement, 
influencing particularly the youth. Biko was born in 1946 in King William’s 
Town, educated at the Catholic mission station at Mariannhill near Durban 
and enrolled as a medical student at Natal University. Inspired by notions of 
Black Theology and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, the 
philosophy of Black Consciousness advocated the psychological liberation 
of black people from generations of conditioning as inferior. The cultural 
and educational fronts were seen as important sites of struggle for such 
emancipation and the definition of a positive black identity and associated 
value systems. Black Consciousness contributed to the emergence of a host 
of new organisations, including the South African Students’ Organisation 
(SASO), which was an increasingly vocal political vehicle for black students 
(Davenport and Saunders 2000: 436-54).  
SASO’s tough language and idealistic principles soon began to influence 
African high school students who, in 1976, protested against new 
government legislation designed to make Afrikaans the medium of 
instruction in some subjects in Bantu Education Department schools. The 
protest action that led to the Soweto Uprising on 16 June and similar violent 
clashes in townships throughout the country during subsequent months must 
also be understood in the context of growing frustration over the inferiority 
of the Bantu education system, especially in the light of rising 
unemployment. In addition, young people also began to realise that the 
impending ‘independence’ of the Transkei homeland would mean the loss of 
South African citizenship and the right to work in the Republic for all blacks 
who had been assigned a homeland citizenship (Davenport and Saunders 
2000: 449; Ndlovu, S.M. 1998; Karis and Gerhard 1997: 156-88).  
The Soweto Uprising is now institutionalised as another key event in the 
fight for liberation, with June 16 being declared a public holiday (Youth 
Day) and the site of the fateful event marked with an ambitious 
commemorative complex. The course of events on that day will be discussed 
below, but over 20 students died and many more were wounded when police 
started shooting at the protestors. The young Hector Pieterson,5 usually 
considered the first victim to be shot on that day, quickly became an 
international icon of youth resistance when Sam Nzima, then a photographer 
from The World, was on the spot to take the legendary photograph showing 
Mbuyisa Makhubu carrying Hector’s limp body away, with his crying sister, 
Antoinette Sithole, running alongside them. 
                                                     
5  Different spellings of this name circulate, including Peterson and Petersen. The 
family’s name was originally Pitso, but they changed it, presumably to attain 
benefits reserved for ‘coloureds’. References to Hector’s age also differ. 
According to his sister, Antoinette Sithole (personal conversation 2003), he was 
12 at the time of the Soweto Uprising and would have turned 13 on 14 August 
1976.  
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This emblematic, emotionally charged image – one of a series of six 
sequential shots – immediately captured the public imagination and became 
an emblem of the liberation struggle, encapsulating better than ‘a thousand 
words’ the oppression wrought by the apartheid regime and ‘the people’s’ 
determination to achieve freedom. It was adopted by the liberation 
movements for reproduction on posters, T-shirts, and murals. Taken up by 
the international media network, it simultaneously entered millions of 
households around the world via magazines and television. Parallelling the 
case of Sharpeville, the Soweto Uprising was similarly subjected to a 
complex process of political appropriation, which began with judicious 
photo editing in the newspaper’s development lab and offices. The conscious 
selection of this particular photograph and its rapid turning into an icon 
seems to have dictated how the narrative was told and still sets the tone for 
how the event should be remembered and understood, as will be shown 
below. 
Although the government decided in early July to drop the Afrikaans 
requirement, the Soweto Uprising sparked a wave of violent confrontation in 
Soweto and throughout the country that lasted for almost a year, in which 
hundreds more lost their lives and probably thousands were wounded.6 An 
additional 5980 people were arrested between 16 June 1976 and 28 February 
1977 according to police records (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 453). In 
1992, the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) placed a red polished granite 
memorial stone in the area of the Soweto Uprising at Orlando West7 and in 
many other townships, Youth Memorials pay tribute to these young victims, 
the great majority of whom were under 25 years old. 
Although this has also been critically interrogated (e.g. Pohlandt-
McCormick 2008), the Soweto Uprising is often described as a turning point 
in the history of the apartheid era. The youth and innocence of the victims 
immediately turned this event into an icon of anti-apartheid resistance, 
powerfully symbolising the ruthlessness of the apartheid regime and the 
determination and bravery of its black victims. For many white South 
Africans, the Soweto Uprising deepened divisions over how best to defend 
minority rule and legitimate Afrikaner power. Ultimately the event set the 
National Party on a course of cautious reforms that eventually led to the 
collapse of the apartheid system two decades later. For black South Africans, 
the Soweto Uprising marked the shift from a period of conservative political 
culture, in which young people had played a subordinate role, to a new era in 
                                                     
6  Karis and Gerhard (1997: 168) report that by the end of February 1977, the death 
toll officially stood at 575, of which 494 were Africans, 75 ‘coloureds’, two 
whites and one Indian. 
7  On 16 December 1981, the Azanian National Youth Unity, an internal wing of 
the PAC, had already unveiled a tombstone for Hector Pieterson at Avalon 
Cemetery in Soweto (Hlongwane 2008: 39). 
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which the youth, increasingly radicalised, acted as the driving force (Karis 
and Gerhard 1997: 156).  
Having participated in and been politically conscientised by the Soweto 
Uprising and its subsequent nationwide unrest, many young individuals, 
such as Solomon Mahlangu, experienced the desire to become activists or to 
go underground and join the armed struggle. Many clandestinely left the 
country to receive ideological schooling, military training, and other forms 
of special preparation abroad, for instance in the Soviet Union, East 
Germany or at MK training camps in Tanzania, Angola and Zambia. Upon 
their secret return to South Africa, these young activists played a key role in 
organising the armed struggle and were relentlessly persecuted as terrorists 
by the security police.  
Many resistance leaders and activists ‘disappeared’ or died in police 
custody under mysterious circumstances – according to official records often 
by ‘suicide’. Captured ‘terrorists’ were habitually tortured and often died as 
a result of their injuries. Some were assassinated in carefully planned police 
actions. Their bodily remains, sometimes mutilated, were often discarded in 
shallow, unmarked graves or even destroyed without leaving a trace. Many 
family members learnt only through the hearings of the TRC what had 
happened to their loved ones and where their remains were dumped, 
sometimes leading to their exhumation, dignified reburial, and official 
memorialisation.  
The documentary film Amandla: A Harmony in Four Parts (directed by 
Lee Hirch, 2003) includes harrowing footage of the excavation of Vuyisile 
Mini’s remains. Mini (1920-1964) was a well-known political activist and 
composer from Port Elizabeth’s township New Brighton, whose music had 
made an enormous contribution to the resistance movement. Together with 
five other activists he was hanged by the apartheid state on 6 November 
1964, and their remains were discarded.8 The fact that Mini was later found 
innocent made his death infinitely more symbolic and all six activists were 
reburied on 27 June 1998 at the Emlotheni Memorial Park, also called 
Heroes Acre, in New Brighton.  
Tensions remained high at schools throughout the country and conflict 
would easily erupt. In 1984 class boycotts were staged at Cradock in the 
Eastern Cape, when Matthew Goniwe, a local teacher and political activist, 
who drew strong community support, was dismissed over his refusal to be 
transferred. The following year, Goniwe and three of his comrades – Fort 
Calata, Sparrow Mkhonto and Sicelo Mhlauli – were killed by the Security 
Forces as they were travelling back from a meeting in Port Elizabeth. Their 
charred bodies, bearing stab-wounds and signs of mutilation, were later 
                                                     
8  The other five activists were Zinakile Mkaba, Wilson Kayingo, Nolali Mpentse, 
Daniel Ndongeni and Samuel Jonas. The latter three were executed on 7 July 
1965 (Hansen 2003: 44). 
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found along with Calata’s burnt-out car. The funeral of the ‘Cradock Four’ 
on 20 July 1985, with numerous busloads of angry mourners and ANC and 
SACP flags flying defiantly, has been called the beginning of the end of 
apartheid. In July 2000 a memorial in their honour was erected in a public 
park in Cradock9 (Mangxamba 2000; Krog 2002: 37-44; Davenport and 
Saunders 2000: 490; Nicholson 2004; Catsam 2005). 
The 1983 introduction of a new constitutional system based on the Tri-
cameral parliament, which gave Coloureds and Indians a limited form of 
political representation but left the African majority out completely, 
prompted widespread protest and unrest in townships throughout the 
country. The nationwide UDF called for a boycott of the 1984 polls and 
played a significant role in supporting and organising anti-apartheid 
resistance. While rioting in the Coloured and Indian areas soon died down, a 
massive wave of violence swept through the black townships during the mid-
1980s, fuelled by economic hardship, growing unemployment and political 
desperation (Omar-Cooper 1994: 237-9; Davenport and Saunders 2000: 
502ff). 
The period of the mid-1980s was a particularly tense time. The ANC/ 
UDF vowed to ‘make South Africa ungovernable’ and the government 
called a State of Emergency (in 1985 and again in 1986). As in the case of 
the Mamelodi Massacre described earlier, protest marches, boycotts and riots 
occurred in townships throughout the country over various grievances, 
frequently leading to brutal police reprisals. The Langa Massacre took place 
on 21 March 1985, the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre, when 
police shot at a peaceful crowd marching through Uitenhage in the Eastern 
Cape. The memorial in honour of the 19 killed (some sources say 20) and 
many wounded demonstrators will be referred to again below. Unlike the 
Soweto Uprising, these ‘township rebellions’ involved both the young and 
adults. Although locally organised, they happened largely in response to the 
boycott call of the nationwide UDF, and they were able to draw on the 
organisational resources of the civic associations. Under cover of state of 
emergency provisions, the government cracked down on the township unrest 
by arresting thousands of alleged activists, many of them youngsters, many 
                                                     
9  The new memorial was set up in the immediate vicinity of a small Afrikaner 
nationalist monument – a miniature version of the Voortrekker Monument in 
Pretoria – which had been erected there in 1988 in celebration of the 150th 
anniversary of the Great Trek. This was roughly the same period during which 
the four Cradock activists were killed and the presence of their memorial now 
opens up an uncomfortable new perspective on the public history of this 
picturesque town. By introducing a discourse that ideologically counters and 
challenges the hegemony established by the existing memorial marker, it 
furthermore inclusively claims this public park for a demographically trans-
formed town population. 
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of whom were held for long periods without trial (Omar-Cooper 1994: 237-
9). 
Violence and civil strife increased even further during the fragile 
negotiation period of the early 1990s as the state instigated conflagration 
within the black community, especially between members of the ANC and 
the IFP. While the annual deaths from civil strife were estimated at between 
600 and 1400 during the period of the late 1980s, in the early 1990s, the 
figures rose to between 2700 and 3800 (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 562). 
For instance, in Sebokeng in the Vaal region 47 people were killed during 
the so-called Nangalembe Night Vigil massacre by unknown gunmen while 
mourning a fellow comrade. During the night of 17 June 1992 ANC 
supporters were killed while asleep in their homes by residents of an IFP-
dominated hostel at Boipatong near Vanderbijlpark. Suspicion of police 
involvement placed a serious strain on the CODESA process. In the area of 
Thokoza on the East Rand approximately 800 people died and about 600 
families were displaced, their homes ruined, between 1990 and 1994 as a 
result of community violence fuelled by the IFP-ANC conflict, overlaid by 
ethnic tensions between Zulus and Xhosas. The worst battleground was 
Khumalo Street, which remained a no-go area for some persons even after 
the official end of the violence (Kgalema 1999; Davenport and Saunders 
2000: 562; Chipkin 2007: 123-36). Neighbouring areas on the East Rand 
experienced similar political violence during this period and similar 
memorials have since been installed to commemorate the victims, for 
instance in Katlehong (unveiled on 21 March 1998), Tembisa (16 June 1998) 
and Sebokeng (Kgalema 1999). 
Problems also arose from the unresolved reintegration and ambiguous 
political positioning of the homelands. On 7 September 1992 the ANC 
organised what was meant to be a peaceful march across the Ciskei border to 
hold a rally at the stadium of the homeland capital, Bisho. A clash between 
what was later found to be irresponsible ANC leaders (notably the ex-MK 
leader Ronnie Kasrils) and undisciplined Ciskeian troops led to the killing of 
29 marchers, with another 200 wounded (Davenport and Saunders 2000: 
564-5). A memorial was set up at the edge of the stadium in Bisho in 1997.  
Violence during this period emanated also from both black and white 
extremists. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) under the leadership 
of Eugene Terre’blanche, engaged in dramatically staged acts of violent 
protest and on 10 April 1993 the charismatic young Communist Party leader, 
Chris Hani, was murdered under the directive of the ultraconservative white 
Right, as said earlier. Black extremists executed acts of terrorism against 
white individuals under the slogan ‘One Settler, One Bullet’. Their best-
known victim became Amy Biehl (1967-93), a white American Fulbright 
exchange student, who had been working at the University of Western Cape 
Community Law Centre in preparation for the 1994 Elections. On 25 August 
1993, three days before her scheduled return to the United States, she was 
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beaten and stabbed to death in Gugulethu township, while taking black 
friends home in her car. The incident shocked the country and created much 
negative publicity for the ‘new’ South Africa in the United States and 
elsewhere, but it also caused considerable controversy in both countries 
(Davenport and Saunders 2000: 566; Gish 2003). 
Symbolic gestures of reconciliation 
Despite this context of extraordinary violence and instability, which lasted 
throughout the run-up to the elections, and the very real threat of an IFP 
boycott, South Africa’s first general democratic elections went ahead 
peacefully. Aerial photographs of the endless queues of people who enjoyed 
the right to vote for the first time in their lives quickly became international 
icons of the peaceful transition of power and the foundation of the post-
apartheid order. Under the so-called sunset clause, the elections brought to 
power the transitional GNU under the presidency of Nelson Mandela for a 
fixed period of five years. A new South African constitution was drafted and 
signed into effect by the President on 10 December 1996 in the symbolically 
charged township of Sharpeville, where he had unveiled a small memorial 
two days earlier ‘in memory of those who gave their lives for a free and just 
South Africa’.  
The immediate focus of the newly elected government was on taking 
appropriate measures to secure peace, foster reconciliation and heal the 
divisions of the past. In the interest of unity and nation-building, inclusive-
ness was emphasized at every level. It was a time of many iconic moments 
and powerful publicly staged and widely reported symbolic gestures, for 
instance Mandela’s invitation of some of his former warders at Robben 
Island to his inauguration as president in April 1994, or his visit with Betsy 
Verwoerd, widow of the former Prime Minister, Dr Hendrik F. Verwoerd, 
notorious ‘architect of apartheid’, in September 1995.  
In Katlehong, meanwhile characterized by a climate of relative but fragile 
peace, political leaders of both the ANC and IFP started visiting ‘no-go 
areas’ together, setting a public example of reconciliation and signalling to 
their respective supporters the end of such zones. In this context, the idea of 
memorials as lasting symbols of reconciliation and acknowledgement of the 
victims often emerged in discussions between political leaders and local 
communities (Kgalema 1999). 
In Thokoza plans for some kind of memorial appear to have surfaced as 
early as 1994, although it is contested who first conceptualized the idea. 
Different constituencies, including the local branch of the ANC, the 
Phenduka Displacees Committee and the local Self Defence Units and Self 
Protection Units seem to have independently thought of a project of this 
nature. It was only in May 1998 that the Thokoza Monument Foundation 
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was formally established, bringing together over twenty different organis-
ations (political, cultural, religious, etc) in addition to the two former enemy 
parties. Fundraising from both the public and private sectors took place and a 
site along notorious Khumalo Street was chosen as the most symbolically 
significant place to mark the end of no-go areas, to commemorate its victims 
and to serve as a symbol of peace and reconciliation (Kgalema 1999; 
Memela 1998; Memela 1998a). 
 
 
Photo 3.1 Memorial to the victicms of apartheid violence in Thokoza, East 
Rand, unveiled 1999. 
Ironically, the planning process was marred by quarrels and clashes over 
various details and especially arguments between the ANC and the IFP about 
who should be invited for the unveiling ceremony. As a result, the unveiling 
had to be postponed repeatedly and eventually took place only on 16 
October 1999. Nevertheless, as Kgalema’s (1999) research established, the 
inclusive process of working on this memorial initiative contributed to the 
process of healing and re-establishing trust within the community.  
Those involved in the Thokoza project emphasise that it was a 
community initiative, not a political one; i.e., the memorial does not belong 
to any political party or organisation but is ‘owned’ solely by the 
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community. However, the quarrel between the political parties that led to the 
long delay in the official unveiling, during which time the community could 
not even visit the memorial, prompted Kgalema (1999: 9) to ask: ‘If the 
project belonged to the community as all had claimed, it is hard to 
understand why the process was held at ransom by the absence of political 
leaders’. The pressure to be all-inclusive and satisfy the needs and interests 
of the local branches of the two former enemy parties inevitably allowed 
political agendas to dominate.  
A case may be made for the Thokoza project to be referred to as a 
‘community monument’, but most memorials commemorating the victims of 
township violence are unmistakably initiated, primarily sponsored or 
crucially driven by a particular political organisation, such as the ANCYL; 
or the local branch of the dominant political party, usually the ANC; or an 
enthusiastic individual community leader, often affiliated with a political 
party organisation; or an agency of the local (sometimes provincial or even 
national) government dominated by the ANC.  
Funding usually originates at least in part from government sources, 
supplemented by sponsorship from the private sector or non-governmental 
organisations. Local businesses have an obvious interest in promoting a 
stable local environment, but may also see their contributions as a welcome 
opportunity to associate themselves with a highly visible and politically 
correct initiative. Sometimes a memorial may be initiated by the private 
sector but end up being appropriated by the public sector, as political 
officials recognise the opportunities arising from the project for furthering 
the aims of their office, which is often connected with the interests of a 
political party.  
This is not to suggest that communities do not experience a sense of 
ownership of the memorials in their midst. At Thokoza, for instance, funds 
collected from victims’ families were used to finance the water tap on the 
memorial site and as Kgalema (1999: 28-9) reports, for some family 
members of victims it was very meaningful to have made a small, but 
tangible contribution. Nevertheless, as will be discussed later, it cannot be 
denied that by and large a sense of community ownership is still 
underdeveloped in post-apartheid monument projects, not least as a result of 
flawed community participation processes. As a result, lack of identification 
and even vandalism of new memorials remain persistent problems.  
The need for truth and reconciliation  
Even before the elections and the formal advent of the post-apartheid order, 
key legal thinkers within the ANC, influential intellectuals and representa-
tives of religious organisations began discussing the need for a truth 
commission as a mechanism for administering amnesty. There was broad 
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consensus that South Africans had to come to terms with the past if they 
wanted to move forward as a nation, and that reconciliation and forgiveness 
were contingent on ‘uncovering the truth’ about what had happened in the 
past. The TRC was established by the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act of 1995 (Republic of South Africa, 1995) and in 
December of that year the commissioners of the TRC were appointed under 
the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. On 15 April 1996 the first 
Human Rights Violations hearings were held in East London. During the 
following months these public hearings took place in towns and cities around 
the country (Lodge 2002; Ross, F. 2008; Chipkin 2007). 
Much has been written about the TRC process, which the scope of this 
book does not allow me to engage with, but I want to highlight one 
important aspect, namely the educational dimension of the TRC hearings. 
Among the key characteristics that made the South African TRC unique in 
comparison with international examples was the fact that the hearings were 
held in public and were accompanied by extensive media coverage. As 
Lodge (2002) pointed out, the public hearings were less concerned with 
establishing facts, which had in any case already been deposited in written 
statements, than with broadly sharing these facts, thereby educating society 
at large about what happened, especially from the perspective of the victims. 
As a result the TRC hearings have become an important source of historical 
knowledge about the apartheid period, often countering established historical 
discourses and invalidating officially promulgated versions of contested 
events. For many individual victims the process, indeed the ritual, of 
testifying before the Commission was not simply a matter of reporting on the 
past, but a cathartic practice intended to help them deal with the trauma 
suffered in the past (R&R Committee report, reproduced in Doxtader and 
Villa-Vicencio 2004: 6). For the public at large, the process of witnessing 
these victims personally tell their horrific stories was meant to cause 
empathy with the victim and facilitate a process of communal reconciliation.  
Fiona Ross (2008: 236) points out that compared with Truth commissions 
in other countries, the South African TRC was unusual in linking ‘truth’ with 
‘reconciliation’, whereby reconciliation was regarded as a necessary basis 
for overcoming division and creating a new national identity. Chipkin goes 
further to assert that one of the key tasks of the TRC was to identify and 
establish the basis for national unity, to provide a principle of commonality 
that would ground South Africans as a people, and suggest a foundation for 
the new nation (2007: 12, 173). Through the process of truth-telling an 
exhaustive, new history of apartheid was expected to emerge, commonly 
shared by all South Africans. This is an important point that we will return 
to. 
While the public hearings came to an end in August 1997, statement-
taking from individual victims continued. The research department began 
analysing the information gathered from victims, and in October 1998 a five-
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volume interim report was published. After that the TRC began to disband, 
although the Amnesty and Reparations committees continued their tasks 
until the end of 2001. A total of 1167 full amnesties (a further 157 partial 
amnesties) were granted and some 22000 individuals were identified as 
victims of gross violations of human rights (Ross, F. 2008: 236). During the 
course of the TRC process increasing tension manifested itself between the 
TRC and the ANC and the interim report, which was debated in Parliament 
in February 1999, brought these to the surface (Lodge 2002). Most 
importantly for the purposes of this book, decisive fissures developed over 
the issue of reparations and how apartheid’s victims should be acknow-
ledged.  
Material and symbolic reparations 
The key aims of the TRC were the granting of amnesty in exchange for full 
disclosure about gross human rights violations during the apartheid era; the 
identification and location of victims; and the granting of reparations and 
other forms of assistance to those victims. Chaired by Dr Wendy Orr, the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (R&R) was charged with 
investigating and advising the government on measures of rehabilitation and 
reparation for victims of human rights abuses (Burton 2004). After much 
discussion and research, also taking into account comparative international 
models, the Committee tabled its draft policy proposal, the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, in July 1997. In October 1997 the 
reparation policy was finalised and publicly launched in Cape Town. It 
stipulated an annual payment to victims (or their dependants if the victims 
were dead) for a period of six years of an amount of between R21000 and 
R23000 according to various criteria; an ‘Urgent Interim Reparation’ 
payment of R2000 to those on the list who had suffered hardship as a result 
of violations; symbolic reparations, such as days of remembrance, 
monuments and places of memory; practical assistance, such as the issuing 
of death certificates; and lastly community rehabilitation in the form of 
improved service delivery in the fields of health, education and housing 
(ibid.: 35). 
In its official report in 1998 the R&R Committee argued that apart from 
legal considerations the state had a moral obligation to acknowledge the 
victims of apartheid violence through reparation and rehabilitation measures. 
This obligation flowed directly out of the need ‘to counterbalance the 
amnesty process in South Africa’ because, as the Committee’s report stated, 
such granting of amnesty was so generous and comprehensive that equally 
generous and comprehensive reparation measures had to be offered to the 
victims of gross human rights violations (R&R report 1998 in Burton 2004: 
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32-3; see also Lodge 2002).10 However, the government procrastinated over 
the paying of individual monetary grants. Many victims soon vented their 
anger and frustration over the lack of response to their depositions, and the 
R&R Committee was inundated with letters enquiring about payment. To the 
dismay of victim support groups, no decision was made on the issue of 
reparations, when Parliament debated the much awaited TRC Report on 25 
February 1999. Many of the speeches even suggested that the notion of 
individual reparations grants might need to be replaced by collective forms 
of reparations through redistribution, reconstruction and community 
development (Burton 2004: 40).  
Urgent Interim Reparations of between R2000 and R3000 had been paid 
out to about 17000 applicants by the end of November 2001, but the issue of 
individual reparation grants was revisited only in March/April 2003, when 
the two final volumes of the TRC Report were handed over to President 
Mbeki and discussed in Parliament (on 15 April 2003).11 His announcement 
that there would be a once-off payment of R30 000 as a reparation grant to 
each victim identified by the TRC, sparked much disappointment among 
victim communities, causing bitterness about the TRC process as a whole 
(Burton 2004: 40-1). From November 2003 to July 2007 these lump-sum 
reparations grants were paid out to 15677 identified victims/survivors; 532 
victims had died after receiving the Urgent Interim Reparations, but before 
payment of their final reparations (Gunn 2007: 72-3). Antje Krog in her 
award-winning book Country of my Skull sums up the situation as follows: 
‘[r]eparation for the trauma of the victims has – by its own admission – been 
the TRC’s single biggest failure’ (2002: 290). 
                                                     
10  ‘It is generally accepted that victims and survivors of terrible atrocities of the 
past deserve reparation and rehabilitation. The state, as well as the community, 
owes it to them that adequate measures should be taken to restore their dignity 
and self-respect. Comprehensive forms of reparation should also be implemented 
to restore their physical and mental well-being. Without adequate reparation and 
rehabilitation measures, there can be no reconciliation, either on an individual or 
community level. Reparation and rehabilitation measures are necessary to 
counterbalance the amnesty process in South Africa. The granting of amnesty to 
perpetrators of gross human rights violations is so generous and comprehensive 
that, without equally generous and comprehensive reparation measures to 
alleviate the plight of the victims, the process will prove to be extremely one-
sided and unfair’ (R&R Commission report, quoted in Burton (2004: 32-3)).  
11  The report contained an updated list of recommendations on reparations, which 
advocated the payment of additional reparations by corporations, banks and 
parastatals which had benefited in some way from apartheid policies. President 
Mbeki rejected the suggestion of a wealth tax and criticised efforts by various 
organisations and foreign lawyers to bring suits against mining companies and 
corporations for the payment of reparations (Burton 2004: 40/1).  
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While the issue of individual grants was being debated, various agencies of 
the state from national to local level immediately began investing in 
commemorative markers such as memorials, monuments and statues as 
collective, symbolic forms of reparation. Although the construction of such 
markers was explicitly recommended by the R&R Committee in addition to, 
not in lieu of, monetary grants for the victims of human rights abuses or their 
descendants, in reality, I argue, memorials became a kind of compensation 
for the failure to pay monetary grants. In fact, it appears that the prolonged 
absence of payments increased the urgency and necessity for the 
construction of memorials, both from the point of view of the victims, who 
at least wanted to feel publicly acknowledged, and most notably for the 
government. Financing, or even better initiating a memorial for the 
community was a way of politically legitimising government structures from 
local to national level, to some extent exonerating them and implicitly 
appeasing those within their constituency who were justifiably angry about 
the lack of substantive grants.  
 
 
Photo 3.2 Memorial for the victims of the ‘Langa Massacre’, KwaNobuhle 
(Uitenhage), unveiled 2000. 
At KwaNobuhle township near Uitenhage a simple memorial had originally 
been unveiled in 1986 to commemorate victims of the ‘Langa Massacre’. By 
the late 1990s it was felt that a more substantial and dignified memorial was 
needed to adequately commemorate the event. The Secretary to the Town 
Council, RD Basson (1998), therefore sent a letter to the NMC stating: ‘My 
Council is of the opinion that the erection of a Memorial for the victims of 
the “Langa Massacre” will be the greatest form of reparation to the families 
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of the victims’. The new Langa Massacre Memorial, conceptualized as a 
viewing platform with a vertical concrete slab punctuated by a circular hole, 
‘through which one can look at the spot where the Langa shootings took 
place’ (Schoeman 2000), was unveiled in March 2000. I don’t want to 
dispute that the new memorial and the public recognition it conveys may 
indeed constitute ‘the greatest form of reparation’ for some individuals of the 
Langa community, but I cannot help noticing the patronising tone of the 
letter and the potential political expediency associated with the initiative.  
As Kgalema (1999) rightly observes, there is a tendency to exaggerate the 
importance of monuments and memorials as symbolic forms of reparation by 
those who apparently want to escape their responsibilities in discharging 
other forms of reparations. This trend, warns the author, must stop if the 
process of reconciliation is to proceed. He explains that reconciliation and 
reparation can never be reduced to collective symbols and refers to the 
example of an elderly woman who had submitted the names of her two 
children for inclusion on the Thokoza monument. The mother expressed her 
appreciation for the monument, but also explained that the death of her 
children had left her without anyone to assist with paying basic living 
expenses (1999: 33).  
Similarly, even at the momentous occasion of the unveiling of the 
Sharpeville Memorial with its publicly staged process of communal 
mourning, some members of the local community registered their 
disgruntlement over the fact that they had not been consulted or involved in 
the project and the fact that they were still waiting for any payments of 
reparations (Khumalo 2001; Magardie 2001). As a local woman, quoted in 
the Sowetan, succinctly put it: ‘It [the monument] will soothe our hearts but 
the Government must move a step further and wipe our tears with 
reparations’ (Nkuta 2002). A similar comment was made more recently at 
the unveiling of the Gugulethu Seven memorial in Cape Town. Irene 
Mxinwa, mother of one of the victims, expressed her satisfaction with the 
new memorial, but then added that the ‘Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission had yet to live up to its promises of cash reparations to the 
youths’ families’ (Anonymous 2000e). To put these statements in 
perspective, it must also be acknowledged that the media are quick to jump 
at an opportunity to criticise the government’s investment in commemorative 
structures, especially when these involve large expenditure. But before I 
engage with such criticism, it is imperative to elaborate on the important role 
that memorials and monument can indeed play in the process of individual 
and societal healing.12  
                                                     
12  Criticism regularly emerges when new memorials and monuments are associated 
with substantial costs funded through public coffers. A recent press report, for 
instance, stated: ‘While the Budget was silent on reparations for victims of 
apartheid, it allocated R 140-million for the construction of Freedom Park …’ 
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The role of memorials in individual and group mourning  
Based on Sigmund Freud’s 1920s work on the role of fetishistic objects in 
the formation of sexual identity, D.W. Winnicott developed the theory of the 
‘transitional object’ – an object that mediates the relationship between the 
inner psychological world and the outer world. In his early writings 
Winnicott (1953) relates transitional objects only to the childhood phase, as 
objects that facilitate the process of separation from the mother. According 
to later expansions of the concept, transitional objects can also be understood 
to constitute the link with a deceased loved one and ease the pain of loss. A 
transitional object facilitating mourning can be a photograph or an item that 
belonged to the deceased, but also a grave-stone or a memorial. Winter 
(1995: 113) explains that the touching of war memorials and especially 
touching the inscribed name of the deceased constitutes an important ritual 
of separation, an act which can be witnessed in many period photographs of 
mourners at World War I memorials.  
What makes a memorial arguably more powerful than other transitional 
objects is the combination of the object with the significance of the site. The 
memorial is a lasting marker of the site and it endows that site with added 
import. Memorials often serve as destinations of pilgrimage, where personal 
healing can be attained. They are ritually meaningful as places where people 
can mourn and be seen to mourn (ibid.: 93). But unlike the countless 
memorials to the fallen of the First World War, built immediately after the 
war, when many families were grieving the loss of a loved one, the 
memorials built in South Africa at present commemorate losses suffered in 
the past, often many decades ago. Although without doubt some visitors of 
post-apartheid memorials are descendants or friends of the deceased, most 
visitors are probably members of the younger generation and even foreign 
tourists, who have not personally experienced the conflict situation and are 
not directly bereaved, but rather share in a general, mediated sense of loss.  
Volkan (1997) speaks of monuments or memorials as ‘linking objects’ in 
group mourning: 
Nevertheless, building monuments after drastic collective losses has its own 
special place in societal mourning; such actions are almost a psychological 
necessity. Structures made of stone or metal function as the group’s linking 
objects. Their indestructibility makes them psychological containers that 
preserve and limit emotions (1997: 40). 
They mediate between the daily reality of the present and the memories and 
internal worlds of those who directly experienced apartheid violence. For the 
                                                                                                                            
(Merten 2003) (Incidentally, this figure has meanwhile increased to over R 800 
million, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven).  
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younger generation, such memorials constitute a link with the past and assist 
in vicariously sharing the experience of those directly affected. Beyond the 
immediately affected communities, such memorials are offered to the 
general public, the nation, and even the international community, as objects 
and sites of contemplation and identification in a collective process of 
historical mourning.  
In an African context dominated by ancestral beliefs, visiting the grave 
site of a deceased member of the community is furthermore an important 
opportunity for communication with the ancestors and requests for guidance 
and advice. Many African cultures believe that the dead attain ancestral 
status after the completion of proper funerary rituals and become 
intermediaries between the living and the Supreme being. The ancestors are 
in control of the forces of nature and the guardians of the moral and social 
order; an eternal reciprocal relationship exists between them and their living 
descendants (Ngubane undated; Bunn 2002; Kgalema 1999). If a person dies 
an unnatural death, for instance as a result of human disasters, conflict or 
witchcraft, burial alone will not ensure the resting of the soul, but a special 
ceremony must be conducted at the place of death and the soul must then be 
‘taken home’ to rest. A memorial and certain ritual actions performed at its 
unveiling and perhaps on anniversary occasions can be understood as a form 
of laying the spirits to rest and bringing them home, as Kgalema (1999) 
shows with respect to the Thokoza Monument. 
Acknowledging loss and suffering  
Accepting loss and coming to terms with the past is an important 
prerequisite for forgiveness and reconciliation. As a family member of one 
of the victims of the ‘Cradock Four’ said at the unveiling of the memorial: 
‘We cried enough but this monument brought hope and removed some of the 
anger we had from the past’ (quoted in Mangxamba 2000). The government 
promotes the construction of memorials in post-apartheid South Africa 
because reconciliation is a high-priority national goal and memorials are 
believed to assist in the process of attaining reconciliation in divided 
societies. 
Cultural symbols such as flags or public monuments and memorials and 
their associated narratives or ritual actions can play a crucial role in 
situations of conflict, as can be observed for instance in Israel, Northern 
Ireland, Sri Lanka or Afghanistan, to name but a few countries (Ross 2000; 
2002; 2004). Cultural symbols and gestures can aggravate but also calm such 
situations. This applies particularly to what John Burton (1987; 1990) called 
‘deep-rooted’ conflicts, for instance among ‘identity groups’ (national, 
ethnic, racial, etc.) over matters of sovereignty, dignity, autonomy, group 
security and cultural survival (Avruch 2000: 86). As opposed to violent 
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competition for scarce resources or material interests, which can be resolved 
through a process of negotiation and power bargaining, deep-rooted conflicts 
are more difficult to resolve and require an engagement with their root 
causes, for instance through problem-solving workshops.  
Although the specific conflicts that post-apartheid monuments and 
memorials relate to – notably resistance against colonial oppression and the 
anti-apartheid struggle – have been historically concluded, their legacy 
continues to impact on the present society both in material terms and in 
terms of identity and consciousness (see e.g. Terreblanche 2002). Below the 
veneer of politically correct ‘rainbowism’ and racial unity, another reality 
characterised by prejudice, resentment, or even hatred still prevails in South 
Africa and creates fault lines, mostly along racial and ideological lines, as a 
result of protracted or deep-rooted conflicts.13  
A psychological and often political prerequisite to conflict resolution and 
reconciliation is that an official recognition, a public acknowledgement of 
the pain and losses suffered in the past must take place (Ross 2000; Volkan 
1997). Such acknowledgement can take the form of ritual actions, symbolic 
gestures or monuments and memorials officially and publicly testifying to 
the suffering of the aggrieved group. There is also a moral obligation within 
society to acknowledge the suffering of victims of human rights abuses, 
suggests the Report of the TRC’s R&R Committee: 
Although we may currently be experiencing fatigue about the consequences of 
the past, it remains true that if we do not deal with the past it will haunt and may 
indeed jeopardise the future. We need to remember that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission … was established in large part because of the 
dangers of inappropriate forgetting. We acknowledged then and must remember 
now that moving forward requires acknowledgement of the past, rather than 
denial. To ignore the suffering of those found by the Commission to be victims 
would be a particular kind of cruelty (reproduced in Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio 
2004: 9). 
Post-apartheid memorials dedicated to the victims of township violence or 
killed liberation movement activists essentially constitute an important 
aspect of such official recognition.  
                                                     
13  As a result of the apartheid regime’s successful application of the ‘divide and 
rule’ strategy, divisions have been created and carefully fostered among all racial 
and ethnic groups in South Africa. One example of the persistence of racial 
stereotypes and bias is the furore created by Mbongeni Ngema’s song 
AmaNdiya, released in May 2002, the lyrics of which supposedly expressed the 
negative sentiments Africans harbor about Indians. It was temporarily banned by 
the Broadcasting Complaints Commission for inciting race hatred (Comins 
2003). 
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It is important to remember that the protracted historical conflict between 
members of the white minority and the black majority in South Africa was 
not fought over political power and enfranchisement only, but also over 
basic human rights and issues of identity and dignity. This includes 
experiences of personal humiliation, racial discrimination in every aspect of 
life, denigration of culturally specific beliefs, customs and values, and other 
such forms of abuse and violation. 
As the R&R Committee reports:  
There has been a tendency to dismiss those declared as victims by the 
Commission as an ‘elite victim group’. It needs to be borne in mind that, given 
the systemic abuse committed during the apartheid era, virtually every black 
South African can be said to be a victim of human rights abuse (reproduced in 
Doxtader and Villa-Vicencio 2004: 9).  
Monuments and memorials can restore dignity and enhance self-esteem by 
publicly countering the racist discourses of the past. Corresponding with the 
recognition and promotion of African languages, indigenous knowledge 
systems (IKS) and other aspects of previously marginalised culture, 
monuments and memorials can be means of validating cultural values and 
practices, highlighting achievement and celebrating leadership, thereby 
assisting in reconciliation and restoring harmony in society.14  
Dealing with trauma 
Colvin (2008) explains that ‘trauma’ was originally a narrow, technical term 
within psychiatry, but became widely talked about after 1980 when the 
diagnostic term Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was introduced. 
From its initial application to returning war veterans, the term trauma has 
subsequently been utilised to refer to more and more classes of victims and 
has increasingly entered popular discourse. In fact, trauma is now part of a 
global cultural complex and the word is used metaphorically to refer to 
societies, including South Africa, that have undergone widely shared 
experiences of extreme suffering, genocide, and other forms of violent 
conflict. What is of interest to Colvin is not so much the factual question of 
whether or not South Africa has experienced a traumatic history, but rather 
what happens when the medical term trauma is used to describe a complex 
                                                     
14  As King Goodwill Zwelethini put it at the unveiling of the Isandlwana memorial 
(discussed in Chapter Nine) on 22 January 1999: ‘We have had to endure long 
years of suffering under colonialism and apartheid. These chapters in our history 
closed with the democratic elections in 1994. We are now faced with the 
challenges of rebuilding our economy and regaining our dignity’ (AMAFA File: 
07/2/7).  
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and variegated past. In other words, what is there to lose or gain when South 
Africa is said to be a traumatized society, one that has repressed traumatic 
histories? Such questions, as well as the concept of trauma itself and how to 
deal with it, are very much part of an ongoing debate which is attracting an 
increasing number of scholars with different viewpoints. I want to explore a 
few of these views and consider their impact on the issue of monuments. 
Antje Krog (2002: 42) maintains that fixing a traumatic memory in 
words, or capturing it through language, means taking control over it, 
asserting mastery. She refers here to the TRC hearings and the healing 
process that is widely believed to be facilitated by the remembering and 
narration of a painful story. This position is also contested, as I will discuss 
below, but for the moment I want to engage with this point and suggest that 
one might apply the same principle to the ‘fixing of traumatic memory’ 
through other systems of representation, including visual images or symbols. 
In this sense, monuments and memorials – operating with symbolically 
significant forms and materials, text panels, images, and poetic inscriptions – 
cast traumatic memories into lasting objects. Assuming that one can indeed 
infer from individual to collective experiences, public memorial markers can 
help those affected by apartheid violence to ‘assert mastery’ over their 
haunting recollections, hence attaining emotional healing.  
The conscious recollection and articulation of traumatic experiences, 
bolstered by public memory sites, may lead to the collective organising of a 
group or be employed in constructing a coherent group identity. The 
inscription of trauma narratives can indeed be pursued as a strategy of 
identity politics, a compelling means of establishing recognition (Lambek 
and Antze 1996: xxiv; Ross 2000). Just as the term trauma opens up for 
individuals ‘a way to label and interpret their experiences that was 
previously unavailable’ (Colvin 2008: 225), the trauma discourse can now be 
mobilised politically and legally for a variety of agendas ranging from the 
protection of human rights to victim empowerment programmes or 
reparations. Even the writing of history has been affected by this discourse, 
observes Colvin (ibid.: 226), as politicians and scholars feel compelled to 
pay more attention to ‘traumatic’ events in the country’s or community’s 
past. Volkan (1997: 48) uses the term ‘chosen trauma’15 to describe ‘the 
collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors’ and 
which now serves as a foundation for group identity.  
This often applies in cases of minority groups asserting themselves 
against the dominant discourses of the majority, but the institutionalised 
                                                     
15  Volkan (1997) concedes that the term ‘chosen trauma’ has been criticized, 
because a group does not choose to be victimized. However, he maintains that 
‘the word chosen fittingly reflects a large group’s unconsciously defining its 
identity by the transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the 
memory of the ancestor’s trauma’ (ibid.: 48). 
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remembrance of traumatic experiences and the associated cultural practices 
of historical mourning can also serve as a foundation for national identity. 
As early as 1882 the distinguished French journalist and scholar of religious 
studies, Ernest Renan, argued that the national remembrance of victims and 
‘having suffered together’ can be more powerful than memories of joy and 
triumph in unifying a nation.16 With reference to Germany’s recent flurry of 
activity in commemorating the victims of the Holocaust, Jörg Rüsen points 
out the parallels between the cathartic effect of mourning for the individual 
self and the officially endorsed practice of collective mourning, which 
allows the collective self, the nation, to emerge from its loss as new and 
changed (in Kirsch 2003: 319).  
It has been pointed out that the TRC process in South Africa promoted 
the inscription of trauma narratives and the definition of a new political 
identity, ‘that of a “national victim”, a new South African self which 
included the dimensions of suffering and oppression’ (Lodge 2002: 184). 
But it is also important to remember that some people refused to testify at 
the TRC precisely because they did not want to be regarded as victims 
(Ross, F. 2008: 243) and that both the TRC and especially the state-directed 
effort of memorialisation stress the importance of transcending trauma and 
victimhood, for instance by defining an affirmative identity based on 
resistance. As much as the conscious recollection of traumatic memories and 
the speaking out in public about past suffering can be personally 
empowering for the individual victim, the cathartic effect of telling the truth 
has also been contested (Verbeeck 2007; Ross, F. 2008; Colvin 2008). 
Fiona Ross (2008), for instance, critically interrogates the TRC’s sim-
plistic assumption that telling is inherently healing (implying that remaining 
silent is damaging) and alerts us to the complex meanings of silence, as well 
as the potential costs of speaking out in public. At TRC hearings throughout 
the country clear age and gender patterns could be observed in speaking out 
about the experience of violence. Women were far less likely to talk about 
their own suffering than about that of their sons, their husbands, or other 
people around them. The strong emphasis of the TRC on documenting 
events rather than processes, and on gross violations of human rights abuses 
such as death and torture, rather than systemic relationships, generates a 
biased account of the past, in which predominantly masculine experiences 
become normative (ibid.: 239).  
                                                     
16  ‘I spoke just now of “having suffered together” and, indeed, suffering in 
common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, 
griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a 
common effort’. These words are part of a now famous lecture that Renan 
delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1882 (quoted in Bhabha 1990: 19).  
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At TRC hearings throughout the country women were reluctant to speak 
about their experiences of violence, especially when this involved sexual 
violation.  
The women were afraid that deeply hurtful experience might become public and 
thereby expose them to judgement and censure. In contexts in which young 
women are often blamed for the harm they experience, especially when that 
harm is sexual, it ought not to be surprising that many would prefer not to speak 
(ibid.: 242). 
In a patriarchal society women are subjected to strong notions of what 
constitutes proper behaviour, and female political activists who had 
experienced detention, rape or torture or who had borne children out of 
wedlock were especially vulnerable to being shamed, ridiculed, accused of 
impropriety or otherwise negatively judged. Remaining silent might have 
been a means of protection, containing harm rather than extending it 
outwards (ibid.: 243). One can imagine how much more complex this 
situation would be rendered if the perpetrator of the rape had been one of the 
woman’s own comrades who was widely celebrated for his heroic fight for 
freedom. Ross argues that the ‘truth’ is determined not only by factual 
evidence, but depends on and is shaped by what it is permissible to say 
within a specific discourse (ibid.: 244). We will see that similar discursive 
limits apply to commemorative representation.  
I quoted the R&R Committee report before with its assertion that the 
TRC process essentially led to the formation of an elite victim group, who 
furthermore qualified for reparations payment, whereas the systemic abuse 
committed during the apartheid era and the damages suffered through 
sustained repression remain largely unacknowledged. This is precisely where 
Colvin (2008) sees one of the pitfalls of allowing the trauma discourse to 
frame our experience of the past and understanding of the present. Because 
the concept of trauma is an event-centered model of suffering it does not 
sufficiently acknowledge ongoing forms of stress such as the damaging 
effect of continued, sustained forms of suffering. 
Those trying to use the idea of trauma to fight apartheid came to realise that 
many of the violences of apartheid were systematic and structural, lived every 
day as part of the basic conditions of ‘normal’ life, rather than as an unusual 
event that shook one out of daily life (Colvin 2008: 230). 
The trauma model also relegates the suffering into the past, whereas many 
people today are still affected by ongoing forms of torment that could be 
considered traumatic, such as chronic poverty, sustained police harassment 
or persistent discrimination (ibid.: 230). The emphasis on a new beginning 
after 1994 accompanied by the TRC process as a vehicle for coming to terms 
with and asserting mastery over repressed traumatic memories eclipses the 
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continuities of suffering experienced by so many South Africans today. 
Some people’s experience that ‘nothing has changed’ in their lives since the 
first democratic elections17 raises critical questions about their identification 
with public monuments that represent the evil of the past and emphasise how 
it has been overcome.  
With reference to the so-called Trojan Horse memorial in Athlone, I now 
want to revisit and qualify my earlier suggestion that public commemorative 
markers can constitute a form of asserting mastery over past traumatic events 
and hence have an empowering effect on the individual and the community. 
The Trojan Horse incident or Trojan Horse Massacre occurred in the 
township of Athlone on the Cape Flats on 15 October 1985 and involved a 
carefully planned South African security forces ambush in which three 
young men were killed and 13 children and two adults wounded. The 
security task team was hidden inside three large wooden crates carried on the 
back of a railway delivery truck. Variations on this ‘Trojan Horse’ strategy 
were repeatedly used on the Cape Flats at the time. A CBS film crew 
documented the tragic incident in Athlone, which was broadcast 
internationally the same evening, prompting wide-spread outrage (Khoisan 
2001: 63-5; Gunn 2007). 
In 1995 a small memorial plaque was unveiled near the site of the 
shooting in honour of the victims. Five years later the city made a modest 
budget available and commissioned Tyrone Appollis, a well-known local 
community painter, sculptor, musician and poet, to design a memorial for the 
Trojan Horse incident, while one of his friends designed a memorial for the 
Gugulethu Seven (discussed below). Both memorials – plain and simple 
artefacts, made of stones and concrete – were unveiled on Human Rights 
Day, 21 March 2000. But members of the community criticised their lack of 
monumentality and dignity and considered especially the Gugulethu 
memorial as meaningless. The city eventually re-invested in both projects, 
increasing the budget manifold, and two much more monumental 
commemorative markers were eventually unveiled in both Gugulethu and 
Athlone in 2005 (Gunn, personal communication 2005; Gunn 2007; 
Anonymous 2000e; Khoisan 2005; Minnaar 2005; Singh 2000).  
The Cape Town-based architectural firm ACG Architects won the design 
competition for the Trojan Horse memorial organised under the City of Cape 
Town Memory Project. Participating architect Malcolm Campbell recalls 
that the visual component of the memorial generated extensive debate during 
the design process (personal e-mail communication 2009). Shirley Gunn 
from the Human Rights Media Centre, who closely collaborated with ACG 
Architects on this project, produced still images from the CBS footage and 
                                                     
17  Compelling examples of this attitude can for instance be found in detailed 
interviews with survivors of the 1985 ambush attacks in Athlone and Crossroads 
(see Gunn 2007). 
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discussed the usage of specific compelling photographs in the creation of the 
memorial with the mothers of the three youngsters killed. But the mothers 
were adamant that they did not approve of a public memorial that would 
show their sons being shot or dead (Gunn, personal communication 2005).  
While I suggested earlier that the fixing of memory – the emotional 
confrontation with the shocking truth in public memory sites – can help 
victims (and perhaps society at large) to come to terms with traumatic 
events, the mothers’ rejection of publicly displaying the graphic photographs 
illustrates that such images can also ‘freez[e] memory in ways that 
constantly recycle and reproduce unbearable pain’, as Itzkin puts it in a 
different context (2006: 14).18 I still maintain that a public memorial 
attesting to trauma can assist victims with their psychological healing and 
even political empowerment, but it seems imperative that such memorials 
are designed in consultation with the victims. In the Athlone case the wish of 
the mothers was respected and the ACG Architects designed a figurative 
visual component that did not represent the actual killing. However, all too 
often victims are not sufficiently consulted.19 Even in the case of the Trojan 
Horse memorial, recalls Campbell, the project team battled to keep city 
officials at bay, who repeatedly tried to take ownership of the intiative and 
interfere in the memorial’s design process (personal e-mail communication 
2009). 
In fact, what the families in Athlone wanted most were tombstones for 
the graves of their sons in the local cemetery, as they had never been able to 
afford a dignified marker (Gunn, personal communication 2005). The same 
sentiment was voiced by Tatana Sipho Fatman, uncle of Mabhuti Fatman, 
who was killed in a very similar ambush killing the following day (16 
October 1985) in Crossroads, an African township community not far from 
Athlone:  
I am an ordinary person. I don’t know what memorialisation is, but I would like 
to be able to point at my nephew’s grave and feel proud about him and the cause 
of his death and say, ‘This was my nephew who died for our freedom’. What I 
would like more than anything for Mabhuti is a tombstone (Tatana Fatman, 
quoted in Gunn 2007: 113). 
This seems to suggest that the concept of public memorialisation, like the 
idea of trauma and how to treat it, is based on very specific cultural 
                                                     
18  Itzkin raises this in the context of his discussion of a controversial proposal for a 
memorial in honour of those who were tortured and lost their lives while in 
police custody at the notorious John Vorster Square police station in 
Johannesburg. 
19  Complaints about lack of consultation occurred, for instance, in the case of the 
Sharpeville Massacre memorial or the Stanza Bopape memorial in Mamelodi, as 
will be discussed below. 
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assumptions which remain foreign to a great many people (Clovin 2008: 
231). It also raises the question for whom – if not primarily the victims – 
these memorials are really installed and for what purpose. 
Discomforting memories 
The ‘fixing’ of memories and their representation in the public memory 
landscape may be empowering for some, but it can also lead to the 
disempowerment of others, as selected memories and specific interpretations 
of the past are sanctioned over others, literally carved in stone for now and 
the future. Officially endorsed public memory, moulded and interpreted by 
the forces of political necessity, always withholds recognition from 
alternative narratives and can contradict private memories, thereby de-
authenticating and invalidating them. Such eclipsing of other stories, the 
silencing of dissenting voices, inevitably nurtures resentment and alienation. 
It may even cause tension and conflict. 
It is of course immensely difficult and challenging to acknowledge the 
complexities and portray the ambivalences of the past with its manifold 
categories of victims. Community unease often surrounds the killing of 
suspected spies; cases of torture suffered in liberation movement camps; 
civilian victims of MK bomb attacks (‘collateral damage’); the sexual abuse 
of women within the movement, and various other such contested and 
controversial memories. One of the important principle decisions taken by 
the commissioners of the TRC was that the suffering of all victims, 
irrespective of the ideological perspective they represented, was to be of 
equal moral significance. As Archbishop Tutu put it in response to a white 
woman’s testimony about the killing of her husband by Umkhonto guerillas, 
it was wonderful ‘for the country to experience that – black and white – all 
feel the same pain’. But audiences often resisted this sentimental equalis-
ation of victims, as seen in other societies marred by conflict (Lodge 2002: 
184). 
The most significant group of ambivalent victims in South Africa 
includes those who died through the grisly practice of ‘necklacing’, the 
vigilante killing of suspected spies by placing burning tyres around their 
necks. It is estimated that between 1984 and 1989 approximately 450 people, 
almost all of them black, were killed in this manner. The brutal lynch justice 
must be understood in the context of the anti-apartheid conflict at the time, 
the extreme level of frustration and anger felt especially among the younger 
township generation, and the prevalence of young, inexperienced or 
intolerant leaders as a result of the imprisonment of the established 
leadership. Recent research shows how deeply traumatic this experience was 
and how many people have been affected by its painful memory, beginning 
with the surviving parents of victims, who often feel a sense of shame, and 
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going on to the perpetrators, who were once celebrated as heroes but are now 
the ‘black sheep of the liberation movement’, and to the many bystanders 
who must now come to terms with the fact that they looked on and perhaps 
clapped and sang. The memory of the necklace has even been observed to 
crop up in such unlikely places as the games of children far too young to 
have personally witnessed such scenes, thus suggesting that it has become an 
unacknowledged part of collective memory (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003 and 
2004). 
Parents of necklace victims, such as the mother of Nosipho Zamela, who 
was burnt to death on 8 December 1985 in the centre of Mlungisi township 
in Queenstown (Eastern Cape), because she was accused of being an 
informer on the basis of having an affair with a policeman, were even 
reluctant to testify at the TRC hearings. Necklace cases always evoked 
strong ambivalence among people attending the TRC, and people like Mrs 
Zamela often suffer deeply from the lack of community support and their 
own shame, which prevents them from sharing the same platform as the 
families of those killed by the security police (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004). 
In any society some victims will always be easier to remember than 
others, and some victims are better not remembered at all. No public 
memorial has yet been installed or proposed to remember victims of the 
necklace. This includes even, and perhaps especially, those ‘embarrassing’, 
tragic cases in which the victims have later been found innocent, like Maki 
Skosana, one of the first victims of this practice, who was posthumously 
rehabilitated during the TRC process (Lodge 2002: 188). With the passage 
of time, future generations may be able to come to terms with such 
unpleasant memories and acknowledge the less honourable episodes of the 
struggle, but at the current moment giving recognition to such ‘bad’ victims 
in the official memory landscape is considered counter-productive to the 
government’s goals of attaining reconciliation, unity and nation-building on 
the basis of pride in a shared history of resistance. 
Although a consideration of private memorials generally is not part of 
this volume, I want to briefly draw attention to one exceptional case, because 
it illuminates so well the priorities in and absences from the public 
commemorative effort. In Gugulethu one can encounter two memorials 
within close proximity of each other along the same street, both testifying to 
killing incidents that happened on the respective sites within the space of a 
few years. One is the privately erected memorial for Amy Biehl, the other 
one the publicly sponsored memorial commemorating the ‘Gugulethu 
Seven’. 
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Photo 3.3  Memorial for the Gugulethu Seven, Gugulethu (Cape Town), unveiled 
2005. 
The ‘Gugulethu Seven’ were a group of seven young local activists – 
Mandla Mxinwa (Mxinga), Jabulani Miya, Themba Mlifi (Molefi), 
Christopher Piet, Zola Swelani, Zabonkwe Konile and Zandisile Mjobo – 
who were ambushed and killed by security police at the corner of NY1 and 
NY111 in Gugulethu township on 3 March 1986. Although forensic 
evidence and eyewitness reports confirmed that the seven had been shot at 
point-blank range, two official inquests in the late 1980s found police not 
guilty of any wrongdoing. Only the TRC hearings brought to light the fact 
that the attack had been orchestrated by the state’s anti-terrorist unit based at 
Vlakplaas. The young men, most of them in their early twenties, had been 
recruited, trained and armed by an informer in January/February 1986, who 
then lured them into the deadly ambush (TRC report 1998, Vol.3: 451-3).  
As stated earlier, a modest memorial was initially erected in honour of the 
Gugulethu Seven, about which especially the victims’ mothers quickly 
expressed their anger.20 With the support of the wider community, the family 
eventually succeeded in motivating for the construction of a more imposing 
new memorial, unveiled on 21 March 2005 along with the Trojan Horse 
Memorial. Ntombomzi Piet, the sister of one of the seven activists, told a 
news reporter that 
                                                     
20  Notably they claimed that they had not been consulted and that they considered 
the marker inappropriate and incomprehensible (Coombes 2003: 110). 
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... the men’s families were happy that the sacrifice of the seven was finally being 
recognised with a proper memorial. The monument that used to be here on the 
spot where they died was not fitting and we as the families were not proud to be 
associated with it … When we saw monuments of others ... like Hector Pieterson 
we felt aggrieved because Cape Town’s heroes did not have a proper memorial 
(Mtyala 2005).  
Designed by Donovan Ward and Paul Hendricks, the new Gugulethu Seven 
memorial consists of seven black polished granite slabs, from which stylised 
life-size silhouettes of the young men are cut out. According to Ward 
(personal communication 2009), this was inspired by apartheid-era ‘protest 
art’, notably the haphazardly stencilled symbols of resistance that cropped up 
on many walls in townships at the time, but one might also interpret the cut-
out shapes as a reference to the absence of the victims and the gap their 
death has left behind. Each slab furthermore bears a bronze plaque with the 
name, dates and a photographic likeness of the deceased (the latter not 
available in all cases at the time of unveiling).  
 
 
Photo 3.4 Memorial cross in honour of Amy Biehl, Gugulethu (Cape Town), 
date of installation unknown. 
Another bronze plaque contains detailed explanatory text, describing how 
the attack was planned and carried out and celebrating the memory of the 
seven young men as brave freedom fighters. A bus parking bay and a small 
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amphitheatre behind the memorial cater for the needs of large groups of 
visitors. A few hundred meters down the same road, at the entrance to a 
petrol station, one can find Amy Biehl’s memorial – if one knows where to 
look. The killing of Amy Biehl, as said earlier, was subject of much 
discussion at the time, including the question of whether or not a memorial 
should be built for her and whether or not she deserved such a memorial 
(Gish 2003). One might consider the Amy Biehl Foundation her memorial, 
but in terms of commemorative markers in the urban geography of 
Gugulethu, there is nothing but a small stone cross stuck in the grass, similar 
to the type set up along highways in memory of road accident victims. A 
private company, Crosstones, took the initiative to sponsor this modest 
marker, which is inscribed ‘AMY BIEHL MEMORIUM’, followed by the 
sponsor’s name and telephone number. The lack of any further explanation, 
the informality of the marker, as well as its undignified placement, all 
reinforce the unofficial nature of this memorial tribute to an extraordinary 
young woman whose tragic death cannot be officially acknowledged in the 
emergent memory landscape, because it casts a shadow over the inspiring 
grand-narrative of the liberation struggle endorsed by the state.  
The comparison between the commemorative markers for Amy Biehl and 
the Gugulethu Seven illustrates how the post-apartheid process of 
memorialisation draws its mandate from the TRC process yet violates one of 
its most important principles, namely the acknowledgement of all victims. 
The TRC explicitly emphasised the equal value of the suffering on opposing 
sides of the ideological divide, considering all of the victims to be victims of 
an unjust system fought and defended with violence in a larger context of 
state-incited race hatred. But the government-supported practice of 
memorialisation is implicitly based on a distinction between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ victims, a hierarchical ranking of casualties in terms of their symbolic 
significance or ‘usefulness’ to support specific value systems and govern-
mental agendas.  
The case of the Gugulethu Seven memorial moreover illustrates the 
emergence of another type of hierarchy. The families’ complaints about the 
insufficient dignity of the first commemorative marker and the subsequent 
‘upgrading’ of both this and the Trojan Horse memorial indicate the 
surfacing of a new consciousness, where the purpose and benefits of public 
memorialisation, the public acknowledgement of being a victim of trauma, 
are beginning to be clearly understood by some and where, furthermore, the 
monumentality of the marker is increasingly regarded as a direct reflection 
of the perceived importance of the victim. 
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Conclusion 
It is one of the characteristics of the heritage sector – by no means unique to 
South Africa – that it represents reductionist narratives and reinforces 
dichotomous categorisations of historical events and persons. The fact that 
the current South African politics of remembrance is largely based on a 
careful distinction between ‘good’ (i.e. useful) and ‘bad’ (ominous) 
memories may suggest that the post-apartheid nation still experiences a 
sense of insecurity and vulnerability, a lack of confidence about its national 
identity. One might compare this to the case of the United States, where little 
attempt is made to deny or suppress the shameful history of slavery or the 
recent discovery that one of the country’s greatest national heroes, George 
Washington, once kept slaves in his residence in Philadelphia. On the 
contrary, the heritage sector – forever in search of new attractions for 
commodification – thrives on controversy and sensationalism. But in young, 
emergent nations such as South Africa, the challenge lies in how such issues 
of shame can be presented without destroying people’s sense of pride in the 
new nation and without undermining the project of restoring the dignity and 
self-esteem of those previously declared inferior. 
A more serious problem with dichotomized representations of the past in 
the heritage sector can be inferred from Macdonald’s (2002) analysis of the 
TRC. In the process of the public hearings, a polarised image of the 
apartheid period emerged, characterised by victims and perpetrators, as a 
result of which a large category of people have eluded coverage by the work 
of the TRC. It is the category of white South Africans who were neither 
victims nor perpetrators but simply beneficiaries or onlookers and who did 
nothing to question the racial foundations and injustices of the system that 
secured their privilege and power. As a result, the majority of whites in 
South Africa today can easily distance themselves from the human rights 
violations of the past and from sharing a sense of guilt or responsibility. This 
might explain why so few whites appear to identify with new post-apartheid 
commemorative markers. Macdonald predicts that if the symbolic 
representation of South Africa’s past – as in monuments, one might suggest 
– vindicates all those who silently benefited from the system, reconciliation 
will not be possible (2002: 65-66, 69). 
Many people and communities without doubt support the government’s 
initiative in setting up monuments, memorials and related markers of public 
memory (notably street renaming) as an important official recognition of 
their historical experiences, which were previously invalidated or written out 
of the official record. However, the government’s embracing of symbolic 
gestures, indeed its frequent prioritisation of monuments over service 
delivery or reparations of a more tangible and material kind also fuels 
criticism and suggests a certain unwillingness or inability to take more 
substantive steps in the socio-economic transformation of the country and to 
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address the material needs of its populace in general and victims specifically. 
Incidentally, in Argentina, where thousands of men, women and children 
‘disappeared’ during the brutal reign of the military dictatorship in the late 
1970s, the national government has done a lot to provide financial 
compensation to the victims, but it has been criticised for its reluctance to 
establish public memorials that pay homage to the victims and remind 
society of what happened (Lois and Lacabe 1999: 5).21  
But the issue is not necessarily one of monetary versus symbolic 
reparations. In Argentina many descendants of victims reject all types of 
compensation, because to them accepting money equates to selling out the 
struggle for truth and justice. They believe that the only possible reparation 
is justice, which must begin with the state’s taking action in the punishment 
of all human rights violators (Lois and Lacabe 1999: 7-8). Experience from 
other countries too (e.g. Chile) illustrates that the passage of time does not 
necessarily lay these contentious matters to rest. Public pressure for just 
mechanisms to redress the past can resurface after decades (Burton 2004: 
42). This will remain one of the key challenges for South Africa. The TRC 
process is now over, but many issues remain unresolved, most notably the 
prosecution of human rights violators who were denied amnesty and those 
who chose not to apply. The South African government’s enthusiastic 
investment in memorials, although pursued with the best intentions, may just 
not be enough in attaining healing and especially restoring dignity and a 
sense of justice for the victims of apartheid violence and their descendants.  
                                                     
21  The Monument to the Victims of State Terrorism in Buenos Aires, a project 
initiated by the city rather than the national government in 1999, now constitutes 
the most important public memorial to the victims (Lois and Lacabe 1999: 6). 
Inspired by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, it lists the name of every person 
who disappeared or was killed. It was in turn clearly one of the sources of 
inspiration for the Wall of Names at Freedom Park in South Africa discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 

  
4 
Imagining Community through 
Bereavement: The Institutional-
isation of Traumatic Memory 
Introduction 
The previous chapter foregrounded the role of memorials in individual 
healing and community reconciliation, largely ignoring aesthetic aspects of 
their visual design. Indeed, observation suggests that many viewers do not 
accord much importance to details of visual appearance. While art critics and 
interested members of the public may argue over the artistic merit of a new 
monument – as for instance in the case of the Steve Biko statue in East 
London – the media reported family members and other sympathisers as 
expressing their satisfaction about the mere physical presence of the statue.1 
I believe that for many communities affected by township violence, the 
inscription of all of the victims’ names on a new memorial, for instance, may 
be far more important than its clever conceptualization and aesthetic quality.  
But these statements may soon have to be reconsidered as the heritage 
sector becomes more established and a growing commemorative conscious-
ness tends to manifest itself among communities throughout South Africa. 
Mimicking the case of the Gugulethu Seven and Trojan Horse memorials, 
several other commemorative markers have also already been replaced with 
or accompanied by, other, more ambitious commemorative projects within 
                                                     
1  The aesthetic merit of the Steve Biko statue quickly became a matter of 
controversy and extensive public debate. The statue was labelled ‘anything from 
unrealistic, disproportionate and disrespectful, to plain ugly’ (Jonker 1997; see 
also Bentley 1997; Anonymous 1997e). Local artists, academics, and museum 
professionals deliberated issues of style, whether or not exact likeness was 
imperative, and whether or not the statue must be a work of art. Foreign critics 
dismissed the statue’s ‘colonial style’ as an unfitting tribute (Jacobson 1997). 
Yet when Biko’s widow, Nontsikelelo, was asked for her opinion, she expressed 
her satisfaction with the sculpture and plainly summed up that she was ‘glad the 
statue is there’ (Anonymous 1997e).  
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the last few years. More incidents of such upgrading are likely to follow as 
funds become available. It appears that an increasing sense of competition is 
setting in, as communities, supported by political organisations, become 
aware of heritage projects throughout the country and compare how the 
memorials to ‘their’ respective heroes measure up. Solidity and monument-
ality are promoted as important markers of dignity, which enhance the public 
recognition and sense of respect paid to those who suffered and lost their 
lives. In this context, a modest memorial can quickly be perceived as 
insufficiently dignified, indeed disrespectful, and hence in need of replace-
ment or support through the addition of a more appropriate tribute. 
This inflationary process of public commemorative construction is 
significantly fuelled by the heritage tourism industry, as international visitors 
especially are flocking to the sites where important historical events took 
place or apartheid atrocities were committed. In the case of Sharpeville, for 
instance, Themba Goba, a former apartheid activist, was quoted by the 
Pretoria News as saying that it can be a bit embarrassing when people travel 
from all over the world to see the site. ‘It is like we disregard the people who 
sacrificed their lives for their country and that is what prompted us to 
develop the idea of a museum’ (Anonymous 2000d). This need to provide 
appropriately decorous visitor attractions is complemented by the desire of 
the state to institutionalise the memory of trauma and resistance for the 
attainment of specific policy goals and national identity discourses.  
This chapter investigates three cases of such memorial ‘upgrades’, 
namely the Solomon Mahlangu statue in Mamelodi, the Hector Pieterson 
Memorial in Soweto, and the Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct. I focus 
specifically on their visual appearance and the parameters of their aesthetic 
design, such as their conceptualisation, scale, style, subject matter, 
iconography, symbolism and materials. It is through such visual signifiers 
(and the allied textual inscriptions) that a monument ‘speaks’ to its viewers, 
signalling who should feel addressed by it, who is invited to identify with it, 
and who is excluded. Memorials and monuments are not only beacons of 
hope and symbolic markers of healing, but also pieces of commemorative 
public art and architecture which can have a significant visual impact on 
their environment. Their varied textual and visual signifiers are often 
strategically employed to make authoritative claims about the past that may 
affect people in unpredictable ways. As information about the historical past 
is increasingly mediated through heritage, the conceptualisation and visual 
design of these commemorative markers, the images they carve in stone, 
impinge on the ways in which the past is remembered and even ‘known’.  
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Upgrading Solomon Mahlangu square 
 
Photo 4.1 Bronze statue of Solomon Mahlangu, Mamelodi (Tshwane), unveiled 
2005. 
Although the Umkhonto memorial in Mamelodi discussed in Chapter One 
was always associated with Solomon Mahlangu as an extraordinary 
individual, its visual design based on the ANC logo and its official 
dedication to the fallen cadres of MK represented a collective form of 
memorialisation. During the following years, however, the story of 
Mahlangu as a heroic individual began to assume an increasingly prominent 
role. The reburial of his bodily remains in the Mamelodi Cemetery has 
already been referred to. Two years later, in 1995, the Mamelodi Heritage 
Forum was established and in 1999 the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom Square 
project was officially launched as part of the general upgrading and 
development of the area (Shonisani 2001). With the emergence of township 
tourism, Mamelodi had become a point of attraction with a moderate flow of 
tourists visiting the area and the existing memorial. The Solomon Mahlangu 
Freedom Square project was integrated into the Mamelodi Tourist Route and 
plans for an ‘upgrading’ of the memorial emerged (Ratlou, personal 
communication 2003). 
On 17 September 2005, an over life-size bronze statue of Solomon 
Mahlangu (modelled by Angus van Zyl Taylor) on a high plinth was 
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unveiled in place of the Umkhonto memorial. The new monument, 
commissioned by the City of Pretoria (the Tshwane Metropolitan 
Municipality) and the Mamelodi community, is dedicated ‘to the life of our 
freedom fighter, Solomon “Kalushi” Mahlangu’. It shows a realistically 
rendered statue of the young man, dressed in combat fatigues and boots. 
With both feet planted firmly on the ground and a determined look on its 
face, the statue resembles that of Steve Biko in East London. In his hands 
Mahlangu holds a globe which, according to the affixed plaque, symbolises 
‘a combination of Africa’s riches and the world of opportunities now open to 
us all’.  
If one wants to draw a distinction between memorial and monument in 
Danto’s sense, this towering commemorative effort would certainly pass as a 
monument. It forms the centre piece of the large circular paved Mahlangu 
square, which visitors approach from the parking area opposite the 
Municipal Offices via a palm-lined pathway. The approach is a staged 
experience, a metaphorical journey, which contains symbolic markers 
representing three significant phases in the recent history of the township 
and the country. Firstly, there are the remains of the former gate-structure 
that once allowed security forces to control access to and from the township. 
These concrete pillars, now supporting text panels with information on the 
‘Mamelodi Heritage Route’, represent the apartheid history of the township 
and constitute more generally a symbol of oppression. Immediately in front 
– directly opposite the Mahlangu statue – the old Umkhonto memorial, now 
freshly repainted, has been re-erected, representing the first official tribute to 
the fallen liberation fighters and symbolising triumph over oppression. 
Lastly, the new Solomon Mahlangu statue, in its very monumentality, the 
predominance and imposing character of its visual appearance, speaks of the 
confidence and firm establishment of the new order. There are no more 
references to the names, logos and symbols of specific political parties, 
although the initiated know that Mahlangu represents the ANC.  
The new monument represents a shift from a collective to an elitist 
approach to commemoration, focused on individual stalwarts or martyrs of 
the struggle. This reflects a wider trend in post-apartheid South Africa, 
which manifests itself in the widespread installation of bronze statues of 
individual leader figures (almost always male) and memorials dedicated to 
one named person as a representative of an unnamed group. This pars pro 
toto mode of memorialisation – at least in part inspired by the Hector 
Pieterson memorial – was meant to personalise the struggle for freedom 
through the example of Solomon Mahlangu and allow ordinary people to 
relate to it. Moreover, in an attempt at educating or conscientising the 
younger generation, local children were actively involved in the design of 
the new monument. Affixed to the base of the statue is a series of six small 
bronze relief plaques with visual images based on children’s drawings. They 
interpret Mahlangu’s (alleged) last words, ‘Let my blood nourish the tree 
IMAGINING COMMUNITY THROUGH BEREAVEMENT 
 
99
that will bear the fruits of freedom’, in the context of the new democracy and 
its opportunities.2  
However, these words do not exactly reflect the innermost personal 
thoughts of the dying Mahlangu, but are instead a quotation from the 19th 
century Italian Risorgimento leader, Guiseppe Mazzini, which Mahlangu 
must have memorised, perhaps in the context of his ideological training. 
Correspondingly, the similarity of the Mahlangu statue to the Biko statue 
and its iconographic link with the familiar formula of colonial military 
statuary makes it more of a stereotype than a representation of a particular 
person. One may doubt that the imposing, over life-size statue elevated far 
above ground level really allows for personal identification. One might also 
critically ask, what precisely the youth of Mamelodi today is intended to 
learn from the example of Mahlangu, what they are invited to identify with, 
and how that fits into the current post-apartheid context.  
It could be argued that the monument as a whole and the relief images in 
particular are meant to induce children to appreciate, rather than take for 
granted, what their parents’ generation fought for. In this context, the 
ideological differences of the past, despite being echoed in political 
opposition in the present, are denied or neglected, superseded as it were by 
the persuasiveness of the larger liberation narrative. It is important how we 
remember and represent history, because the present is always seen in a 
context that is causally connected to events in the past (Connerton 1989: 2). 
Hence to some extent one can manipulate the younger generation’s 
experience of the present by influencing its knowledge and perception of the 
past.  
The sense of indebtedness that flows from the public invocation of 
suffering and sacrifices made by dedicated members of the community in the 
past can be channelled towards an acceptance of a commitment to civic duty 
for those in the present. It is ostensibly the commitment to the ideals for 
which others gave their lives, but actually the commitment to the 
interpretation of those ideals by political officials and other stakeholders 
who engender memories in specific ways and subtly infuse them with 
ideological messages. A key characteristic and indeed purpose of all public 
commemoration is the periodic renewal and constant updating of memory 
and its adaptation to the needs of the present. Public commemorative 
functions, where the essentially private affair of mourning the dead and 
remembering the suffering is institutionalised and turned into a public 
activity, need not only a suitable site, but also a symbolically significant 
                                                     
2  The images interpret these words ‘in the context of our new democracy and 
opportunities that can be attained due to this freedom’. Each of the images is 
explained in a caption, e.g. ‘Through the fruits of freedom all people in South 
Africa are united’; ‘Through the fruits of freedom all people can harvest from 
our land’; ‘Through the fruits of freedom education will make us strong’.  
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time. Public holidays constitute the most pertinent occasion for official 
processes of remembrance linked to the narrative of the nation and indeed, in 
South Africa today attendance of commemorative functions on public 
holidays is increasingly portrayed as a civic duty, a reflection of the 
individual’s commitment to the nation.  
Public holidays and ‘shrines of the nation’ 
In some countries, as Koshar (2000: 289) explains, nationhood is rooted in 
territorial integrity, political and administrative tradition, and a shared sense 
of citizenship. In other countries national identity is based on mutual ethno-
cultural roots (e.g. Germany; Poland). In other cases religion is the 
integrating factor (e.g. Israel), and in yet others, identity is based on the 
celebration of a revolution (e.g. France; United States). The post-apartheid 
South African nation shares some elements of all or most of the above, but 
none of these models applies here completely. Although constitutionally 
enshrined, the ‘Rainbow Nation’ model of a non-racial, multicultural nation 
in which every group’s culture and heritage are equally valid and important 
is effectively waning in the face of an increasing African nationalism. 
Chapters Six and Seven will engage with issues of national identity, 
notably the question of who belongs to the nation and how this is manifested 
in post-apartheid heritage, but at this point I want to focus on the concept of 
the commemorative monument as a stage for enacting national identity. In 
the modern world nationality is a universal socio-cultural concept – 
‘everyone can, should, will “have” a nationality, as he or she “has” a 
gender’, notes Benedict Anderson (1983: 14) in his influential book 
Imagined Communities. Nationality is widely and unquestioningly accepted 
as natural and given; people feel a strong sense of belonging to their nation 
and some are prepared to die for it. Yet nations are not necessarily based on 
deeply rooted bonds, historically shared values and cultural practices (e.g. 
language, religion, ethnicity), but artificially constructed, even invented, 
political entities created within specific socio-political contexts, which are 
subsequently naturalised and mythologised.  
Anderson’s definition of the nation as an imagined political community 
implies that mechanisms are required to maintain the idea of the nation and 
inculcate in the populace a sense of belonging. One such mechanism is 
public monuments, notably national monuments and most especially 
cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers, which, Anderson claims, instill a 
sense of awe and reverence ‘precisely because they are either deliberately 
empty or no one knows who lies inside them’ (1983: 17). In their 
commemoration of historical persons and events deemed significant for the 
nation, monuments promote the notion of shared historical bonds and 
provide a stage for ceremonial public reverence that is designed to conjure 
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up the idea of the imagined community and foster the desire to belong. 
Indeed, Anderson sees nationalism as a kind of religious practice, which 
makes the gathering at sites of national memorials and monuments, ‘shrines 
of the nation’, comparable with pilgrimages to religious shrines as places of 
contemplation, where consciousness is shaped and identity performed. 
Hetherington (1998) nuances (and secularises) this argument by pointing to 
the link between politics and issues of identity and lifestyle. Identity is in 
part about spatiality, i.e. identification with particular places that act as sites 
for the performance of identity. Monuments and memorials are spaces where 
like-minded people can meet or assemble and engage in a collective 
remembrance of the past, aimed at a confirmation of identity and sometimes 
a shift in consciousness. 
I now want to focus on the new Hector Pieterson memorial and museum 
and the new Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct, both of which have been 
referred to in the media as ‘shrines of the nation’. I argue that their layout 
and architectural design were crucially inspired by the idea of communal 
gatherings and ritualized acts of commemoration. They are designed to set 
the stage for the public performance of officially endorsed memory. The 
need to provide a suitable space for mass gatherings, especially on the 
relevant public holidays, and a stage for officials to deliver a speech or 
publicly perform a symbolic act (e.g. laying a wreath) was crucial, because 
in both cases the site was largely undeveloped. The site of the ANCYL 
memorial in Orlando West was in the middle of a large traffic island and the 
modest memorial that Mandela had unveiled at Sharpeville in 1996 – 
referred to in one newspaper report as ‘a small outcrop of rock with a tiny, 
weather-beaten plaque’ (Anonymous 2000d) – was located on the edge of a 
vacant, unpaved and undeveloped lot.  
Unlike many of the country’s self-effacing memorials designed and 
constructed by local builders, both the Sharpeville and Hector Pieterson 
Memorials are ambitious, monumental, large-scale projects, designed by 
professional architectural firms. They reflect some conceptual engagement 
with the perceived role and purpose of a memorial and with the challenge of 
visualising memories and facilitating healing. Both structures commemorate 
similar events. They mourn the death of victims of apartheid violence and 
celebrate the heroism and bravery of peaceful protestors. Both events are 
well-known internationally and within South Africa, and both events still 
carry a high degree of emotional charge despite their relative historical 
distance. In both cases the commemorative structures were built with similar 
objectives in mind: to serve as national sites of identification and as tourist 
attractions; to acknowledge loss and restore dignity to affected communities; 
and to facilitate reconciliation and nation-building for the general public. 
How successful are the two similar yet different monuments in addressing 
these wide-ranging expectations? Although it was developed slightly later, I 
want to begin with a brief discussion of the Sharpeville Human Rights 
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Precinct (following on from Chapter Two), before engaging in a detailed 
analysis of the Hector Pieterson Memorial.  
Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct 
Ashplant et al. (2004: 52ff.) explain in their discussion of war memorials 
that the hegemonic framing of memories, in which the nation-state 
recognises selected war memories for incorporation into the national 
narrative, begins with the process of naming the respective memories and 
conflicts. In post-apartheid South Africa, 16 June, formerly referred to as 
‘Soweto Day’ or simply June 16th, has been declared a public holiday, 
officially called ‘Youth Day’ in memory of the crucial contribution made by 
the younger generation to the attainment of liberation. The controversial 
naming of the public holiday on 21 March has already been mentioned. In 
both cases, the name of the holiday indicates what is deemed symbolically 
significant about the day and impacts on the nature of its annual public 
commemoration.3 
In the case of Sharpeville, the hegemonic framing of memory through the 
politics of naming is transferred onto the actual memorial structure, which is 
officially called ‘Human Rights Precinct’, although it is popularly known as 
the Sharpeville Memorial. The site of the shooting had been well-known 
within the community but not formally marked until 1996. The initiative for 
a much more prominent memorial marker and the development of the 
surrounding site arose from two key trajectories. On the one hand there was 
the government’s increasing awareness of the unique symbolic significance 
of Sharpeville: firstly as the locus of the 1960 massacre, and secondly as the 
place where Nelson Mandela solemnly signed into effect the new South 
African Constitution, thus sealing the attainment of liberation over apartheid 
oppression and violence. On the other hand we find the urgent need for 
urban design and regeneration of this poverty-stricken, characterless 
township environment – for the benefit of the local community, but also for 
the sake of the increasing number of tourists attracted to this emotionally 
charged place. 
 
 
                                                     
3  In the context of the Freedom Park project (discussed in Chapter Seven) a public 
survey was conducted in 2001, which also revealed widespread criticism about 
the new names, which were generally considered unnecessary and unsuitable. 
‘June 16 and Sharpeville Day must be restored’ was the general sentiment 
(Survey 2001: 39). 
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Photo 4.2  Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct (Sharpeville Massacre memorial), 
Sharpeville, unveiled 2002. 
Following an initiative from academics at the University of Witwatersrand 
for the urban renewal of Sharpeville (among other neglected areas around 
Johannesburg), Gabriel Greeff, a Pretoria-based architect and urban 
designer, became involved. Greeff’s task was to design an appropriate 
memorial and heritage site, which would do justice to the increasing public 
interest in Sharpeville and function as the focal point of a new town centre, 
the core element that would give definition to future urban development 
expanding from that point. Apart from a memorial, the plan entailed a large 
arts and crafts sales outlet, a small amphitheatre, and a museum for human 
rights in the ‘town centre’.  
From there a ‘Freedom Walk’ – lined with text panels, sculptures and 
other suitable objects – was supposed to link the memorial with the local 
stadium, where the signing of the Constitution had taken place. No funds 
were available for the implementation of this elaborate scheme, but the 
Gauteng Department of Arts, Culture, Sports and Recreation offered the 
relatively modest amount of R1 million to ensure that at least one small 
component of the project would be realised, namely the adequate 
commemoration of the massacre through the construction of a dignified 
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memorial. This was eventually unveiled on 21 March 2002, while the 
adjacent museum, or rather Exhibition Centre, opened only three years later 
(21 March 2005), separated from the memorial space through a truncated 
version of the proposed Freedom Walk (Greeff personal communication 
2004).  
 
 
Photo 4.3  Sharpeville Exhibition Centre, Sharpeville, unveiled 2005. 
Greeff recalls struggling to find suitable design precedents drawn from an 
African cultural context, but then decided to focus on the concept of a 
wailing wall, stylistically inspired by North African gate structures and 
similar monumental walls in ancient Egypt (personal communication 2004). 
Hence the Sharpeville memorial is dominated by a massive red brick wall 
structure with a small central opening leading into the sacred fenced 
memorial space behind. The wall was meant to function as a clear definition 
and boundary, as well as marking the end of the axis that leads to the local 
church, where the service for victims of the shooting was held in 1960. Very 
obviously, the wall also defines a public space and a stage – ideal for annual 
commemorative ceremonies with their official speeches and ritualistic 
performances, but also possibly suitable for other community functions, 
notably those that aim to evoke (or appropriate) the memory of the past. 
A tall metal fence between buttresses delineates the triangular site of the 
memorial garden behind the massive gate structure. For Greeff it was most 
important that the memorial should imbue a sense of respect for the dead, 
which he tried to achieve through a strong formality of design, a sense of 
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order contrasting with the informal fabric or ‘chaos’ that characterises the 
surroundings (personal communication 2004). In other words, the strong 
seclusion of the memorial space from the traffic and buzz of its urban 
environment was to give it an aura of dignity and reverence. The more a 
monument site is separated from its surroundings, says Zeller (2000: 25), the 
stronger is its effect as a taboo zone, forcing the visitor into the role of the 
silent, awe-inspired viewer who feels duty-bound to pay respect. 
Although the memorial is located in the middle of the township, its 
implicit design precedent is a cemetery combined with the concept of a roof-
less church. The place of the congregated worshipers – on both sides of the 
central aisle – is taken up by the symbolic headstones of the 69 individually 
named victims or martyrs, assembling them for a kind of sacra 
conversazione (the actual bodies, it will be recalled, are buried at the local 
cemetery). The ‘apsis’ contains, in lieu of the altar, a water feature 
symbolising that ‘the spirit lives on’ (Greeff, personal communication 2004) 
and carrying connotations of peace, renewal, hope and perhaps symbolic 
resurrection. Like a small chapel or side altar, the older memorial cairn is 
incorporated on the side. The tall opening in the centre of the monumental 
gate structure facilitates entry into the sacred precinct (much like the portal 
of medieval cathedrals) and metaphorical transcendence, which is 
underscored by its axial alignment with the local church.  
Rowlands (1999) argues that in war memorials, the act of transcendence 
that is needed to break out of the melancholy induced by the identification 
with the dead is usually achieved through triumphalism – the assertion that 
the deaths were not in vain, that people had died for a good cause, and that 
something positive had been achieved. This assertion is accompanied by a 
suppression of humiliating or guilt-ridden memories. If one considers the 
Sharpeville memorial in conjunction with the display in the adjacent, 
recently opened exhibition centre, which illustrates the historical context of 
the Sharpeville Massacre and details the events of the day, a linear narrative 
of oppression, suffering, martyrdom and ultimate triumph emerges. It is 
tempting to draw parallels with eschatological biblical themes, especially 
because the TRC, too, was strongly mantled in Christian language and 
dominated by Christian mores, including even the use of certain symbols and 
ritual practices. This was in large part due to the dominant influence of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whose notions of reconciliation blend Christian 
religious concepts with aspects of African philosophy (Krog 2002: 109-11, 
153; Lodge 2002). 
One might question the appropriateness of a secluded, solemn memorial 
space as a town centre, but as King (1999) points out, the symbolic presence 
of the deceased in the midst of the community allows the living to commune 
with the dead and to care for them – much like their ancestors – in private or 
public acts of reverence. In traditional rural African communities the most 
important ancestors may be buried in the central cattle kraal, a much 
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respected space surrounded with taboos and rules of access.4 In his analysis 
of First World War memorials in Britain, King observed that there is often a 
suggestion that the dead are still somehow present: ‘A number of contem-
porary accounts, not only by spiritualists, refer to a sense of their presence at 
ceremonies or near memorials, but frequently as judges, issuing warning and 
requirements, rather than as souls at peace’ (1999: 156). Whereas King notes 
the inconsistency of this way of thinking with the traditional Christian 
conception of resurrection, this is presumably a most common and 
completely naturalised experience among African traditionalists.  
‘The way in which people choose to remember an event – indeed how 
they adjust to it – is as historically important as the event itself’, notes Philip 
Frankel (2001: 17). As mentioned earlier, based on extensive archival and 
oral history research, he uncovered an array of complexities and 
contradictions about the Sharpeville Uprising, exposed some highly 
disturbing aspects of the ‘Sharpeville story’, and cast some PAC leader 
figures in an ambivalent light.5 Echoing my earlier remarks about ‘bad 
victims’, the Sharpeville memorial and exhibition centre must suppress such 
uncomfortable memories because they compromise what is meant to be a 
tragic but inspiring narrative. Ironically, new heritage sites in South Africa 
habitually purport to tell the ‘truth’ about what happened in the past, to 
reveal the ‘people’s story’, long neglected in official historical discourses. 
But in reality such sites can rarely afford to expose the infinite gradations, 
contradictions and ambiguities inherent in historical events and persons, 
because ultimately they are intended to play a particular societal role, which 
includes providing moral guidance and achieving specific objectives aligned 
with national policies and government visions. 
In short, commemorative monuments and other products of the heritage 
sector delivered by the government limit the choices of how we remember 
the past, leaving little room for divergent memories and alternative 
interpretations. Not only does the PAC contestation of the Sharpeville 
                                                     
4  For the importance on the cattle kraal and generally cattle symbolism in Zulu 
culture, see Hammond-Tooke (2008). 
5  For instance, Frankel highlights the contentious role of black police officers 
‘around which a web of silence has been woven to this day’ (2001: 138). After 
the shooting, when the gates of the police station were opened and police fanned 
out to assess the situation, large numbers of black police apparently worked their 
way through the bodies and systematically killed those who were still alive. A 
contingent of five black police from Bez Valley specifically targeted women 
lying on the ground, using their assegais on the heart, throat or genitals of these 
victims (2001: 139). This may have been prompted by the outrage black police 
had experienced, when a group of women protestors close to the fence had raised 
their skirts and exposed their genitals as a gesture of contempt for the forces of 
law and order, while simultaneously shouting obscenities in their mother-tongue, 
targeted at the black police behind the fence (2001: 142).  
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memorial expose the myth of a unified liberation movement and shared 
experience of the struggle as a foundation of a unified post-apartheid nation, 
but contestation also emanated from members of the Sharpeville community, 
as mentioned in earlier. The fact that the ANC-dominated council of 
Vereeniging had pushed the project at the expense of actively involving 
Sharpeville residents and especially without sufficiently consulting victims 
and families on how they wanted the dead to be memorialised caused 
resentment that is still palpable within the community today. 
The Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum 
 
Photo 4.4 Hector Pieterson Memorial, Orlando West (Soweto), unveiled 2001. 
I now want to examine the Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum in 
Orlando West, designed by the Johannesburg-based architectural firm 
Mashabane Rose Associates. The site is today one of the country’s premier 
heritage sites associated with the liberation struggle and a major tourist 
attraction, constituting one of the highlights of a standard Soweto township 
tour. Although the community has always remembered the events of the 
Soweto Uprising and its victims, the new heritage development consisting of 
a memorial and adjacent museum represents a significant shift towards an 
increasingly formal, imposing, public and ‘official’ form of commemoration. 
Tensions had been rising for several months in Soweto in 1976 and from 
mid-May of that year about a dozen schools went on strike over the 
Afrikaans language issue and a long list of other grievances. On 16 June 
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students from three schools – Belle Higher Primary, Phefeni Junior 
Secondary, and Morris Isaacson High – planned to march to the Orlando 
Stadium to hold a meeting. Police, who were not specifically prepared for 
the event, intercepted and confronted one column of the singing, gathering 
crowd along the way in Vilakazi Street in the morning. Firing tear gas 
canisters failed to disperse the demonstrators, some of whom responded by 
throwing stones. The police then fired live ammunition into the crowd, 
killing 12-year-old Zolile Hector Pieterson and wounding several others. 
This incident sent the furious marchers on a rampage through the township, 
smashing windows and setting fire to schools, vehicles and government 
buildings. By the evening Soweto had turned into a battle zone with police 
pursuing and shooting at anyone who appeared to be involved in the rioting 
and destruction of property. The resultant bloodshed shocked communities 
and fuelled the anger of black youths throughout the country. What was 
planned as a local one-day protest action escalated into a nationwide revolt, 
eventually affecting more than 100 urban areas, leading to reprisals and 
further bloodshed over the course of almost a year (Karis and Gerhart 1997: 
167-8; Ndlovu, S.M. 1998; Pohlandt-McCormick 2008).  
Hlongwane (2008: 29) shows that the memorialisation of the June 16 
Soweto Uprising was an integral part of the unfolding liberation project. 
Annual commemorations of June 16, organised by the South African 
Council of Churches, were held at various churches throughout the country 
from 1978, but particularly at the well-known church of Regina Mundi in 
Soweto, one of the key sites of anti-apartheid resistance. In 1996, on the 
occasion of the 20th anniversary of the event, an exhibition of black and 
white photographs entitled Youth Uprising – Point of No Return was 
mounted, featuring photographs by Peter Magubane, Alf Khumalo, Sam 
Nzima and others. Curated by Bongi Dhlomo and Tumelo Mosaka under the 
auspices of the African Institute of Contemporary Art (AICA), the exhibition 
was installed in ten recycled shipping containers, which were set up in the 
vicinity of the ANCLY memorial in Orlando West. The site was locally 
known as ‘Hector Pieterson Square’ and had been declared a National 
Monument on 15 February 1995. The high number of both local and 
international visitors attracted by the exhibition (initially about 250, later 500 
visitors per day), underlined the significance of the 1976 revolt to South 
Africans and the international community and prompted the decision to 
extend the exhibition period (Baines 2007; Nieves and Hlongwane 2007; 
Simbao 2007). Nieves and Hlongwane (2007) provide a valuable insider 
perspective into the genesis of the June 16 memorial project that emphasises 
in particular the generally underrepresented participation of the local 
community and critically examines the role of community-based 
organisations such as the Ward Committee, the Local Economic 
Development Forum, the Civic Association, the Unemployed Forum and 
especially the Soweto Heritage Trust (SHT), which was founded in 1995 to 
IMAGINING COMMUNITY THROUGH BEREAVEMENT 
 
109
identify places of historic value and designate them as heritage sites. 
Conflict erupted between the SHT and the photographers of the exhibited 
images, when the Trust began to charge an admission fee for the exhibition. 
The photographers, who had made their work freely available as a service to 
the community, were incensed about the profit-taking and eventually 
withdrew their images. This left the site and the existing memorial stone 
denuded of an important and popular complementary component that could 
‘tell a story’ in compelling visual images. It also left a group of informal 
traders from the local community, who had become accustomed to selling 
craft and other merchandise to visitors, without an income (Hlongwane 
personal communication 2008).  
The vendors began to lobby the city for the installation of a permanent 
exhibition, hence in a sense initiating the idea of a museum. Simultaneously 
Jeremy Rose from Mashabane Rose Associates (and perhaps others) also 
conceived of the creation of a formal place of remembrance at Hector 
Pieterson Square through the construction of a more substantial memorial 
and a museum. During the course of the following years, this ambitious 
project – the first of its kind in a South African township – took concrete 
shape through a multiplicity of contributions and the collaboration of various 
stakeholders. The city of Johannesburg assigned Ali Hlongwane, a member 
of the Council, to represent the interests of the city and oversee the 
establishment of a curatorial team to conduct research and collect material. 
Mashabane Rose were appointed for the architectural design, and the SHT in 
conjunction with project architect Jeremy Rose embarked on a two-and-a-
half year venture to secure funds from both the public and the private 
sectors. The architects and the curatorial team collected photographs, 
archival material and artefacts, and a few members of the community 
proudly donated items for the emerging museum in their midst, the first such 
institution in Soweto (Rose, personal communication 2004; Nieves and 
Hlongwane 2007: 360-1; Hlongwane, personal communication 2008).  
Remembering June 16: Pars pro toto  
Various aspects of the Soweto Uprising are unknown, contested or 
sometimes misrepresented. Contrary to popular belief the first victim to be 
shot on that fateful day was not Hector Pieterson, but Hastings Ndlovu, who 
is believed to have died a few days later. Hector Pieterson was furthermore 
not an activist but merely an innocent bystander, drawn to the march mostly 
through curiosity and then inadvertently caught up in the events that led to 
his untimely death. Antoinette Sithole insists that her brother, being at 
primary school, was neither involved in student politics, nor would he even 
have known what the protest was really about. Although oral history 
research revealed that the role and contribution of primary school students 
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has been overlooked and underestimated (Hlongwane, personal 
communication 2008),6 Sithole maintains that the younger children 
(certainly in her brother’s school) were not briefed on the campaign and 
were not supposed to take part in the demonstration (Sithole personal 
communication 2003; Baines 2007). Nevertheless, the new memorial in 
Orlando West is dedicated to Hector Pieterson as an internationally known 
icon of youth resistance and as a personal link with ‘all other young heroes 
and heroines of our struggle who laid down their lives for freedom, peace 
and democracy’, as the dedication reads.  
This personalised mode of commemoration accorded more significance 
to the actual spot where Hector Pieterson was shot, which was identified 
only during the course of the research project as being at the corner of 
Moema and Vilakazi Streets, approximately two blocks away from the 
ANCYL memorial. Because the area surrounding this spot is built up, 
whereas the site of the ANCLY memorial was largely open for development, 
the new memorial complex was erected on the latter site. The first phase of 
the project hence focused on the enlargement and enhancement of this site, 
which necessitated the re-routing of one of the streets to turn the former 
traffic island into a larger plot. The commemorative complex comprises the 
memorial itself, unveiled on 16 June 2001, the museum, unveiled exactly 
one year later, an official marker on the spot where Hector Pieterson was 
shot and various visitor amenities, notably parking and a sales arena for craft 
vendors.  
The project’s most important financier was the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), which contributed R16.8 
million from the Poverty Relief Fund. The City of Johannesburg provided 
another R7.5 million at a later stage for the interior of the museum, and 
Standard Bank contributed services, being appointed by the DEAT as the 
implementing agent for the project (Vester, personal communication 2003; 
Anonymous 2001). The DEAT’s involvement was based on the rationale 
that the development would create income generation and employment 
opportunities for the local community. The national and international status 
of the Soweto Uprising and the close proximity of the site to other places of 
interest – notably the private homes of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, 
Archbishop Tutu, and the old Mandela family residence (now a museum) in 
Vilakazi Street – constituted ideal parameters for exploitation as a cultural 
tourist attraction.7  
                                                     
6  Since the new language policy was initially supposed to affect only primary 
schools, it was apparently in some cases the primary school students who played 
the most active role, while their older brothers and sisters came along only in 
support (Hlongwane personal communication 2008). 
7  ‘The Hector Pieterson Museum is of international interest and is expected to 
attract many tourists’, claimed the Gauteng Tourism Authority in a newsletter 
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Based on the Hector Pieterson Memorial as precedent, the official 
remembrance of many unnamed victims through one iconic representative 
became a popular strategy for other commemorative initiatives. Yet this pars 
pro toto approach is not always acceptable to the families and descendants of 
the victims, as became painfully evident in the case of the Stanza Bopape 
memorial in Mamelodi. Bopape was a prominent activist from Mamelodi 
who had participated in activities of the local civic structure. He disappeared 
along with 19 other youths who – according to TRC Investigations – had 
been killed and their bodies fed to the crocodiles of the Komati River in the 
Komatipoort border of Mozambique in 1986 and 1987.8 When in 1998 the 
ANC and the Civic Organisation built the Stanza Bopape memorial to 
represent all those who died in the Mamelodi struggle against apartheid, the 
families of the other dead activists were highly offended that they had not 
been consulted and the memorial did not acknowledge the names of their 
loved ones. In protest they resolved not to attend the unveiling of the 
memorial (Kgalema 1999: 20-1). 
In the case of the Hector Pieterson heritage site the conflict could be 
resolved by displaying the names of all of the other victims inside the 
museum. The memorial’s exclusive focus on Hector Pieterson was justified 
for several reasons: the boy constitutes the epitome of innocence, 
vulnerability and blamelessness, and he is free from any suggestion of 
aggression or violence, which might contaminate the story of the protestors’ 
morally elevated cause. But he is also widely known as an icon, based on the 
international recognition value of the famous photograph by Sam Nzima. A 
roughly life-size enlargement of the Nzima photograph, screen-printed on 
metal, was incorporated into the Hector Pieterson memorial, next to the older 
ANCLY memorial. The photograph forces the viewer to be literally 
confronted by the tragic group, as if asked to receive the dead body. It 
prompts visitors to visualize the historical event and appeals to them for 
identification with the victims. Adapting and modifying the Christian story 
of salvation, the Hector Pieterson Memorial condenses emotions and 
projects them onto one person whose suffering represents that of many 
others.  
Photographs often focus on motifs and follow familiar compositional 
schemata historically developed in the visual arts, especially painting. 
Nzima’s photograph compositionally mimics the entrenched Christian 
                                                                                                                            
(Anonymous 2001). Tourism is expected to bring development and employment 
into the area, notably through the creation of Small, Micro and Medium 
Enterprises (SMME), through craft stalls outside the museum building and 
training programmes run by the museum curator. 
8  It is estimated that a total of about 50 activists from Mamelodi died up until 
1994. Not all of them disappeared. Some of the bodies were found dumped in the 
streets (Kgalema 1999: 20-1). 
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iconographic tradition of the pietà, which, in turn, has informed the 
sculptural conventions of war memorial sculpture all over the western world. 
It expresses innocence and martyrdom, and implies the notion of ultimate 
triumph. Its compelling character and high recognition value has prompted 
numerous artists in South Africa and internationally to appropriate the 
Nzima photograph. Examples range from Kevin Brand’s 1996 work Pietà, a 
plastic tape installation on a wall of the Cape Town Castle, to French artist, 
Ernest Pignon Ernest, who adapted the famous photograph of the Struggle 
for Liberation as a compositional reference for his Aids Pietà project, the 
‘new Struggle’, in 2002. 
Echoing the case of the Hector Pieterson Memorial, a mural was painted 
on a wall near the entrance to the Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct, based 
on a photograph of the Sharpeville massacre by Drum photographer Ian 
Berry. Although Berry’s photograph is well known and is closely associated 
with the Sharpeville massacre through frequent reproduction and display, it 
lacks the compelling, iconic quality of Nzima’s image, arguably because it 
does not include those familiar, time-honoured compositional formulae and 
iconographic motifs. Testifying to the continued high level of identification 
with the Nzima photograph, Simbao’s (2007) detailed analysis illustrates not 
only the popularity and endless reproduction of the image, but also its 
creative re-working in different contexts, even its incarnation through 
performance. During the commemorative march on 16 June 2006, a group of 
young people holding up Youth Day posters marched, sang, and danced 
around the Hector Pieterson Memorial, when a young man spontaneously 
picked up a young boy and small group re-enacted the scene shown in the 
photograph as they continued to march (ibid.: 64).  
Design and symbolism of the memorial  
On the same occasion, the 30th anniversary of the Uprising, the Minister of 
Arts and Culture, Pallo Jordan, announced that a life-size bronze statue 
modeled on Sam Nzima’s iconic photo would be added to the memorial site. 
In February the following year the statue, made by artists Kobus Hattingh 
and Jacob Maponyane, was indeed completed with funds donated from 
Sweden via the Thanda Foundation (Ryan 2007), but never installed at 
Hector Pieterson Square. The addition of the proposed statue constitutes a 
rather ironic development, because from the outset local residents, 
represented by the ANC Youth League and the Soweto Development Forum, 
had voiced their desire for a bronze statue of Hector Pieterson. They 
envisaged the statue as being seven meters tall, according to Jeremy Rose, 
but the architects persuaded the community to refrain from this idea 
(personal communication 2004). As Rose put it, ‘a story must be told here’ 
and this cannot be achieved by setting up a statue. With the approval and 
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input of community representatives, the architects then designed the present 
memorial complex.  
An important design consideration was that the new commemorative 
structures should blend in with the characteristic township environment. The 
same holds true for Sharpeville, where the reddish colour of the wall finish 
was chosen to match the brick of the surrounding houses and the grass for 
the memorial garden was sourced from the nearby river to facilitate a certain 
sense of rootedness in the local context (Greeff, personal communication 
2004). According to Denis Gibbon from Mashabane Rose, the most 
important sources of inspiration for the formal design of the Hector Pieterson 
Memorial were the urban environment of the site, the historical narrative of 
the Uprising, and the notion of a large crowd (personal communication 
2003). The texture of the memorial is informed by street imagery such as 
cobblestones, gravel, slate and curbs. The emphasis was on smallish 
elements, human scale, and the usage of predominantly natural materials, 
notably rocks and water. In contrast to the Sharpeville Human Rights 
Precinct, the entire site was deliberately left unfenced and remains accessible 
from all sides.  
Along the north-western boundary of the Hector Pieterson precinct, the 
‘wall of memory’ forms the backdrop for the ANCYL memorial (which was 
slightly modified and raised) and the Nzima photograph. Built with many 
small stones – ‘symbolizing the crowd’ (Gibbon, personal communication 
2003) – the wall is not a solid divider but is broken up into uneven blocks or 
slabs that allow passage or transcendence. Towards the left of the memorial 
stone is the ‘garden of contemplation’, a circular patch in the pavement, 
filled with gravel and surrounded by benches and metal railings. Its 
depressingly drab appearance inverts all notions associated with the word 
‘garden’. Extensive inscriptions provide a narrative of the event and its 
significance, encouraging quiet contemplation. In axial alignment with the 
memorial stone, a stepped series of shallow water basins extends the 
memorial in a south-easterly direction. The entire axis is cut into the earth 
‘like a wound’ (Gibbon, personal communication 2003), much like Maya 
Ying Lin’s influential Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., 
although Gibbon insists that the reference was not conscious. In contrast to 
the imagery of violence and pain, the pools of water convey a quiet, 
peaceful, soothing mood and suggest healing and rejuvenation. This 
expresses two of the key functions of the memorial – remembering the pain, 
and healing. 
Ross (personal communication 2004) observed that much of the power of 
museums, monuments and memorials rests in how ‘generalisable’ they are, 
i.e. how different groups of viewers are able to connect the signifier 
(whether it is in an image, a piece of writing, or a pile of stones) to a larger 
process that evokes both feelings and cognition. It is partly for this reason 
that designers of commemorative monuments make frequent use of images 
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and iconographic formulae which – through extensive repetition and a long 
process of cultural diffusion – have become instantly recognisable. Their 
power and popularity lies in the fact that they appear to trigger similar 
feelings in people of a wide range of different cultural backgrounds.  
The fact that diverse groups of visitors tend to find intense meaning in 
Maya Lin’s abstract, minimalist Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington 
D.C. suggests that there are very simple signifiers that have the power to 
evoke remarkably similar emotional responses across time, space and 
culture. The same applies to some natural elements, for instance fire or 
water, which have extensively been used in monument and memorial design 
throughout the world. Yet ultimately, it is difficult to determine whether it is 
the inherent quality of a particular shape or element that has the power to 
trigger virtually universal feelings, or their mere conventionality, the 
extensive usage of certain elements in recurring specific contexts that has 
established a cross-cultural tradition of emotional responses. 
Although there are also important differences, memorials to the victims 
of the freedom struggle in South Africa are comparable with the genre of 
national war memorials, sharing such key characteristics as the presence of 
idealism, suffering and death, fighting for a noble cause, defending or 
bringing about a new political order.9 Rowlands (1999: 132) reminds us that 
many memorials encourage remembrance of the dead or the painful event by 
giving it a narrative form. They largely repeat the visual forms of the past 
(e.g. the image of a soldier in uniform) in an attempt to encourage the viewer 
to repeat and then ‘live through’ the emotional experience. However, as all 
of us know from experience, such memorials can appear empty and lifeless, 
especially as their proliferation throughout the world has led to the over-use 
of pathos formulae. The opposite pole is marked by the minimalist solution, 
which seeks to disturb and encourage the viewer to imagine the experience 
rather than to visually conjure up a pre-arranged representation of it. Many 
Holocaust memorials also use an abstract or minimalist formal language in 
implicit acknowledgment of Theodor Adorno’s famous contention that 
extreme terror and suffering are beyond representation.10 In fact, Michael 
Kimmelman (2002) observed in a New York Times article that Minimalism 
has become ‘the unofficial language of memorial art’ in the United States. A 
                                                     
9  Rowlands (1999) highlights the tremendous growth in war memorials both in the 
West and elsewhere in the world during the past two decades. This suggests, he 
argues, that ‘the need to “find out” what happened, that the process of “coming 
to terms” is now and probably always has been more complicated than a passive 
acceptance that “they died for a good cause”’ (ibid.:129). 
10  Holocaust memorials have recently become the focus of numerous studies. 
James Young’s (1994) book constitutes a seminal study and in South Africa, 
Neville Dubow (2002) published a book on the subject. 
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cursory glance at recent projects in Europe and other parts of the world 
confirms the wider prevalence of this trend.  
Lack of descriptiveness and openness of meaning are often considered 
the strengths of abstract or minimalist sculptures, but according to Rowlands 
(1999), minimalist solutions can appear just as lifeless as the literal narrative 
of old. The Hector Pieterson memorial essentially blends both approaches. 
The literal repetition of the visual forms of the past is provided through the 
inclusion of Nzima’s photograph, which allows the viewer to travel back in 
time and participate emotionally in the event. The architectural forms, on the 
contrary, are highly abstract and ambiguous, provoking the visitor’s 
imagination and allowing for a transcendence of the state of emotional 
distress, notably through the symbolism of the pools of water. By viewing 
the memorial in its actual social and environmental context, the visitor is 
furthermore reminded of what has in fact been achieved through the actions 
of those who struggled for freedom.  
The Museum 
 
Photo 4.5 Hector Pieterson Museum, Orlando West (Soweto), unveiled 2002. 
The museum, whose strangely anthropomorphic ‘face’ is turned towards the 
memorial, is an integral part of the commemorative complex. Its red face-
brick architecture takes its cue from the surrounding township houses in 
accordance with the community’s request that the new building should as far 
as possible blend in with its surroundings (Rose, personal communication 
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2004). Without engaging in a detailed discussion of the museum 
architecture, it should nevertheless be noted that the Hector Pieterson 
Museum shows some parallels with the Apartheid Museum at Gold Reef 
City, in which Mashabane Rose were crucially involved. Both buildings are 
in turn influenced by two very important international museum buildings of 
recent date, namely Libeskind’s new Jewish Museum in Berlin and the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., by James 
Ingo Freed.  
Mahabane Rose’s appreciation of these key architectural works and their 
adaptation to the local South African context is highly significant in view of 
the fact that they have emerged as one of South Africa’s foremost archi-
tectural firms specialising in museum and commemorative architecture. 
There is certainly a high degree of diffusion (locally and internationally) of 
commemorative formulae and cross-fertilisation within contemporary 
architectural design generally, and within the sector of commemorative 
architecture specifically. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the design 
for the Sharpeville museum, which was developed after the completion of 
the Hector Pieterson museum, reveals remarkable similarities with the latter, 
despite the fact that Greeff claims not to have visited it at the time (personal 
communication 2004). 
Both the Sharpeville museum and the Hector Pieterson museum not only 
provide information about the respective historical events, thereby eluci-
dating and contextualizing the meaning of the memorial outside, but also 
function as elevated lookout points. At the Hector Pieterson Museum, large 
2.5 metre square windows are placed at principal points on the upper level to 
establish sightlines to significant sites in the surrounding area. These include 
the Orlando police station, the Orlando Stadium, the long rows of mono-
tonous township houses, and the actual site of the shooting. Text inscribed in 
the window-glass explains the significance of these sites and turns them into 
symbolic signifiers in their own right. The memorial complex thereby 
becomes the nexus of a much larger geographical matrix of significant 
places. The Sharpeville museum has similar windows, although the concept 
is less effectively employed there. 
This system of reaching out to points of significance and drawing in their 
symbolic meanings allows the visitor to visualize the course of the events in 
time and space – the route of the marching crowd, the arriving police force, 
the shooting, and the subsequent dispersal. Moreover it facilitates an 
understanding of the broader causes that led to the conflicts, and of the 
township context in which the 1976 Soweto Uprising is firmly anchored not 
as an incidental geographical location but as a highly significant site of 
socio-political control.  
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Memorials turned monuments?  
Is the June 16 heritage precinct a monument or a memorial? I want to digress 
briefly, at this point, in order to revisit and critically add to my earlier 
discussion of the distinction between the two terms, which appears 
particularly pertinent to the material discussed in this chapter. The state-
directed process of institutionalising the memory of resistance, combined 
with the trend towards more ambitious, ‘monumental’ commemorative 
developments, may suggest that memorials are being turned into 
monuments. Many critics are likely to agree with this observation, yet I want 
to show that this is too simplistic a viewpoint. Consider the following.  
Gibbon insists that the commemorative development in honour of Hector 
Pieterson and the Soweto youth of 1976 is a memorial, not a monument 
(personal communication 2003). Likewise, Greeff explains that the local 
community wrongly refers to the Sharpeville Human Rights Precinct as a 
monument, because it is really a memorial (personal communication 2004). 
He believes that the structure may one day become a monument, if the 
government declares it as such. If this implies that for Greeff the term 
‘monument’ signals an honourable status, for Dennis Gibbon it is rather a 
badge of shame, because a monument, in his understanding, is something 
‘out of scope’, ‘larger-than life’, and ‘cold’, while a memorial is ‘a living 
thing’, ‘something people can relate to’ (personal communication 2003). 
This comparison highlights the common confusion of two completely 
different dimensions associated with the term monument: the symbolic or 
philosophical sense (following Danto) and the legal sense, i.e. ‘monument’ 
as an indicator of a legal status, the result of an act of official promulgation.  
Historically the status of a ‘national monument’ was conferred on 
architectural structures and other significant objects by the NMC on the basis 
of exceptional artistic merit and/or historic importance. The term 
‘monument’ in this sense is a marker of quality and significance – according 
to the value systems of those empowered to confer such status (and the 
socio-political order they represent). Neither the old National Monuments 
Act nor the new NHRA distinguish clearly between a monument and a 
memorial. Heritage management staff at the SAHRA offices in both Cape 
Town and Johannesburg confirm the interchangeable usage of both terms in 
their professional practice.11  
                                                     
11  The National Heritage Resources Act (NHRA) frequently refers to monuments 
and memorials, but does not define either term. When SAHRA issued a file note 
on the topic ‘What the NHRA says about “Public Monuments and Memorials”’ 
in 2002, definitions were spontaneously drawn up on the basis of the New 
Oxford Dictionary. A memorial was defined as ‘something, especially a 
structure, established to remind people of a person or event’, whereas a monu-
ment is a ‘statue, building, or other structure erected to commemorate a famous 
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Even more significant is the new policy document’s replacement of the term 
‘monument’ with the term ‘heritage site’ in an attempt to create a more 
comprehensive category that can include intangible heritage often associated 
with previously marginalised groups. In other words, since the new Heritage 
Act has come into effect in South Africa, the government no longer 
proclaims anything a ‘monument’, but rather a ‘heritage site’. As Thabo 
Kgomommu from SAHRA explains, ‘the word monument is now limited to 
those structures that are built to memorialise or commemorate something’ 
(personal communication 2004), paradoxically suggesting that one can build 
a monument but not declare one. 
One might still insist that such legalistic differentiation does not affect 
the possibility of distinction in the theoretical sense. But there is one 
important dimension that never seems to enter this debate, namely the 
translatability of concepts and academic discourses across different 
languages. If in the human perception reality exists only to the extent that it 
can be represented through semiotic systems, notably language, it is 
significant to what extent the terms ‘monument’ and ‘memorial’ translate 
into, or even exist, in other languages. Consultation of common dictionaries 
reveals that the two English words do not precisely overlap with the 
denotative and especially not the connotative meaning of, for instance, 
French, German or Afrikaans terms for different types of commemorative 
markers. No equivalent distinction between monuments and memorials 
appears to exist in local African languages, which may account for the 
common interchangeable usage of the two terms and incidents of ‘wrongful’ 
denotation, as reported by Greeff. Moreover, critics may agree with 
members of the Sharpeville community that the Human Rights Precinct is a 
monument, but for entirely different reasons. In short, such distinctions are 
culturally specific and tied up with conventions of culturally distinct 
memory practices. In a multilingual, multicultural society, any distinction 
between memorials and monuments in a philosophical sense remains a 
matter of interpretation, tied to language and cultural conventions.  
Commodification 
When the incorporation of the famous Nzima image into the Hector 
Pieterson memorial was first considered controversy erupted, because 
Nzima, who had never been paid royalties for the use of his image, 
demanded R80 000 (some sources say R100 000) after copyrights had at last 
been awarded to him in 1998. The Pieterson family lambasted Nzima for 
                                                                                                                            
or notable person or event’ (SAHRA 2002). This reveals not only the obvious 
lack of precise distinction between the two terms, but also testifies to a 
considerable level of confusion.  
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being ‘greedy’, various organisations came out against Nzima and the 
ANCYL refused to pay such ‘exorbitant’ fees, threatening to drop the idea of 
including the image (see Mahlangu 2002; Memela 2002). Some argued that 
the image does not belong to Nzima but to the nation. This raises critical 
questions about who owns memories of the past and icons of the Struggle, 
who determines their meaning and representation, and who has direct or 
indirect rights to their use and commodification. 
The latter point is particularly important and controversial, as the process 
of institutionalisation is driven not only by political forces but increasingly 
by market forces and the private sector. In fact, the political process of 
authorising selected memories – involving careful framing, inspired 
packaging and symbolic branding – conveniently prepares the ground for 
private enterprise to step in and appropriate such heroes and famous events 
for commercial exploitation. One can increasingly observe the strategic 
alignment of private enterprises and commercial zones with highly 
recognisable icons of the Struggle through the process of naming, the 
installation of statues, and the sale of branded souvenirs and other 
merchandise, often directed at tourists. This is particularly evident with 
respect to the Mandela icon (despite fierce efforts at protecting his image 
and controlling its representation), and will be discussed in Chapter Ten. 
The bronze sculptural group of Hector Pieterson was eventually erected 
inside Maponya Mall, a large-scale upmarket shopping development opened 
in Soweto in 2007 (one of the first malls to be built in an African township 
in South Africa). At heritage sites throughout South Africa it appears that the 
presence of tourists, especially perhaps foreigners, strongly encourages the 
commercial exploitation of the commemorated event through the 
manufacture and sale of post-cards, books, souvenirs, and ‘struggle chic’. 
Hector Pieterson’s half-sister, Sina Molefi, in partnership with a clothes 
designer, recently licensed a range of apparel (T-shirts, caps, takkies, etc.) 
depicting the Nzima image or text relating to the Uprising (Baines 2007; 
Simbao 2007).  
Although some tourists reject such commercialisation,12 others are keen 
to purchase souvenirs that symbolically encapsulate, prolong and preserve 
their visitor experience, while simultaneously making a contribution to the 
social welfare of the local community. Simbao (2007) cautions against 
                                                     
12  While tourists are implicitly expected to assist the government’s poverty relief 
efforts through their purchases, it is often precisely these tourists who scorn 
victims for their unashamed attempt to make money out of their traumatic 
experiences. Simbao (2007: 8) reports that Mbuyisa’s mother at some stage sold 
postcards while telling her story on a bench outside the memorial, for which she 
was criticised by some visitors. Similarly, Antoinette Sithole, while on an 
overseas trip, was accused of commercialising traumatic memories when she was 
seen carrying postcards of Hector Pieterson. 
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wholesale dismissal of such commercial practices in favour of a more careful 
consideration of how these items are used and what meanings they might 
carry.13 In an international context of increasing alliance between heritage, 
life-style and consumption one can literally buy into a lifestyle based on 
specific memories and parade one’s identification with their associated value 
systems. 
Party-political appropriation  
In 2001 Antoinette Sithole – now employed as a guide in the Hector 
Pieterson museum – publicly expressed her appreciation that her brother is 
honoured as an icon of the Soweto Uprising, but simultaneously stressed that 
this ‘does not justify the heroism around him as a martyr’. Hector ‘was an 
ordinary child’, she explained, criticising all the ‘glamour’ now created 
around his death.14 In a personal conversation she expressed her disapproval 
of the politicisation and political party appropriation of the event and 
specifically her brother: politicians tend to ‘categorize these things … like 
today Hector Pieterson falls into the ANC’ (personal communication 2003). 
Pieterson’s mother, Dorothy Molefi, also voiced her grievance that the 
private memories of her son had not only become public property, but were 
increasingly exploited to advance an ANC political agenda (Baines 2007).  
Sifiso Mxolisi Ndlovu, himself a participant in the Soweto Uprising, 
critically observes that ‘[e]very year, prior to the commemoration of 16 June 
1976, one becomes aware of the dogfight between various liberation 
movements clamouring and posturing for recognition as champions of the 
uprisings’ (1998: 50). The TRC provided a media-effective forum for both 
the ANC and the PAC to lay claim to the Soweto Uprising and the role they 
played in mobilising the youths. Yet the TRC report largely dismisses such 
claims. Although some underground cadres were probably involved, the 
youths appear to have been mostly inspired by Black Consciousness 
ideology and motivated by their own grievances, rather than to have been 
following a directive from the exiled leadership of either of the two parties. 
Hlongwane adds, moreover, that although there were definitely links with 
the liberation movements, the oral history research conducted by the 
curatorial team brought to light various other constitutencies within the 
                                                     
13  For instance, wearing a Hector Pieterson T-shirt, especially by young South 
Africans today, must be seen in the context of South Africa’s tradition of protest 
T-shirts and can constitute an important part of the youths’ own re-interpretation 
and creative re-enactments of the past, as illustrated earlier (2007: 66). 
14  This quote by Hector’s sister, Antoinette Sithole, adapted from The Sowetan (15 
June 2001), is displayed inside the Hector Pieterson Museum.  
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community, whose contributions were previously unacknowledged or 
underrepresented (personal communication 2008).15 
While the extent of involvement of either party remains unclear, the TRC 
report concludes that the ANC benefited most from the events of 1976 and 
77, because ‘it was the only liberation movement able to absorb, train, 
educate and direct the thousands of youth who left South Africa as a direct 
result of these events’ (TRC report quoted in Baines 2007: 293). In the post-
apartheid context of competitive claims to the public memory of the Soweto 
Uprising, it was again the ANC, now the ruling party, that ‘was well 
positioned to fashion a narrative of the uprising in terms of which the 
community story coincided with its own version’, concludes Baines (2007: 
299). Certainly the Hector Pieterson memorial can be interpreted (and has 
been interpreted) as an attempt by the ANC to cement the ruling party’s 
association with this key icon of the liberation struggle. 
Hlongwane rejects such claims about ANC appropriation as overly 
simplistic. He is, after all, a member of the PAC, and he saw his appointment 
to the position of chief curator of the Hector Pieterson museum as a call to 
bring a multiplicity of voices and perspectives to the fore (personal 
communication 2008). As in the Sharpeville museum and other exhibitions 
dealing with the anti-apartheid struggle, the exhibition at the Hector 
Pieterson museum relies heavily on photographs, film footage and text 
panels, although a few artefacts such as T-shirts and posters are also 
included. The visitor is first invited into the auditorium to view an audio-
visual presentation explaining the context and course of the event, then 
proceeds through the exhibition in roughly circular fashion, and ends up at 
an extruded memorial space near the foyer, where the names of all those 
who died are recorded.  
Without engaging in a detailed discussion of the exhibition, which has 
been done by others (e.g. Baines 2007; 2008), it is indeed evident that 
different perspectives are featured in the museum, for instance through 
eyewitness accounts, and certain aspects of the Soweto Uprising are 
somewhat demythologised. This applies notably to the role of Hector 
Pieterson, which is so strongly affirmed in the memorial space outside the 
museum. I would argue that any visitor will get a far more nuanced and 
balanced understanding of the event when visiting the museum, as opposed 
to viewing the memorial on its own. Unfortunately it appears that many 
visitors do not avail themselves of this opportunity. But, as Hlongwane 
acknowledges, any museum suffers from space limitations, the need to 
                                                     
15  For instance, Hlongwane mentions the Student Action Committee and other 
groups of activist students who played an important role in terms of 
coordination, interaction with personalities and leader figures, the production of 
posters, etc. Certain teachers also contributed crucially in conscientising their 
students in the classroom (personal communication 2008). 
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reduce text and the pressure to present a compelling, somewhat simplified 
narrative (personal communication 2008). The voice of certain interviewees 
who now occupy prominent roles within the ANC leadership inevitably 
looms larger and sounds more authoritative than others, especially when 
their ‘memories’ tie in with familiar versions of the narrative.  
Although the initiative for the construction of the Hector Pieterson 
memorial complex may have come from the community and the private 
sector, the ANC dominated national government (in the form of the DEAT) 
and the ANC dominated local government (the Johannesburg Municipality) 
eagerly embraced the project. At the official opening of the museum, on 16 
June 2002, little mention was made of Standard Bank as a major sponsor16 
and Mashabane Rose was only credited for the architectural design, not as 
co-initiator of the project.17  
As in the case of Sharpeville, many members of the local community 
surely identify with the memorial and appreciate its presence, but others are 
likely to associate the site primarily with the tourist consumption of a 
‘famous’ event or a politicised stage for government officials pursuing their 
own agendas. Some individuals who were personally affected by the Soweto 
Uprising have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the representation 
of the event in the commemorative development. Elizabeth Makhubu, 
mother of Mbuyisa, who is seen in Nzima’s photograph carrying Hector’s 
body, resents the fact that her son was not sufficiently honoured in the 
memorial (Davie, personal communication 2003). She testified at the TRC 
that her son was not an activist, but felt forced to flee the country because he 
was so traumatized through his experience of June 16 and feared for his 
safety. Police had harassed the family after identifying Mbuyisa in the 
photograph, who they claimed had posed for the photographs. Like Hector 
Pieterson, Mbuyisa Makhubu was an accidental martyr of the liberation 
struggle. Unlike Pieterson, Makhubu is largely forgotten today (Baines 2007: 
290-1). 
Poppy Buthelezi, one of the survivors of the Soweto Uprising, who has 
been confined to a wheelchair due to the injuries she sustained on that day, 
voiced her grievances in a prominent Mail & Guardian article with the tell-
tale title ‘Our leaders forgot us’ (Anonymous 2003a). To her, not much has 
                                                     
16  The bank did not provide cash, but contributed substantially over the duration of 
the entire project by donating the services of Bruce Vester, then Senior Manager 
of the Property Division, for the management of construction and finances, as 
well as three or four members of administrative support staff. In fact, Vester 
reports that the Standard Bank was invited to the opening only at the very last 
minute and that it feels bitter about having received so little acknowledgement 
for its role in the project (personal communication 2003). 
17  At a visit shortly after the opening of the museum, I found the following 
‘initiators’ acknowledged on a plaque in the foyer (in this order): DEAT, 
DACST, City of Johannesburg, Standard Bank and Soweto Heritage Trust.  
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changed in the ‘new South Africa’ and those who fought for freedom in the 
past are still forced to struggle today. She resents the manner in which the 
sad events of June 16 have been turned into an occasion for celebration:  
Since 1994 this noble day has lost its meaning. Instead of being commemorated 
in a dignified way it has been hailed as a day of celebration. Celebration for 
what? The present government is simply undermining and insulting our painful 
history. For us June 16 will always be a solemn day, the day we changed the face 
of the revolution, a day of courage (Buthelezi quoted in ibid.). 
While government officials tend to criticise the general lack of interest in 
national Youth Day, not only among white, Indian and ‘coloured’ South 
Africans, but even among black youths,18 others – notably members of the 
older generation – express their dissatisfaction about the way June 16 is 
‘celebrated’ rather than ‘commemorated’.19 Similarly critical voices are 
frequently heard about the character of the commemoration that takes place 
annually on 21 March. The PAC and some members of the local community 
want the day to be a solemn remembrance of those who lost their lives, but 
the ANC considers the public holiday a joyous occasion for remembering 
what has been achieved through the loss of life.20  
In other words, in both cases the ANC-dominated government deter-
mined that the symbolic significance of the Soweto Uprising and the 
Sharpeville Massacre and their respective associated public holidays lies in 
the ultimate triumphal outcome of a tragic narrative. This interpretation 
parallels the framing of the past in most other new heritage developments 
and links with the foundation myth of the post-apartheid nation. Its best-
known and most visible example is the branding – both in a symbolic and a 
                                                     
18  In 2002, Gauteng Premier Mbhazima Shilowa bemoaned the lack of interest 
among whites, Indians and ‘coloureds’ in national celebrations of Youth Day. 
‘But even the youthful crowd he addressed in a half-full Orlando stadium 
yesterday was largely uninterested. They came alive only when the kwaito 
sounds of Mandoza’s Godoba blasted from the loudspeakers. “We need to ask 
ourselves: What can we do to ensure that all races celebrate with us? We can 
organise marathons, athletics and kwaito competitions, which are other ways to 
celebrate Youth Day”’ (Tabane and SAPA 2002). See also Baines (2007). 
19  Simbao observed in the context of the 30th anniversary of June 16 in 2006 that 
many members of the Soweto community appeared reserved about the official 
commemorations staged at the Hector Pieterson Memorial and made a point of 
not attending the large commemorative concert at the FNB stadium, which took 
place afterwards (personal communication 2007). 
20  For instance, on 22 March 2002, PAC secretary general Thami ka Plaatje was 
quoted as saying, ‘The ANC has chosen to celebrate Sharpeville by turning it 
into a social jamboree that involves playing gangster rap and kwaito. We think 
Sharpeville should be commemorated in a solemn, dignified manner in 
remembrance of our fallen heroes’ (Ngidi, Mntungwa and Sapa 2002).  
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commercial sense – of Robben Island as a monument not to suffering and 
hardship (as the PAC leadership would interpret it), but to the triumph of 
overcoming such suffering. This was eloquently expressed by Ahmed 
Kathrada’s now famous statement: 
While we will not forget the brutality of Apartheid we will not want Robben 
Island to be a monument of our hardship and suffering. We would want it to be a 
triumph of the human spirit against the forces of evil; a triumph of wisdom and 
largeness of spirit against small minds and pettiness; a triumph of courage and 
determination over human frailty and weakness.21  
The establishment and consolidation of this branding influences every aspect 
of the work of the Robben Island Museum, including educational messages 
and research, and not least the public representation of the island to visitors. 
When I first visited the island short after its official opening for tourists in 
January 1997, the guided tour – conducted by ex-prisoners and ex-warders – 
was still strongly influenced by the guide’s personal memories and 
subjective perceptions of life on the island, but on subsequent visits the 
narrative appeared considerably more standardised and scripted – an 
observation shared by other scholars (e.g. Kruger 2000; Coombes 2003). 
Deacon (2004: 315) observed that even the personal stories offered by tour-
guides are influenced by the triumph narrative. At Robben Island and 
elsewhere, this interpretation may contradict the sentiments of many 
individuals who were personally affected by or involved in the events of the 
past.  
This is to suggest that below the surface celebrated in the inspiring 
speeches of public officials, the hyperbolic tourism marketing literature and 
the exciting tour guide narratives presented to visitors, ordinary people and 
particularly the victims and active participants in the historical events do not 
necessarily share the government-sanctioned version of ‘their’ history, 
experience and identity. The appropriation of their stories is particularly 
                                                     
21  This statement and its paraphrases have been published in various forms by the 
Robben Island Museum, including on the home page of the Robben Island 
website (www.robben-island.org.za), and on the cover of folders and other 
promotional material. According to Coombes (2003) the statement actually 
formed part of the PAC’s response to a study conducted by Peace Visions in 
1993/4 about the future of Robben Island: ‘For the PAC the significance of 
Robben Island lies in the triumph of the human spirit over the numerous 
obstacles placed by human beings upon human beings. The history of Robben 
Island shows that human beings have the capacity, individually and collectively, 
to overcome huge obstacles. While the island is not a main priority at this time 
the PAC places emphasis on the history of the island and the contribution it 
made to the development of the PAC’s understanding of non-racialism’ (ibid.: 
57/8). 
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likely to be contested when the narratives of nation overlap with the 
narratives of the ANC to the exclusion of the contributions and experiences 
of other participants and organisations in the historical processes at stake.22 
Cynics may argue that the ANC is abusing its power within the demo-
cratically elected government to enshrine its own preferred version of the 
historical past in the official memory landscape and shape the historical 
consciousness of the present citizenry and especially the new generation 
before potential future changes in the political playing field might favour 
different interpretations of the past.  
To put this attitude in perspective, it must be remembered that in any 
nation, including western democracies, monuments reflect dominant 
ideologies and the heritage field is always gradually reshaped in accordance 
with policies and values upheld by the government elected by the majority. 
Azaryahu’s (2003) work on the politics of memory demonstrates that the 
memorialisation of the concentration camp of Buchenwald near Weimar in 
Germany is an excellent example.23 Heritage is always subjective and tied to 
prevailing power relations. As Linenthal (personal communication 2005) 
aptly put it: there is no point in saying that heritage is biased, because bias is 
the whole point of heritage. Having said this, there can be no doubt that the 
more the state gets involved in heritage, the stronger looms the danger of a 
state-monopoly on public memory and the potential reduction of the people 
to mere spectators of ‘their own’ heritage landscape. Ultimately the question 
arises for whose sake these sites are primarily installed and at whom their 
‘message’ is addressed. 
Community identification with newly installed heritage  
The replacement of the term ‘monument’ – historically associated with 
elitist, Eurocentric notions of memorialization – with the all-inclusive term 
‘heritage’ was not only intended to acknowledge and celebrate previously 
neglected facets of the past as valid and valuable, but also, implicitly, to 
increase community interest and identification with cultural heritage 
                                                     
22  Ironically, in line with government policy and in contradistinction to top-down 
approaches followed by the past regime, all new heritage developments involve 
processes of community participation, as said in Chapter One. However, it may 
be suspected that certain agendas introduced by government representatives tend 
to become imperatives that supersede dissenting variations. 
23  Azaryahu (2003) first discusses the contrasting ways in which Buchenwald was 
previously commemorated in the former West German and East German state. 
After reunification the government commissioned a group of heritage experts to 
develop a new interpretation and turn Buchenwald into a memorial site of the 
reunited Germany. Not surprisingly, the end result is far closer to the former 
West German paradigm of remembrance than the former East German one.  
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conservation. Public officials and the media regularly emphasize how much 
communities value the new museums and symbolic markers constructed in 
their midst, but in reality people’s sense of ownership may be far more 
limited. This is supported, for instance, by museum visitor patterns 
dominated by school groups and foreign tourists, but rarely local 
communities, and by the high level of vandalism, misuse and neglect, which, 
ironically, affects newly installed monuments to a greater degree than the 
politically contested monuments of ‘the oppressor’.  
 
 
Photo 4.6  Vandalism at Emlotheni Park (Vuyisile Mini Heroes Acre), New 
Brighton (Nelson Mandela Metro), photographed June 2009. 
On a recent visit to the Eastern Cape, I was shocked to witness the state of 
deterioration that had affected the Emlotheni Park Heroes Acre in New 
Brighton since my last visit a few years ago: light fixtures had been stolen, 
metal parts of various kinds removed, and paving bricks ripped up. Sporadic 
visitors may not realize the extent of the vandalism that has afflicted heritage 
installations country-wide, because its traces are sometimes more quickly 
removed than at Emlotheni. Needless to say, this work is done at consider-
able expense to already overstretched public maintenance budgets. Based on 
sources such as media reports, municipal records and oral testimony of 
stakeholders and local residents, I venture to claim that almost all monu-
ments, memorials and statues installed since 1994 have suffered either 
damage due to neglect or deliberate defacement of some kind or another at 
some stage. The only exceptions seem to be monuments located in highly 
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secured areas, such as the publicly inaccessible National Monument to the 
Women of South Africa in Pretoria or the seated bronze statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi in Chatsworth, prudently placed in a lake.  
The threat of vandalism has become so prevalent and the type of 
vandalism so predictable that it poses considerable constraints on the design 
process and exerts a tangible influence on the aesthetic language, choice of 
materials and positioning of new commemorative markers. Authorities are 
increasingly resorting to building high fences around the new monument to 
keep people out. At Sharpeville, as explained above, the sturdy high fence 
was integrated into the design of the memorial from the start. The single 
entrance gate is securely locked at night and during the day staff from the 
adjacent exhibition centre provide some protection. At the Hector Pieterson 
site, a conscious decision was taken against a fence, but here the craft 
vendors have played a pivotal role in watching over the memorial that has 
become the source of their livelihood (Hlongwane, personal communication 
2008).  
The extent to which monuments and other public facilities have been 
subjected to defacement and deterioration can be considered one of the most 
remarkable and distinctive characteristics of post-apartheid heritage 
development, but the real question is what exactly this observation means. 
Some may be quick to conclude that the vandalism is clear evidence of a 
broadly lacking sense of community identification with the type of heritage 
products commonly installed, but I do not agree with such wholesale 
judgment. The issue deserves more nuanced consideration.  
One might see the maltreatment of new commemorative markers in the 
context of community disgruntlement over lack of consultation and party-
political appropriation of their memories. Resentment on the part of victims 
and their families who find their loved-ones inadequately memorialized can 
be found not only at Sharpeville and Orlando West, but at many newly 
developed heritage sites. It can certainly be assumed that people who hold 
such sentiments are unlikely to identify with and care for the respective 
monument. But the mothers of victims and other immediately affected 
stakeholders are not likely to be the perpetrators of physical violence against 
symbolic markers in their midst; they presumably express their anger 
verbally or perhaps through boycotting of official commemorative functions. 
In fact, the type of violation meted out at new monuments and memorials is 
almost never committed to convey some kind of calculated ‘message’ of 
dissatisfaction. The only exceptions are a few examples of clearly politically 
motivated acts of defacement ostentatiously committed by ultraconservative 
white extremists, who sometimes spray-paint statues of black heroes with 
Afrikaner nationalist symbols.24 It is only in those cases that one can safely 
                                                     
24  For example, the Tshwane statue in Pretoria, the Biko statue in East London and 
the Makhado statue in Makhado (formerly Louis Trichardt) have been defaced 
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interpret the defacement as an expression of a shared sentiment of rejection 
among members of that particular community.  
The type of maltreatment that post-apartheid monuments are most 
commonly subjected to is not specific to monuments at all, but similar to the 
kind of vandalism meted out at public property of all sorts (as well as old 
commemorative markers as will be discussed in the next chapter). Much of it 
is economically motivated, involving the theft of ‘useful’ components, such 
as the light fittings at Emlotheni, or valuable metal parts, especially bronze.25 
The life-size bronze statue group of Robert Waterwitch and Coline Williams 
in Athlone, installed in 2005 at a cost of around R330 000, was completely 
removed and carted off to a scrap metal dealer, where the thieves were 
allegedly paid R9000 for the bronze (Minnar 2009). The sculpture was later 
recovered and re-installed. The phenomenon of bronze theft has become so 
common that replacements of stolen statues or plaques are now sometimes 
fashioned in bronze look-alike fibre-glass26 although in at least one case, 
thieves even stole the fibre-glass copy.27  
As opposed to the theft of bronze, which receives a fair amount of media 
attention, the general level of misuse, neglect and degradation of heritage 
installations tends to be underreported. Litter can frequently be found in 
heritage spaces; water features are routinely used for laundry and ablutions; 
monuments with seating areas or quiet spaces become favorite hang-outs for 
vagrants and drunkards. The square polished granite blocks that comprise the 
new Slave Memorial in the city centre of Cape Town were immediately 
appropriated as seating opportunities, as tables for the display of 
merchandise or as a convenient stands for the placement of advertisement.28 
Although such treatment speaks of a lack of respect and probably lack of 
understanding of heritage and its purpose, such type of abuse is not 
                                                                                                                            
with spraypainted references to ultraconservative Afrikaner political symbols, 
notably the old Oranje flag (see chapter 10). 
25  See Chapter Five for examples.  
26  A case in point is the monument of the SS Mendi in Ga-Mothakga-resort in 
Atteridgeville, unveiled in March 1998 in honour of the black South Africans 
who lost their lives when the SS Mendi sank in the English Channel in 1917. The 
bronze sculpture on top of the high plinth was stolen soon after the unveiling; it 
has meanwhile been replaced with a fibre glass copy. 
27  The stolen bronze eagle on top of the Sir Pierre van Ryneveld monument on the 
ground of Pretoria University was replaced with a fibre glass copy, but in 
December 2006, the Volksblad reported that thieves had removed the sculpture 
again (Fourie 2006). 
28  Monuments tend to be located in parks and grassy environs, which serve the 
homeless as a place of rest. In the case of the Resistance Park in Durban, 
unveiled in 2002, the problem of drunkards misusing the monument was 
facilitated by the presence of a liquor store across the road. The municipality was 
eventually forced to fence the monument in. 
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necessarily committed with malicious intent. In some cases it is motivated 
by the plight of vagrants and people who have no access to proper facilities; 
more broadly speaking it reflects a widely prevailing utilitarian mindset 
constantly on the look-out for the practical use-value of facilities in the 
public domain. The more extreme face of this mindset is an attitude of 
complete carelessness that considers public property simply as free for the 
taking. This can easily lead to the most worrying type of vandalism, namely 
completely wanton, senseless destruction, committed without any specific 
purpose, perhaps in anger, frustration, in a drunken stupor or out of sheer 
boredom.  
Importantly, as Wilma Cruise, co-designer of the Slave Memorial, aptly 
observed, it is not only vagrants and ordinary people who neglect and deface 
monuments, but city officials and municipal authorities bear their share of 
responsibility (Cruise, oral contribution to discussion 2009). Once unveiled, 
often with great fanfare, new monuments tend to be left without further care 
or maintenance, on some occasions even without proper completion of the 
initial construction. Almost a year after the unveiling of the Slave Memorial, 
for instance, the city of Cape Town has not yet lived up to its promise to 
install the interpretive plaque, yet they are already occupied with the 
planning of other memorials. Poor workmanship and the use of less durable 
or lower cost materials further contribute to the quick deterioration of post-
1994 monuments.29 
Poverty, poor education and a historical lack of exposure to and 
involvement in (western forms of) heritage conservation are undoubtedly 
important factors, but they can ultimately not explain the extent of vandalism 
and general degradation. As Shepherd aptly observes, one of the paradoxical 
aspects of heritage is that it hovers between individual consciousness and the 
collective; it exists fundamentally as corporate entity, a set of values and 
objects held in common, but it is always experienced from an individual 
standpoint (2008: 117). This includes the possibility that some individuals 
have no experience whatsoever: they neither support nor reject the heritage 
development; they simply have no opinion and can’t be bothered at all. The 
                                                     
29  Clearly there is often more interest in making a highly publicized statement than 
a sustained intervention in the heritage landscape. In my experience, a familiar 
pattern is emerging, whereby the construction process of a new monument / 
heritage site is delayed for various reasons; this results in a great rush to 
complete the structure in time for the unveiling ceremony, the date of which is 
usually tied to anniversaries or other symbolically important occasions; the rush 
leaves no time for finishing touches and after the great day of the unveiling, 
interest in actually completing the monument drops dramatically. On several 
occasions, I have witnessed monuments that were left incomplete even years 
after the unveiling; in some cases, the last piles of building rubble had never 
been removed; in other cases, the first signs of vandalism and natural 
deterioration began to occur before the monument was actually completed.  
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lack of care for heritage installations and indeed, the lack of respect for 
public property and public spaces more generally suggest a failure to share 
in a sense of citizenship that involves pride in liberation or in nation. One 
must acknowledge the existence of subaltern groups, which may include the 
earlier mentioned vandals and vagrants, who are completely alienated from 
society and who do not feel part of any community.  
Chipkin (2007: 156-7) writes about the emergence, during the mid-1980s, 
of a new conception of the democratic space – not simply as political protest, 
but as the pursuit of political ends through demands for service delivery. The 
sense of being part of that democratic space, being a citizen of the 
democratic nation, is hence connected to one’s perception of the state’s 
engagement in service delivery. Those who experience themselves excluded 
from the state’s public services, those who feel that the state has failed them, 
may express themselves through refusal to participate in public discourses 
and respect for public spaces. From their perspective, a monument that 
implicitly celebrates the overcoming of oppression and the achievements of 
the newly democratic order in which all people are valued equally, may not 
only be perceived as meaningless but as an insult.  
Having said this, a few important points must be acknowledged in the 
final analysis with respect to the issue of vandalism and community 
identification. Firstly, although little is known about the perpetrators and 
their motivations, it can be assumed that acts of vandalism are usually 
committed by individuals. Hence I maintain that the defacement of a 
monument does not necessarily allow us to conclude that the broader 
community does not identify with the monument. Many members of the 
community – if asked for their opinion – would probably severely condemn 
the defacement. Secondly, a monument is meant to fulfill multiple purposes 
and is addressed at diverse audiences; while it may be completely pointless 
and even offensive to some, it can simultaneously be deeply meaningful, 
significant and authentic to others. Thirdly, a targeted effort at more 
education, consultation and awareness creation could be very effective in 
enhancing the level of community ownership, identification and respect for 
heritage installations. This is a priority area of concern for the National 
Heritage Council (NHC), which was established in 2004 to attempt a more 
effective transformation of the heritage sector through the development of 
strategic policy and more community engagement.30 
                                                     
30  The (NHC) is a public entity established through the Act of Parliament (NHC 
Act 11 of 1999) and came into being in February 2004 with Advocate Sonwabile 
Mancotywa as CEO. Its functions are to protect and preserve heritage in South 
Africa, raise awareness about heritage matters, conduct broad-based consultation 
on heritage matters, provide funding for community-based heritage initiatives 
and advise on policy (NHC website 2009; see also Wells 2004; 2007; 2008). 
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Conclusion 
The upgrading of the Solomon Mahlangu Square, the Sharpeville Massacre 
Memorial, the Hector Pieterson memorial and other memory sites 
throughout the country indicates how, within the space of a few years, the 
post-apartheid government has assumed an increasingly active and powerful 
role within the heritage sector and in the metaphorical and literal 
construction of the new memory landscape. Throughout the nation, the state 
invests in selected historical moments, victims’ stories and struggle heroes, 
and turns them into heritage. The memory sites are marked by ever more 
ambitious commemorative initiatives, whereby the significance of the event 
and the greatness of the person are increasingly seen in linear relation to the 
portentousness of the monument. The associated narratives are carefully 
crafted to foster national unity, reconciliation and social cohesion, but also to 
entrench preferred readings of the past and portray a new national identity. 
This is part of a much larger dynamic of developing and institutionalising 
a new public culture and shaping a new historical consciousness, which 
involves the media, the school history curriculum, and indirectly (I would 
argue) even publicly funded academic research. Lawrence (2002) considers 
how Sharpeville is taught in schools today and suggests that the strong 
emphasis on specific outcomes in terms of the viewpoints, attitudes and 
values stipulated by the Revised National Curriculum for Social Sciences is 
potentially dangerous. Rather than developing autonomous, critically 
thinking citizens, this approach to history, argues Lawrence, can lead to the 
manipulation of memory and indoctrination, not unlike the history textbooks 
of old (Lawrence 2002: 4, 6).31 
Based on the TRC hearings and oral history research, the post-apartheid 
monuments no doubt contribute to making visible and lending legitimacy to 
previously denied facets of the past, which are of deep emotional 
significance to the affected communities and beyond. But the implicit 
authenticating of some interpretations over others also encourages a new 
process of mythologising and alienates those who hold alternative memories. 
As much as some may feel honoured by an ambitious monument in tribute to 
their heroes and experiences, others may instead resent the fact that their 
                                                     
31  Mirna Lawrence’s (2004) excellent research report – accompanied by a learning 
programme in the form of an open-ended, non-prescriptive Teacher’s Guide – 
focuses on how Sharpeville is publicly remembered and especially how this 
iconic event and its significance are taught in schools. The Revised National 
Curriculum for Social Sciences stipulates that history teaching in South African 
schools should encourage a critical analysis of complex historical events, but 
should also develop an appreciation of the country’s heritage and constitutional 
values.  
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accustomed community spaces and humble symbolic markers have been 
turned into ostentatious monuments and tourist attractions.  
Monuments often become focal points of contestation and public debate, 
grinding stones of public opinion, against which divergent ideological 
positions or identity discourses are played out, sometimes accompanied by 
powerful public gestures that can involve violence against the monument. 
Such engagement marks the division between those who identify with the 
government-supported narrative of nation and those who actively oppose it. 
But I have suggested that the type of vandalism and degradation that South 
African heritage installations are predominantly subjected to speaks 
precisely of a lack of participation and engagement, a lack of interest in 
public debate and alienation from the democratic space. While it is important 
to highlight how much memorials and monuments can mean to some, it is 
equally important to point out that for others, the newly installed heritage 
sites are markers of a fractured society. They not only fail to meaningfully 
articulate the notion of a shared past, but they also fail to articulate a sense of 
present citizenship.  
  
5 
Dealing with the 
Commemorative Legacy of the 
Past 
Introduction 
Previous chapters have illustrated that changes to the public landscape of 
memory began manifesting themselves almost immediately after the end of 
apartheid, while simultaneously the administrative restructuring of the 
heritage management sector was under way and the formulation of policies 
about heritage and public monuments slowly proceeded at national and local 
levels. In comparison with many international contexts, for instance post-
soviet societies, South Africa did not experience incidents of mob violence 
against monuments representing the old regime, but a few markers were 
indeed destroyed, deliberately or inadvertently; some statues and especially 
busts were removed; some monuments were relocated; and others were re-
interpreted or re-contextualized. Sometimes the need for a clear policy on 
such matters of symbolic representation was prioritised only after a de facto 
alteration of the heritage landscape had caused dissent. 
Discussing key examples as case studies, this chapter examines new 
challenges affecting symbolic markers representing the old guard and how 
the latter have been adapted to the needs of a new socio-political order. I will 
trace the fate of specific contested monuments and engage with the processes 
and discourses that shaped the remoulding of their meaning and sometimes 
their physical appearance. It will become evident, once again, that the 
treatment of existing memory sites involves a delicate balancing act between 
signalling continuity in the interest of reconciliation and rupture in the 
interest of defining a new beginning. The chapter is structured along the 
lines of the different options that present themselves for dealing with 
contested heritage, which can broadly be categorised as removal, relocation 
and re-interpretation. I argue that the effectiveness of re-interpretation in 
rendering a contested monument acceptable to the majority is often doubtful, 
and furthermore that the modification of the originally intended meaning in 
the name of political correctness is often unacceptable to the minority who 
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identify with these markers. The obvious solution, then, is to build new 
monuments complementing existing heritage. 
Destruction, damage and vandalism 
 
Photo 5.1  Empty plinth following theft of bronze sculpture, Beyers Naudé 
Square, Johannesburg. 
In broad daylight during the afternoon of Thursday, 18th September 2003, 
thieves removed a large bronze sculptural group from Beyers Naudé square 
in front of the Municipal Library in the city centre of Johannesburg. The 
sculpture was called ‘Family group’, created by Ernst Ullmann, and given to 
the City by The Star on 6 May 1968. Amazingly the theft of this massive 
sculptural piece took less than two minutes and was precisely timed between 
3:10 pm and 3:12 pm to elude the rotating security camera. Nobody saw the 
incident (Basson 2003). The whereabouts of the bronze group remains 
unknown. Most likely it was sold to a private art collector, but it may also 
have landed at a scrap metal dealer’s to be melted down.  
Countless monuments have suffered from the removal of bronze plaques 
or the sawing off of protruding sections of the sculpture.1 As said earlier, the 
                                                     
1  One example is Anton van Wouw’s well-known Kruger monument in Church 
Square in Pretoria. The Daily News reported on 23 January 1996 that vandals 
had sawn off the barrel of a Martini Henry rifle held by one of the Burgher 
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scourge of this type of vandalism affects by no means only or even 
predominantly ‘white heritage’, but there are some forms of defacement that 
are particularly tragic with respect to these older memory sites, for example 
the fact that Anglo-Boer War memorials and grave sites are regularly looted 
by treasure hunters (de Bruin 2002). There are also isolated incidents of 
accidental damage as well as the more or less deliberate destruction of 
smaller monuments in the context of development projects.2 It is highly 
regrettable that no comprehensive database has yet been compiled for future 
reference, recording the destruction of these symbolic markers or 
systematically capturing their inscriptions to facilitate the replacement of 
stolen plaques at a future date. 
Although some of the perpetrators may find the old statues expendable or 
undesirable, there is little evidence to suggest that any of these acts of 
vandalism are politically motivated. Initially, a political motive was sus-
pected when the portentous monument on Strijdom Square in Pretoria – a 
gigantic head of former prime-minister, J.G. Strijdom,3 shaded by a 
billowing concrete dome – collapsed on 1 June 2001, exactly 29 years after 
its unveiling and 40 years after South Africa became a republic under the 
National Party regime. The gigantic head had suddenly tumbled off its 
pedestal and the monumental structure imploded, leaving a chaotic site of 
destruction right in the heart of Pretoria and causing much debate. Yet, no 
evidence of wilful destruction was ever found (Anonymous 2001c; 
Anonymous 2001e; Stiehler 2001).  
No ‘white’ monument has been as deliberately and violently destroyed as 
the ‘black’ memory site of Ntaba ka Ndoda in the Eastern Cape, formerly the 
Ciskei ‘homeland’. The imposing architectural structure, commandingly 
situated on the sacred hill of Ntaba ka Ndoda, was built in 1981 by Ciskei 
‘homeland’ leader, Chief Lennox Sebe, as a spiritual place of identification 
with a Ciskeian national identity. Sebe had reportedly been inspired by a 
visit to Masada in Israel and used the monument to stage ‘national’ 
celebrations which the people were forced to attend. After a military coup in 
the Ciskei, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo turned the monument into a military base, 
but when the military was withdrawn early in 1994 and the formal end of the 
homeland was declared, the community went on an aggressive rampage to 
destroy the much-hated monument. Sebe’s bronze statue in the Ciskei capital 
                                                                                                                            
statues. Pretoria sculptor Phil Minnaar was commissioned to repair the damage 
(Anonymous 1996).  
2  In February 2004 a Voortrekker monument in the Great Trek Park in 
Vereeniging, originally set up in 1988, was knocked over and destroyed by 
construction machinery after the land had been sold to a developer. The 
inconspicuous monument was supposed to have been transferred to a local 
museum in Vereeniging (Tempelhoff 2004). 
3  J.G. Strijdom was Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa from 1954-58. 
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of Bisho was also removed, albeit less violently. There are plans to turn the 
ruins of Ntaba ka Ndoda into a cultural tourist attraction, but when I saw it in 
2003 the site was visited only by herds of cattle, which had deposited a thick 
carpet of dung inside the rooms (Bunn 1999; Grant 1995). 
The removal of Verwoerd statues and busts 
Contrary to the common lament by conservative Afrikaners, to the present 
date the only noteworthy, high-profile case of iconoclasm targeted at an 
Afrikaner nationalist monument under the post-apartheid government was 
the removal of the Verwoerd statue in Bloemfontein.4 More than any other 
political figure of the past, Hendrik F. Verwoerd (1901-1966) is widely 
perceived as a symbol of apartheid. Born in Holland but educated in South 
Africa, Verwoerd worked as a newspaper editor and held the position of 
professor of social psychology at Stellenbosch University before embarking 
on a political career. By 1955 he was the dominant force in the National 
Party cabinet with strong support from Prime Minister JG Strijdom. He 
made his mark as Minister of Native Affairs and then became Prime 
Minister following Strijdom’s death in office in August 1958. From the 
outset of his tenure, Verwoerd advocated the concept of a republic as a 
rallying point for Afrikaners and pursued a political programme based on 
coercive social engineering to maintain the migrant labour system and 
control of the urban African workforce. He laid the foundations for the 
systematic racial segregation of all spheres of life and introduced a large 
quantity of repressive apartheid legislation (e.g. the much-hated pass laws, 
the Group Areas Act and the Bantu Education Act) that prompted a new 
wave of protest and resistance (SADET 2004: 16, 20-1; Davenport and 
Saunders 2000: 390ff.).  
The fact that the memory of Verwoerd is therefore extremely offensive to 
the majority of the population prompted the newly-elected ANC-dominated 
(Orange) Free State Legislature to vote for the removal of the statue, as well 
as the renaming of the Verwoerd building, the prominent government 
administration high-rise, in front of which the statue was enthroned on a high 
plinth. On 9 September 1994 a work crew removed the letters from the 
façade of the building and the statue from its pedestal. The photograph of the 
colossal 4 m statue lying on its back quickly became one of the icons of 
change at the beginning of the post-apartheid era, but the manoeuvre incited 
heated emotional reactions on both sides of the racial and socio-political 
divide. Black onlookers witnessed the process with cheers and joyful toy-
toying. One individual was reported as climbing on the empty pedestal and 
                                                     
4  The statue was made by Gerard de Leeuw and originally unveiled by Betsie 
Verwoerd on 17 October 1969.  
THE COMMEMORATIVE LEGACY OF THE PAST 
 
137
jokingly assuming the well-known pose of the Verwoerd statue. A few 
individuals trampled on and danced on the toppled statue (Anonymous 1994 
a; b; c; d; e; f; g; h).  
Many white residents of Bloemfontein and conservative Afrikaners 
throughout the country were outraged – not only by the fact that the statue 
had been removed but also by the disgraceful manner in which this had 
occurred. The Freedom Front, the Conservative Party and the AWB firmly 
condemned the move and the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge 
(FAK), the most important Afrikaner cultural organisation, warned that the 
elimination of such symbols could lead to violence. Angry protests of 
individuals, reflected in a deluge of letters and articles in the Afrikaans news 
media, testified to the fear of many Afrikaners that the statue’s removal 
signalled the beginning of the wholesale destruction of their culture and 
heritage (Anonymous 1994 a; b; c; d; e; f; g; h; August 1994).  
However, the new Free State premier, Patrick Lekota, quickly moved to 
allay such fears by asserting that statues and other cultural heritage items 
would not be indiscriminately removed. At national level, Deputy President 
F.W. De Klerk reassured the public that the cabinet would propose 
‘guidelines’ for dealing with the issue (Anonymous 1994g) and President 
Nelson Mandela himself publicly criticised the insensitive way in which the 
dismantling of the Verwoerd statue had been handled. A newspaper report 
quoted him as saying the ANC must be ‘particularly careful because we have 
the massive majority and the world and the country are watching us’ 
(Anonymous 1994d).  
In retrospect the hysteria appears ironic and completely unwarranted, as 
virtually no more changes were made to the monumental reminders of the 
old order in Bloemfontein5 or anywhere else for the next decade. Only inside 
public institutions – schools, libraries, hospitals, and government 
administration buildings – busts of Verwoerd and other controversial figures 
were removed fairly systematically (although not without exception)6 from 
foyers and assembly halls, usually quietly and without much ado. Among the 
exceptional cases where such action caused public debate and protest from 
conservative minorities was the removal of a Verwoerd bust from the 
entrance to the Pretoria Academic Hospital (also previously named after 
Verwoerd) in April 1997. A group of white right-wingers gathered in a 
solemn congregation, deferentially paying tribute to their hero in a public 
show of reverence (Anonymous 1997b).  
                                                     
5  Among the very few exceptions is the removal of the Children’s Monument 
mentioned further below.  
6  For instance, in March 2003 the then Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, was 
reported to be offended by the fact that a bust of Verwoerd at the Hendrik 
Verwoerd High School in Pretoria had not yet been removed despite the 
successful integration of the school (Louw 2003). 
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While one might dismiss such performances as isolated interventions by 
fundamentalists and extremists, the fact remains that the majority of the 
white community in South Africa, including liberal and progressive-minded 
individuals, tends to be defensive about and emotionally attached to the 
symbolic markers of their past. This is not necessarily because they identify 
(or ever have identified) with the role models, values and intended ‘message’ 
each of these monuments conveys, but because they have an increasing 
sense of alienation, and anxieties over black domination and perceived 
threats to their sense of cultural identity and their future role in the country. 
Hence, any proposal to change or remove commemorative monuments or 
other aspects of ‘white heritage’ (notably name changes) regularly provokes 
public outcries and protests. A monument that nobody seemed to care about 
for decades can suddenly become a matter of heated debate and turn into a 
rallying point for a defensive community.  
Although some removed busts and statues end up in storage rooms and 
quickly slip into oblivion, others are by no means erased from public 
memory. In fact, some statues have been leading an animated afterlife, 
passing through new symbolic and economic markets that emerge in the 
process of transition from one political order to another. When Verwoerd’s 
widow, Betsy, passed away in 2000, her modest house in the Northern Cape 
town of Orania was turned into a Verwoerd museum, serving as a new home 
for many Verwoerd busts ‘donated’ from all over the country. 
Orania, often referred to as the ‘Afrikaner homeland’ or the ‘last bastion 
of the Afrikaner nation’, consists of a thriving farm and a small settlement 
privately owned by an ultra-conservative Afrikaner community who reject 
racially integrated development and fiercely defend the traditional cultural 
and religious values they cherish as integral to their understanding of 
Afrikaner identity. Towering above the town on a small hillock, the 
community erected the orange and blue Orania flag and a miniature statue of 
Verwoerd. For several years Verwoerd’s daughter, Anna Boshoff, and other 
residents attempted to have the disgraced Bloemfontein Verwoerd statue 
(stored in a government warehouse since its removal) shipped to Orania, 
either to replace the rather pathetic-looking miniature or to be established in 
another appropriate place of honour. Instead, the statue was transferred to the 
VTM in Pretoria, which has emerged as a suitable holding facility for a 
number of busts and paintings no longer wanted in their familiar places. At a 
visit in 2007, the Verwoerd statue was still wrapped up in a ‘body bag’ 
awaiting storage or even its possible future resurrection in an appropriate 
heritage space on the grounds of the VTM. 
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Photo 5.2 Miniature bronze statue of Hendrik F.Verwoerd, Orania, Northern 
Cape. 
It is important to emphasize that the sneering and disdainful treatment meted 
out to this contentious statue on the occasion of its toppling has remained an 
isolated incident. To my knowledge, no comparable deliberate physical 
abuse and subsequent public outrage have accompanied any other of the 
isolated cases in which colonial or apartheid-era monuments were removed 
or relocated. It appears that these objects are still to some extent sacrosanct 
and treated with a sense of respect, even if unceremoniously placed in 
municipal depots or hidden from public view in other storage facilities. To 
my knowledge, there has also to date not been a single incident of a ‘surplus’ 
Afrikaner Nationalist statue or bust being turned into a quaint apartheid 
artefact, an object of amusement, or a unique commodity. No such statue has 
been incorporated, for instance, into the décor of a new restaurant or 
township tavern, as imagined by South African writer Ivan Vladislavić in his 
fictional story about the fate of a discarded Lenin statue (Vladislavić 1996; 
Popescu 2003). In the current South African situation, I believe, even the 
most enterprising and callous businessman would consider violating such 
taboos to be in bad taste. 
Relocating monuments  
It is telling that despite Ngubane’s explicit request more than a decade ago, 
no concrete guidelines or criteria have as yet been developed to facilitate the 
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removal of selected colonial and apartheid-era monuments. The process of 
removal is acknowledged as being contentious and divisive, whereas the 
installation of new monuments is presented as an inclusive, unifying act, 
conducive to nation-building and reconciliation. Not only is this rationale 
often questionable, but I argue that it is in fact politically more opportune to 
erect new monuments as a mechanism for the inscription of new ideological 
values and a preferred reading of the past than to remove existing ones. 
Moving from such general statements to specific contexts, it must be 
considered that not every provincial government, city council and rural town 
community considered the transformation of the existing array of 
monuments to be equally urgent. Priorities depended largely on specific 
local parameters, such as the availability of resources, the perceived urgency 
of basic service delivery, demographic factors, political power relations and, 
perhaps most importantly, the presence of an influential government official 
with a strong vision and drive to keep the issue of symbolic markers on the 
agenda (e.g. the former mayor of the Nelson Mandela Metro, Nceba Faku). 
Attesting to the link between heritage and political power, very little 
activity occurred in terms of democratically adjusting the memory landscape 
in the Western Cape and notably Cape Town before the 1999 elections. Only 
after the ANC gained a substantial share in the provincial government and 
Cape Town elected an ANC mayor was the heritage of previously neglected 
groups afforded more serious attention and a few new commemorative 
projects emerged in the townships. It was only in 2004/05 that the office of 
the UniCity Mayor, NomaIndia Mfeketho, initiated the ‘Memory Project’ in 
collaboration with the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), an NGO 
set up to pursue aspects of the unfinished work of the TRC. Geared towards 
‘community healing’, the purpose of this flagship project is to transform 
Cape Town’s symbolic markers, physical environment and cultural life.7 
There is, however, another factor that may explain the slow pace of 
interventions in the memory landscape in Cape Town and perhaps 
elsewhere. The implementation of the new heritage legislation with its three-
tiered management system created confusion about which authority is 
ultimately responsible for decisions about the possible removal, relocation or 
re-interpretation of existing monuments and the addition of new 
                                                     
7  Christian Ernsten (2006: 75), who was involved in the project while serving an 
internship at the City’s Department of Urban Design, writes critically about the 
official three-page document introducing the Memory Project: ‘In reading the 
text, I was struck by the absence of historical analysis or reflection (besides a 
single sentence in the introduction referring to the colonial and apartheid past), 
and by the fact that the authors of this document had not used notions such as 
identity, culture, or heritage. The City and the IJR seemed to attempt to create 
memory objects without a narrative’. 
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commemorative objects.8 As much as the decentralised structure of the new 
heritage legislation system was meant to federalise and democratise heritage 
management, it must be acknowledged that it also burdened municipalities 
with a new set of responsibilities and challenges. Heritage impact 
assessments (along with an environmental impact assessment) are now 
required prior to any new development. Some municipalities were compelled 
to devise heritage management plans, develop a heritage policy9 or guide-
lines on the interpretation of the NHRA, compile inventories of local 
monuments, or set in motion processes for public participation. Some 
municipalities established heritage departments or heritage units within other 
departments (e.g. Architecture, Urban Planning or Environmental 
Management) to deal more effectively with issues of heritage.  
In Durban, for instance, the municipality’s ‘heritage department’ orga-
nised a workshop on monuments and memorials in 2000, attended by 
various stakeholders within the heritage sector, representatives of local 
communities and interested parties from the general public. One of the 
measures recommended on this occasion in dealing with the commemorative 
legacy of the past was the physical repositioning of statues and smaller, 
movable objects away from highly official, prestigious places (e.g. in front 
of the city hall) to less prominent locations and ‘community spaces’.10 Such 
                                                     
8  The SAHRA report (2003: 29) points out for Cape Town: ‘In terms of the three-
tier heritage management system outlined in the NHR Act, most of the 
memorials within the study area should be regarded as local or Grade 3 heritage 
resources and thus they should ultimately fall under the decision-making 
responsibility of the local authority, namely the Heritage Resources Section of 
the Environmental Management Unit or the City of Cape Town Municipality. 
However, at present, interventions affecting all objects older then 60 years 
remain the decision-making responsibility of the provincial heritage authority, 
i.e. HWC, until such time as this heritage management responsibility is delegated 
to the local authority. However, there are no procedures in place to delegate 
responsibilities … There is at present no coherent policy relating to the repair, 
maintenance, adaptation and interpretation for existing memorials or for new 
additions. Within the three-tier management system for heritage resources 
SAHRA is responsible for developing overarching policies and principles for the 
national collection of memorials and issues relating to memorialisation. 
However, these policies and principles still need to be interpreted at a provincial 
and local level before any specific interventions are implemented’. 
9  The Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council, for instance, commissioned a private 
heritage management company, CULTMATRIX, to develop a proposal for a 
Heritage Policy, Strategy and Action Plans in 1998 (GPMC Minutes, 7 May 
1998). 
10  Kearney (2000) has outlined this as one of the preferred options for colonial and 
apartheid era monuments in Durban. ‘Examine each monument, memorial or 
object in relation to its origin, meaning and context. Find new homes and 
situations for them. Shift their spatial dominance from the city centre. But find 
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relocation has been mooted elsewhere as a compromise solution that ensures 
the conservation of existing monuments whilst simultaneously rendering the 
content of their ‘message’ less universal, authoritative or offensive.11 
In practice, very few public monuments have thus far been relocated. A 
representative random example would be the so-called Children’s 
Monument in Bloemfontein, a bronze group representing ‘The children of 
South Africa’, which was originally unveiled in 1959 and consisted 
exclusively of white youngsters in Voortrekker garb. In 2003 the sculpture 
was moved ‘for sake-keeping’ from its original location in the Sunday 
School building to the Oranje Girls High School a few streets away, where it 
was unveiled on 2 October 2005 (Smith 2003; Dressel 2006). In some cases 
the relocation or realignment of monuments was not politically motivated 
but merely the pragmatic result of local town planning measures and it 
would be mistaken to assume that every such move invariably leads to a 
deflation of the monument’s significance or symbolic authority. In Durban, 
for instance, a monument to the 15th century Portuguese explorer, 
Bartolomeo Diaz, originally erected by the Portuguese community in 1988, 
was transferred from its previous site on the Marine Parade pedestrian 
walkway along the beach-front to a newly designed small park in the 
harbour. Although now perhaps exposed to a smaller audience, one might 
argue that the monument of the famous navigator has in fact accrued 
significance through this shift, as it now forms the focal point of a park 
named in his honour.  
Dealing with soviet-era statues in post-communist societies  
As opposed to Eastern Europe, where ‘an upsurge of humour, irony and 
deprecating imagery swept away the symbolic remains of communism’ 
(Popescu 2003: 420), South Africa still treats the past and its symbolic 
reminders with respect. It is interesting to digress, for a moment, to Russia 
and other countries under the tutelage of the former Soviet Union, to observe 
how these societies have dealt with the heritage and specifically the 
monuments representing a now widely discredited and often vehemently 
hated communist past. After the collapse of the Soviet Union many statues 
were removed from their accustomed places in the Russian capital, although 
there was by no means a systematic attempt at the wholesale clearance of 
monuments imposed on the citizens by the Soviet order. Up to the present 
day one can find statues of Marx, Lenin and other leaders of the working-
                                                                                                                            
new locations for them in meaningful spaces and places’, recommends Kearney 
(ibid.: 9). 
11  See for instance the section on recommendations in the SAHRA Monuments 
Project Report 2003 for each of the three cities surveyed. 
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class movement (although not Stalin), some of which were perhaps too large 
or otherwise impractical to dismantle. While some dismantled statues may 
been destroyed, a good number appear to have been conserved through 
relocation to a park at the State Tretyakov Gallery.  
 
 
Photo 5.3 Relocated soviet-era statues in the State Tretyakov Gallery Park, 
Moscow, photographed in 2003. 
The Tretyakov is the National Museum of Russian Fine Art and the adjacent 
park is an outdoor extension of the museum space for the purpose of 
exhibiting large-scale sculptures. To some extent, this context allows the 
political statues, intermingled with the art pieces, to be appreciated as works 
of public commemorative art, but on the whole the statues, usually deposed 
from their plinths, appear simply to have been dumped there for want of a 
better place.  
In the Hungarian capital, the General Assembly of Budapest, a body 
predominantly controlled by the Alliance of Free Democrats, decided in 
December 1991 to remove the city’s symbolic reminders of Communism 
and establish a purpose-built heritage park or open-air museum as a publicly 
accessible repository of the dismantled statues (James 1999: 300). Since 
such statue parks are also sometimes suggested as a ‘solution’ for the South 
African statue ‘problem’, it is worthwhile taking a closer look at two 
overseas examples. 
The Budapest Statue Park Museum was opened on the outskirts of the 
city in 1993 with about 40 artifacts, including full-length statues, busts, 
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reliefs and plaques, arranged into three sections.12 The park’s designer, Ákos 
Eleöd, was reportedly keen to avoid creating a ‘counter-propaganda park’ by 
providing evaluative, explanatory text messages that would guide visitors 
towards a pre-determined interpretation. Rather, his intention was not to pass 
judgement on the statues (and especially the artists who created them) and to 
contextualize them in ways that respected the diverse memories and 
experiences of different visitors and encouraged an openness of meaning 
(James 1999: 296, 304).  
Although it has become a must-see tourist attraction, the statue park has 
also been widely cricitised. Many local residents considered the removal of 
the statues and the construction of the park a waste of scarce public funds. 
They would have preferred the familiar landmarks to have remained in their 
accustomed places, albeit perhaps officially re-interpreted. Politically, the 
establishment of the park was perceived as a matter of partisan politics in a 
context where various factions sought to appropriate important memories 
and establish their anti-communist credentials. Aesthetically, many people 
objected to the undiscerning selection of artefacts on display and the 
government’s failure to distinguish between communist kitsch and genuine 
works of art (ibid.: 306-07).  
As opposed to the government-initiated and funded Budapest Statue Park, 
the Soviet Sculpture Garden at Grutas Park (Gruto parkas) in Lithuania, by 
far the largest Soviet era statue park in Europe, is entirely a private-sector 
operation. Following the attainment of their independence in 1991, the three 
Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – immediately embarked on an 
iconoclastic onslaught on the symbolic reminders of the widely detested 
Soviet occupation. In Estonia and Latvia bronze statues and other types of 
commemorative monuments were quickly destroyed, but in Lithuania the 
state invited constructive proposals from the general public for the destiny of 
the deposed relics in the interest of conservation and education. Viliumas 
Malinauskas, a successful business magnate in the mushroom industry, won 
the tender, mostly on the grounds that he did not request any public funding 
for his proposed Soviet era heritage park. The tourism potential of Grutas 
Park, nicknamed ‘Stalin World’, and its establishment in a rural area much 
in need of development (the park is located next to the village of Gruto, ca 
130 kilometres southwest of the Lithuanian capital Vilnius) were additional 
strong points.  
 
                                                     
12  The first one is dedicated to monuments commemorating the liberation of 
Hungary from Nazi Germany and the enduring friendship between Hungary and 
the Soviet Union. The second section contains monuments dedicated to 
individual Hungarian activists in the working-class movement, while the third 
houses monuments to various working-class episodes and ideals (James 1999: 
294-5). 
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Photo 5.4 Soviet Sculpture Garden at Grutas Park, Lithuania, opened in 2001. 
Malinauskas invested about two million Euro to create this unique heritage 
establishment, which included extensive drainage of ca 20-30 hectares of 
wetlands, the transport and sometimes purchase of statues and relics (most 
were donated), the construction of various buildings, as well as a playground 
and mini-zoo for the entertainment of small children. Grutas Park officially 
opened in 2001. It holds over 80 statues in a landscaped setting and a total of 
about 1.5 million artefacts, including paintings, posters, photographs, 
uniforms, and pins, many of which are exhibited in wooden buildings that 
reconstruct typical soviet-era institutional establishments (Malinauskas 
personal communication 2007). Along the edge of the park, barbed wire and 
watch towers with attached megaphones recreate the atmosphere of 
concentration camps and the Soviet Gulag prisons.  
Although the representation of the past at Grutas Park conveys a clear 
attitude towards Soviet ideology and neglects any positive aspects of the 
Soviet era, Grutas Park aspires to be a serious educative (as well as 
entertainment) site, which does not intend to overtly denigrate or ridicule the 
country’s Soviet heritage and cause offence to sympathetic Russian visitors. 
Each statue is accompanied by a plaque with well-researched historical 
information in Lithuanian and English, as well as – in many cases – a photo-
graph of the statue in its original setting. Likewise, inside the museum 
buildings text panels and an optional audio guide available in different 
languages provide detailed information. The site is regularly visited by 
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school groups and is popular with local residents and foreign tourists alike, 
the vast majority of whom have welcomed the existence of the park and have 
expressed positive reactions to its displays (Malinauskas personal 
communication 2007; Bark, personal communication 2007l; Coulaloglou 
2006; Grutas Park 2004; Anonymous undated).  
But Grutas Park, like the Budapest Statue Park Museum, has also been 
criticised, albeit on different grounds. The main objection appears to be the 
theme-park nature of the park, its commercial basis and tourist orientation, 
which some perceive as inappropriate and insensitive to the suffering of the 
Lithuanian victims of the Soviet occupation. Some critics even object to the 
mere fact that the park conserves monuments of ‘killers’ and ‘tyrants’, 
pointing out that no comparable monuments to Hitler or Goebbels have been 
deemed worthy of preservation and public display (Anonymous undated). 
Closer examination of the statues and the individual personalities they 
represent moreover reveals some ambiguous or contradictory cases that raise 
questions about selection and interpretation.13 The fact that a particular 
statue is displayed in this themed heritage space in the company of other 
specific statues prompts a particular reading of its meaning which the 
statue’s original context may not have suggested or intended. Consultants 
from relevant national authorities (e.g. the Arts Council) were involved in 
the establishment of Grutas Park and – according to Malinauskas (personal 
communication 2007) – regularly monitor the representation and interpret-
ation of its monuments and artefacts, but it is nevertheless extraordinary that 
the conservation of the country’s most significant period in recent history 
rests so prominently in the hands of a private investor. 
Soviet-era heritage parks can be credited with rescuing discredited public 
statuary from destruction, hence perhaps conciliating iconoclast and 
conservationist forces, but their relocation from their accustomed public sites 
into the new context of a themed heritage space, subjected to the tourist 
gaze, inevitably changes their symbolic meaning (Johnson 1995). However, 
it is now widely acknowledged that the ideological significance of these 
statues has never been stable. How widely the official meaning of these 
monuments and related political symbols was ever shared by the general 
                                                     
13  The most striking example is that of a young woman, Adele Siauciunaite, whom 
the audio guide introduced as ‘an example of a destiny destroyed by 
Communism’. The young woman had contributed her services to the Soviet 
cause during the interwar period, but pursued certain interests of her own that 
brought her into conflict with the authorities. She was killed in 1938 at the age of 
24, allegedly by Soviet authorities. Asked about the rationale behind including 
this ostensible ‘victim’ among the indisputable ‘villains’ of Communism, 
Malinauskas laconically responded that ‘all these people did something bad’ 
(personal communication 2007) and explained that Siauciunaite’s statue is set up 
in the section of the park that focuses on collaborators, not the worst 
perpetrators.  
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populace, and what alternative readings individuals developed and 
disseminated within private circles, while publicly paying lip service to the 
official version, may never be known. It is likely that many statues had lost 
their originally-intended meaning years before they were moved to the statue 
park, as James (1999) points out with respect to the case of Budapest. 
Levinson (1998: 73) asks whether we would have 
… found the Budapest solution acceptable in Germany and Japan following their 
defeats in World War II? Surely most of us would have been profoundly 
dissatisfied had the successor regimes moved any public statuary of Hitler, Tojo, 
and their minions to the carefully tended grounds of a state museum where they 
would stand, without further adornment or explanation, for the presumed 
edification of onlookers. 
He suggests that the horror of Nazism is still regarded in a category of its 
own and considered out of bounds for irony and display in playful heritage 
contexts. Yet it is striking to note that at heritage sites and museums in both 
Lithuania and Hungary, the sense of injury resulting from the Soviet 
occupation seems to far outweigh that of the Nazi crimes in the current 
socio-political climate.14 What is far more important here is not the content 
of the statue park, i.e. which tyrants and disgraced leaders can or cannot be 
exhibited, but rather the very concept of such a site. It is the predominant 
contemporary climate influenced by postmodernism, with its penchant for 
irony, eclecticism, the juxtapositioning of sometimes incongruous elements, 
and the creation of polysemic collages inviting multiple readings that made 
such ventures possible at the turn of the 21st century – although not in all 
societies. 
The concept of statue parks in post-apartheid South Africa 
In South Africa, postmodernism has arguably never had quite the same 
impact or especially the wide societal reach that can be observed in many 
Western countries. In the current post-apartheid climate, the issue of political 
symbolism and group identity symbols appears to be too sensitive and taken 
                                                     
14  The Museum of Genocide Victims in Vilnius, established in the former 
headquarters of the KGB, barely features the crimes committed during 
Lithuania’s Nazi occupation period. A similar bias has been observed about the 
House of Terror in Budapest, which officially commemorates the victims of 
terror in general and those of Nazism and Communism in particular. The 
controversial museum was opened in 2002 inside a symbolically significant 
building in 60 Andrássy Avenue. In the early 1940s the building housed the 
Nazi-affiliated Arrow Cross party, which used the facility as a prison and torture 
centre. After 1945 it was taken over by the Communist Secret Police and was 
used as an interrogation centre until 1956 (Rátz 2006).  
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too seriously to allow for anything more ‘playful’ than a political cartoon. 
Heritage officials in particular are well aware of the great importance 
communities in South Africa across the racial and ideological spectrum 
attach to their political icons and the heritage sector would hardly dare 
engaging in ventures that might undermine its widely perceived role as 
contributing to morally elevated societal goals, such as community 
empowerment, reconciliation, education and nation-building.  
Although sometimes suggested as a solution to the ‘problem’ of 
unwanted bronze effigies of discredited heroes,15 no concrete proposal for a 
colonial and/or apartheid-era statue park has ever been seriously considered 
in South Africa. Such a proposal would presumably be unacceptable both to 
most white and probably many black residents. Some would object to the 
theme-park nature of the site; others to the fact that such a move would 
unmistakably result in the wholesale symbolic devaluation of ‘white 
heritage’; and others to the fact that such clearance of the symbolic 
representations of the past order would be an attempt to erase memories and 
sanitise the country’s painful history. As I argue in Chapter Nine, the 
prevalence of the dialogic approach to adjusting the monument landscape in 
post-apartheid South Africa is crucially dependent on the continued presence 
of the symbolic reminders of the past in their accustomed places.  
Nevertheless, what has been mooted in several South African cities over 
the past one-and-a-half decades of democracy is the establishment of 
designated commemorative spaces where relocated monuments of the past 
would be joined by new monuments dedicated to the heroes of the present 
order. Unlike the post-soviet examples, these spaces have not been 
envisaged as disguised ‘dumping grounds’ for unwanted statues but 
conceptualised as inclusive, genuine places of remembrance and serious 
contemplation. The proposed Durban Heroes Monument constitutes a case in 
point, simultaneously illustrating the complex array of emotional 
reservations held by various stakeholders and the ideological problems 
associated with such a project. 
In 2000 an open competition was held to elicit proposals for the Durban 
Heroes Monument in honour of ‘men and women of extraordinary courage, 
vision and enterprise who had made their mark in the city’s eventful history, 
many of whom remained as yet unrecognized’.16 The monument was 
supposed to be erected in Botha’s Garden, a small park on the fringe of the 
city’s Central Business District, and the competition brief requested contest-
                                                     
15  See for example the recommendations of the academic panel in the context of the 
Legacy Project (Chapter Six). In my own experience of discussing the issue with 
students of Cultural and Heritage Tourism, a statue park is often the first 
suggestion that comes to mind. 
16  City of Durban. Metropolitan, North and South Central Councils. Heroes 
Monument. Competition Briefing Document (2000).  
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ants to include in their design a recommendation for the future of the park’s 
current focal point, the statue of General Louis Botha designed by Anton van 
Wouw (unveiled in 1921). Louis Botha (1862-1919) was an important Boer 
general in the South African Anglo-Boer War and in 1910 became the first 
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa.  
The winning design by the Durban-based firm Architects Collaborative 
(Paul Mikula) proposed that the Botha statue be retained and joined by other 
statues of ‘the old guard’. They were to be moved to the park from various 
sites in the city to co-exist peacefully with new statues celebrating liberation 
heroes and other leader figures of significance to ‘the people’ in post-
apartheid South Africa. Mimicking the Moscow example, the plan was that 
all relocated statues were to be taken off their pedestals and lowered to the 
ground to stand on their feet. While literally and metaphorically signifying a 
‘deposing’ of these grand leaders of the past, this measure would 
simultaneously render them more human, allowing people to confront them 
face to face and ‘look them in the eye’ (Mikula quoted in Peters 2001 and 
personal communication 2002).  
 As stated earlier, public commemorative monuments are automatically 
protected in terms of heritage conservation legislation at the same level as 
registered sites. Anyone intending to remove or modify a monument must 
apply to the responsible heritage authority, which will subsequently notify 
potential stakeholders, who can in turn lodge their complaints, mobilise 
public opinion or make constructive recommendations (Hall, personal 
interview 2006). No objections were raised when Architects Collaborative 
presented their winning design to the City Council. However, upon its 
publication in the KZN Institute of Architects Journal, a letter by the South 
African architect, Hans Hallen, promptly arrived from his new home in 
Australia, ridiculing the proposal and specifically opposing the idea of 
lowering the Botha statue (Hallen 2001).  
Hallen argued that van Wouw would have conceptualised the over-life 
size statue with the high pedestal in mind, compensating for the 
foreshortening, which would make the lowered statue appear top-heavy. This 
is probably correct, although statues in Moscow on pedestals of similar size 
do not appear to have suffered unacceptably from the removal of their 
support, following their relocation to the sculpture park. One might speculate 
that Hallen’s aesthetic argument disguises his emotionally and politically 
motivated opposition to the thought of ‘deposing’ Botha and other symbolic 
representatives of the colonial and apartheid era. Hallen himself, it must be 
remembered, was closely associated with the commemorative endeavours of 
the Afrikaner Nationalists during the heyday of apartheid, notably through 
his design of the VTM at Winburg.17 Amafa subsequently refused per-
                                                     
17  Hans Hallen and Maurice Dibb jointly won the design competition for the 
monument, administered by the FAK in 1965. See Bunn (1999: 105). 
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mission to alter the Botha statue or any other statue envisaged for relocation. 
The entire Heroes Monument proposal died a slow death in the corridors of 
the local bureaucracy and was eventually officially abandoned, when the 
new Premier, S’bu Ndebele, embraced the idea of confronting the Botha 
statue with a new statue of King Dinizulu, as will be discussed later. 
In Cape Town, similar proposals of uniting statues of old heroes and of 
those who served the people and the freedom struggle emerged during a 
public debate on ‘Old Memorials in New Times’ (SAHRA 2002a). The 
Castle was suggested as a possible site for such a venture, but no serious 
steps were ever taken to implement the idea. As early as 1992, Mewa 
Ramgobin had publicly raised the idea of creating a ‘Heroes’ Square’ 
somewhere in South Africa. In a Sunday Tribune article he wrote:  
It will be to our credit and a source of inspiration for those who follow us if we 
were to: Interface the statues of Louis Botha and Jan Smuts with those of Albert 
Luthuli and Mahatma Gandhi; Create a ‘Heroes’ Square’ in South Africa where 
the remains of the late Johnny Makatini, Braam Fischer, Yusuf Dadoo and the 
hundreds of other fallen heroes of the resistance movement could be recognised 
and honoured. (Ramgobin 1992).18  
In 1994, long before the collapse of the Strijdom monument, discussions 
were held in Pretoria about a possible renaming of Strijdom square ‘to 
honour all freedom fighters including Boer soldiers from South Africa’s 
past’ and to possibly erect busts, ‘smaller than that of Strijdom for aesthetic 
reasons’, of a number of freedom fighters (Anonymous 1994). Nothing came 
of these proposals. Meanwhile the Tshwane Building Heritage Association 
resuscitated an interesting proposal that Herbert Baker, architect of the 
Union Buildings, had developed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
Inspired by the model of Rome, Baker had envisaged a Via Sacra in Pretoria, 
a road to be built behind the Union Buildings, lined with commemorative 
statues of prominent leader figures. In a submission to the Pretoria Public 
Works department, the Heritage Association motivated for the 
implementation of this pertinent proposal to create a place of honour for all 
relocated existing statues or busts (of which there are many in this capital 
city) combined with new sculptures dedicated to liberation fighters and other 
heroes of the post-apartheid order (Anton Jansen, personal conversation, 
2002 and 2007).  
A comparison with the much debated and publicised American case of 
Monument Ave in Richmond, Virginia, may come to mind, as in fact many 
aspects of South African history and its commemoration mirror examples in 
                                                     
18  The fact that not a single woman is included in this list of new heroes suggests 
that gender bias was part of the public debate around new monuments and the 
commemoration of new heroes from the very beginning. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter Eight. 
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the United States. But the important difference is that here the intervention 
amounted only to an ‘invasion’ of an established exclusive commemorative 
space to render it more inclusive. The eminent boulevard of Monument Ave 
was laid out in the Confederate capital during the same period when Baker 
conceived of the Via Sacra for Pretoria, lining up equestrian statues and 
other types of monuments in honour of major leaders of the Confederate 
army. Controversy first erupted in the late 1960s, when the increasingly 
vocal African American community officially began to question the 
selection of ‘heroes’ and the ideological discourses they publicly 
represented. Yet it was not before the early 1990s that the City Council 
seriously considered adding a black leader figure to this prominent and elitist 
site of commemoration. Against persisting vestiges of resistance, a statue of 
black tennis champion Arthur Ashe (who was from Richmond) was 
eventually unveiled in 1995 (Black and Varley 2003; Wilson 2003; Savage 
1997). Savage (1997) demonstrates that this strategic addition has 
fundamentally transformed the existing commemorative space by turning it 
into an inclusive site of remembrance and opening up discursive 
perspectives on a contested past. 
The strategy of adding a black leader figures to assemblies of white 
statuary is becoming increasingly popular in South Africa, but no proposals 
for relocating ‘white statues’ and joining them with monuments to black 
leaders have been – or are likely to be – implemented. Resistance towards a 
designated, shared place of honour for old and new heroes prevails not only 
on the part of people who identify with the ‘old guard’ but also on the part of 
those who identify with the new order, because the commemoration of their 
leaders is perceived to be neutralised, rendered ambiguous or even 
‘contaminated’ through the presence of ‘enemy’ heroes. 
Re-interpretation 
Even with political will and financial resources in place, physical relocation 
is not a viable option for some public monuments, either on account of their 
size or their fragility or other factors that render them unsuitable for a move. 
In such cases a monument can be re-interpreted or re-contextualized through 
small modifications to the structure itself; through the wording of its 
inscription; through renaming; or simply through official, media-supported 
efforts at redefining its meaning and significance. Public monuments 
throughout the world are prone to be affected by the passage of time and 
associated changes in cultural patterns and societal climates. The process of 
re-interpreting the meaning of monuments is as old as the tradition of 
installing such structures in the public arena. Historically, re-interpretation 
sometimes occurred actively and deliberately, perhaps officially decreed by 
political or religious authorities for ideological reasons. Sometimes, it may 
CHAPTER 5 
 
152 
have emerged gradually, unofficially, perhaps as a matter of growing 
community consensus in contestation of the official reading.19  
What is (relatively) new, both in scholarly research and popular 
perspectives, is the widespread recognition of the instability of the meaning 
of cultural products in general and monuments in particular (e.g. Mills and 
Simpson 2003; Coombes 2003; Savage 1997). There is much conscious 
awareness today that the interpretive meaning of monuments can shift 
between different viewers or periods of time; that there is potential 
divergence between intended and received meaning(s); that it is impossible 
to design a symbol that carries only the meaning that it was meant to carry; 
that meaning can be actively manipulated; and indeed that sometimes 
completely unpredictable meanings may emerge. 
Thelen believes these views to be in alignment with postmodernist 
thought: monuments and memorial have become ‘not markers with single 
meanings from and about the past but objects for “dialogue” or “negotiation” 
...’ (1993: 128). There have been fundamental shifts in the understanding of 
history itself. In international scholarship historical knowledge is no longer 
understood as a series of objective facts uncovered by historians, but as 
meanings discursively constructed, subjectively shaped by specific needs 
and processes, and determined by prevailing power relations. Foucault’s 
seminal writings demonstrate that representation must always be considered 
in relation to the motivations and ideological agendas of those who have the 
power to ‘speak’ – about themselves and more importantly about others. 
Historical narratives are produced in complex ways by competing groups 
and individuals who make uneven contributions and who have unequal 
access to the means of such production. Trouillot (1995: xix) aptly observes 
that power is never so transparent that its analysis becomes superfluous. The 
challenge for historians today lies in exposing its roots, thereby explaining 
the predominance and acceptance as historical fact of some narratives rather 
than others (which are then often declared to be fictive). 
In South Africa the impact of these intellectual currents and the 
associated fundamental challenges for the discipline of history were 
somewhat muted by the permeating ‘struggle paradigm’ during the 1970s 
and 80s, but have since been much debated (Nuttall and Wright 2000: 36; 
see also Rassool 2001; Nuttall and Wright 1998). Significantly, while 
                                                     
19  Then there were of course cases of re-interpretation as a result of mistaken 
identity. The ancient equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius (AD 166-80, Capi-
toline Hill, Rome), for instance, survived the medieval iconoclasm targeted at 
pagan monuments only because it was believed to represent the Christian 
emperor Constantine the Great. Closer to home in place and time, the statue of 
Queen Victoria in the city centre of Nairobi is widely believed to represent the 
Virgin Mary (Larsen personal communication 2006) and many people would 
probably strongly object to its removal. 
THE COMMEMORATIVE LEGACY OF THE PAST 
 
153
notions of historical ‘fact’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are questioned by academic 
historians and presented as social constructs relative to specific times and 
places, statements by political officials and representatives of the heritage 
sector are frequently based on the assumption that the past is a known entity, 
which needs only to be ‘objectively’ represented or officially told for the 
first time. New museums, monuments and heritage sites are needed to tell 
the ‘true history’, as opposed to the biased official record disseminated by 
the previous order. Colonial and apartheid era monuments as public symbols 
of that biased history should be re-interpreted to ‘correct the past’. 
Case study: the Terrorism Memorial in Pretoria 
 
 
Photo 5.5 Memorial for the victims of terrorism, Pretoria city centre, originally 
unveiled 1988, re-dedicated 1994. 
Even if some colonial and apartheid era monuments may today be sponta-
neously ‘updated’ in meaning – for instance when tour guides narrate local 
history to tourists, or when school teachers on field trips present new 
historical perspectives to their learners, or when city officials and allied 
publicity media endorse the multifaceted cultural heritage attractions of the 
urban environment – very few such monuments have thus far been officially 
re-interpreted through changes in their inscriptions, their iconography or 
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other aspects of their physical appearance. The most frequent examples are 
World War I and II memorials, as well as South African Anglo-Boer War 
memorials, which have sometimes been re-dedicated to acknowledge the 
role of black participants and victims in these conflicts.  
One important case of an official re-interpretation is the so-called 
‘Terrorism memorial’ in Pretoria. It was originally set up at the entrance to 
Munitoria (corner of Van der Walt and Vermeulen Streets) in 1988 to 
honour ‘residents of Pretoria who lost their lives as a result of acts of 
terrorism, or in preventing or combating terrorism’, as the official City 
Council Newsletter announced at the time (Anonymous 1988). The 
symbolism of all of the individual elements of the memorial was explained 
in both Afrikaans and English on an attached plaque. Mounted on a rock 
symbolizing ‘the infallibility of God’s Word’ is a tall arch made of stainless 
steel, which ‘denotes the triumph of a people living by God’s principles’. 
The arch is broken at the apex as a reference to ‘the untimely death of the 
victims of terrorism’. The structure was originally surrounded by a water 
feature symbolizing ‘calmness and reflection’ and equipped with an 
inscription from the Bible, ‘Vengeance is mine: I will repay’ (Romans 
12:19), as well as the dedication ‘To our victims of terrorism’.  
Only months after the first universal franchise elections, in September 
1994, the ANC-dominated Pretoria city council decided that the wording on 
this memorial had become intolerable (Stapelberg and Uys 1994). The 
‘message’ of the entire structure, the vengeful biblical quote and especially 
the reference to ‘terrorists’ were extremely offensive to the majority, who 
identified with those who had suffered, sacrificed and often lost their lives in 
the fight for freedom, democracy and human rights. After heated debate, in 
which Conservative Party councillors voiced their strong objection, it was 
resolved to re-dedicate the memorial to ‘all’ instead of ‘our’ victims of 
terrorism and to remove the biblical quote. The change of one single three-
letter word now theoretically renders the previously exclusive memorial 
inclusive, depoliticised and ideologically neutral.  
This technocratic solution to a ‘problematic’ memorial is indicative of the 
way government officials in South Africa deal with questions of cultural 
heritage. Where decision-makers often lack professional training and 
expertise in the field of museums and heritage studies, little awareness exists 
about the complexities of interpretation and the semiotic processes of 
meaning-making. Assuming that the change to the inscription is even 
noticed, many local residents and passers-by will still remember the original 
text and retain their erstwhile emotional or ideological associations with this 
memorial (provided they ever took active notice in the first place). One 
might think, in comparison, of the way in which old names of streets and 
landmarks linger on in popular currency long after any signs of those names 
have been removed, and how prejudices against once reviled institutions and 
buildings can overshadow their new usages. Long gone features of the urban 
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geography such as separate facilities for different race groups or previously 
existing buffer zones between racially divided residential zones may still be 
deeply rooted in oral memory and may affect the attitudes and emotional 
responses of local communities or individuals.  
If this expresses doubt about the effectiveness of the politically correct 
adjustment of a memorial whose originally intended signification is deemed 
no longer acceptable, it must be remembered that the erstwhile meaning of 
this memory site was also never monolithic, and readings of its meaning 
would certainly have diverged even among those whom the memorial 
primarily addressed. ‘In the same way that myths are flexible discursive 
forms, symbolic places are “condensation sites”, replete with polysemic 
interpretations’, states Edensor (1997: 176) in the context of his discussion 
of the heroic Wallace Monument in Stirling, Scotland. Viewers who chose to 
actively engage with the memorial will invariably fuse its intended meaning 
with their own personal experiences and their understanding of the larger 
context in which it exists. 
To some extent, the well-intentioned inclusive rededication has rendered 
the Terrorism memorial less meaningful altogether, as it has in effect lost its 
reference to the specific South African context. One might remember 
Patricia Phillip’s (1989) scathing critique of public art in the urban environ-
ment: public art tries so hard to be accessible and pleasing to everyone that it 
becomes utterly meaningless to anyone, she argues. On the other hand, the 
Terrorism memorial excels as an example of the unexpected surfacing and 
unforeseen accrual of meaning of a commemorative object. In the context of 
the recent spate of terrorist attacks around the world, this memorial, 
dedicated to all victims of terrorism, can be interpreted as an expression of 
South Africa’s empathy within an international community of nations.  
Recasting personalities 
An effective and yet ‘non-invasive’ way of re-interpreting commemorative 
monuments dedicated to specific leader figures, notably statues, can be 
achieved by recasting the symbolic identity of the person concerned. As 
Popescu (2003: 419) shows with respect to Lenin, the same person, and 
implicitly the statue as his/her symbolic representation, can be perceived 
from different historical vantage points and integrated into different types of 
narratives. This may involve the re-positioning of the person’s life and work 
in a specific historical perspective; an ‘explanation’ of controversial deci-
sions through contextualisation in a particular ideological framework; and 
thus an inflection or re-inscription of the person’s symbolic significance. 
Such re-interpretation must be introduced or reinforced through the official 
education system, notably in schools and museums, and supported by 
popular media campaigns (e.g. feature stories in newspapers, magazines, or 
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on TV). If sufficiently entrenched, such recasting may even make changes to 
the inscription of a statue or memorial obsolete. Entire groups of once 
despised or controversial personalities can be ‘rehabilitated’ all at one time, 
as happened, for instance, in the former German Democratic Republic 
(GDR, i.e. East Germany) during the period of the 1970s and 1980s as a 
result of a conscious re-definition of the prevailing national identity. A 
famous statue of Frederick the Great in Berlin, which had been dismantled in 
1950, was even re-erected in 1980 in its original spot, because its symbolic 
meaning had suddenly changed and become acceptable through this state-
directed shift in identity construction.20 
During times of socio-political upheaval and change, when individual and 
group identities are in a state of flux and uncertainty, when established 
identity categories are increasingly questioned or dismantled, appropriating 
prominent leader figures of the past and interpreting their significance in 
new ways can assist in redefining personal and community identity. In 1996 
a ‘coloured’ woman, Luella Chequenton, from Eldorado Park (Johannes-
burg), unexpectedly defended the Paul Kruger statue in Pretoria – commonly 
assumed to be associated by black communities with colonialism and 
Afrikaner nationalist values. Claiming Kruger as part of her heritage, she 
proudly announced herself to be one of ‘Oom Paul’s’ many mixed race 
descendents and expressed outrage at the government’s habit of mentioning 
Kruger’s name in the same breath as apartheid (Kelly 1996). While she 
sympathised with the government’s drive to remove monuments to 
Verwoerd and other controversial personalities, she advocated that the statue 
of Paul Kruger should be re-dedicated (and ideologically neutralised): ‘Not 
as a symbol of Afrikanerdom as was originally intended, but rather 
[dedicated] to a quite amazing figure in our history’ (ibid.). By re-
interpreting the symbolic meaning of Paul Kruger, she implicitly negotiated 
and repositioned her own identity.  
An interesting case (and thus far a lost opportunity) is the over-life size 
bronze statue of John Ross in Durban (created by Mary Stainbank in the 
1970s), which stands, unobtrusively and somewhat hidden by vegetation, in 
front of an office block to this date named after Ross along the Victoria 
                                                     
20  It was from the 1970s that the Government began to embrace German history 
and heritage in its entirety, departing from the earlier tradition of exclusively 
focussing on aspects relating to the worker’s struggle. This was done in order to 
define a broader-based identity for the socialist German state, which was now 
considered a fulfilled national entity, instead of merely a stepping stone towards 
a unified socialist Germany. As a result, many historical personalities, such as 
Martin Luther or the Prussian kings, were re-interpreted and rehabilitated. A 
famous statue of Frederick the Great in Berlin, which had been dismantled in 
1950, was re-erected in 1980 in its traditional spot. The symbolic meaning of this 
and other statues had suddenly changed through a shift in the construct that is 
national identity (Koshar 2000: 268-9). 
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Embankment (now the Margaret Mncadi Ave). Nobody has yet come 
forward with a proposal to re-interpret this statue by recasting the identity of 
this amazing historical figure. Charles Rawden Maclean (1812 or 181521-
1880), who allegedly became known as John Ross on account of his red hair, 
was only a boy when he arrived at Port Natal, the site of the current city of 
Durban, on board the stranded Brig Mary, among a party of British pioneers 
primarily interesting in ivory hunting.  
 
 
Photo 5.6 Bronze statue of John Ross, Durban, undated (1970s). 
Maclean himself has produced a body of writings about the three years he 
spent in Natal and Zululand, accessible in published form since 1992 
(Maclean 1992, edited by Stephen Gray). A particular interpretation of his 
life story was popularised through a TV series broadcast in South Africa in 
1986 (John Ross, An African Adventure), following the success of the series 
on Shaka Zulu.22 A year later South African writer, Stephen Gray (1987), 
published his historical novel John Ross, the True Story partly in response to 
the distortions presented in the TV series. The statue dedicated to the 
memory of John Ross portrays the teenager as an adventurous young British 
                                                     
21  According to Stephen Gray’s research, Maclean was born on 17 August 1815 in 
Fraserburgh, Scotland (Maclean 1992: 2), but his birth date is frequently cited as 
1812.  
22  For a critical analysis of the TV series on Shaka Zulu, see Hamilton (1998). 
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hero in somewhat tattered Western clothes. The text plaque mounted on the 
façade of the office block (in 1974) explains that ‘In 1827, at the age of 15 
years, he walked to Delagoa Bay and back, to obtain urgently needed 
medical supplies for the new settlement at Port Natal. The Zulu King, Shaka, 
provided him with an escort of warriors to accompany him during the 
journey’.  
The current inscription focuses on the lad’s heroic deed as perceived from 
the British perspective, namely the invaluable service he rendered to the tiny 
British contingent at Port Natal, saving them from annihilation. In the settler 
legends of Natal, the story of John Ross is implicitly linked with the 
foundation myth of the British colony. But other aspects of Maclean’s 
fascinating experiences could be foregrounded as more relevant in the 
current socio-political context. According to Maclean’s own account, he had 
become a great friend and admirer of the Zulu people and was much liked by 
King Shaka, who reportedly adopted him as his son. Ross in fact lived with 
the Zulus at Shaka’s settlement at KwaDukuza for some time. He learnt the 
Zulu language, dressed in Zulu attire and generally absorbed Zulu culture. 
He became the first ‘white Zulu’. In later years Maclean became a sea-
captain in the British merchant marine in the Caribbean and a spokesperson 
for human rights and democratic values (Maclean 1992).  
The ‘official’ history of the ‘old’ South Africa largely covered up the 
extraordinary relationship between John Ross, the white settler hero, and 
King Shaka and the Zulu people (Lebdal 2004: 121). The prevailing 
historiography of the time often underscored the apartheid ideology of 
separate development by focusing on historical narratives of hostility and 
‘difference’ between various racial and ethnic groups in society. The 
academic climate of the ‘new’ South Africa, on the contrary, influenced by 
societal trends and political prerogatives, encourages historical perspectives 
that speak of amicable relations and productive contact between blacks and 
whites. The frequently invoked spirit of ubuntu refers to the common 
humanity that is promoted to serve as the foundation of the new non-racial 
nation, in which people are meant to focus on the fundamental similarities 
they share below the surface of superficial differences in physical 
appearance and culture. Based on a revision of the historical data and official 
repositioning of his identity and historical significance, John Ross could 
emerge as the incarnation of the ideal ‘rainbow nation citizen’. His statue 
could be interpreted as an inspiring, highly appropriate symbol of cross-
cultural understanding and respect, interracial dialogue, and in fact of ubuntu 
(Lebdal 2004). 
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Re-positioning the VTM 
 
Photo 5.7 Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria, unveiled 1949. 
The most prominent (and therefore now most contested) commemorative 
structure of the apartheid era in South Africa is the VTM outside Pretoria, 
the penultimate icon of Afrikaner nationalism and for many a prime symbol 
of apartheid oppression.23 Its unveiling in 1949, one year after the National 
Party came to power, was a triumphant event for the Afrikaner cause. The 
foundation stone of the VTM was laid in 1938 on the occasion of the 
centenary celebrations of the ‘Great Trek’, the historical exodus of the 
‘Voortrekkers’ from the British Cape Colony in search of new lands and 
independence, mythologised as the move of ‘God’s chosen people’ to the 
‘promised land’. Demonstrating the relationship between historical and 
national consciousness, Van Jaarsveld (1988) explains how the Great Trek 
became a key symbol of the Afrikaner foundation myth, its significance 
reinforced and publicly called to mind through annual ritual observance, 
especially on 16 December, the ‘Day of the Vow’ (this is discussed in the 
next chapter). It legitimized Afrikaner existence, culture and policy, 
supported their sense of identity as a people, and provided them with an 
orientation in South Africa and in the world (1988: 11).  
                                                     
23  Although some black South Africans now have a more positive attitude towards 
the monument, many still view it as a symbol of their oppression (see e.g. 
Matshikiza 2002). 
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Many of the actual facts of the Great Trek are uncertain or contested, and 
historical evidence suggests that the Voortrekkers were a much more diverse 
and heterogeneous group of people with different socio-cultural and 
linguistic roots than commonly portrayed (e.g. Welsh 2000). It was primarily 
in the context of the Centenary celebrations of 1938 and the period leading 
up to these events that a systematic process of selective remembering, 
intended to define the Afrikaner nation, took place.24 Its key event was the 
re-enactment of the famed ox-wagon journey, officially memorialised to this 
day by countless commemorative monuments in towns along the route and 
culminating in the laying of the foundation stone for the VTM. The highly 
exclusive nature of this event – and the group identity it helped to forge – 
was brilliantly captured by the acclaimed South African author, Alan Paton 
(1980), himself an enthusiastic but quickly alienated and disillusioned 
participant in the 1949 celebrations.25  
Delmont’s (1993) careful analysis of the conceptualisation of the 
monument, its architectural and sculptural elements, its real and imagined 
precedents, illustrates how the monument translates the foundation myths 
and ideological tenets of emergent Afrikaner nationalism into visual form. 
This ‘shrine for Afrikanerdom’, intended to last eternally, was designed by 
Gerhard Moerdijk, an architect well suited for this eminent task, as he had 
experience with large government commissions and the design of religious 
buildings. He also had international training and was well known for fiercely 
promoting the Afrikaner cause (Delmont 1993: 80). His obvious yet 
unacknowledged source of inspiration for the layout and many architectural 
and sculptural details was the late 19th century German Völkerschlacht-
denkmal in Leipzig designed by Bruno Schmidt.  
The structure of the VTM is meant to be understood as a series of 
protective layers radiating out from the innermost core, the cenotaph of Piet 
Retief in the crypt below the ‘hall of heroes’. Accompanied by an eternal 
flame, this symbolic altar dedicated to Retief and his fellow heroes 
constitutes the ultimate ‘symbol of sacrifice’ (Moerdijk) in the narrative of 
the Afrikaner nation. The great marble frieze that encircles the walls of the 
                                                     
24  For the following see Bunn (1999), Coombes (2000; 2003) and Graham et al. 
(2000).  
25  In his autobiography Towards the Mountain, Paton describes how he – as a 
liberal and open-minded South African of British descent – was excited about 
attending the Great Trek centenary celebrations. He even grew a beard for the 
occasion, dressed up in ‘Voortrekker’ clothes and stocked up on boerewors and 
sosaties. Yet when he realized the highly exclusive nature of the event and the 
Afrikaner nationalist, anti-British fervour of many participants, he was deeply 
disappointed, leaving the scene with a profound sense of alienation and 
disillusionment. Paton describes this experience as a turning point in his attitude 
towards Afrikanerdom. 
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domed ‘hall of heroes’ visually details the story of the ‘Great Trek’ from an 
Afrikaner nationalist perspective. 
 
 
Photo 5.8 Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria, Hall of Heroes. 
In conjunction with the architecture, it serves to reinforce the central myths 
of Afrikaner history, notably the construct of the Voortrekkers as a ‘nation’, 
the connection between the Trekkers and the land, and the notion that 
Afrikaners are God’s chosen people. 
The VTM was officially positioned as hallowed ground, a sacred symbol 
of Afrikanerdom, a place of pilgrimage for many Afrikaners and their 
children, while blacks were barred from entry. Although by the end of the 
apartheid era a significant portion of the white Afrikaans-speaking 
population no longer identified with the monument’s originally intended 
symbolism, aligned as it was with early Afrikaner nationalism, ethnic myth-
making and apartheid, the destruction or significant physical alteration of the 
VTM would nevertheless have raised alarm among many whites and would 
have been completely unacceptable to a small but still influential minority of 
conservative Afrikaners. The question of how to deal with this ideologically 
charged structure, this virulently contested identity symbol, posed unique 
challenges for the newly elected ANC-led GNU and occupied public debate 
even before the official beginning of the post-apartheid era . 
Simon Harrison (1995: 255) maintains that ‘[c]ompetition for power, 
wealth, prestige, legitimacy or other political resources seems always to be 
accompanied by conflict over important symbols, by struggles to control or 
manipulate such symbols in some vital way’. He calls this behaviour 
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‘symbolic conflict’ and distinguishes four prototypical forms, all of which I 
will refer to again later.  
‘Proprietary contests’ relate to a struggle for the monopoly or control of 
some collective symbol, the importance and prestige value of which is 
agreed upon by the rival groups. This type of contest is essentially about 
laying claim to ownership of significant symbols or appropriating significant 
icons to enhance one group’s status, authority or legitimacy. Its relevance in 
the South African context is most obvious in the struggle over the icons of 
the Struggle discussed in Chapters One and Three.  
In an ‘expansionary contest’ one group in society tries to displace the 
symbols of a competing group’s identity with its own symbols. This can 
result in the disappearance of the defeated side’s identity symbols, not 
necessarily in the sense of their physical destruction, but in the sense that 
they are no longer used to represent the identity of the group. The aim of 
suppressing the rival group’s identity symbols is not to leave that group in 
some sense devoid of an identity, but ‘to integrate or absorb the group by 
supplanting its symbols of identity with one’s own’ (Harrison 1995: 265). 
This will be discussed further in Chapter Nine.  
‘Innovation contests’ involve the invention or competitive creation of 
traditions and symbolic forms by one societal group in order to establish and 
symbolically represent a separate identity from other groups. While this 
concept often concerns ethnic minority groups seeking to assert themselves 
in the face of the dominant power, it can easily be applied in present-day 
South Africa, where the previously marginalised African majority is striving 
to symbolically represent itself (e.g. through monuments) in competition 
with the existing bulk of representations inherited from the previous order, 
as will be explained in Chapter Nine.  
Most relevant for my discussion of the VTM are ‘valuation contests’, 
which involve the ranking – according to some criterion of worth such as 
prestige, legitimacy or sacredness – of identity symbols (such as monu-
ments) of competing societal groups (ibid.: 256). The result of a valuation 
contest is not the destruction or alteration of the symbol, nor its replacement 
with a new symbol, but merely a change in the relative position of the 
symbol along some scale of value. In other words, in valuation contests it is 
possible to manipulate the value of a symbol without changing it in any other 
way (ibid.: 266).  
This is precisely what Tokyo Sexwale, then Premier of Gauteng 
Province, inadvertently attempted to do in 1996, when he made a highly 
publicised attempt at officially re-interpreting the contested VTM and re-
inscribing meaning onto its mottled symbolic signifiers. Sexwale had 
himself photographed in front of and inside the monument for a double 
spread in the City Metro edition of the Sunday Times (Unsworth 1996; 
Coombes 2003). Examining one by one various elements of the monument’s 
design, he attributed new meanings to each, often inverting the originally 
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intended one.26 While precluding any physical changes, this ostentatious 
demonstration (or ‘performance’) was intended to illustrate the monument’s 
potential for multiple readings, to make a contribution towards removing the 
structure’s stigma for the majority of the population by manipulating its 
meaning and significance, and to appropriate the formerly exclusive 
structure for a new inclusive national agenda. However, critics might 
rightfully question the effectiveness of this strategy. Can a merely discursive 
revaluation without physical manifestations that visually support a new 
interpretive account be sufficient to disinvest this disputed monument of its 
ideological power and contested symbolic charge, which remains offensive 
for so many people?27  
Recent scholarship has focused on how the symbolism of the VTM – far 
from being static – has habitually been remoulded over time. Grundlingh 
(2001) describes significant structural changes and transformations within 
the social composition of Afrikanerdom from the 1950s to the 1970s and 
explains how the meaning of the VTM and other cultural markers had to be 
adjusted and renegotiated in view of these historical developments. The 
pressure for such changes intensified during the 1980s and especially since 
the advent of the post-apartheid era, prompting Grundlingh to emphasise that 
one can no longer describe the significance of the VTM in the same terms as 
when Afrikaner nationalism was dominant. Coombes’ (2003) analysis 
concentrates particularly on the cultural changes and political transformat-
ions of the post-apartheid period, illustrating how the symbolism of the 
VTM has effectively been altered by various constituencies, how the 
monument has come to act as a foil for the performance of different identity 
discourses, and how meanings have accrued over time, inflecting the 
originally intended symbolism and sometimes (as in the case of Sexwale’s 
re-interpretation) contradicting it. 
Specifically, Coombes (2000; 2003) considers a case of re-inscribing 
meaning not from an African but from an Afrikaner perspective. In June 
1995 a new Afrikaans-language porn magazine entitled Loslyf was launched 
with a cover image of ‘Dina at the Monument’. The magazine included a 
photo-shoot of porn model Dina posing in the grassy environs around the 
                                                     
26  Andrew Unsworth (1996) reports about the unusual visit: When told that the iron 
assegaais on the gates actually symbolise the power of Dingane who sought to 
block the path of civilisation, he [Sexwale] stops. ‘No, it was not to be’, he 
muses. ‘It was precisely the assegaai at its height that turned the tide. That’s why 
our army was called Umkhonto weSizwe, the spear of the nation. The path of 
civilisation was not blocked by the spear; in the end it was the spear that opened 
it up’ (Sexwale quoted in Unsworth 1996). 
27  This observation is based on informal talks about monuments with various 
people, but most specifically on a class discussion (May 2002) among third-year 
students enrolled in the Cultural and Heritage Tourism programme at the then 
University of Durban-Westville.  
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VTM. Coombes argues that this feature represents not simply the usual 
disrespect of the boundaries between the sacred and the profane common in 
pornographic literature but ‘a more serious critique of the most oppressive 
version of Afrikaner ethnic absolutism’ (2000: 189). Dina, being reportedly 
related to General Andries Hendrik Potgieter, one of the leading figures of 
the Great Trek, proudly proclaims her Boer heritage and admiration for her 
great-great grandfather, Potgieter.28 
Coombes (2000: 191) concludes that Dina represents a deliberately 
ambiguous figure, both in terms of gender and ethnic identifications, which 
disrupts the versions of Afrikaner identity (both male and female) as they are 
played out in the interior marble frieze and other aspects of the VTM. Dina’s 
subscription to a considerably altered Afrikaner identity and her 
identification with the monument suggest that the structure carries multiple 
meanings within a fragmented and transforming post-apartheid Afrikaner 
community. While Sexwale is a public official who appropriates the VTM 
for a new political order and the population majority, Dina appropriates the 
monument to negotiate her own identity and perhaps that of a particular 
sector of the Afrikaans-speaking community, echoing Luella Chequenton’s 
appropriation of the Kruger statue for herself and (gratuitously) for an 
unspecified number of ‘coloured’ descendants. 
Such attempts at reworking and inventively adapting the monument’s 
symbolism to the needs of different groupings have been accompanied, over 
the years, by various rumours and suggestions about possible physical 
changes, an inclusive re-interpretation of the Hall of Heroes through the 
addition of new heroes, or even an exhibition on the liberation struggle in the 
Cenotaph Hall (Kruger and Van Heerden 2005: 254). Pre-empting any 
possibility of such a ‘violation’ of Afrikaner sacred ground and preventing 
the prospect of future government interference, a number of Afrikaner 
organisations, including the FAK, transformed the VTM and its surrounding 
nature reserve into a private, non-profit (Section 21) company in 1993, 
officially named Voortrekkermonument en Natuurreservaat, and governed 
by its own Board of Directors. A recently published information brochure 
(2006) reads:  
Due to several reasons the VTM lost considerable support during the nineties of 
the twentieth century, which led the Board of Directors to accept a new 
management approach and philosophy based on the appointment of a more 
comprehensive management team in March 2000.  
                                                     
28  ‘My great great grandfather, Hendrik Potgieter, has been my hero since my 
childhood. He was the sort of man who inspired people to trek barefoot over the 
Drakensberg mountains so that us Boere could be free and at peace living here in 
the Transvaal. If only we could have a leader of his calibre today’ (Dina quoted 
in Coombes 2000: 189-90). 
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General Major Gert Opperman, formerly a successful military strategist in 
the South African Defence Force, was employed as CEO of the VTM. He is 
a multi-talented, well-respected and highly diplomatic man, who makes 
ample and strategic use of the media to publicly de-stigmatize the VTM and 
Afrikaner culture more generally. Motivated by both political and economic 
pressures (the monument now relies on its self-sustainability), the VTM has 
been repositioned from an ideologically tainted political icon to an important 
cultural icon in the rainbow-nation spectrum of South Africa’s multi-
coloured heritages. Lively marketing and fundraising efforts are targeted not 
only at inviting diverse (paying) audiences to visit, but also controversially 
at renting out the building and its grounds to host a variety of inclusive 
cultural activities such as concerts and even a fashion show. 
The expansive grounds of the VTM Heritage Site are increasingly being 
developed into a prominent centre for the preservation of the culture and 
heritage of white Afrikaans speakers. In 2000 nearby Fort Schanskop, 
originally built by Paul Kruger to protect Pretoria from British invasion after 
the 1896 Jameson raid, was purchased from the Pretoria City Council and 
turned into a museum focused on the history of the South African Anglo-
Boer War, whereas the museum at the foot of the VTM itself remained 
dedicated to the history and culture of the Voortrekkers and the Great Trek. 
A Garden of Remembrance was created near the monument where members 
of the community can purchase a final resting place for their cremated 
remains. Most recently (2008), a new heritage centre, entirely financed with 
funds raised from private individuals and interest groups, was opened 
between the Garden of Remembrance and the administration building. The 
centre houses a well-designed exhibition emphasising the positive 
contributions of Afrikaners to the country, especially in the economic and 
cultural spheres during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Furthermore, archival records are being collected and a Research Trust has 
been established to concentrate on aspects of Afrikaner history in the 
broadest sense (Information brochure 2006; Pretorius and Judson, personal 
communication 2007).  
Strategic marketing efforts have succeeded in selling the monument visit 
to school groups, many of them black, as an educational experience filled 
with fun and entertainment,29 while tour operators regularly bring bus loads 
of curious tourists, especially from foreign countries. Indeed, tourists have 
emerged as an important new constituency for whose comfort and enjoyment 
adjustments have been made to the building and the grounds, ranging from 
improved access for the disabled and the elderly to signs indicating from 
where to take the best photo (Fourie 1999; Retief 2002). No physical 
changes have been made, though, to adjust the historical narrative of the 
                                                     
29  Part of the tour for school children is that they can try on Voortrekker clothes; 
the black school kids like that very much (Anonymous 2004d). 
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Great Trek or encourage a different reading of the symbolic meaning of the 
monument. But the guided tours are now predominantly conducted by black 
individuals, who theoretically have the power to provide a counter-narrative 
and ‘perform’ a critical re-interpretation, perhaps emulating Tokyo 
Sexwale’s precedent.30 In practice, however, the new narrative may in fact 
not be so different from the old version, although it is impossible to 
generalise how different guides vary the scripted tour or how the same guide 
may spontaneously respond to challenges posed by specific audiences and 
occasions.  
Ironically, as the VTM is becoming more palatable to black commu-
nities31 and the flow of tourists is unabated, conservative Afrikaner indivi-
duals and groups keep expressing their outrage and offence at various 
incidents and activities which to them violate the most sacrosanct symbol of 
their culture and identity.32 Opperman and the VTM Trust must walk a 
tightrope between different constituencies. They know that their strategy of 
opening up is the only viable option for the future of the VTM, but they also 
know that the diplomatic accommodation of ultra-conservative sentiments is 
essential if they are to remain credible as custodians of Afrikaner cultural 
heritage and its key icon.  
New challenges have arisen since the national government approved the 
construction of the Freedom Park at Salvokop, the hill opposite the VTM, as 
a national heroes’ acre and the country’s foremost symbol of an inclusive 
post-apartheid national identity, as will be discussed in the next chapter. The 
Voortrekker Monument and Heritage Foundation (VTM en Erfenisstigting) 
                                                     
30  In the press, one guide, Petrus Maloka, was featured, whose own father had 
ironically worked as a labourer on the grounds of the VTM for many years 
during the apartheid era, sometimes taking his young son along. Maloka says 
that he tries to keep his narrative ‘neutral’, talking both about Afrikaner and 
African perspectives. His interpretation of the assegai at the gate appears to 
incorporate elements of Sexwale’s re-interpretation (Anonymous 2004d; 
Anonymous 2004c).  
31  This is suggested by comments from members of the general public who called 
in to the SAFM public broadcaster’s Tim Modise Show (2002) to share their 
opinion about the VTM. 
32  For instance, in 2004 an international fashion show hosted in the Cenotaph Hall 
caused an uproar, in which notably the Afrikaner cultural organisation ‘Die 
Verkennerbeweging’ condemned the event as blasphemous and insulting, 
demanding that the Board of the VTM ask the volk for approval before agreeing 
to such inappropriate usage of the space. In fact, the organisation called for a 
new Board to be put in place (Anonymous 2004d). When during the following 
year the photo of an actress, Michelle Pienaar (from the popular TV-series Egoli) 
posing on the cenotaph was published in the ATKV magazine Taalgenoot, the 
Board of the VTM condemned the move and demanded an apology (Williamson 
2005). 
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has adopted a cooperative attitude and maintains good relations with the 
Freedom Park Trust (FPT), while at the same time being fiercely protective 
of the integrity and independence of the VTM. On 21 June 2006 a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by both parties, affirming that  
… [t]he institutions concerned will retain their independence, but as they both 
represent significant moments in the South African history, it is accepted that 
visitors to one, should in future be encouraged to also visit the other (Joint media 
statement 2006). 
An existing dirt path between the two sites will in future – this is the plan – 
be turned into a proper link road, facilitating easy driving across for visitors. 
As a logical consequence of the VTM’s ongoing efforts at repositioning 
itself and emphasising its relevance and educational value for all South 
Africans, the management is now seeking official recognition of the 
monument’s national significance through declaration as a Grade I National 
Heritage site (Kruger and Van Heerden 2005). Ironically, the VTM was 
never declared a national monument by the NMC during the apartheid era. 
While the structure will always remain contested, especially among many 
black South Africans, the post-apartheid government’s counterpart of 
Freedom Park is likewise contested and perceived as exclusive by many 
white South Africans, despite the fact that it was conceptualised as an 
inclusive national symbol in conscious contrast to the exclusive nature of the 
Afrikaner nationalist VTM. To any foreign observer, the two monuments 
juxtaposed on opposite hills, separate but equal, inevitably testify to 
continuing divisions: ‘Twee monumente, een nasie’, two monuments – one 
nation, as a newspaper headlines aptly puts it (Kotzé 2003).  
Conclusion 
Coombes (2003: 12) argues that monuments are animated and reanimated 
through performance or rituals and that the visibility of a monument is 
‘entirely contingent upon the debates concerning the re-interpretation of 
history that take place at moments of social and political transition’. In that 
sense, the VTM is arguably more visible and features more prominently in 
the public imagination than it has since the time of its inception. Contrary to 
the common understanding that a monument symbolises very specific sets of 
values and unalterable historical facts, monuments are in fact containers for 
a host of meanings which can be activated by individuals and societal 
groupings in different socio-political contexts. Different facets of meaning 
may be produced through a call for attention to the monument, e.g. in the 
context of a public commemorative ritual or a purposeful private visit with 
friends or family. Meaning production is also activated through a real or 
perceived threat to or a violation of the integrity of the monument – be it 
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through vandalism, alteration, removal, or destruction. Such acts of violation 
will not only increase public visibility, but may make the monument more 
meaningful and significant to a specific community as a site of highly 
charged political acts. This applies equally to other culturally constitutive 
products, such as murals or posters (see James, B. 1999: 292). 
In a context where anxieties about the future and questions about identity 
are projected onto stone structures and bronze objects, monuments can serve 
as a metaphor of political action. The new post-apartheid government’s 
cautious and conservationist approach towards the existing heritage 
landscape as a symbolic representation of the previous order mirrors the 
‘negotiated solution’ and peaceful transition of the political landscape. Yet 
this approach places the representatives of the new order in a quandary. 
Appeasing and reassuring the white minority and conservative forces must 
be squared with the necessity of justifying the abstention from a more radical 
treatment of contentious ‘white heritage’ to their own, predominantly black 
constituencies. The pace of transformation is always relative to the vantage 
point. While some people perceive that their heritage is increasingly being 
erased, many others – ordinary people, some scholars and public officials 
purporting to represent the people’s needs – lament that the transformation 
of the memory landscape is proceeding too slowly. Not only would they 
prefer to see more drastic measures meted out towards the bulk of the 
monuments thus far left untouched, but many indeed call for a more rapid 
and fundamental transformation of the actual socio-political landscape.  
Although there are signs that the tide is slowly turning towards a more 
radical dealing with contested aspects of white heritage – notably street and 
place names, but also perhaps some monuments – the official response to 
addressing the monumental bias of the past still lies in the construction of 
new monuments to reflect the values and contributions of the previously 
marginalized. 
  
6 
Defining National Identity with 
Heritage: The National Legacy 
Project 
Around the time of the first general election, the Presidency and the Minister 
of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology were reportedly flooded with 
thousands of letters by individuals and organisations concerned about 
matters of heritage. They expressed a request for official forms of tribute to 
those who had made sacrifices for the fight against apartheid and encouraged 
the acknowledgement of significant sites and events reflecting the history 
and experiences of previously marginalised communities. The GNU 
understood such broadly shared sentiments as a mandate to make an urgent, 
high-profile intervention aimed at facilitating the construction of new 
monuments, memorials and museums, as well as encouraging the re-
interpretation of existing commemorative markers and their associated 
historical narratives. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted the National Legacy 
Project, developed by the DACST in consultation with social historian Luli 
Callinicos. 
The Legacy Project comprises a selection of nine high-priority heritage 
developments spread throughout the country, namely 1. the commemoration 
of the Zulu warriors at the battlefield of Blood River/Ncome near Dundee in 
KZN; 2. the Monument for the Women of South Africa at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria; 3. the inclusive commemoration of the Centenary of 
the South African Anglo-Boer War; 4. Constitution Hill (the site of the Old 
Fort and the new Constitutional Court in Johannesburg); 5. the commemo-
ration of Nelson Mandela’s home and sites associated with his youth through 
the Qunu Museum in the Eastern Cape; 6. a memorial to former 
Mozambican president Samora Machel on the rural site where his plane 
crashed near the border town of Mbuzini; 7. the Albert Luthuli project 
focused on the restoration of his home in Groutville, KZN; 8. a Khoe/San 
heritage route situated mostly in the Western Cape; and 9. the ambitious 
Freedom Park outside Pretoria.  
Drawing its legitimacy both from above and below, i.e. from the ‘flood of 
requests’ from grassroots-level and from its endorsement at the highest level 
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of the democratically elected government, the National Legacy Project 
appears to truly encapsulate what South Africans value about the past. 
However, this chapter retraces the genesis of the National Legacy Project 
based on archival records1 and illustrates how the popular requests for 
memorialisation were carefully condensed and channeled into a few high-
profile projects. I consider how these projects were selected, what their 
symbolic significance was perceived to be and how they reflect cornerstones 
of a newly defined foundation myth. It will become evident that most of the 
nine components became ‘part of the list’ not as a result of critical debate, 
consultation and conscious selection, but rather due to specific 
circumstances, pragmatic considerations, political compromises and 
technocratic processes of decision-making. I argue that the assembly of a 
panel of academics tasked with critical discussion and ‘consultation’ was 
largely a token gesture and that a very different memorial landscape could 
have emerged, had their recommendations been considered seriously. 
Ultimately the Legacy Project is not necessarily a reflection of what ‘the 
people’ value about the past and how they would like to see their heroes 
memorialised, but a highly institutionalised form of commemoration 
sponsored and directed by the national government in pursuit of specific 
aims and intentions.  
Foundation myth of the post-apartheid nation 
Contrary to the popular notion that memories inevitably fade, some 
memories are nurtured and intensify with the passage of time, argues 
Assmann (2003: 15). This applies for instance to the memory of the 
Holocaust, which is currently marked by an increased awareness that the 
living memory (Erfahrungsgedächtnis) of those who witnessed the events 
must not get lost, but must be transferred into cultural memory and passed 
                                                     
1  This chapter makes extensive use of archival material sourced at the DAC in 
Pretoria. Although I’m very grateful that the department eventually made these 
documents available to me after many unsuccessful attempts over several years, 
it must be noted that department officials have remained very uncooperative. 
Since so many new monument projects in South Africa are in one way or another 
endorsed by the DAC, I was keen to obtain the department’s official perspective 
on specific heritage initiatives or official explanations for certain questions or 
contradictions. Despite numerous attempts, this has remained impossible, 
because department officials are unwilling to be interviewed or answer questions 
posed to them in writing. There appears to be a great sense of fear ‘to say the 
wrong thing’ and academic research appears to be perceived as a threat, not as an 
opportunity to assist or improve the government’s efforts. Hence in this and 
other chapters the department’s ‘voice’ is regrettably absent, apart from archival 
sources.  
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on to future generations. In South Africa, I argue, it is the memory of 
resistance against apartheid, colonialism and all forms of racism and 
oppression that is being transferred into a cultural memory designed to 
explain ‘who we are and where we come from’.  
In recent years, scholars have paid much attention to the ways in which 
images of the past serve to legitimate a present social order and specifically 
how nations forge a group identity through processes of selective 
remembering and the invention of usable pasts. ’[W]e undoubtedly find 
narration at the centre of nation: stories of national origins, myths of 
founding fathers, genealogies of heroes. At the origin of the nation, we find a 
story of the nation’s origin’, states Bennington (1990: 121). The search for 
the foundational moment for the establishment of the self can be found in 
individuals and in nations alike. It is linked to the notion that every story has 
a beginning – an idea that is deeply ingrained in our consciousness and 
imported unnoticed into memory and practices of commemoration (Lambek 
and Antze 1996: xvii). The story of a nation’s origin, the root and basis of its 
identity, commonly referred to as the ‘foundation myth’, is publicly 
represented and preserved through official, institutionalised forms of 
remembrance, including commemorative monuments and public statuary.  
The term foundation myth may appear misleading and can indeed be 
perceived as offensive to those who identify with the selected narratives and 
know them to be true. Myth is commonly understood as fiction and beliefs, 
stories of uncertain truth – the opposite of history, which is popularly 
associated with objective fact. But history is today widely acknowledged to 
be a social construct, strongly dependent on power relations, frequently 
subjective, purpose-driven and containing elements of fiction.2 Likewise, 
myth is not something necessarily untrue, but something that is true in a 
special sense. The fact that a great many people believe in it gives it a 
contemporary validity (Graham et al. 2000: 18). Roland Barthes’ notion of 
                                                     
2  Internationally such an understanding of history owes much to (and was partly 
prompted by) Foucault’s seminal writings. In the South African context, the 
constructed nature of historical discourse and the link between history 
production and power – or as Trouillot (1995) would say, the gap between what 
happened and what is said to have happened – has been much debated, especially 
since the late 1980s. In more recent times, the rise of ‘heritage studies’ has 
prompted reflection about the nature and purpose of academic history and to 
what extent history can really claim to be more objective, factual, and 
disinterested than heritage. In June 2002, the South African Historical 
Association held a conference on Heritage Creation and Research: The 
Restructuring of Historical Studies in Southern Africa in Johannesburg, where 
these issues were extensively debated, followed up at the South African 
Historical Society’s conference in Bloemfontein the following year (see e.g. 
Kros 2002; Wells 2002; Grundlingh 2002; Allen 2003). On related issues see 
also Rassool 2001; Minkley and Rassool 1998; Coombes 2003; Callinicos 1986. 
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myth as ‘depoliticised speech’ is important for its emphasis on what he 
describes as ‘blissful clarity’, the abolition of complexities and contra-
dictions for the sake of rendering the myth pure, innocent, natural and 
eternally justified.3  
Most useful for the present study is Assmann’s (2003: 76) concept of 
myth as any past that has been (or is being) fixed and internalised as 
foundational history – irrespective of whether this past is fictional or factual. 
For instance, the Holocaust is a historical fact and, as such, the subject of 
historical research. Beyond that, in modern-day Israel, the Holocaust is the 
foundational past, or foundation myth, which provides legitimacy and 
orientation and which is institutionalised through incorporation in school 
curricula, representation in museums, commemoration in memorials,4 rituals 
and public events. In the process of remembrance, says Assmann, myth and 
history are largely indistinguishable. The foundation myth provides the 
framework within which selected narratives and their associated artefacts, 
heroes, and places are embedded, and from which they derive meaning. 
Monuments and heritage sites are meant to visually represent, officially 
endorse, preserve and solidify these narratives, although they may not 
always succeed in doing so. Public monuments, in conjunction with other 
forms of institutionalized remembrance, are built to control and guide 
people’s perception of the contemporary socio-political order, because the 
experience of the present is intricately linked with the memory of the past.  
Given its colonial origins, arbitrarily drawn borders and racial, ethnic and 
culturally diverse population, what in fact is the essence and foundation of 
the South African nation? Chipkin (2007) has recently approached this 
question from a philosophically grounded angle in his provocatively titled 
book Do South Africans Exist? I want to engage with the issue from the 
perspective of the state-sponsored memory landscape, especially as it is 
being enshrined through the Legacy Project. In the current post-apartheid 
era, the challenge lies in creating a new, inclusive myth of origin or 
foundational story that can be shared by all and provide the basis of 
identification with the new nation. Some scholars consider the concept of the 
                                                     
3  For Roland Barthes, myth is ‘depoliticized speech’: ‘Myth does not deny things, 
on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it 
makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives 
them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact ... 
[I]t abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of 
essences ... it organises a world which is without contradictions because it is 
without depth ... [I]t establishes a blissful clarity’ (1999 [1973]): 58). It is this 
blissful clarity – as opposed to the confusing opacity of gradations, ambiguities, 
and contradictions which tends to characterise historical reality – that arguably 
attracts people to myth.  
4  For an excellent analysis of the changing representation of the Holocaust in 
Israeli Holocaust memorials, see Goldman 2006.  
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‘Rainbow Nation’, much touted nationally and internationally during the 
immediate post-election period, as the key foundation myth of the post-
apartheid state.5 The term was first introduced into the South African context 
by Archbishop Desmond Tutu in the 1980s, describing his vision for a new, 
non-racial state of diverse peoples, bound together by mutual respect and a 
shared humanity. But the metaphor of the Rainbow Nation is not unique to 
South Africa6 and its invocation has lost currency in recent years. Rather, I 
want to argue that the imaginary of the post-apartheid nation rests on four 
interrelated foundational pillars: a) the ‘meta-narrative’ of the struggle for 
liberation; b) resistance – against apartheid, colonial domination and all 
forms of disenfranchisement of the marginalised, as well as against negation 
of their value systems; c) the notion of triumph over oppression; and d) the 
concept of ubuntu, which, broadly speaking, refers to a commonly shared 
humanity rooted in African values and associated beliefs in a romanticised 
notion of African ‘tradition’ as a means to facilitate reconciliation, healing 
and moral regeneration for the nation.  
The language of constant struggle against oppression and humiliation and 
the centrality in such discourse of resistance and the quest for freedom 
echoes the Afrikaner nationalist foundation myth. Ultimately these obvious 
parallels are unremarkable and predictable, as many nations and new social 
orders describe their origins in roughly similar terms, especially after periods 
of prolonged conflict. Countless historical precedents show that immersion 
in and internalisation of dominant cultural ideas and myths prevailing in a 
particular society invariably contributes to the forging of new myths in a 
new society.7 Burke (1989) explains how societies tend to remember in 
                                                     
5  The Research Group On South Africa at the Université de la Réunion (Reunion 
Island, France) organised an international conference on ‘Foundation myths of 
the new South Africa’ at the University of Reunion Island in March 2003, where 
South African and international scholars representing different disciplines shared 
their perspectives on the matter and compared South Africa with other countries. 
6  The ‘Rainbow Nation’ had served as a foundation myth for the island state of 
Mauritius also, in the 1960s (Boudet 2003), and the Reverend Jesse Jackson 
introduced the term in the United States in 1984. Jackson, one of the United 
States’ foremost civil rights, religious and political figures, founded the National 
Rainbow Coalition in 1984. This national social justice organisation, based in 
Washington, D.C, is devoted to political empowerment, education and changing 
public policy. Jackson is known for his promotion of inclusiveness across lines 
of race, culture, class, gender and belief. See www.rainbowpush.org/founder/. 
7  Elise Marienstras points out that myth-makers never invent from nothing, as 
their own culture is invariably immersed in earlier ideas and myths. In the case 
of the United States, for instance, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin both 
spoke about old Anglo-Saxon institutions as some kind of ancestors to the new 
American state (personal communication 2003). Koshar refers to the same 
example: ‘[I]n North America … Thomas Jefferson proposed that the seal of the 
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terms of templates or schemata, where new heroes are often fresh versions of 
earlier figures in reversals of hierarchies. Key battles fought and traumas 
sustained by the newly empowered social group mirror those of the previous 
order.  
The centrality of the liberation struggle as the focal point of the post-
apartheid society’s effort of conscious remembrance is also scarcely 
surprising when considering the commemorative tradition of other countries 
on the African continent or indeed throughout the previously colonised 
world. Newly independent nations tend to engage in highly visible symbolic 
acts of paying tribute to those who fought for their liberation. Permanent 
public monuments are often erected to celebrate the attainment of political 
freedom8 and museum exhibitions present detailed accounts of the liberation 
war and its main protagonists. Throughout the decades, many African states 
have organised the official periodic renewal of the memory of the liberation 
war through purposefully staged rituals and public ‘performances’ which 
often take place at monument sites, as a means of justifying the current 
socio-political order and endorsing the ruling party as liberators of the 
people.9 
Among the most prominent examples is the official politics of 
remembrance pursued in Zimbabwe and its focal point, Heroes’ Acre on the 
outskirts of Harare, built immediately after independence in 1980 according 
to a design imported from North Korea. Much has been written about 
Heroes’ Acre as propaganda, as a didactic glorification of the war of 
liberation and its stalwarts; about its socialist iconography and symbolism; 
and about the heroic, socialist-realist style of its extensive sculptural 
artefacts, which are so roughly adapted to the local context that some of the 
facial features are said to be more Asian than African in character. The 
liberation struggle is portrayed in highly confrontational and dichotomous 
terms, drawing on crude stereotypes in terms of which all whites are 
oppressors, and depicting simplistic black and white, good and evil-type 
narratives (Anonymous 1986; Arnold 1989; Werbner 1998).  
                                                                                                                            
United States feature not only the children of Israel being led out of the 
wilderness but the “Saxon chiefs” Hengist and Horsa, who were seen as political 
ancestors of the American revolutionaries’ (2000: 37). 
8  Outstanding examples include the Ghanaian Independence monument in Accra, 
replete with a gigantic arc de triomphe topped by the five pointed Soviet star, 
expansive parade grounds and an eternal flame lit by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s 
first black president; two Uhuru monuments celebrating freedom from 
colonialism in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi; in the Algerian capital of Algiers, a 
well-known colonial equestrian statue in a prominent public square was replaced 
by an abstract Independence monument; both in Zimbabwe and twenty years 
later in Namibia, large-scale heroes’ acres were built outside the capital.  
9  Among many examples the reader may be referred to Larsen (2004) for Kenya; 
Werbner (1998) for Zimbabwe; or Çelik (1999-2000) for Algeria. 
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Like most post-colonial African societies, South Africa is preoccupied with 
the commemoration of the fight for liberation, but no commemorative 
structure exists in this country that communicates its meaning in similarly 
aggressive, derogatory and confrontational terms, be they visual or verbal. 
On the contrary, despite inevitably making frequent reference to the 
oppressive acts meted out by the apartheid regime or the injustices of 
colonialism, both the images and the inscriptions in the newly erected post-
apartheid monuments tend to be measured and restrained, and carefully 
considered to avoid giving offense. The notion of triumph and the linear 
unrolling of a teleological resistance narrative are certainly prominent in the 
National Legacy Project and other post-apartheid heritage developments, but 
these monuments do not crudely celebrate the victory of the black majority 
over its white oppressors. Rather, the Struggle is portrayed as an historic 
process that ultimately benefited all people. Members of the white minority, 
it is intimated, can also celebrate the advent of freedom and the achievement 
of the new democratic order, as they have been liberated from the moral 
burden of benefitting from racial injustice; from the constraints of living in 
an environment controlled by principles of social engineering; and from the 
stigma of belonging to a nation of white oppressors.  
Not only can the history of the anti-apartheid movement and more 
generally the history of resistance against oppression, the fight for human 
rights, be portrayed as a morally elevated cause, a noble past that constitutes 
a proud foundation of the new democratic order. More importantly, the 
meta-narrative of resistance is not limited to the experience of one racial 
group, but rather shared by individuals from diverse backgrounds, including 
liberal and progressive whites, who contributed in their various ways, hence 
allowing for an inclusive identification with a new non-racial, non-sexist, 
democratic nation. What is more, the focus on a cross-culturally shared 
history of resistance and the liberation struggle was also meant to overcome 
the tension between ethnic and national identity, one of the greatest dangers 
to peace and democracy in newly independent nations, especially in Africa.  
The emphasis on a shared past, the participation of all societal groups in 
the historical processes that shaped this country represents a relatively novel 
perspective compared to the dominant historiography of the colonial and 
apartheid eras. The commemorative practices of the previous regime had 
typically implied that Africans played no significant role in South Africa’s 
history apart from being obstructive in the advancement of ‘civilisation’. The 
motivation for the National Legacy Project and related commemorative 
initiatives is precisely the desire to define the beginning of a new order, and 
to express a new national identity and value systems completely different 
from those endorsed in the past, while simultaneously recasting the role of 
Africans as agents and positive contributors. Since the need for 
reconciliation and nation-building requires refraining from establishing 
national heritage developments that may be perceived as confrontational and 
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divisive, the emphasis on a shared past is also meant to express continuity 
with the past and to allow those who identify with that past to share in the 
celebration of the new nation. 
The National Legacy Project: Constitutive phase  
I now want to investigate the constitutive phase of the National Legacy 
Project and introduce each of the projects that were proposed or adapted. It 
is important to briefly reflect on each project, including those that do not 
involve monuments, because the Legacy Project in its entirety provides 
official guidance to which historical events should be considered 
foundational moments for the birth of the democratic order, which 
extraordinary individuals should be respected as national heroes, and which 
aspects of the past should be conserved for future generations as symbols of 
the nation and as representations of ‘our shared history’.  
As the possibilities of symbolic politics inherent in historical events, 
places or personalities are almost infinite, diverse audiences and 
stakeholders are likely to differ in their interpretation of the past and their 
assessment of significance. Hence my introduction of the various projects 
will primarily be guided by the official documentation produced by or on 
behalf of the DACST, notably the Legacy Project discussion document, to 
illustrate what the government found important and memorable about each 
project. I also want to show how each project celebrates a foundational 
element or symbolically expresses integral, constituting values of the new 
nation as conceptualized by the government.  
Following Cabinet’s adoption of the Memorandum on the establishment 
of the National Legacy Project on 10 April 1997,10 the Minister of Arts, 
Culture, Science and Technology approved the proposed composition and 
terms of reference of the Legacy Committee (11/6/1997), which would be 
located in the DACST and include representatives of the NMC, the 
President’s Office and other relevant organisations and government 
departments (notably Education, Public Works and Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism). Once approved by the Legacy Committee (accountable to the 
Minister), each individual project was to be guided by a steering committee 
which would facilitate the implementation of the project and assist with 
additional fund-raising. The Legacy Project was initially planned to have a 
life-span of three years and funding was envisaged to come from the public 
and private sector within South Africa and from abroad.11 
                                                     
10  Some archival documents alternatively record this date as 4 April 1997 or 14 
April 1997. 
11  Proposed Legacy Committee: Legacy Project, Letter Director-General to Minis-
ter, 9 June 1997, Ministerial approval 11 June 1997, DAC, Legacy Committee 
and General, Vol. 1, file 6/16/7. 
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On 11 July 1997 the Legacy Committee met for the first time to consider the 
initial Legacy Project Discussion Document, prepared by the DACST. Apart 
from setting down key principles of operation, the document included six 
‘potential legacy projects which have been initiated or mooted’, namely 1. 
Constitution Hill; 2. the Qunu Museum; 3. the Samora Machel Monument; 
4. Freedom Square; 5. Freedom Park; and 6. the Centenary of the South 
African War 1899-1901 (sic).  
Constitution Hill is the name chosen for the precinct around the Old Fort 
in Braamfontein, Johannesburg, which the eleven constitutional judges 
selected as the preferred site for the new Constitutional Court (officially 
opened on 21 March 2004). The Old Fort was established in 1893 as a 
military defence post, but soon began to function as a prison. New buildings 
were added over time, notably a Women’s Prison, an Awaiting Trial 
building, the ‘Native Quarters’ and Isolation Wards. The summary of the 
Old Fort’s history in the discussion document emphasises the link between 
incarceration and apartheid oppression, pointing out that over the decades, 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners were held here, many of them for 
contravening apartheid laws such as pass laws and beer brewing regulations. 
The Old Fort also served as a prison for political prisoners and leader figures 
of all racial backgrounds, among whom the discussion document mentions 
Boer generals during and after the Anglo-Boer War, Mahatma Gandhi 
during the 1913 Passive Resistance Campaign, white workers during the 
1922 strike, and various political leaders, including Nelson Mandela at the 
time of the 1956 Treason Trial (Discussion Document 1997).  
Constitution Hill – the ‘Robben Island of Jo’burg’, as the metro’s official 
publicity department put it (Davie 2002) – is a highly symbolic site with 
multiple layers of meaning (see also Segal et al. 2006). The Old Fort is now 
a museum, an almost completely intact artefact of a larger topography of 
apartheid oppression, testifying to the racial injustice of the past. The new 
Constitutional Court building, designed by Janina Masojada, Andrew Makin 
and Paul Wygers, and much celebrated for its unique architectural qualities, 
has arisen next to it as a symbol of justice and the constitutional principles of 
the non-racial, democratically elected post-apartheid nation. The court 
building incorporates structural remnants of the demolished prison buildings 
and re-uses some of their materials, hence creating a deliberate interweaving 
of old and new that symbolically reinforces the triumph of freedom over 
oppression. From the outset Constitution Hill was meant to rise ‘out of the 
ashes of colonialism and apartheid to symbolize a new, democratic South 
Africa’ (Discussion Document 1997: n.p.). Today, the guided tour starts out 
with narratives of suffering and hardship while visiting the Old Fort and 
various adjunct prison facilities, all carefully restored, and ends up in a spirit 
of celebration inside the court with its remarkable design and artistic 
adornment, which is meant to express inclusiveness, common humanity, and 
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a truly South African identity through the creative genius of innumerable 
artists and crafters from throughout the country.12 
The Qunu Museum, in later documents also called the Nelson Mandela 
Museum, refers to a project in the small rural village in the Eastern Cape 
where South Africa’s first democratically elected president grew up. Since 
the publication of Mandela’s autobiography A Long Walk to Freedom 
generated much public interest in his early life, his family origins and 
homestead, the Qunu museum was envisaged as a focal point of tourist 
interest in South Africa’s most famous and internationally admired leader. 
Being located in a marginalised province much in need of development and 
tourist attractions, the Qunu museum moreover added to the geographical 
balance of the National Legacy Project. The museum was intended primarily 
as a resource centre holding the many gifts, tributes, films and documents 
produced in Mandela’s honour. According to the Discussion Document 
(1997: n.p.), Qunu was meant to be a national tribute to Nelson Mandela as 
‘an international symbol for wisdom, reconciliation and statesmanship’ and, 
I would add, as a ‘founding father’ of the post-apartheid nation. I will engage 
with the issue of commemorating Nelson Mandela from a different 
perspective in Chapter Ten.  
The Samora Machel project commemorates the site at Mbuzini in the 
Barberton District, Mpumalanga, where the former president of Mozam-
bique and his closest allies were killed under mysterious circumstances in a 
plane crash in October 1986. Machel (1933-86) was the socialist 
revolutionary leader in the Mozambican struggle against Portuguese 
colonialism and became the first president of the independent nation in 1975. 
Mozambique subsequently became an important support base for the South 
African anti-apartheid movement and numerous political activists spent time 
in exile there. Although an official investigation by the apartheid 
government at the time cleared the South African security forces of any 
possible involvement in the plane crash, the incident has remained contested 
and the post-apartheid government has expressed its commitment to re-
opening the investigation. 
The DACST discussion document (1997) points out that the Mbuzini 
valley carries deep historical significance for local communities, hence 
                                                     
12  One might add another interesting perspective here, reconnecting to the earlier 
distinction between monument and memorial. South African professor of law, 
Jeremy Sarkin, once argued that the new South African constitution is both a 
monument and a memorial. Monuments, in his understanding, are meant to be 
affirmative means of celebrating people or events, while memorials are 
reminders of losses and suffering (paraphrased in Macdonald 2002: 61). The new 
constitution is a proud monument to new values of equality and human rights, 
built upon the painful memories of the past and the old constitution, just as the 
new Constitutional Court is built upon the foundations of the Old Fort.  
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placing the proposed Samora Machel memorial into a larger cultural land-
scape. The fact that the rural site lies at the cross-roads of three countries 
(South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique) adds further to its symbolic 
value as a reference to the contribution of other African countries to the 
South African liberation struggle. The Mozambican government was anxious 
to see an appropriate tribute to their fallen national hero, and in 1996, 
Mandela himself promised that a memorial would be built to honour 
President Machel and acknowledge the support of the Mozambican people. 
The site of the plane crash, which still contains some wreckage, was 
declared a national monument in 1998 and the memorial, designed by 
Mozambican architect José Forjaz and consisting of 35 steel pipes 
symbolizing the lives of those lost in the plane crash, was unveiled there in 
January 1999. A museum or interpretation centre has recently been added to 
the site (Anonymous 1999; 2000c; 2001a; Koch 1999; SAHRA file Mbuzini; 
Discussion document). 
The Freedom Square project refers to the commemoration of the place in 
Kliptown where the Freedom Charter was adopted by the Congress of the 
People. The fact that the Charter’s various clauses had been widely 
canvassed amongst communities and organisations before the Kliptown 
meeting gave broad legitimacy to this important document. Although both 
the document and the process of its adoption remain contested to the present 
day, the Freedom Charter was ratified a year later, following consultations 
with various ANC branches. As the Discussion Document (1997) mentions, 
the political significance of the Freedom Charter, which sets out the vision 
for a free, democratic, non-racial South Africa, has been compared to 
Britain’s Magna Carta or the United States’ Declaration of Independence. 
Perhaps more importantly, as it constitutes the ideological basis of the 
present Constitution, the Freedom Charter can be considered a key 
foundational document of the post-apartheid nation.  
Despite the emphasis on unity, one must not forget, as said earlier, that 
the Freedom Charter was not unanimously adopted and its adoption in fact 
led to the split between the ANC and the PAC. Most recently, the ANC has 
split once again with the establishment of the break-away party, the 
Congress of the People (COPE).bUsing the Freedom Charter as a 
foundational reference point, the new party portrays itself as the true heir of 
the 1955 Congress of the People. If COPE manages to become a sustained 
and substantive factor in the political landscape in South Africa, we will 
probably see, in due course, a fierce battle to appropriate this key icon of the 
past, which may manifest itself in a renegotiation of the meaning of the new 
heritage site in Kliptown.  
The fifth project, Freedom Park, was described in the Discussion Docu-
ment (1997: n.p.) as ‘an accessibly situated, multi-disciplinary museum and 
monument park, representing the triple themes of struggle, democracy and 
nation-building’. From the outset it was envisaged as a large-scale, central 
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site of pilgrimage that would include various commemorative components 
such as art works, plaques, a proposed TRC memorial to the victims of 
apartheid, a monument to women, and a ‘House of Memory’ dedicated to 
oral culture and other aspects of South Africa’s rich, intangible heritage. The 
conceptual evolution and actual implementation of this project will be 
detailed in the next chapter, but it should be evident that the intention was to 
build a ‘shrine of the nation’, an ambitious, comprehensive site that would 
become a national focal point of memory, a symbolic final resting place for 
the ‘ancestors’ of the nation, as well as a site of celebration of the political 
achievement and cultural diversity that characterises the new nation.  
The sixth project was prompted by the impending centenary of the so-
called Anglo-Boer War, now renamed the South African War or the South 
African Anglo-Boer War, which was seen as an opportunity for a critical 
assessment and inclusive re-interpretation of this important historical 
conflict. While the war has long played a significant role in the history of 
South Africa as represented from the perspective of the two opposing white 
minority groups, and was closely linked to psycho-cultural narratives of 
identity, especially for Afrikaner communities (Nasson 2004), the impact of 
this military encounter on the black majority had attracted little attention 
both in academic scholarship and in the popular imagination. Yet black 
communities had not only been affected by the devastation of the war but 
they had also been employed in various capacities by both warring parties. 
Many black men lost their lives in the conflict and black women suffered 
and died in British concentration camps just as Boer women did, although 
certainly not alongside them.  
The Discussion Document (1997) envisaged that the National Legacy 
Project would guide the way in which the Centenary would be comme-
morated and in the process forge a new interpretation of the war, relevant to 
the values and principles of the post-apartheid nation. To this effect, new 
research would be needed ‘to remedy the imbalances and omissions of past 
interpretations of the war’ and to ensure that ‘the formerly silenced voices … 
be heard’ (ibid.). Commemorations should include multiple perspectives and 
experiences of the war. Broad public participation would be facilitated 
through the media. Educational programmes of various kinds were proposed, 
and the need for linking anniversaries and other commemorative events to 
the provision of opportunities for capacity-building among a range of people 
was stressed. In short, this Legacy Project proposal was about an 
appropriation of the (‘white on white’) Anglo-Boer war for the black 
majority, the encouragement of broad identification of all South Africans 
with one another, and the staging of an inclusive commemoration that would 
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pre-empt the predictable outcome of narrow sectarian commemorative 
events that divide and exclude in the spirit of the old order.13  
Portfolio of Legacy Projects and Consultation 
Towards the end of 1997, the department commissioned DACST consultant, 
Luli Callinicos, to draw up a discussion document containing a complete 
portfolio of potential projects to be considered by the Legacy Committee. 
Without wanting to overstate Callinicos’ role in the Legacy Project, it is 
nevertheless illuminating to consider briefly her academic background and 
her approach to history. Callinicos belongs to a small group of white 
academics with a long-standing interest in popular history and a dedication 
to radical social history, which often challenged the work of orthodox 
academic historians during the apartheid period. Popular historians tended to 
research and popularise the history of those sectors of the population 
marginalised by the ruling classes or within the prevailing socio-political 
order, and often developed a close relationship with the communities they 
addressed. Popular history and radical history were understood as alternative 
history, countering the dominant historical narratives and discourses 
developed by the ruling groups. Its aim was to examine the origins of 
prevailing struggles and the structures and power-relations underlying the 
contemporary socio-political order, drawing on new methodologies and 
techniques such as the use of personal testimony, experiential and oral 
history (Callinicos 1986).  
Callinicos was a long-time research officer for the History Workshop at 
the University of Witwaterrand, and her publications strongly focused on the 
popularisation of worker histories (e.g. Callinicos 1981; 1986a). She was 
also an activist and a member of the Congress of Democrats in the 1950s and 
has remained politically well connected. Her most recent publications 
include The World that Made Mandela (Callinicos 2002) and a biography of 
Oliver Tambo (Callinicos 2004). 
Callinicos’ 41-page discussion document entitled ‘Portfolio of Legacy 
Projects’ represents a detailed, well researched and referenced paper, 
                                                     
13  Several war memorials throughout the country were re-dedicated in accordance 
with the general revision and repositioning of the war itself. For instance, the 
Rand Regiments Monument in Saxonwold, Johannesburg, designed by Sir 
Edwin Lutyens and originally erected in the early 20th century to honour the 
British victims (the Rand Regiments) of the Anglo-Boer War, was re-dedicated – 
as articulated in the changed inscription – to the victims of all races. But even 
prior to this recent rededication, there appears to have been confusion about the 
meaning of the Rand Regiment’s Memorial. As Brink and Krige (1999) point 
out, it is frequently referred to as the ‘War Memorial’, reflecting the common 
notion that this memorial is dedicated to the victims of World Wars I and II. 
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comprising a total of twenty projects (including the six listed above) clearly 
aimed at broad inclusiveness. Although most projects related to political 
memory and histories of oppression and resistance, some were also 
dedicated to the celebration of the country’s vibrant cultural achievements 
and literary heritage (e.g. ‘Our Precolonial Heritage’; ‘Dedicated Libra-
ries’).14 But when the Legacy Committee met for the third time (on 18 
November 1997), its members considered this impressive document only 
briefly towards the end of the meeting and did not engage with specific 
details. Rather it was decided that members of the committee should submit 
comments in writing by 2 December (the archival record suggests that few 
seem to have done so), and that the DACST should find ‘a credible 
consultative process involving government and civil society’ early in 1998 to 
obtain critical feedback and constructive input.15 
To this effect, the DACST organised a colloquium attended by 15 invited 
academics16 on 22 January 1998 to generate discussion around the Portfolio 
                                                     
14  These projects were titled as follows: 1. Constitution Hill, 2. The TRC Wall of 
Remembrance, 3. Monument to the San, 4. Our Precolonial Heritage, 5. Great 
Patriots, 6. Memorial to the Women of South Africa, 7. Monument to the 
Workers of South Africa, 8. Forced Removals and the Celebration of Restitution, 
9. Freedom Square, 10. The Long Walk to Freedom: the Mandela Trail, 11. 
Cenotaph to the Martyrs who fell in the Armed Struggle, 12. Dedicating 
Libraries, 13. Historical Turning Points, 14. A History Trail of the Resistance of 
Slaves in the Cape, 15. In the Footsteps of Gandhi, 16. The Cultural Mapping of 
War Graves, 17. The Centenary of the 1899-1902 War, 18. New Museums, 19. 
The Samora Machel Memorial, 20. Freedom Park. 
15  ‘Legacy Project Discussion Document’, DACST, 1997, DAC, Legacy Commit-
tee and General, Vol. 1, file 6/16/7. Minutes of the 1st meeting of the Legacy 
Committee on 11/7/1997, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, no Vol. #, file 
6/16/7. Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Legacy Committee on 17/9/1997, DAC, 
Legacy Committee and General, no Vol. #, file 6/16/7. Minutes of the 3rd 
meeting of the Legacy Committee on 18/11/1997, DAC, Legacy Committee and 
General, no Vol. #, file 6/16/7. ‘Portfolio of Legacy Projects’, Discussion 
Document, Prepared for the Legacy Committee, November 1997, DAC, Legacy 
Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
16  Jabu Maphalala (University of Zululand), Jeff Guy (University of Natal), 
Wandile Kuse (UNITRA), Henry Bredekamp (University of Western Cape), 
Albert Grundlingh (UNISA), Philip Bonner, University of Witwatersrand, Ben 
Magubane (HSRC), Paul Maylam (Rhodes University), Krish Rancod (Gyane 
College of Education), Palesa Makhale-Mahlangu (HSRC), Peter Delius, 
(University of Witwatersrand), Achmat Davids, (NMC), Christopher Saunders, 
(University of Cape Town), Sean Field, (University of Cape Town), Philip 
Tobias (University of Witwatersrand), Beki Peterson (University of Witwaters-
rand). The following apologies were noted: Cherryl Walker (University of 
Natal), Ciraj Rassoul (University of Western Cape), Colin Bundy (University of 
Witwatersrand), Bill Nasson (University of Cape Town), Eddie Molaka 
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of Legacy Projects. Since it appears that few (if any) other consultative 
processes were pursued, especially with civil society, the academic 
colloquium constituted the primary forum for critical debate. It should be 
noted that meanwhile the Legacy Project Steering Committee had already 
been set up (in January 1998) with fortnightly meetings aimed at discussing 
progress and proposing strategic actions for the smooth implementation of 
the existing components of the project. Participants in the academic 
colloquium discussed the Portfolio document and its twenty projects in terms 
of their inclusiveness and balance; their interpretation and ‘voice’; the 
appropriateness of the proposed forms of representation; the issue of 
‘offensive monuments’; and the process of consultation. According to 
official reports, there were no major criticisms and the concept of the Legacy 
Project itself was not questioned.17 Various points made in the Portfolio, 
however, generated some discussion and members of the panel made a 
number of suggestions, of which I want to highlight only those most relevant 
to this study.  
Caution was expressed against an over-celebration of the nation state, as 
reflected especially in the proposed project on ‘Great Patriots’ and ‘Founders 
of Nations’; the panel recommended a revision of these categories to allow 
for a more inclusive representation and especially a more accurate reflection 
of the role played by women. These are important points that overlap with 
my own critique of post-apartheid heritage and memorialisation, as argued 
especially in Chapter Eight. 
Participants furthermore expressed concern about the use of monuments 
as the primary mode of representation and proposed that the portfolio 
emphasise more appropriate forms of commemoration, such as festivals, 
                                                                                                                            
(University of Cape Town), Carolyn Hamilton (University of Witwatersrand), 
Alpheus Mangezi (Development Bank of Southern Africa), Pallo Jordan 
(Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism), Andre Odendaal (Robben 
Island Museum), Ndlunkulu Sigcau (Qawukeni: The Great Place). See appendix 
A attached to the ‘Report on Colloquium on the Portfolio of Legacy Projects 
held on 22 January, 1998’, undated, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 
2, file 6/16/7. 
17  ‘Report on the Colloquium concerning the Portfolio of Legacy Projects’, Letter 
Director-General to Minister, 5 March 1998, DAC, Legacy Committee and 
General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. In response to this summary, the Minister requested 
a more detailed document capturing the discussions. This was submitted on 7 
May 1998. See ‘The Portfolio of Legacy Projects: Report on the Discussions of 
the Colloquium held on 22 January 1998’, Letter Director-General to Minister 
7/5/1998, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. The undated 
document entitled ‘Report on Colloquium on the Portfolio of Legacy Projects 
held on 22 January, 1998’ consists of summarised minutes of the meeting, as 
well as a list of those who attended the colloquium (DAC, Legacy Committee 
and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7). 
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anniversaries and oral history, in which the community or general public has 
a direct role to play.18 This recommendation was a direct response to the 
problematic issue of community identification and ownership and 
foreshadowed the more prominent role that has only recently been accorded 
the official recognition of intangible heritage. The shift towards a more 
comprehensive understanding of heritage conservation and more diverse 
forms of preserving memory was in alignment with an international trend 
bolstered by the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage. This trend strongly influenced the approach of 
the NHC, which during the few years of its existence has placed much 
emphasis on promoting local, community-based heritage initiatives that 
focus on oral memory, rituals, music, and other aspects of intangible heritage 
(e.g. the Ubuntu Campaign for Nation Building, or the South African 
Traditional Music Awards) (NHC website 2009). Yet despite the inclusion 
of some elements of oral memory and community-based activities, the 
conceptualisation of the National Legacy Project remained firmly structured 
around monuments and museums in continuation of the established 
(Eurocentric) tradition.  
The members of the academic panel also made a few concrete suggest-
ions for specific commemorative initiatives or the modification of proposed 
projects. The most significant, in my view, was the installation of a cenotaph 
for miners (suggested by Jeff Guy in a written submission) in 
acknowledgement of the tens of thousands of miners who lost their lives 
underground in South Africa’s long history of resource extraction. Indeed, 
many disused mines are virtual mass graves today, but to my knowledge no 
such memorial has ever been installed. If the post-apartheid foundation myth 
had been structured not around the resistance struggle but around the class 
struggle, in which the exploitation of black labour assumed centre stage, 
such a memorial might have been imagined as a national site of mourning. 
Viewed from this perspective, and compared with the commemorative 
politics of socialist states during the course of the 20th century, it is indeed 
striking to note how few post-apartheid monuments and memorials 
acknowledge the specific contribution of workers to the development of the 
country. This absence is a clear reflection of prevailing political power 
relations and the economic path South Africa has chosen, in which, for 
instance, the nationalisation of the mines remains out of the question. One 
may speculate how a potential shift towards the political Left might in time 
affect the memorial landscape in this regard.  
The academic panel also debated the issue of ‘offensive monuments’, 
with one participant suggesting that the offending statues be moved to an 
                                                     
18  ‘The Portfolio of Legacy Projects: Report on the Discussions of the Colloquium 
held on 22 January 1998’, Letter Director-General to Minister, 7 May 1998, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
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apartheid museum or dedicated park, while another cautioned against large-
scale iconoclastic measures. It was felt that the Legacy Project should 
somehow address the question of such contested markers. But in the context 
of the government’s compartmentalised approach to heritage matters the 
Legacy Project was, of course, intended only to identify and appropriately 
commemorate new leaders and events, while a different process would deal 
with existing monuments of the previous order. Significantly, participants 
strongly emphasised the importance of conceptualising each project within a 
broader historical context and juxtaposing multiple voices around the same 
event. This would require that proper research, including oral history 
research, be conducted and that sufficient funds be allocated for this purpose. 
On the issue of consultation, some academics questioned the composition of 
the colloquium and it was generally felt that various mechanisms must be 
used to engage the community and civil society, as well as to foster 
collaboration between the media, academia and schools.19 
It is remarkable that virtually none of the findings and recommendations 
of the panel of academics appear to have been implemented or even 
seriously considered. The minutes of the fourth and even the fifth meeting of 
the Legacy Committee (on 14 April and 13 August 1998 respectively) reflect 
no discussion or even mention of the colloquium and its work on the 
conceptual document. Instead, at the fourth meeting, the Director General, 
Roger Jardine, simply informed the Committee about three new legacy 
projects identified for delivery in 1998, namely the Blood River 
Commemoration, a Tribute to Chief Albert Luthuli, and the Women’s 
Monument.20 The first two of these had not been included in the Portfolio 
document or proposed by the participants in the colloquium (as reflected in 
existing written documents). Contrary to the panel’s recommendation, it was 
announced that all projects would consist mainly of the building and 
unveiling of monuments and the Portfolio of Legacy Projects would be 
reorganised to foreground these priority items, with the NMC reorganising 
its budget to assist with funding.21 This obvious side-lining of the academic 
                                                     
19  ‘The Portfolio of Legacy Projects: Report on the Discussions of the Colloquium 
held on 22 January 1998’, Letter Director-General to Minister, 7 May 1998, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
20  Minutes of the 4th meeting of the Legacy Committee on 14/4/1998: 8, DAC, 
Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 3, file 6/16/7. 
21  When the NMC submitted its revised budget for 1998/99 in response to 
Mtshali’s request, 80% of the total budget was earmarked for legacy projects, 
surveys of cultural sites and the restoration of properties in previously 
marginalised communities. An unspent amount of R125 000 from the previous 
financial year was carried over and proposed to be used for the Women’s 
Memorial and the Freedom Square projects. ‘The National Monuments Council: 
Projects Budget 1998/99’, Letter Director-General to Minister, Undated, DAC, 
Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 3, file 6/16/7. 
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expertise of historians in the Legacy Project development suggests to me that 
the ‘consultation’ was largely a token process.  
Three priority legacy projects 
Since the three new projects that Jardine presented to the committee in April 
1998 were identified for priority delivery at the highest level of the DACST, 
I briefly want to consider their significance and their political import. Only 
the proposed Women’s Monument project is rooted in the Portfolio of 
Legacy Projects Discussion Document (1997: 13). Under the heading 
‘Memorials to the Women of South Africa’, the document seems to have 
envisaged several markers, presumably at different locations throughout the 
country. The discussion document refers firstly to a ‘statue or monument’ 
commemorating the women’s march to the Union Buildings in protest 
against the extension of the pass laws on 9 August 1956, the day now 
celebrated as National Women’s Day. Secondly it proposes the conversion 
of the Old Fort’s Women’s Goal in Johannesburg into a museum dedicated 
to women’s political and social history, acknowledging women’s 
contributions not only to the political struggle, but also to the economy and 
as custodians of culture and language. Thirdly, it suggests the inclusive re-
interpretation of the Vrouemonument, the Afrikaner Nationalist monument in 
Bloemfontein dedicated to Afrikaner women who died in British concen-
tration camps during the South African Anglo-Boer war. 
However, the official national Legacy Project in honour of women as it 
stands today is based only on the commemoration of the 1956 protest march 
and consists of a monument in Pretoria.22 This event constitutes the most 
obvious connection with the political memory of the anti-apartheid struggle, 
allowing the nation to celebrate women as active participants in political 
resistance and contributors to the country’s liberation, ‘founding mothers’ or 
‘midwives’ in the birth of the post-apartheid nation. The symbolic 
significance of the women’s march in terms of the value systems promoted 
by the post-apartheid order furthermore lies in the peaceful nature of the 
event; in the determination and resilience of ordinary women, many of 
whom were very poor; and most importantly, in the true show of unity 
between black, white, Indian and ‘coloured’ women, hence representing a 
past model for the present vision of a non-racial society.23 Chapter Eight will 
                                                     
22  The Old Fort’s Women’s Goal (part of the Constitution Hill legacy project) has 
been converted into a museum, but not as envisaged in the portfolio document. 
The Vrouemonument has never been inclusively re-interpreted, although a small 
exhibition on the suffering of black women was indeed added to the adjacent 
museum. 
23  The symbolic significance was captured thus: ‘The dramatic event of the 9 
August, 1956, also celebrates an harmonious and non-racial event, in which 
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engage in a detailed analysis of this project and critically assess its success in 
representing ‘the women’ of South Africa. 
The Blood River Commemoration was soon referred to as the Ncome 
project in reference to the Zulu name of the river and its associated battle 
(iMpi yase Ncome). The famous 1838 battle between advancing Voor-
trekkers and Zulus over access to the fertile land between the Drakensberg 
and the coastline had long constituted a foundational moment in the history 
of the Afrikaner ‘nation’ – a historical consciousness shaped and passed on 
through multiple channels, including quasi-religious rituals during annual 
commemorations on the battle site on 16 December each year. Although the 
idea of paying tribute to the previously unrepresented fallen Zulu warriors 
and re-interpreting the conflict from a Zulu perspective related quite 
narrowly to ethnic history, the wider, national significance of the Ncome 
project was seen as having the potential to symbolise reconciliation between 
former enemies. This was a particularly apt symbol because after 1994 the 
public holiday on 16 December had been renamed the Day of Recon-
ciliation. The impending 160th anniversary of the battle legitimated the 
prioritisation of this project, but the resultant time pressure arguably 
compromised the development process of the project and made it vulnerable 
to the domineering impact of IFP political officials with partisan agendas.  
The Albert Luthuli project can be understood as a counterpart to the 
Ncome project within the politically divided DACST. The Luthuli project 
was essentially concerned with an official tribute to this remarkable political 
leader who became an international icon of peaceful leadership in Africa 
when he was awarded the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize. Chief John Albert 
Mvumbi Luthuli (1898-1967) was anchored in Zulu tradition and respected 
as a tribal authority (he was elected as chief in Groutville, north of Durban, 
in 1935), but as the son of a missionary and having himself been educated at 
Adams Mission south of Durban, he also embraced Christian and western 
values. He joined the ANC in 1945, rising through the ranks until he became 
president of the ANC in 1952. When the government forced him to choose 
between his chieftaincy and his anti-apartheid political leadership during the 
same year, he opted for the latter. Despite periods of detention, 
imprisonment and house arrest, he was crucially involved in various protest 
actions and resistance campaigns, as well as in the drafting of the Freedom 
Charter (Appiah and Gates 1999: 1210; Sithole and Mkhize 2000: 69-70). 
It is necessary to briefly illuminate the complex and deeply ambivalent 
Zulu cultural identity discourses and the emergence of conflicting 
                                                                                                                            
occupation, collaboration, cooperation, generosity, determination and remarkable 
self-discipline were displayed – qualities which continue to have meaning in our 
democratic society’. Towards a monument for the women of South Africa 
(project briefing document), Undated, DAC, Women’s Memorial, Vol. 4, file 
6/16/9, p. 6. 
CHAPTER 6 
 
188 
imaginings of African nationalism during the era in which Luthuli grew up 
to understand the different images that later emerged of this important leader 
figure. Since the late 19th century, as a result of the intense regional 
missionary effort, an elite of propertied, Christian African (kholwa) intellect-
uals had emerged in Natal and Zululand. They embraced Victorian Christian 
values, including an ideology of self-improvement and entrepreneurialism, 
but nevertheless remained marginalised within British colonial society, as 
well as largely excluded from the traditional societies of their origin, whose 
tribalist values they appeared to have renounced. However, during the early 
20th century, this Christian, Zulu-speaking intelligentsia began to 
sympathize with the powerful Zulu ethnic sentiments attached to the 
memory of an autonomous Zulu nation under the leadership of the Zulu 
kings, which had broadly emerged as a result of the Bambatha Rebellion 
(1906-08). Their development of nationalist political models of community 
aimed at bringing together the world of urban Zulu migrant labourers and 
farm dwellers with the traditional communities in Natal and Zululand (la 
Hausse 2000: 1-13). 
When the state began to promote the idea of the territorial separation of 
the races, the Natal Native Congress split into two factions over the issue, 
between 1912 and 1914. But it is significant for the history of regional 
African nationalism for decades to come that Zulu intellectuals appropriated 
the segregationist language of the state to endorse the separatist vision of 
Zulu chiefs and commoners and to mobilise them against oppressive state 
legislation. Despite the elite’s rediscovery of Zulu ethnicity, black 
intellectuals of that period (e.g. John Dube) remained tied to the terms of 
engagement determined by colonial society and partially submitted to white 
authority, upon which their position was structurally dependent. During this 
formative period, the kholwa elite forged the development of a complex 
mixture of Zulu ethnic identity, African nationalism and Christian 
progressivism (la Hausse 2000: 14-17), which must have had a profound 
influence on Luthuli during his formative years. 
Since the time of his death, Luthuli’s memory has been appropriated by 
different political players – the apartheid state, the ANC, the Communist 
Party and most notably Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Inkatha – for divergent 
ideological goals, and his memory remains contested today (Sithole and 
Mhkize 2000). Luthuli’s symbolic significance for the post-apartheid nation 
as represented by the Luthuli Legacy Project primarily rests on his belief in 
nonviolent resistance and non-racialism, and his promotion of alliance 
politics. This image is essentially rooted in representations of Luthuli 
produced by the ANC after its unbanning in 1990, in the context of peace 
negotiations with the representatives of the apartheid state and between the 
ANC and IFP. But in the specific context of regional identity politics in 
KZN today, it is also significant to remember Buthelezi’s strategic 
appropriation of the Luthuli figure through commemorative functions and 
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press statements in the 1970s and 1980s. This occurred to mobilise support 
for his ethnic Zulu political agenda and to bolster the notion of Inkatha as the 
true successor of the ANC with himself as a leader in the tradition of Luthuli 
(Sithole and Mkhize 2000; Sithole 2008a).24 
Today, Buthelezi’s and Inkatha’s appropriation of Luthuli enjoys little 
credibility, certainly at national level. Although the Ncome project can 
conceivably be interpreted as playing into the hands of the IFP and Zulu 
nationalist forces in its celebration of the Zulu ethnic heritage and identity, 
allowing for a foregrounding of the Zulus’ proud tradition of militarism and 
resistance, the Luthuli project is unmistakably associated with the ANC and 
its non-racial, non-ethnic national identity politics. Given the ideological and 
party-political differences between IFP loyalist Minister Mtshali and DG 
Roger Jardine as a member of the ANC, the simultaneous addition of the two 
projects appears to be the result of a political compromise at the very top of 
the DACST.25 The fast-tracking of the Ncome project and the repeated 
postponement of the Luthuli project further testify to the politicised nature of 
each project in a province fiercely contested between the two parties, but 
ruled by the IFP. The Luthuli project, which included the restoration of 
Luthuli’s house in Groutville, the construction of an adjacent interpretation 
centre, a bronze bust on this site and a life-size bronze statue near the city 
hall in KwaDukuza (Stanger), as well as the posthumous conferring of an 
honorary doctoral degree in law by the newly merged University of KZN, 
was completed only in 2004, incidentally the year in which the ANC won 
the provincial elections in KZN for the first time.  
                                                     
24  During the 2nd half of the 1970s Buthelezi first embraced the symbols of the 
ANC and the figure of Luthuli by painting a picture of the resistance struggle 
that began with the Zulu kings and continued via the ANC and Luthuli to Inkhata 
and Buthelezi. After the break with the ANC and its repudiation of Buthelezi and 
Inkatha as enemies of the oppressed people of South Africa in 1980, Buthelezi 
was forced to retreat into ethnic Zulu politics and rely on his KwaZulu Bantustan 
support base. Yet he tried to take the symbolic figure of Luthuli along by 
monopolising the annual commemoration services for Chief Luthuli and revising 
his earlier account of struggle history. He now claimed that the year 1960, when 
the ANC was banned and soon decided to embark on the armed struggle, 
represented an abrupt break with the principles of its founders, including Luthuli 
(Sithole and Mkhize 2000: 75-9).  
25  No archival records could be found that shed further light on this decision and 
despite repeated efforts, the DAC sternly refuses to provide information or 
engage in any discussion of this issue.  
CHAPTER 6 
 
190 
Finalising the canon 
Although the Legacy Project Steering Committee had ‘generally endorsed’ 
the Portfolio of Legacy Projects,26 it was announced at the committee’s 4th 
meeting on 18 March 1998 that  
… in a meeting between the DG and the Minister of DACST, it was decided that 
the department would not pursue the Portfolio of Legacy Projects, but would 
concentrate on the following identified projects: Freedom Park Project, Freedom 
Square Project; Constitution Hill Project; Women’s Memorial Project; Samora 
Machel Project; Albert Luthuli; Centenary of the 1899-1902 War; Blood River 
Project.27 
In a Memorandum dated 27 May 1998, the DACST presented Cabinet with 
an almost identical list comprising seven projects prioritised for 
implementation in 1998 and the first half of 1999, except that Freedom 
Square had been replaced by the Nelson Mandela Museum at Qunu. It is 
interesting that the former was no longer included, because the Legacy 
Committee kept dealing with this project and it had previously been decided 
that it would remain part of the Legacy Project portfolio, even if it should 
eventually be taken over by a local government level.28 Mention was 
furthermore made of a number of other legacy projects identified for 
medium to longer term implementation (although only Constitution Hill was 
specifically named).29 Cabinet subsequently proposed an eighth project – on 
the history of the Khoi-San community – and requested the Minister to 
submit a detailed schedule reflecting the prioritisation of and projected 
                                                     
26  Minutes of the 2nd Legacy Project Steering Committee Meeting held at the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, on 4 February at 12h00, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
27  Minutes of the 4th Legacy Project Steering Committee Meeting held at the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, on 18 March at 11h30, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
28  ‘First progress report of the Legacy Project of the Department of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology for the period ending 17 September 1997’, DAC 
Legacy Committee and General, no Vol. #, file 6/16/7. At the 9th meeting of the 
Legacy Project Steering Committee on 19 June 1998, concern over the ambi-
guous status of the Freedom Square project was raised for the first time, as the 
media had meanwhile reported Cabinet approval for nine projects excluding 
Freedom Square. Minutes of the 9th Legacy Project Steering Committee Meeting 
held at the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, on 19 June 
998 (sic), at 11h30, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 4, file 6/16/7.  
29  Cabinet Memorandum No. 10 of 1998, prepared by DACST, 27 May 1998, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
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financial expenditure on all Legacy Projects (Cabinet Minute of 12 August 
1998).30  
The Khoi-San project must have been inspired by the Portfolio of Legacy 
Projects discussion document (1997), which includes ‘A Monument to the 
San’ in ‘acknowledgement of the highly skilled and detailed knowledge of, 
and respect for, the land, the fauna and flora, by which the San linked the 
environment to humanity …’ (ibid.: 6). The document stresses the 
uniqueness and non-renewable nature of the San heritage and its relevance to 
the present and to all South Africans. The proposal envisaged selecting and 
developing one of the many rock art sites, possibly the Strandberg in the 
Northern Cape, as a symbolic site dedicated to San rock art and culture. It 
moreover emphasised the need for broad community consultation and some 
form of practical, material reparation, including modern services and 
amenities, because the San are the most neglected section of the country’s 
population, who have furthermore been stereotyped and caricatured, their 
culture cast as frozen in time. 
Today, more than a decade later, the Khoi-San project is the only one of 
the nine components of the Legacy Project not yet implemented or near 
completion. One of the key reasons for the long delay in developing even a 
more concrete project proposal is the fraught issue of community 
consultation and the difficulties in defining who can legitimately claim to 
represent the Khoi-San. In a context where impoverished, marginalised 
people harbour hopes for material benefits emanating from a national 
heritage project focused on ‘their’ community, ‘belonging’ or being seen to 
belong can become a matter of survival. The link between heritage and the 
formation of group identity here takes on another dimension. As a result of 
the fragmentation, diversity and shifting nature of the groups identifying 
themselves as Khoi-San descendents, it is moreover difficult to reach 
consensus on how the Khoi-San heritage should be represented. Ultimately, 
the stakeholders in the Khoi-San project were far less powerful than the 
stakeholders in any of the other components of the Legacy Project, and 
therefore unable to ensure a swift materialisation of ‘their’ project. From this 
perspective, the Legacy Project and the process of its implementation is also, 
to some extent, a reflection of existing demographic trends and power 
relations in the new democratic order.  
                                                     
30  The following figures were proposed as estimated total costs for the selected 
projects: Luthuli Monument: R1,650 000; Samora Machel Monument (phase 1): 
R 3,000 000; Nelson Mandela Museum (phase 1): R15,150 000; Battle of Blood 
River: R 3,750 000; Women’s Memorial: R1,450 000; Khoi-San Project: R2,600 
000; Freedom Park Project (phase 1): R2,950 000; Constitution Hill (phase 1) 
R2,500 000; Anglo-Boer War commemoration: R2,075 000. Cabinet Memoran-
dum, no number, undated, Prepared by DACST, DAC, Legacy Committee and 
General, Vol. 3, file 6/16/7. 
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By December 1998, these eight projects, plus Constitution Hill as a long-
term initiative, had been approved by Cabinet and no more changes or 
additions were made to the selection after that.31 Five of the nine final 
projects are identical with the initial selection of ‘potential projects’ drawn 
up by the DACST; one project (Freedom Square) was dropped from the list; 
two projects (Blood River and Albert Luthuli) were added; and two more 
projects (Women’s memorial and the Khoi-San) were also added, probably 
inspired by the discussion document on the Portfolio of the Legacy Project. 
None of the many other proposals presented in the Portfolio document 
appear to have been seriously considered for incorporation in the Legacy 
Project, although some may be said to have a degree of overlap with the 
selected projects.  
At its 9th meeting (on 19 June 1998), the Legacy Project Steering Com-
mittee discussed how to deal with letters from enthusiastic individuals and 
organiations who regularly approached the DACST with suggestions and 
proposals for other commemorative initiatives. Although some of these 
projects were raised and briefly discussed at the meetings, it was resolved 
that a standard letter should be sent in reply, explaining that the Cabinet has 
approved nine projects for delivery in 1998/9 and no mandate has been 
received by the DG or the Minister to pursue any other projects.32 In other 
words, one could say that the government had decided to invest in nine high-
profile projects and all other commemorative initiatives emanating from civil 
society and seeking public funding had either to be aligned with one of the 
approved projects or be put on hold until such time as a future list of Legacy 
Projects was drawn up. 
After the 2002 split of the DACST, both the National Legacy Committee 
and the Legacy Project Steering Committee were disbanded and the newly 
formed Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) appointed a permanent Sub-
directorate, headed by a Deputy Director, which was responsible for the 
planning and evaluation of the Legacy Projects. Steady progress had being 
made in the construction of most projects since 1998, but overall the 
duration of the implementation process considerably exceeded the originally 
envisaged three years. Costs have also far surpassed initial projections, 
especially for Freedom Park, and although the nation can now be proud of 
several state-of-the art heritage sites, one might want to reflect on what 
                                                     
31  ‘The Legacy Project: Progress Report’ (for the period ending 1 December 1998), 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
32  Minutes of the 9th Legacy Project Steering Committee Meeting held at the 
Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, on 19 June 998 (sic), at 
11h30, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 4, file 6/16/7. 
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alternative – perhaps more humble, but truly community-driven – ways of 
commemorating the past could have been attained with the same resources.33  
Shepherd and Robins (2008: 118) aptly observe that  
… [i]n the self-mythology of heritage it arises from ‘below’, spontaneous and 
decentralized. In practice, it more often comes from ‘above’, through official 
projects of memorialization and celebration. 
Many archival documents relating to the National Legacy Project contain a 
brief summary that cites the ‘thousands of letters’ allegedly sent to the 
Minister, which officially prompted the development of the Legacy project. 
Likewise, the comprehensive status report on the National Legacy Project 
produced by the DAC towards the end of 2002, which recaps the rationale 
and administrative process of the Legacy Project, is infused with a strong 
sense of legitimation through recourse to those letters.34 While these 
submissions may have provided the first impetus for the plans eventually 
adopted, I have tried to illustrate that the process of developing heritage 
projects for the nation increasingly took on a dynamic of its own, one that 
was entirely propelled from within the government and its sometimes 
conflicting political forces. Incidentally, I was keen to read exactly what it 
was that members of the public requested, but no trace of the letters could be 
found either at the DAC or at the Presidency. 
Proposed New Legacy Projects 
Meanwhile, the idea of developing a new list of additional legacy projects 
had taken hold within the department. By June 2002, the new DAC 
Directorate: Heritage had developed a tentative list of six proposals for 
possible inclusion in the National Legacy Project, some of which were 
already under way and at varying stages of completion. First on the list was a 
‘Project to Honour Steve Biko’. A bronze statue of Biko (1954-77) had 
                                                     
33  The DACST could, for instance, have developed a policy with clear guidelines 
about proper processes to be followed for the construction of heritage sites and 
the erection of statues and then provided funds for approved proposals. Such 
guidelines may have stipulated that a broad public consultation process needs to 
be conducted; that design and construction need to be developed through compe-
titions or public tender processes; that feedback mechanisms need to be in place 
to avoid types of memorialisation that clearly offend or alienate some sectors of 
the population; that a feasibility study and budget need to be attached, etc. 
34  The letters are referred to as ‘requests from diverse sources for official approval 
for the installation of monuments, museums, statues, commemorations of great 
leaders and historic events’ (‘The National Legacy Project: Status Report July 
1998-October 2002’, Department of Arts and Culture, DAC, New Legacy 
Projects, no Vol. #, file 6/16/7. 
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already been erected in front of the city hall in East London (Buffalo City) in 
1997 in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of his death in detention, a 
bridge had been renamed in his honour in the same city, and his home in 
Ginsberg township outside King William’s Town had been declared a 
national monument with a bronze bust set up in front of it. The new Legacy 
Project on Biko proposed a re-conceptualisation of the ‘statue’ (i.e. the bust) 
in King William’s Town, as the existing one ‘does not adequately reflect the 
stature of the man’. In addition, it was thought that an interpretive centre 
should be constructed to document the development of the Black 
Consciousness movement and the life and work of Steve Biko.35  
The parallels between this proposal and the Luthuli project are obvious 
and the proposed Biko project of course constitutes another example of the 
institutionalisation and ‘upgrading’ of an existing memory site. But the Biko 
project may also be interpreted as allaying fears of ANC domination or 
appropriation and encouraging a more balanced representation of the 
liberation struggle and its leaders (perhaps in response to criticism) by 
acknowledging – at the officially declared level of national significance – a 
prominent leader figure not directly representing the ANC.  
This rationale becomes even more poignant with respect to the second 
proposed project – in honour of Robert Sobukwe – given the common 
neglect or under-representation of the PAC’s contribution to the anti-
apartheid movement. The proposed Sobukwe project included the 
establishment of a statue in his home town of Graaf Reinet in the Eastern 
Cape, the restoration of both his grave and his family house, as well as the 
house in which he lived on Robben Island, and the establishment of an 
interpretive centre detailing the history of the PAC and Sobukwe’s life and 
work, to be set up in his former law office in Galeshewe township outside 
Kimberley (Sol Plaatje Municipality).  
The list of proposals furthermore included a Hall of Fame, for which no 
details were supplied; the Freedom Square project, which had been dropped 
from the list of the original Legacy Project but was indeed progressing fast, 
driven by the province and the Johannesburg Development Agency (JDA); 
the memorialisation of Hector Pieterson, which was similarly nearing 
completion at that time; and the eMakhosini project in KZN, which 
concerned the commemoration of a cultural landscape associated with the 
origins of the Zulu ‘nation’ and their royal burial site. Spearheaded by 
Amafa, this heritage site development was well under way and is discussed 
in Chapter Ten. Echoing Ncome in the original Legacy Project, eMakhosini 
                                                     
35  ‘Legacy Projects: Proposals for New Legacy Projects’, Letter Acting Director-
General to Minister, 14/11/2002, DAC, New Legacy Projects, no Vol. #, file 
6/16/7. ‘Projects to be tabled at MINMEC on Tuesday 11/06/2002: Confirmation 
of New National Legacy Projects for Cabinet Approval’, DAC, Legacy 
Committee and General, Vol. 3, file 6/16/7. 
THE NATIONAL LEGACY PROJECT 
 
195
is the only site celebrating a specific ethnically based heritage and identity. 
Like Ncome it occupies an ambiguous position within the National Legacy 
Project as it so obviously lends itself to fostering partisan Zulu nationalist 
values.36  
By November 2002 this tentative proposal document had been finalised 
with considerable modifications to a list of six projects, which now read 
‘Project To Honour Steve Biko’, ‘Project to Honour Robert Sobukwe’, 
‘eMakhosini Project’, ‘Liliesleaf Legacy Project’, ‘Sarah Bartmann 
Memorial, and the ‘Mapungubwe Legacy Project’. Liliesleaf is the name of a 
farm in Rivonia, Johannesburg, which served as a cover for the headquarters 
of Operation Mayibuye.37 It was here that the ANC High Command and 
leaders of MK were captured in July 1963. Joined by Nelson Mandela, who 
had been captured in August of the previous year near Howick in Natal, the 
arrested leaders were charged with sabotage at the Rivonia Trial, convicted 
and sentenced to life imprisonment.  
The Sarah Bartmann Memorial proposal resulted from the repatriation of 
the famous KhoiSan woman’s bodily remains and the plaster cast of her 
physique from the Musée de l’Homme in Paris. According to renowned 
palaeo-anthropologist, Philip Tobias, who initiated and tirelessly pursued the 
repatriation issue with the French authorities over a period of several years, 
Sarah Bartmann (or Saartjie Baartman) was born in 1789 near the Gamtoos 
River in what was then called British Caffraria and is now part of the Eastern 
Cape Province, but she grew up in Cape Town (Memorandum on Saartjie 
Baartman 2001). By 1810 Bartmann was working as a servant on a farm, 
when the farmer’s brother, Hendrik Cezar, much impressed by some features 
of her anatomy, persuaded her to go to England for the purpose of publicly 
exhibiting herself against payment. Although in a subsequent court case in 
England Bartmann declared that she had voluntarily entered into this deal, 
the degree to which she had freedom of choice in the matter has been 
disputed.  
Known as the ‘Hottentot Venus’, Bartmann had to parade naked and 
perform ‘tricks’ in front of curious paying audiences both in England and 
later in France (from the middle of 1814), who were particularly fascinated 
by her buttocks and genitalia. She was featured in numerous cartoons (many 
of which satirised the spectators) and quickly became the object of medical 
and scientific attention. Following Bartmann’s premature death from illness 
                                                     
36  ‘Projects to be tabled at MINMEC on Tuesday 11/06/2002: Confirmation of 
New National Legacy Projects for Cabinet Approval’, DAC, Legacy Committee 
and General, Vol. 3, file 6/16/7. 
37  Operation Mayibuye, which had not been universally accepted by the time the 
ANC High command was arrested, refers to a proposed plan of action for a full-
scale revolutionary civil war, possibly with the assistance of the Soviet Union 
(SADET 2004: 137ff.). 
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in 1816, Georges Baron Cuvier obtained permission to dissect her corpse. He 
first produced a complete body cast in wax, from which an authentic 
reconstruction of her body could later be produced. This was preserved in 
the Musée de l’Homme until recently, along with her skeleton and some of 
her remains (notably the brain and genitalia) conserved in glass jars.  
While the bottled organs seem to have disappeared, the skeleton and the 
body cast were repatriated to South Africa in May 2002, where they were 
officially handed over to the South African Government, rather than any 
particular community who might gain political advantage from the 
possession of these highly symbolic remains. In this way the DAC became 
charged with responsibility for the dignified interment of Sarah Bartmann, 
which occurred on 9 August (Women’s Day) 2002 at Hankey in the Eastern 
Cape, a site chosen for its proximity to her place of birth. A memorial in her 
honour was to be erected in Cape Town during the 2003/04 financial year, 
but this has not yet materialized.38  
The memorialisation of Sarah Bartmann could have been considered part 
of the original KhoeSan Legacy Project, but its inclusion as a separate 
proposal in the portfolio of new Legacy Projects may have been motivated 
by her symbolic significance and iconic status. In the figure of Sarah 
Bartmann the unspeakable humiliation, exploitation and suffering inflicted 
upon the indigenous population through colonialism is given a personal face. 
She can be interpreted as the epitome of the innocent, helpless victim of the 
racist ideological discourses of her time, the precursor of countless victims 
of colonial and apartheid-era humiliation who suffered like her until the end 
of the apartheid era. The ‘bringing home’ of Sarah Bartmann and her 
dignified ‘burial’, in which appropriate KhoiSan rituals were performed, 
were highly emotional events for specific communities.39 Beyond that, the 
initiative represents an official act of acknowledgment of the suffering and 
contributions of the marginalised KhoiSan community – the post-apartheid 
government’s show of respect for South Africa’s ‘first nation’ in a context 
often marked by community resentment over the perceived prioritisation of 
the needs of Africans. The symbolic import and high visibility of the Sarah 
Bartmann project was also an important gesture in view of the embarrass-
ment over the long delays faced with the implementation of the orginal 
KhoiSan Legacy Project. 
                                                     
38  ‘Sarah Bartmann Project: Invitation to President T Mbeki to deliver the keynote 
address during the ceremony to inter the remains of Sarah Bartmann scheduled 
for 9 August 2002’, Letter DG to Minister, 31/7/2002, DAC, Legacy Committee 
and General, Vol. 5, File 6/16/7; see also Bauer 2002; Barbier 2004. 
39  One might question, however, to what extent KhoiSan communities indeed 
consider the process of laying Sarah Bartmann’s spirit to rest as completed, 
especially given the fact that the brain was never repatriated and buried. 
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The last project to be considered here is the archaeological site of 
Mapungubwe in the Shashe-Limpopo basin, which UNESCO declared a 
World Heritage site in 2003. In addition to Early, Middle and Late Stone 
Age artefacts, Mapungubwe testifies to the existence of pre-colonial African 
civilisations in the region, dating back to the period AD900-1300. Between 
1220 and 1300 Mapungube was the capital of a Middle Iron Age society 
characterised by sacred leadership and distinct social classes. It contained a 
stone-walled palace for the king and his entourage on a hill site with an 
adjacent town below (Huffman 2005: 7).40 This previously neglected, indeed 
invalidated history has now been recovered and is proudly presented as one 
of the roots of the South African nation. It is a powerful refutation of older 
historical discourses that vested the notion of civilisation exclusively in the 
white settler community and credited ‘the white man’ as the sole producer of 
science, technology and progress. The DAC proposal document sees further 
significance in the site, when it states that ‘[t]he history of Mapungubwe and 
the civilization it exhibits typifies what Africa could achieve this century, 
through NEPAD’ (i.e. the New Partnership for Africa’s Development), 
hence linking the celebration of a chosen past to the chosen path of the 
present and the envisaged future of the nation and the African continent. 
The Minister seems to have approved of all of the six projects on the list, 
as the DAC developed a comprehensive document detailing the ‘Process 
towards the development of conceptual framework documents for each 
project’, in which key stakeholders were identified, and the status quo and 
proposed further development sketched out.41 All six projects, plus an 
additional one referred to as the Matola project, are included in the DAC’s 
Strategic Plan 2007-2010 under the heading ‘Legacy Project (new)’. 
However, Cabinet has not at the time of writing yet approved of the New 
Legacy Project. 
Conclusion  
When comparing the components of the proposed new Legacy Project with 
the original set, it is evident that there is an even stronger emphasis on leader 
                                                     
40  Three distinct Middle Iron Age settlements have been identified in the region. 
The first capital was at a site called Schroda and is dated AD900-1000, the 
second is K2 (AD1000-1220) and the third Mapungubwe, which in turn was the 
forerunner of the well-known Great Zimbabwe civilization.  
41  ‘New Portfolio of Legacy Projects: Process towards the Development of 
Conceptual Framework Documents for Each Project: Initial Key Stakeholders 
Consultation Process’, DAC, New Legacy Projects, no Vol. #, file 6/16/7. 
‘Legacy Projects: Proposals for New Legacy Projects’, Letter Acting Director-
General to Minister, 14/11/2002, DAC, New Legacy Projects, no Vol. #, file 
6/16/7. 
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figures and on the memorialisation of extraordinary individuals, as opposed 
to collectively shared experiences. Despite the explicit concerns of the 
academic panel about nationalism and an emphasis on great patriots, the 
notion of identifying heroes and celebrating implicit ‘founders of the nation’ 
plays an increasingly prominent role not only in the Legacy Project, but also 
in the wider post-apartheid commemorative effort as it has been unfolding 
over the past years. This is evidenced not least in the flourishing production 
of bronze statues and busts, mostly in honour of African male leader figures.  
Participants in the colloquium had also cautioned against the use of 
monuments as the primary mode of representation, ‘especially in light of the 
fact that the existing heritage sector has not yet been transformed’.42 This 
point – along with virtually all points of critical but constructive feedback 
raised by the panel of experts – was largely ignored. Almost all of the 
components of the Legacy Project now involve monuments, museums and 
bronze statues, furthermore often rendered in highly conventional, 
Eurocentric style or fashioned along the lines of international trends in 
memorial design.  
As I will explain in Chapter Nine, I certainly do not concur with scholars 
who advocate a ‘moratorium’ on the installation of monuments and who tend 
to summarily disparage monuments and statues as an inappropriate medium 
of memorialisation in a post-apartheid context. However, given the 
enormous financial investment in the Legacy Project, I maintain that this 
initiative represents a lost opportunity for the development of more unique, 
creative alternatives not necessarily involving buildings and sculptures. 
Although some projects do include performative modes of commemoration, 
notably community-based anniversary celebrations, as recommended by the 
colloquium, on the whole the Legacy Project misses the opportunity to 
explore intangible forms of heritage more firmly rooted in local cultural 
traditions and memory practices. Not only is the conservation of intangible 
heritage specifically called for in the NHRA and affirmed by international 
trends, but it is arguably much more meaningful to communities because it is 
genuinely rooted in their traditions and customs. 
Given its multifaceted nature, geographical spread and aims of broad 
inclusivity, the National Legacy Project constitutes a state-directed strategic 
attempt at addressing the imbalance of the South African heritage landscape 
and countering the exclusiveness of existing monuments. Some may 
appreciate the project as a decisive political tool for the purpose of inspiring 
the nation and fostering social cohesion, reconciliation, nation-building, 
community development and other national policy goals. Others may argue 
that through the Legacy Project – organised, financed and professionally 
                                                     
42  ‘The Portfolio of Legacy Projects: Report on the Discussions of the Colloquium 
held on 22 January 1998’, Letter Director-General to Minister, 5 March 1998, p. 
3, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. 
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implemented – the government has helped ‘the people’ see ‘their’ heritage 
represented. They might see the agents of the state primarily as acting on 
behalf of and mandated by impoverished communities who lack the 
experience and professional capacity for self-initiative due to decades of 
marginalisation.  
But others will be more inclined to agree with Shepherd’s provocative 
assessment of the nature of heritage in post-apartheid South Africa, which is 
that it claims to be available and accessible to all, but in fact tends to be 
managed and controlled by highly bureaucratic structures and agencies 
which – he argues – are moreover largely unaccountable (2008: 118). The 
government’s decision to invest in the Legacy Project has turned the state 
into the main promulgator and interpreter of history. Although communities 
and key stakeholders were consulted and to some extent participated in the 
implementation phase of each project, it was the government that made the 
principle decisions about what is most significant and how the past should be 
remembered. The Legacy Project and the prominent role of the state 
arguably stifled the emergence of a more broadly based, community-driven 
approach to memorialisation, which might have resulted in a much more 
diverse, albeit probably less ambitious, landscape of memory, and especially 
a far broader range of perspectives on history.  
The increased involvement of the state in the shaping of ‘public history’ 
and the government’s encroachment and restructuring of public space 
through symbolic interventions and the strategic usage of heritage for the 
purpose of political and societal policy goals have sparked much debate in 
South Africa, especially within the field of academic history. Historians 
lament the decreasing role of critical scholarship and the academic study of 
history in the face of the persistent trend towards political appropriation and 
endorsement of selected historical narratives, their absorption into the realm 
of ‘public history’ and their commodification and sometimes outright 
commercialisation by the growing ‘heritage industry’ (Nuttall and Wright 
2000; see footnote 1). Drawing on Alessandro Triulzi, Ranger suggests that 
the prominent role of the state in interpreting, representing and 
memorialising the past represents a wider trend in Africa.43 Professional 
historians are often side-lined in this process, in fact sometimes dismissed as 
public agitators, and many aspects of history are invariably marginalised or 
neglected, e.g. ‘trade-union history, the history of the towns, the historical 
                                                     
43  With reference to examples from north-east and southern Africa, Triulzi argues 
that ‘public history in many parts of Africa has largely overcome academic 
explorations of the past, while its strongest ally, an ill-defined “public memory”, 
under the guise of state rituals and public memorialisation of past events, has 
come to dominate the public arena filling the fluid space which exists between 
memory and history with a disturbing asphalt-like cover of enduring cement’ 
(Triulzi quoted in Ranger 2007: 258). 
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experience of women, religious history, and the history of the ambiguities of 
colonialism and of African response’ (Ranger 2007: 257).  
If one analyses the historical content of the various components of the 
National Legacy Project, including the proposed new list of projects, an 
overwhelming emphasis on recent political history is immediately evident. 
The vast majority of the projects relates to events and leader figures of the 
anti-apartheid struggle or the broader history of anti-colonial resistance, 
which constitute a key aspect of the foundation myth of the post-apartheid 
state. Although most new heritage initiatives contain depressing memories of 
oppression, loss and humiliation, their overall ‘message’ or morale is always 
one of victory or triumph over suffering, allowing South Africans to be cast, 
not as a sorrowing nation of victims, but as a proud, brave people whose 
courageous fight for justice and human rights can indeed serve the world as a 
role model. Although unconventional and innovative in some respects, the 
National Legacy Project remains firmly tied to an established nationalistic 
tradition of creating physical spaces, memory sites, where a new national 
identity is intended to be forged and a re-orientation of personal values is 
intended to take place.  
  
7 
Freedom Park as National Site of 
Identification 
Freedom Park was conceptualized as the most important, ambitious and 
financially well-endowed element of the National Legacy Project. Purpose-
built for the nation and for international visitors, it is intended to become the 
symbolic focal point of the post-apartheid nation and an instrument of 
nation-building by fostering reconciliation and an inclusive, non-racial 
national identity. Freedom Park has variously been referred to as ‘a leading 
national and international icon of humanity and freedom’,1 a ‘people’s 
shrine’, and ‘a place of pilgrimage and inspiration, a message from Africa 
and South Africa to the world, of suffering and the triumph of the human 
spirit’, but also in more mundane (and rather tourist-oriented) terms as ‘a 
one-stop heritage precinct’ and a ‘technologically advanced and interactive 
wonder of South Africa’s heritage industry’.2  
Freedom Park was inspired by the concept of the national heroes’ acre, 
with important precedents in neighbouring countries (especially Zimbabwe), 
socialist societies and the postcolonial world. These are in turn rooted in the 
tradition of the national monument, as it was popularised during the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries in Western Europe, accompanying and consolidat-
ing the emergence of the nation state. But Freedom Park is also different 
from these (usually unacknowledged) models in important ways, as this 
chapter will show. Freedom Park combines two strands discussed in 
previous chapters, namely the concern for the mourning of victims and the 
attainment of healing on the one hand, and the representation of the 
country’s rich tapestry of diverse heritages and the celebration of the 
contributions and achievements of iconic leader figures on the other. In 
                                                     
1  The official vision of Freedom Park as reflected in all brochures, newsletters and 
on the website.  
2  These descriptions were sourced from the official Freedom Park website in 2003 
(www.freedompark.co.za), which has since been changed, but similar phrases 
can also be found in various brochures and leaflets produced by the FPT over the 
past years.  
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terms of the monument-memorial conundrum discussed earlier, one might 
say Freedom Park qualifies as a combination of the two.  
Although the government always envisaged Freedom Park as an inclusive 
symbol of identification for all South Africans, the latter have been slow to 
embrace the site, and controversies have consistently accompanied the 
process of the park’s conceptualisation and construction. As was to be 
expected, the more the physical molding of Freedom Park progresses and 
tangible elements such as buildings and lists of names begin to take shape, 
the more concretely does critique manifest itself. The FPT, charged with 
conceptualising the project and overseeing its implementation, tends to react 
defensively to criticism. However, I suggest that such contestation is a 
natural and not necessarily unhealthy manifestation of the fragmentation and 
ideological fissures within present-day South African society.  
The concept of the Freedom Park and the process of its implementation, 
including its associated challenges and inherent contradictions, is a synec-
doche of the larger project of public memorialisation in post-apartheid South 
Africa, providing insight into how the state envisages the imaginary of the 
nation and how communities negotiate their role within that nation. 
Parallelling the National Legacy Project, the exhibitions in the museum at 
Freedom Park will probably place strong emphasis on the shared 
participation of all populations in South Africa’s history, but since the 
museum is still under construction at the time of writing, judgement must be 
reserved for future research. What can be assessed at the present moment is 
Freedom Park’s second key function, the commemoration of the dead. In this 
respect I will especially focus on some of the problems and tensions 
associated with the selection of victims and ‘heroes’ for memorialisation, 
and their implicit linking with the nation’s myth of origin. 
Ultimately Freedom Park is being built to pay tribute to those who 
sacrificed their lives for the liberation of ‘the people’ from colonial and 
apartheid oppression, the ‘founding fathers’ of the new post-apartheid 
nation. But in order to be credible as a national symbol and inclusive site of 
identification in the prevailing post-apartheid South African context, 
Freedom Park also has to signal continuity with the past and recognition of 
newly marginalised populations by respecting their heritage and especially 
the dead they cherish. Comparable heroes’ acres in the region are 
unambiguously devoted to honouring the victims and celebrating the 
triumphs of the anti-colonial liberation struggle. They are confident, often 
confrontational and radical symbols of a new beginning. Freedom Park, on 
the contrary, acknowledges the historical struggles (their victims and heroes) 
of different populations in South Africa’s long, divisive past, along with the 
liberation struggle, even if these wars were fought with conflicting interests. 
It is this inclusiveness that makes Freedom Park unique, but it also 
constitutes the root of its contradictions.  
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Early conceptualisation  
The idea of a heroes’ acre as a national site of identification with the post-
apartheid state and especially a place of honour for those who died in the 
course of the liberation struggle probably existed early on in the minds of the 
new political elite, not least inspired by the Zimbabwean Heroes’ Acre at 
Harare and various types of independence monuments erected by 
postcolonial states in Africa and elsewhere. In fact, in its early stages the 
Freedom Park project was referred to as a heroes’ acre, and although no 
actual graves are contained there (unlike the situation in Harare), in essence 
the Freedom Park is a symbolic resting place for freedom fighters (broadly 
defined) and all South Africans, ‘ancestors’ of the nation, who are deemed as 
deserving of such an honour.  
The historical precedent for the concept of a National Heroes Monument 
in modern history is the French Pantheon, the former church of St. 
Geneviève in Paris, which was transformed into a hall of heroes of the post-
revolution French nation in 1791. Following this model, Bavaria’s King 
Ludwig I created a similar site for German heroes, the Walhalla, near 
Regensburg in 1842 (Koshar 2000: 22). Similar initiatives followed in other 
countries, and later in the newly formed post-colonial ‘nations’ of the 
formerly colonised world. The establishment of a national heroes’ acre is 
usually motivated by the perceived need to enhance national loyalties and to 
bolster the idea of the nation, especially where that nation state has only 
recently been established or substantially been redefined. The selection of 
heroes to be included in such a prestigious official site of public comme-
moration is invariably a reflection of the contemporary imagining of the 
nation. 
The Freedom Park project was officially launched on 1 June 2000, when 
the Trustees of the Freedom Park met for the first time in the Presidential 
Guest House in Pretoria in the presence of media representatives.3 By the 
end of that year, Luli Callinicos had drafted a nine-page Position Paper, 
which outlined a basic concept of the park, listed a long series of possible 
components, and discussed the feasibility and various logistical aspects of 
the ambitious development (henceforth cited as Position Paper 2000).4 This 
comprehensive and considered discussion document was meant to enable the 
DACST to develop a business plan for the Freedom Park initiative. Although 
                                                     
3  The Minutes of this meeting list as trustees the following names (sic): Dr R Fox 
(architect), Ms L Callinicos (historian), Ms B Masekela (historian), Adv. 
Moseneke (business), Dr W Serote (portfolio committee chair), R. Jardine 
(business); chair: J. Modise. ‘Draft. Meeting of the Trustees of Freedom Park. 1 
June 2000; 09:30-13:30. The Presidential Guest House’, DAC, Freedom Park 
Project, Vol. 6, file 6/16/4. 
4  ‘Position Paper: Freedom Park’, DAC, Freedom Park Project, Vol. 8, file 6/16/4.  
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the concept of the site has changed considerably over the past years, many of 
its basic elements remain rooted in this initial proposal. 
The concept as set out in the initial discussion document was structured 
around three interactive themes, namely Struggle, Democracy and Nation-
building, associated with the past, the present and the future respectively. 
The struggle for liberation was understood in a broad historical perspective 
to begin with ‘the earliest 17th century Khoi and slave uprisings’ (Position 
Paper 2000: 2) and to include various wars of colonial resistance, as well as 
the armed struggle against apartheid. The section on Democracy refers to 
processes of reconciliation, reconstruction and development which are 
reflected ‘through our icons’ and the way South Africa represents itself to 
the world. It argues that the South African narrative has captured the 
imagination of the world and the way South Africa realises its democratic 
vision has become a universal case study for other multi-cultural societies 
(notably the United States and the United Kingdom). South Africa hence has 
an important role to play internationally and Freedom Park with its 
multifaceted ‘portraits, representations, commemorations, performances and 
festivals’ (ibid.) should become a focal point and exemplar of a truly 
democratic site of representation through processes of consultation. 
The section on Nation-Building is particularly interesting. It deals with 
the conceptualisation of a national consciousness, which ‘is not a “given”, or 
handed down from above’ (ibid.), but which will emerge only over time in a 
process that will and must include contestation and debate.  
It will be important to include the debates and contradictions that occur in the 
process of exploring concepts related to nation-building in a multi-cultural 
society. The presentations in Freedom Park should communicate the important 
point that there is never ‘closure’ in exploring the exciting yet difficult 
challenges and possibilities inherent in the concepts and process of nation-
building (ibid.).  
As will become evident below, this is one of the key challenges the FPT is 
currently facing. Despite its strong emphasis on diversity, inclusiveness and 
non-sectarianism, and the Trust’s determination that this will be a site where 
all South Africans can find their heritage represented and where multiple 
voices and narratives can be found, the Position Paper also states that 
‘ultimately, the ambit of Freedom Park should be the unfolding of one 
coherent story’ (2000: 7). 
The FPT officially began its operations in April 2001 with Dr Wally 
Mongane Serote as CEO. Serote is internationally renowned as an award-
winning poet and novelist (To Every Birth its Blood) and a long-standing 
political activist dedicated to the anti-apartheid struggle. He was born in 
1944 in Sophiatown, Johannesburg and grew up in Alexandra, Lesotho, and 
Soweto. During this final high school years in Soweto he was strongly 
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influenced by Black Consciousness and wrote poems about black identity, 
revolt and resistance. He has always championed the need for self-
expression among the oppressed people and one might link this to his 
concern about asserting the ‘African voice’ in the development of Freedom 
Park today. 
Serote also has a deep personal bond with the experiences of the count-
less anti-apartheid activists whom the Freedom Park project is meant to 
acknowledge. He was arrested under the Terrorism Act in 1969 and held in 
solitary confinement for nine months, after which he went to live in exile. He 
obtained a Fine Arts degree from Columbia University in New York and 
later worked for the ANC in Botswana and London. His role in assisting the 
liberation of South Africa was recognised at the highest level when Thabo 
Mbeki honoured him with the Order of Ikhamanga, a national medal 
awarded by the President of South Africa. During the immediate post-
apartheid period, Serote served as chair of the parliamentary select 
committee for arts and culture, before becoming involved in the Freedom 
Park project. He has recently been reported as having been called upon to 
become a traditional healer (Mokae 2007; Wikipedia website, Serote). 
The concept for the Freedom Park project gradually began to take shape 
during the course of the years with Serote at the helm, but it was also the 
developments on the opposite hill that influenced the decision-making 
processes of the FPT. The idea of establishing a relationship with the VTM, 
ideologically ‘countering’ it but also metaphorically and to some extent 
physically connecting with it as a symbol of reconciliation, was not much 
evident in the early stages of the conceptualisation of Freedom Park, but 
emerged as an increasingly important imperative.5 
The symbolism of the site 
Following an initial search for a suitable site and consideration of various 
options, the FPT decided on Salvokop, a hill on the southwestern outskirts of 
Pretoria, similar in size and shape and in close proximity to the hill occupied 
by the VTM. The main reason for the choice of this location – according to 
                                                     
5  Oblique references in the FPT documentation – i.e. minutes of board meetings, 
jury reports etc. – suggest that the need to respond to the VTM, and in some 
ways contrast with it, had an important, albeit perhaps subconscious, influence 
on the visual appearance of Freedom Park. Consider for instance the 
recommendation that a specific contemplative space should be created along the 
Spiral Pathway ‘in the western facing grassland area near the axis to the 
Voortrekker monument’ (Document 7: 7). The brief for the 2nd stage of the 
competition, it was decided, should emphasize that the sightline with the Paul 
Kruger monument in Pretoria was not as important as the Union Building and 
Voortrekker Monument axis (Document 12: 2).  
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the Minutes of the June 2000 meeting – was its visibility,6 but I believe that 
the site’s opportunities in terms of establishing a counterpart to the VTM 
must have played at least a subconscious role.  
A site on top of a hill and close to the national capital or some other 
location of national significance is of course also the most conventional and 
time-honoured solution for any national monument or heroes’ acre, thus 
linking Freedom Park to a long international commemorative tradition. I will 
engage in the next chapter with such imitation of established and usually 
Eurocentric models, often disparaged by critical observers. Furthermore, 
Salvokop is both well accessible (i.e. conveniently close to the political 
capital and the largest metropolitan centre) and remote. Isolation, 
remoteness, or peripherality are important prerequisites for symbolically 
charged sites, argues Hetherington (1998), emphasising their liminal status 
and allowing ‘pilgrims’ to reorder their values or contemplate their identity.  
Hetherington maintains that identity politics is always also a spatial 
politics. Identity is achieved not only through identification with groups who 
share common values and goals, but also through the performance of 
recognisable repertoires, such as ritual processes and pilgrimages, and 
through the adoption or creation of significant spaces in which identity is 
constituted and expressed (1998: 17-18). Such spaces ‘are not merely places 
where like-minded people congregate but symbolic centres around which the 
values and practices associated with an identity position are performed’ 
(1998: 106-7). In a similar vein, Hecht (2005) shows how sacred places can 
become powerful symbolic focal points in the building of a nation. New 
nations, he argues, virtually ‘need’ such a sacred place and if none presents 
itself naturally, a site can be sanctified or constructed as sacred. 
Freedom Park is actively being made into a symbolic centre, the foremost 
‘shrine of the nation’. Since its selection as the site for Freedom Park, the 
entire hill has acquired a distinct aura, and is treated and promoted as 
hallowed ground, paralleling Afrikaner nationalists’ attitude towards the 
grounds of the VTM and the battlefield of Blood River. Salvokop was 
historically also known as Bron Koppie, Railway Hill, Signal Hill or Time 
Ball hill, testifying to different uses and connotations associated with this 
landmark over time and for different communities. At the apex of the hill 
were the sparse remains of Fort Tullichewan (commonly known as Fort 
Tully), one of several examples of Boer fortifications in the Pretoria area, 
dating from the First War of Independence (1880-81) (Tomlinson 1985). As 
the minutes of the June 2000 meeting show, the FPT was keen to change the 
name of the hill, and despite the initial plans to preserve the architectural 
traces of the old Boer fort (as theoretically required by conservation 
legislation), these were soon eliminated in the process of building Freedom 
                                                     
6  ‘Draft. Meeting of the Trustees of Freedom Park. 1 June 2000; 09:30-13:30. The 
Presidential Guest House’, DAC, Freedom Park Project, Vol. 6, file 6/16/4.  
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Park. One might interpret these moves as an attempt to erase the layered 
history of the chosen site, to clean up its ‘contamination’ with historical 
traces testifying to a chequered past, in order to create a pristine place for a 
‘pure’ development where the intended symbolic meaning can unfold 
unencumbered.  
Design and Consultation  
Reflecting the ambition and prestige associated with the Freedom Park 
project, an international architectural design competition was held during the 
second half of 2002, drawing roughly one hundred entries by architects from 
all over the world. By April 2003 the first phase of the international 
architectural competition had been adjudicated and five finalists had been 
selected to advance to the second stage.7 Most of the entries submitted had 
proposed western or international style commemorative models, some 
drawing on recognisable iconic imagery to establish African references 
(notably the familiar conical tower of the Great Zimbabwe archaeological 
ruins). The FPT’s decision that none of these schemes was suitable for 
implementation was groundbreaking. The second phase of the adjudication 
process, completed in July 2003, consisted of merely selecting three ultimate 
winners who received a prize but no contract.8 They were OBRA Architects 
(Pablo Castro) from New York; Peter To Tai Fai from Hong Kong; and the 
Lebanese team of Vladimir Djurovic as landscape architect with architect 
Imad Gemayel (Fox 2004; O’Toole 2004; FPT document 16 2003).  
The FPT then focused on the development of a suitable structure in a 
gradual design process which would evolve in negotiation between key 
members of the Trust and selected local architectural firms.9 In other words, 
                                                     
7  According to the FPT documentation (Document 3), the Jury met from 22 to 26 
April 2003 and consisted of the following persons: Dr Wally Serote (Freedom 
Park CEO); Ms. Barbara Masekela (Freedom Park Deputy Chair); Mr. Revel Fox 
(Freedom Park Board Member); Dr. Bademli (UIA Representative); Prof. Max 
Bond; Mr. Jordi Farrando; Mr. Femi Majekodunmi. The Deputy Jury consisted 
of: Prof. Julian Beinart; Mr. Mphethi Morojele; Mr. James Ngobeni; Mr. Gerrit 
Burger (UIA Representative).  
8  The jury met on 17 July, and jury reports were completed on 20 July. ‘During the 
process of adjudication the Jury permeated what in its estimation were the three 
best schemes. While each of these proposals has very positive qualities none of 
the schemes fulfilled the Jury’s expectations that if constructed as presented it 
would satisfy the expectations and requirements of the FPT nor would it become 
what the President has described as “the most ambitious heritage project to be 
undertaken by the new democratic government”. As a consequence the Jury 
decided that no first prize should be awarded’ (Document 16: 2). 
9  The architectural structures are being designed by Mashabane Rose Associates, 
Mpheti Morejele and GAPP Architects and Urban Designers. A premier source 
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the prestige and status associated with the product of a world-class 
architectural firm was forfeited in favour of a home-grown design informed 
by the specific South African context and rooted in local traditions. Most 
importantly, the FPT maintains that the design was informed by the input 
obtained through an extensive consultation process with various stakeholders 
and communities. In total, 21 sectors of the nation, including the youth, 
women, traditional healers, faith-based organisations, representatives of the 
different racial groups, labour, and veterans’ organisations from both sides 
of the former political divide were engaged in workshops conducted 
throughout the country over a period of several years. Ramzie Abrahams, the 
Heritage Manager of the Freedom Park since 2006, emphasises that both the 
overall concept of the Freedom Park and the design of its individual 
elements evolved organically over the years as a result of these workshops 
(Abrahams, personal communication 2008).  
Public consultation processes also involved nation-wide surveys to 
canvass public opinion about the Freedom Park concept, determine what 
core values South Africans associated with the site, and what they expected 
to experience there. One of these surveys, conducted in 2001, was based on 
qualitative fieldwork research among predominantly black urban-based 
members of various organisations covering a range of different societal 
sectors in four South African provinces (henceforth cited as Survey 2001).10 
A market survey involving both qualitative and quantitative methods was 
conducted between March and April the following year among black and 
white local residents and foreign tourists (henceforth Survey 2002),11 with a 
focus on ‘target consumers’12 to provide the FPT with a deeper under-
standing of the composition and expectations of the park’s most likely visitor 
groups. It is interesting to reflect, for a moment, on the results of these 
                                                                                                                            
of insight into the development and conceptualisation of the site and the debates 
associated with this process are the minutes of the FPT, dating mostly from the 
period of the competition adjudication in 2003. 
10  The report is presented in a presentation-type format and does not indicate the 
name of the researcher responsible. Geographically the survey was limited to 
Gauteng, Northern Province, Mpumalanga and the Western Cape. 
11  An exploratory qualitative survey involving focus groups and in-depth 
interviews was first conducted to assist with the design of the questionnaire. The 
sample for the quantitative research phase consisted of 605 respondents, of 
whom 505 were locals and 100 foreign tourists. The geographical coverage of 
the fieldwork was limited to Gauteng, Western Cape, KZN and North West 
province (Survey 2002: 12). 
12  The ‘realistic target market’ for a visit to the Freedom Park was defined as being 
adults with a minimum monthly income of R3000, while the extended market 
may include their friends and relatives (Survey 2002: 12, 13). The perceived 
target market, as established in the survey itself, was the general South African 
population, tourists, school children, youth and artists (ibid.: 29). 
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surveys. As with any analysis of a large amount of data, I acknowledge my 
selective focus in highlighting particular responses.  
Significantly, only a few people seemed to have rejected the idea of a 
Freedom Park outright, mostly on the grounds of scarce resources and the 
fact that South Africa has more pressing problems to attend to (Survey 2001: 
11). The majority of respondents in the 2001 survey appreciated the need for 
a symbolic tribute of this nature. The 2002 survey confirmed these findings, 
specifying that 85 percent of locals and 80 percent of foreign tourists 
expressed positive sentiments about the Freedom Park concept.13 Negative 
responses were most frequently registered among white South Africans, who 
often expressed concerns about the perpetuation of ill-feelings by dwelling 
on a history of oppression and especially the negative tainting of people in 
the present who were not responsible for the events of the past (Survey 2002: 
19).  
Not everyone supported the site’s central location in Pretoria, though. 
Among white participants there were strong reservations against building 
‘another monument in Pretoria’ (Survey 2001: 8) and the general feeling was 
that the new democratic government should distinguish itself from past 
regimes by encouraging a more equitable distribution of the nation’s memo-
rial heritage (ibid.: 5). As a result, the majority strongly favoured localised 
variants of the main (Pretoria) Freedom Park or the situation of separate but 
complementary components of Freedom Park throughout the country. 
Firstly, there were distinct concerns about the inclusion or adequate comme-
moration of local events and heroes that would be unlikely to command their 
rightful prominence at the central national site (ibid.: 9). Secondly, 
respondents raised the issue of access and affordability; it was pointed out 
that many local people would not have the resources to ever visit Freedom 
Park and that the site might end up as a place only for the rich (ibid.: 10). To 
my knowledge, there is only one case in which a localised ‘subsidiary’ of 
Freedom Park was established, namely the Poelanong memorial in 
Bloemfontein. 
During the 2001 survey, when the Freedom Park development was still in 
a largely conceptual stage, participants were ambivalent about the name 
‘Freedom Park’. In fact, it was generally felt that the idea of a ‘peace park’ 
would be more appropriate than a ‘freedom park’. The latter  
                                                     
13  To put these results into perspective, one must acknowledge that participants 
were probably not informed about the costs of the development and some may 
have reconsidered their response in the light of this information. As the 2002 
survey found, many participants moreover based their professed interest in 
visiting the park on the premise that entrance would be free or at most a token 
amount (Survey 2002: 31). This will probably not be the case. 
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… was said to evoke memories closely aligned to the freedom struggle whilst 
‘peace park’ appears more compatible with the idea of unifying and reconciling 
South Africans behind symbols of ‘reconciliation’, ‘national pride’, and 
‘freedom and democracy’ (ibid.: 4). 
In accordance with these sentiments, the majority of participants, although 
being somewhat divided about the envisaged visual appearance of Freedom 
Park, conjured up images of a spacious peaceful place, a site with limited 
built structures in expansive gardens generating a tranquil atmosphere, but 
nevertheless impressive in its total impact and size (ibid.: 12-15; Survey 
2002: 24, 31). A considerable number of participants in both surveys empha-
sised the need for a very large-scale development and some even entertained 
outright megalomaniac visions.14 Some saw the initiative as a ‘once in a life 
time project’ and any attempts at making it smaller or optimising it were 
seen as undermining its basic premise (Survey 2002: 5). Members of the 
FPT must have felt extremely pleased and fully legitimated in their efforts 
with the following conclusion from the 2002 survey:  
There is a need for it [the Freedom Park] to be carefully designed to achieve that 
so much anticipated ‘wow effect’ and to be unrelenting in directing the requisite 
level of time and financial investment towards the project. It may even be 
necessary to delay full implementation but to undertake only those portions that 
can be at the expected levels of grandeur (ibid.: 7). 
                                                     
14  ‘In my view, the Freedom Park gives you the impression of a very large place 
which is half the size of the city of Pretoria … buy all the farms around Pretoria 
and build something that will transform the heartland of the Boer republics and 
apartheid into a world show stopper’ (Survey 2001: 16); ‘President Mbeki must 
be brave enough to say to the whole country that this is going to be a big place 
because we wish to build a place that will be one of Africa’s most sacred 
grounds … this cannot be just a statue or monument perched on a hill or 
mountain side somewhere in the Cape or Pretoria … buy enough land and don’t 
be intimidated by those who will criticise this move as a waste of money for 
housing or jobs … the best monuments, statues and peace parks around the 
world were built by leaders who were criticised and vilified as madmen during 
their time’ (ibid.: 17); ‘I think the government must be warned not to put up 
some Mickey-Mouse project … people do not expect government to fund small 
projects … governments are generally expected to come up with huge projects 
that you cannot get used to easily … you end up being respected as a visionary 
when you put up huge and breathtaking projects like that … the Statue of Liberty 
in America took decades to complete …many others were built over decades … 
pyramids took centuries … so we must not rush government to finish this thing 
in one or two years … because people will just ridicule the things afterwards’ 
(ibid.: 21). 
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As Serote put it in a December 2006 television interview (SABC 3 2006), 
Freedom Park was really ‘designed by the nation’ and the latest version (at 
the time of writing) of the official Freedom Park information brochure 
speaks of a ‘Dialogue with the Nation … to gather and present all the 
perspectives of the South African history’ (henceforth referenced as 
‘Freedom Park brochure’, undated, unpaginated). This is certainly a colossal 
overstatement. Observation suggests that (at the time of writing) there is still 
a relatively low level of awareness among many sectors of the population 
about the objectives and even the very existence of Freedom Park. The FPT 
itself has on various occasions stressed the need for more publicity and 
community education.  
Nevertheless, in comparison with the top-down imposition and fast-track 
construction of the national heroes’ acres and independence monuments in 
South Africa’s neighbor states and presumably in other countries on the 
African continent and elsewhere in the once colonised world, Freedom Park 
has thus far evolved in a far more democratic, transparent and consultative 
manner. In response to criticism about the long delays in the implementation 
of the Freedom Park project and especially the enormous escalation of costs, 
Serote tends to point precisely to this time-consuming consultative process, 
which is meant to legitimate the project as an inclusive symbol of national 
identity (e.g. Mokae 2007). To some extent he is right. However, whether 
the mammoth expenditure – estimated at around 800 million rand at the time 
of writing, but possibly still rising – will ever be considered worthwhile and 
appropriate or, on the contrary, will add fuel to the fire of contestation that 
already surrounds the site, remains to be seen. 
Site orientation and Isivivane 
Although the final phase of Freedom Park site is still under construction, the 
overall conceptualisation and the construction of key elements were largely 
completed by the end of 2008. I shall now briefly describe these for the sake 
of orientation. My point of reference for the official names, purposes and 
intended symbolic meanings of the park’s various components is the FPT 
website (www.freedompark.co.za) and the official publicity material 
published by the FPT, notably the Freedom Park brochure, which consists of 
a glossy folder with several colourfully illustrated loose leaflets. 
Freedom Park consists of a variety of spiritual, educational and 
recreational elements, deliberately named in a kaleidoscope of Southern 
African languages: the Sikhumbuto near the crest of the hill constitutes the 
visually most dominant element. It is a place of remembrance, reflection and 
prayer dedicated to the major struggles that shaped the South African past 
and those ‘who laid down their lives in the struggle for humanity and 
freedom’ (Freedom Park brochure). Nearby is the Moshate, a hospitality 
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suite for high-level delegates and a meeting place for diplomatic functions, 
as well as the adjacent Gallery of Leaders, an exhibition space dedicated to 
the extraordinary leaders in the struggle for humanity and freedom.  
 
 
Photo 7.1 ‘Isivivane’ at Freedom Park, Salvokop (Tshwane), completed in 2004. 
The spirits of the fallen heroes are said to rest at the Isivivane on the eastern 
side of the hill, a sacred place of healing and cleansing. The Tiva is a 
proposed artificial lake further down the hill on the same side, which is 
meant to symbolise tranquility and serenity. Adjacent will be a Traditional 
Healer’s Garden. The Mveledzo or spiral path circles the hill, linking all 
individual components and taking the visitor on a metaphorical journey of 
healing and learning. Near the entrance, where various visitor amenities will 
be established, is the place for the ambitious //hapo (currently under 
construction), an interactive museum combined with the Pan African 
Archives, intended to ‘address the gaps, distortions and biases in South 
African history’ (ibid.). Situated half-way between the entrance and the 
Sikhumbuto is the Uitspanplek, a family oriented rest area, and further up is a 
small, secluded place of comtemplation.  
As the 10th anniversary of the First General Elections was approaching, 
the Office of the President exerted pressure on the FPT to have at least one 
section of Freedom Park completed by the key date of 27 April 2004. This 
led to the fast-tracking of the Isivivane, the focal point of the Garden of 
Remembrance. This part of Freedom Park was deliberately exempted from 
the international architectural competition, because it was felt that ‘it must 
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be designed by Africans’ (Serote, personal interview 2004). It was meant to 
bring out the ‘African voice’ by drawing on IKS, African philosophy and 
cosmology.15 This is where the results of the community workshops 
presumably found their most notable impact.16  
 
 
Photo 7.2 Spiral Path at Freedom Park, Salvokop (Tshwane) with Voortrekker 
Monument in the distance. 
                                                     
15  ‘Emancipation of the African voice’ was also important for the adjudication of 
the competition, as is explicitly stated in the Freedom Park minutes: ‘Dr. Serote 
mentioned that after a lengthy consultation process it was clear that the 
Emancipation of the African Voice should form an integral part of the design. He 
further indicated that it is essential that the jurors are aware of the latest 
developments of the first phase. Traditional healers played an important role in 
defining the concept for the first phase. Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) 
should be tapped into. Time should be found to inform the jurors in this regard. 
Mr. Fox stated that Dr. Serote had conducted extensive research on this topic and 
this should be shared with the jurors. He further suggested that Dr. Serote choose 
a number of research papers that should be presented to the jury’ (Document 10: 
2). 
16  This two-tiered approach can – on the one hand – be considered a clever solution 
to combining what may be meaningful at the grassroots-level with what is 
internationally respected. On the other hand, exempting the design of the Garden 
of Remembrance from the international competition meant that no truly holistic 
approach to the conceptualisation of the entire commemorative site was possible. 
Architects were invariably limited to designing a museum building and some 
kind of memorial structure to be located somewhere near the top of the hill. 
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It is noteworthy that Freedom Park means to distinguish itself from related 
heritage sites and icons of the struggle (for instance Robben Island) through 
its conceptualisation as a spiritual place of healing, cleansing and moral 
regeneration. The 2001 survey confirmed the need for a site such as Freedom 
Park to help rebuild pride and cultural integrity among rural communities 
and promote a new sense of morality consistent with African values (Survey 
2001: 30). Respondents expected that the Freedom Park experience would 
contribute to restoring ‘true indigenous cultural values’ or function as a tool 
for the restitution of ‘the authentic values and mores amongst the country’s 
rural communities’, because colonialism and apartheid domination had 
‘robbed every rural African community or tribe of self-identity and 
indigenous values’ (ibid.: 28).  
This is an important objective associated with the Garden of Remem-
brance. According to the Freedom Park brochure, the isivivane is a place 
deeply imbued with spirituality, where sacred rituals are performed to lay the 
spirits of the fallen heroes and heroines to rest. Its middle section comprises 
a sacred heap of stones surrounded by nine boulders sourced from South 
Africa’s nine provinces. Two more boulders represent the national 
government and the international community respectively. Samples of soil 
from all those countries where South Africans lost their lives in various 
historic conflicts are interred here, based on the notion that the remains of 
the dead have merged with the soil and are now ‘brought home’. One may 
recall the African tradition of burying the community’s most important 
deceased in the centre of the homestead or cattle kraal, but this also links 
with an established, perhaps worldwide practice of repossessing the dead, 
the insistence that the bodies of ‘our’ fallen soldiers must be returned and 
buried in ‘our’ soil to allow their souls to rest (Verderey 1999: 42). Steam-
generated smoke rises from this site to emphasise cleansing and purity, while 
simultaneously creating a sense of mystery and, once again, evoking 
traditional African religious practices, notably the burning of incense, which 
is associated with the presence of the ancestors.17  
Simple stone cairns referred to as izivivane18 can be found dotting the 
landscape throughout South Africa and numerous theories exist about their 
origin. In the Southern African context, the tradition was apparently adopted 
by Bantu speakers from the Khoi, who regarded them as graves connected 
                                                     
17  ‘The spiral pathway will start in the general area of the alignment of Paul Kruger 
Street as indicated on the attached document and move in an easterly direction 
up the slopes of the hill. Smoke will be created along this stretch of pathway to 
symbolically represent the beginning of the healing/cleansing process. The 
smoke, along with the relatively dense vegetation, will evoke a sense of 
“mystery” and the unknown due to the lack of open views and the closed tree 
cover’ (FPT Document 7: 7). 
18  Izivivane is the plural of isivivane. 
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with their mythical ancestor, Heitsi Eibib (Hodgson 1982). The Xhosa 
especially followed the Khoi practice in that a passer-by would pick up a 
stone, a branch or a bunch of grass, spit on it and then place it on the cairn. 
Sometimes a simple prayer to the cairn itself or to the Supreme Being and 
the ancestors was said in the process. The custom was also found among the 
San and a similar tradition of creating cairns to bring good fortune to 
travellers exists in many parts of world. Cairns are also established in 
memory of persons or events or as place markers, for instance on the 
battlefield of Blood River or on Robben Island.  
As Pitika Ntuli (personal conversation 2002), sculptor and then chair of 
Sankofa, the Centre for African Renaissance, explains, the real significance 
of the isivivane is not so much the cairn (i.e. the tangible object) but the 
underlying principles of the tradition, notably the fact that the whole 
community gets involved (i.e. the intangible, performative aspects). This is 
presumably what the FPT tried to achieve when conducting workshops with 
different community groups throughout the nation. The Isivivane also 
constitutes the symbolic centre of the Moral Regeneration Movement 
facilitated by the FPT. It conducts Cleansing and Healing as well as Return 
of Spirits ceremonies in different parts of the country and selected places 
abroad, drawing much on the methods and rituals of traditional African 
healers. A memorial was erected in Bloemfontein specifically for the 
purpose of providing an adequate ‘stage’ and a lasting testimony to this 
important event. This is the Cleansing, Healing and Reparation Memorial or 
Poelanong monument in the northern garden (renamed Poelano Park) of the 
City Hall, which was unveiled on 25 May 2003.19 
When I visited the Isivivane in the presence of a Freedom Park official in 
April 2004, all visitors were requested to respectfully take off their shoes, to 
surround the heap of stones holding hands as a symbol of unity and 
reconciliation, to observe a moment of silence in memory of the dead, and 
ritually to cleanse themselves with water from an artificial spring upon 
leaving the site. On other occasions the visit is accompanied by elaborate 
cleansing rituals, as can be gathered from images published in illustrated 
Freedom Park publicity material and on the official website.  
                                                     
19  Serote had written to the Premiers of all provinces, requesting a list of items 
from each province for the Garden of Remembrance at Freedom Park. The items 
were to be displayed at the Provincial Cleansing, Healing and Reparations 
Ceremony and subsequently dispatched to Freedom Park. As a result, the Free 
State MEC for Sport, Arts, Culture, Science & Technology initiated the 
construction of a purpose-built Cleansing, Healing and Reparation Memorial 
(designed by Roodt Partnership) on 14 May 2003. Due to great time pressure – 
the project was due to be completed 11 days later – construction went ahead 
without building permit or consultation with the City Council, although 
permission was retrospectively granted (Letter Ralikontsane to MEC 2003; Fax 
Mfebe to Mokoena 2003). 
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One of the challenges the FPT identified in the process of establishing the 
Isivivane was the recognition that ‘South Africans are a diverse people … 
and not everybody … will align themselves with the cleansing ceremony’ 
(FPT document Annexure D 2003: 28). In the interest of inclusiveness, the 
FPT insists that the iconography and ritual practices associated with the 
Garden of Remembrance are not exclusively African, but rather cross-
cultural, interfaith or inter-denominational, drawing on common denomin-
ators, universal spiritual concepts and ritual elements shared by many 
religious traditions. As Abrahams aptly puts it, every South African is meant 
to discover an echo of his/her religion and culture there (personal 
communication 2008).  
Only time will tell to what extent different sectors of South Africa’s 
multi-racial, religiously and ideologically diverse population will in fact 
identify with this site and especially how meaningful the rituals performed 
there will be perceived in achieving reconciliation and nation-building. 
Afrikaner groups, for instance, have thus far proven indisposed to 
participating in healing and cleansing ceremonies, because ‘they were 
worried that they would have to partake in processes which were alien to 
their culture’ (The Freedom Park Trust undated d: 30). Indian, Coloured and 
KhoiSan minority communities have equally shown reluctance in embracing 
the Freedom Park concept, prompting the FPT to engage with each of these 
groups separately to determine their specific needs and mobilise their 
support (ibid.). 
But critical challenges can also be anticipated from within the 
heterogeneous African community. Many urban black South Africans, 
especially the youth, arguably no longer identify with rural traditional 
customs and practices. The younger generation, which has grown up in a 
post-apartheid society, may not feel the need for healing and cleansing. At 
the other end of the spectrum, some conservatives and traditional healers 
may find the space of the Isivivane compromised and the performance of the 
Freedom Park cleansing ceremonies lacking and ‘improper’. For instance, 
they may not believe the invocation of ancestral spirits to be effective 
without the slaughtering of a cow or another form of animal sacrifice, a 
practice which has thus far been discouraged at Freedom Park, presumably 
in part because it is widely considered offensive by non-African 
communities.20 
One could conclude that the Freedom Park is trying to accomplish too 
much, and that by attempting to accommodate all it may end up being 
meaningful to few. Alternatively, one might argue that the Isivivane and its 
healing and cleansing rituals can only ever be meaningful to separate 
                                                     
20  Although no slaughtering of animals has thus far been performed at Freedom 
Park, Abrahams explains that no policy decision has ever been made against the 
practice as a matter of principle (personal communication 2008). 
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gatherings of different, culturally homogeneous groups with their own 
religious leader or a ritual geared towards their respective cultural needs. 
Some may criticise such a separatist practice as defeating the reconciliatory 
and nation-building objectives of Freedom Park. However, recalling Luli 
Callinicos’ initial proposal document, nation-building is a process, a long-
term project, constantly evolving. One might suggest that South African 
society is not yet ready to have meaningful joint gatherings and to undergo 
spiritually inspired symbolic rituals at Freedom Park together, but this may 
very well change with time. 
The Sikhumbuto and the Wall of Names 
According to the Freedom Park brochure, the word Sikhumbuto is derived 
from a siSwati reference to a place of remembrance, where those who have 
passed on are commemorated, but also invoked for assistance. The most 
visually dominant element of the Sikhumbuto is the sanctuary, a sandstone-
clad building with rounded walls and a dark, cavernous interior intended for 
quiet contemplation and prayer. An Eternal Flame is situated in the large-
scale opening, serenely surrounded by a pool of water and facing an 
Amphitheatre where up to 2000 people can gather for national events, rituals 
and ceremonies. An imposing series of 200 metal poles arranged in 
ascending order and illumated at night defines the rear edge of the 
Sikhumbuto. The monumental sculpture symbolises reeds and signifies ‘the 
rebirth [of] the South African Nation as well as a nation moving forward’ 
(Freedom Park brochure).  
The most contested element of the Sikhumbuto (and in fact of Freedom 
Park as a whole) thus far is the Wall of Names, which was built in response 
to Thabo Mbeki’s concern that the Isivivane is not sufficient in honouring 
the country’s heroes, but that the nation needs to know the names of those 
who sacrificed their lives for humanity and freedom (FPT Annual Report 
2008: 31). The Wall of Names is inscribed with the names of all those who 
lost their lives in eight selected conflict events that shaped South Africa’s 
history, namely the Pre-colonial Wars, Genocide, Slavery, the Wars of 
Resistance, the South African Anglo-Boer War, the First and Second World 
Wars and the Liberation Struggle.21 The Wall is laid out to accommodate up 
to 136 000 names. By the time of the official opening of the Sikhumbuto on 
16 December 2006, 75 000 names had been collected for inscription.  
 
                                                     
21  Most recently, the Liberation Struggle was furthermore subdivided into four 
distinct phases or struggles, namely the Armed Struggle, the Mass Struggle, the 
Underground Struggle, and International Solidarity (Abrahams, personal com-
munication 2008). 
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Photo 7.3 Sikhumbuto, Freedom Park, Salvokop (Tshwane), photographed in 
December 2008. 
 
Photo 7.4 Wall of Names Freedom Park, Salvokop (Tshwane), photographed in 
December 2008. 
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It is significant to note that the fallen heroes are not commemorated 
primarily as victims but implicitly as founders and ancestors of the new 
democratic nation. This is not unlike the famous memorial site of Yad 
Vashem (opened in 1968) in Israel, where the victims of the Holocaust are 
commemorated not merely as passive victims, but as active pioneers and 
‘potential citizens of Israel’ (Kirsch 2003: 245). Ultimately, however, the 
question of who receives the honour of being commemorated at this 
foremost shrine of the nation will probably always be subject to contestation 
and negotiation. Before I engage with issues of exclusion – from the Wall of 
Names and by extension the narrative of the nation – I briefly want to place 
the structural and conceptual elements of Freedom Park described thus far 
into an international context, pointing out some prominent sources of 
inspiration and discussing how unique and ‘African’ the design of the 
Freedom Park really is. 
Designing an authentic African monument?  
The Freedom Park brochure explains that the museum and archive will tell 
‘the South African story in a particular way’, as Freedom Park is meant to 
strengthen democracy by ‘emancipating the African voice. This emancipat-
ion of the African voice was also an important criterion in the adjudication 
of the competition. Thabo Mbeki’s well-known speech ‘I am an African’, 
delivered on the occasion of the adoption of the Constitution in Cape Town 
in May 1996 was a key document that informed the early stages of the 
conceptualisation of the Freedom Park. Linking with an important 
underlying theme of this speech, Abrahams still stresses the importance of 
representing the South African past from an African perspective and the 
challenge of defining an African voice that is not constructed by others 
(personal communication 2008). The FPT has produced a number of 
commissioned research publications on various aspects of African culture 
and their significance for reconciliation and nation-building (e.g. The 
Freedom Park Trust undated a; b; c; d; e). IKS ‘as a way of knowing the 
world’ (Freedom Park brochure) is strongly promoted in the development of 
Freedom Park and the architectural elements, sculptural objects and 
landscaped features undoubtedly contain many rural traditional African 
references. Notably the design configurations of the Sikhumbuto memorial 
space, claims the Freedom Park brochure, are ‘steeped in the traditions of 
Africa’.  
Despite this bold affirmation of African traditions and value systems and 
the frequent references to a character firmly rooted in the local, the 
conceptualisation and design of Freedom Park is of course also strongly 
influenced by a concern for international recognition and competitiveness 
within the global arena of public memorialisation. The architectural design 
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competition was attractively positioned to encourage wide international 
participation and its adjudicators included international jurors. The initial 
meeting of the Trustees already pointed to international examples of best 
practice, notably in Russia, Algeria and Cuba, which (it was resolved) 
needed to be closely investigated.22  
Paradoxically, even after the winning competition entries of the 
international contributors were abandoned in favour of a home-grown 
design, the sources of inspiration for almost all of Freedom Park’s 
components are quite clearly Eurocentric, Western or specifically American. 
The Wall of Names, for instance, has its obvious conceptual and to some 
extent formal precedent in the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial in Washington 
D.C. The Eternal Flame is one of the most conventional elements in the 
European tradition of commemorative monuments (furthermore imitating the 
VTM). The organic-looking architectural design of all buildings (notably the 
reception building at the entrance and the Sanctuary) shows striking 
similarities with the new American Indian Museum in Washington, D.C., 
with its distinctive curved walls and sandstone cladding, while of course also 
referencing the Great Zimbawe ruins. The buried samples of soil in the 
Isivivane recall the same concept in the healing space of the internationally 
much publicized Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. The Isivivane as a 
final resting place for the spirits of the nation’s heroes imitates the sacred 
altar to Piet Retief and his fellow men at the VTM, as well as more generally 
the European tradition of war memorials designed around a cenotaph. The 
Gallery of Leaders recalls the Hall of Heroes at the VTM and its European 
precedents. The assembly of ascending steel poles at the Sikhumbuto is 
informed by current international design trends towards minimalist repetition 
of like elements, as exemplified most notably by Eisenmann’s famous 
Holocaust memorial in Berlin, but also seen in South Africa in the Samora 
Machel memorial. Like the VTM, Freedom Park is meant to last for all 
eternity.23 The list goes on. 
Various members of the FPT indeed undertook several international 
journeys to sites on the African continent, in Europe, the United States 
(notably Washington D.C.) and Cuba in an attempt to gain first-hand 
experience of eminent commemorative monuments and state-of-the-art 
museum technology. The intention presumably was to investigate useful 
models for the design of Freedom Park, but also to establish points of 
difference to constitute the uniqueness of the South African development. 
Despite the prevalence of such international references, one must 
                                                     
22  ‘Draft. Meeting of the Trustees of Freedom Park. 1 June 2000; 09:30-13:30. The 
Presidential Guest House’, DAC, Freedom Park Project, Vol. 6, file 6/16/4. 
23  In a recent newspaper interview Serote was quoted as saying: ‘If, in 2000 years 
from now, there is a conflict in the country and people ascend to Isivivane to 
reflect on how we got to where we are, I will be happy’ (Mokae 2007).  
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acknowledge that Freedom Park is also very consciously striving to develop 
unique design solutions that significantly differ from both the emulation of 
prestigious western and especially regional socialist models of commemo-
ration. One might say that Freedom Park (like the South African nation) 
attempts to articulate a uniquely African identity, while simultaneously 
manifesting its firm alliance with the European tradition and its global 
connection with the rest of the world. One might also say that Freedom Park 
represents the re-interpretation or Africanisation of the Eurocentric concept 
of the national monument. Despite the Freedom Park’s attempts at being 
‘different’, one cannot overlook its conceptual and even formal similarities 
with the VTM. Of particular interest to me was how respondents to the 
public consultation effort perceived the relationship between the two sites, 
although this was not directly part of the questionnaire, and responses 
emerged only obliquely in various contexts. Both black and white 
participants in the 2001 survey consistently recommended that the VTM be 
incorporated into the Freedom Park rather than be left out or destroyed 
(Survey 2001: 38). One person seemed to consider Salvokop’s proximity to 
the VTM a distinct advantage and suggested that the two sites must be 
linked, but others were concerned about the potential perception that the 
Freedom Park was built ‘just for the sake of closing the score with the 
Voortrekker Monument next door’ (ibid.: 18). As another respondent put it:  
The government must be very careful not to be seen to be competing with the 
Voortrekker Monument in terms of message, size and location … if this new 
place is near the Monument, they must be careful not to build something that fills 
the space next to the Voortrekkers … that would look short-sighted and silly … 
we must not be seen to be wanting to compete with those who subjugated and 
oppressed us (ibid.: 16). 
Is the Freedom Park project indeed primarily a silly imitation of a contested 
yet still prominent ideologically tainted monument of the old order, initiated 
for the sake of competition and ‘closing a score’? This question, which can 
be extended to a growing number of post-apartheid monuments and heritage 
sites constructed throughout the country in deliberate juxtaposition with 
existing monuments, will be discussed in Chapter Nine.  
Inclusion/exclusion 
From the time that the government announced its plans to construct Freedom 
Park, members of the general public and specifically the Afrikaner 
community raised questions about who would be included in this eminent 
site of honour, how the fight for freedom and humanity would be defined, 
and specifically to what extent there would be room for Afrikaners (e.g. 
Esterhuyse 2000; Beukman 2002). If – as the Freedom Park brochure claims 
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– the Freedom Park and especially the Sikhumbuto ‘showcases the essence of 
the South African Nation’, the question emerges as to who belongs to the 
nation, who shares in the new narratives of nation formation?  
The 2002 Survey found that some sectors of the population clearly lack a 
sense of identification with Freedom Park as the symbolic centre of the 
nation. The park’s predominant themes of oppression, struggle and liberation 
were largely unpalatable for white respondents, concluded the survey (2002: 
5). This suggests that respondents were predominantly conservative whites 
resisting or only reluctantly adjusting to transformation, but I argue below 
that many liberal or leftist white South Africans, who may indeed strongly 
identify with these themes, nevertheless also feel at odds with Freedom Park. 
More worryingly even, the 2002 Survey found that many ‘coloureds’ and 
Indians too felt alienated from this national commemorative venture. There 
was a perception that the representation of the nation’s heritage and 
especially the liberation struggle was skewed towards a particular 
perspective from which their role was largely excluded and in which their 
heroes were overlooked (ibid.: 6). 
In an attempt to address the lack of participation in the Freedom Park 
project by minority groups, including the KhoiSan, South Africans of Indian 
descent, Afrikaners and ‘coloureds’, the FPT embarked on a series of 
workshops with these specific communities. In April 2005 the first workshop 
took place with members of the ‘coloured’ community, revealing several 
areas of grave concern. It emerged that the Freedom Park was perceived to 
be an ‘African’ project. Not only did the ‘coloured’ community feel 
excluded, but there was a perception that entire communities were being 
written out of history (Freedom Park News, April 2007: 6; The Freedom 
Park Trust undated d; Naran 2007). One may add to this the complexity of 
identity politics in present-day South Africa, where no coherent group 
identity exists among members of the ‘coloured’ community. Some 
individuals, for instance, reject the term ‘coloured’ altogether and prefer to 
identify themselves with blacks, Khoi, San or Griquas (Naran 2007). This 
reflects the tension between the preservation and dissolution of established 
colonial and especially apartheid-era identity categories and renders the 
FPT’s intended task to represent the history of all South African 
‘communities’ and their contributions to freedom and humanity highly 
problematic. The issue is likely to come to boiling point with the completion 
of the museum at Freedom Park, which is intended to ‘rewrite’ South 
African history from its very beginning.  
Among all of the marginalised minority groups, the credibility of the 
Freedom Park as an inclusive place of national identification hinges also 
critically on the acceptance of the Afrikaner community as the former ruling 
power. In an attempt to bring conservative Afrikaners on board, the FPT 
tailored the ideological construct of the fight for freedom and humanity to 
accommodate Voortrekker leaders and Boer generals on the basis of their 
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struggle for freedom from British oppression and colonialism. The fact that 
the Afrikaner nationalist concept of freedom and nationhood was not only 
racially exclusive but also often contingent on the simultaneous oppression 
of black populations is conveniently ignored or implicitly subordinated to 
the utopian imaginary of an inclusive post-apartheid nation. The inclusion of 
Afrikaner leaders furthermore stigmatises whites of British descent as the 
true enemy and oppressor, thus once again pitching the two historical 
opponents against one another and ironically deepening fault-lines at a site 
dedicated to reconciliation and nation-building.  
Let us recall that the Freedom Park concept was crucially informed by 
Mbeki’s ‘I am an African’ speech, which has generated much critical debate, 
especially with respect to the question of who might be considered an 
African. In a careful analysis of this seminal speech, Chipkin (2007: 101) 
highlights that there is a constant shifting between two registers. ‘On the one 
hand, the term [African] includes both the perpetrators and the survivors of 
the colonial “crime against humanity”. On the other hand, it refers exclusive-
ly to those who lived and struggled against this terrible injustice’. Chipkin 
suggests that whites are recognised as Africans only in so far as – in the 
words of the Constitution – they ‘recognize the injustices of the past’ (ibid.) 
This is consistent with my earlier discussion of the post-apartheid foundation 
myth and the expanding record of commemorative projects installed or 
promoted by the state. But Freedom Park honours all those who fought for 
freedom, even if their freedom was contingent on the oppression of others. It 
seems to me that the very contradictions and ambiguities that characterise 
Mbeki’s speech are echoed in the conceptualisation of Freedom Park. 
The mutual commemoration – for the sake of reconciliation in the present 
– of those who fought on opposite sides in the past constitutes the greatest 
conceptual challenge for the FPT. Ultimately, the inclusion of Boer heroes 
might purchase the Freedom Park a small slice of recognition among 
Afrikaners or even whites in general, but it will pay a price, namely an 
equivalent loss of credibility among those on the other side of the racial and 
ideological divide. As I have briefly indicated in Chapter Two, some visitors 
will no doubt find their contributions devalued by such an inclusive 
definition of ‘freedom fighter’ and be offended by finding perpetrators and 
victims, apartheid oppressors and liberation stalwarts honoured in the same 
commemorative arena.  
Verdery argues that nationalism is ‘a kind of ancestor worship, a system 
of patrilineal kinship, in which national heroes occupy the place of clan 
elders in defining a nation as a noble lineage’ (1999: 41). National ideologies 
are saturated with kinship metaphors and many national ideologies celebrate 
great political leaders and cultural figures as forefathers, ‘progenitors’ of the 
new nation, as ancestors (ibid.). Koshar (2000: 25) similarly notes that 
‘etched-in genealogies were central to the nineteenth-century theory of the 
modern nation’. The National Heroes Monument with its roll or honour or 
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busts of heroes constitutes an authoritative way of endorsing selected 
forefathers as the ideological founding fathers or chosen ancestors of the 
present nation.  
But this strategy becomes complex and contradictory when the inter-
national pressure for peace and the internal political necessity of attaining 
unity, especially after years of violent conflict, require an inclusive 
definition of the nation, mirrored in the selection of ancestors commemo-
rated in symbolic spaces and monuments. In Romania, for instance, the 
National Cemetery in Bucharest accommodates both those who died in the 
so-called Christmas Revolution in 1989 and supporters of Nicolae Ceauşescu 
(1918-89), the country’s communist dictator, who was executed following 
his conviction on charges of genocide and crimes against the state and the 
national economy. In the 1990s a sign referred to both groups as ‘Heroes of 
the Revolution’. Volkan (1997: 182) explains that the ‘mix of rebels and 
villains in the same location makes mourning them complicated because, no 
matter what the mourner’s sympathies, the burial place is contaminated with 
“bad” dead buried alongside the “heroes”’. Although it must be 
acknowledged that Freedom Park is not an actual burial site but a resting 
place for the spirits, I contend that many visitors will feel deeply ambiguous 
about the politics of remembrance pursued at this national heroes’ acre and 
would prefer to see a ‘pure’ genealogy of the post-apartheid nation.  
Contestation and counter monuments 
The FPT’s dilemma is that the thorny issue of inclusion/exclusion will 
continue to form the basis for contention. On 16 January 2007, one month 
after the official unveiling of the Sikhumbuto, a group of about 60 former 
South African Defence Force (SADF) members led by the popular musician 
and self-declared custodian of Afrikaner culture, Steve Hofmeyr, unveiled an 
alternative monument at the bottom of the access road to the Freedom Park 
(Govender 2007). Expressing their sense of marginalisation and exclusion, 
the counter monument commemorates SADF soldiers who lost their lives in 
the so-called ‘bush war’ against ‘communist terrorists’ in Angola and South 
West Africa between 1975 and 1989.  
This drawn-out civil war began when a power vacuum and subsequent 
conflict ensued between the three rival contenders to rule in Angola, 
following the Portuguese withdrawal from their African colonies in 1975. In 
an attempt at preventing a Soviet-backed government from coming into 
power, the South African army invaded Angola to fight the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Due to the Soviet Union’s 
support of the MPLA with sophisticated arms and military advisers from 
Cuba, the SADF was soon forced to retreat, but managed to keep the civil 
war alive in the southern part of the country, thereby keeping the popular 
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liberation movement in South West Africa (SWAPO) at bay (Davenport and 
Saunders 2000: 527-8).  
In an open letter to Wally Serote, the SADF veterans protested the 
exclusion of their compatriots from the Wall of Names at the Freedom Park, 
because as young conscripts they had believed that they were defending the 
freedom of the (white) South African nation against the threatening prospect 
of an autocratic communist dictatorship.24 To add insult to injury in the eyes 
of the disgruntled critics, the FPT had decided to include on the Wall of 
Names more than 2000 Cuban soldiers who had been brought in to fight on 
the side of the MPLA and lost their lives in Angola. Amidst a deluge of 
public criticism and debate (e.g. Claassen 2007; Greyling 2007; Warwick 
2007 and 2007a), Serote justified the decision by pointing out that the 
Cubans had fought and died for a just cause, namely the basic human rights 
of Africans, and had helped South African liberation forces to attain freedom 
from apartheid rule (Govender 2006).  
Ironically, many members of the white minority, especially those with 
liberal or leftist political convictions who opposed the apartheid system in 
the past, may agree with Serote about excluding the SADF veterans but are 
nevertheless likely to feel marginalized and alienated from the Freedom Park 
project.25 The concept of the Wall of Names, derived from the tradition of 
the hall of heroes and the roll of honour on war memorials, notably the 
famous Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C., raises fundamental 
questions about criteria for heroism and definitions of suffering or sacrifice. 
Helen Suzman is one of the few prominent regime-critics of old who 
publicly and on numerous occasions voiced her disappointment about the 
lack of recognition of the contributions and sacrifices of white South 
Africans and the reluctance to celebrate white heroes of the Struggle.  
There were many white saboteurs, commanders of MK, and militant 
activists in the trade union movement – some of them members of the ANC, 
others affiliated with the Communist Party. Marius Schoon, for instance, was 
arrested for sabotage in 1964 and spent 12 years in prison. Upon his release 
he left the country illegally for Botswana with his new wife, Jeanette Curtis, 
a trade union activist under banning orders, and the two of them carried out 
instructions from the ANC to mobilise the white left in support of the ANC. 
                                                     
24  The names of the SADF soldiers do not appear on the Wall of Names, but they 
have nevertheless been collected (Abrahams, personal communication 2008). As 
Freedom Park deputy CEO, Peggie Photolo, explained, reconciliation is an 
ongoing process and future generations could decide to include the names 
(Govender 2006a). 
25  Abrahams firmly denies that some whites feel excluded (personal communi-
cation 2008) and the FPT places much emphasis on the performance of healing 
and cleansing ceremonies in which members of Afrikaner communities, as well 
as other minority communities, participated and expressed their support for the 
Freedom Park concept (The Freedom Park Trust undated d).  
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People like Barbara Hogan, Guy Berger, Jeremy Cronin and Raymond 
Suttner, often operating from abroad, set up network structures inside South 
Africa, provided political education to newly recruited ANC cadres, esta-
blished underground routes across the border and were involved in a variety 
of other operations (SADET 2006: 416-20). Some white activists suffered 
long terms of imprisonment. Others were tortured, forced into exile or even 
killed. Albie Sachs for instance, lost an arm and an eye in a security agent 
bomb blast in Maputo, Mozambique. Ruth First lost her life, her body torn to 
shreds, when she opened a letter bomb sent to her office in Maputo. There 
are many more examples. 
Other white anti-apartheid activists were not involved in the armed 
Struggle but made valuable contributions of other kinds, which were 
important, if not essential, in supporting, or even enabling, the efforts of 
their black comrades. Many liberal and leftist whites were members of anti-
apartheid organisations and campaigns, such as the Black Sash, the End 
Conscription Campaign, or various human rights organisations. They gave 
shelter and delivered services to banned black activists; they helped organise 
protest marches and creative arts events with conscientising ‘messages’; they 
distributed prohibited leaflets and posters; they smuggled weapons, money 
or other goods in and out of the country; they boycotted official events 
organised by state-affiliated institutions (e.g. graduation ceremonies, sports 
contests, performances and exhibitions); they rejected contracts, tenders and 
awards offered by the state; they defied orders and sabotaged state 
procedures and projects through clandestine administrative acts; with their 
pens or cameras or many other means they found ways of documenting and 
publicising injustices and atrocities that the world was never meant to know 
about. 
While some high-profile survivors now occupy government positions or 
play leadership roles in other spheres of public life (e.g. Albie Sachs is now 
a judge in the Constitutional Court, and Barbara Hogan has been appointed 
Minister of Health), the people described above remain largely 
unacknowledged.26 Although they might not publicly voice their disappoint-
ment, I have personally met many middle-aged white South Africans who 
resent the fact that their contributions – small as they may have been – to the 
                                                     
26  Even some of those who now occupy government positions have on occasion 
admitted feeling sidelined. Carl Niehaus, for instance, who was imprisioned for 
high treason from 1983 to 1991 and appointed Member of Parliament for the 
ANC in 1994, was asked in a recent interview about his ‘most difficult 
experience’. He replied, ‘The last few years [after prison] were hardest. I found it 
difficult when I found myself sidelined from what was the mainstream of ANC 
under Mbeki. I don’t want to be a lackey; it seemed to be the expectation. I was a 
loyal member of the ANC and did not speak out in public but voiced my 
criticisms internally’ (Isaacson 2008).  
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liberation struggle or the goal of human rights for all is under-appreciated or 
belittled. Sacrifice and suffering must be seen in relation to what is at stake. 
Any white South African could have enjoyed a life of security and privilege, 
yet many chose to stand up for the rights of others and had to endure 
suffering as a consequence of their actions. They suffered from police 
harassment, tapped telephone lines, occasional arrest. They lived in constant 
fear of detection, they had to wage the balance between fighting for their 
ideals – a better life for all – with the repercussions their actions might have 
for their own lives and the lives of their families. Some suffered psycho-
logical damage (perhaps permanently) from forced participation in traumatic 
experiences, such as shooting ‘terrorists’. Others made personal sacrifices in 
terms of forfeiting educational or professional opportunities, promotions, 
lucrative business contracts or even in terms of simply indulging in ordinary 
pleasures (like swimming at a ‘whites only’ beach) that the system provided 
for them. 
Many whites today still suffer from the lost opportunities for the 
advancement of their careers and personal goals. Unlike their former black 
comrades, who now benefit from affirmative action and other measures of 
redress, they may lose out all over again because they are white and 
considered ‘formerly privileged’. They certainly lose out at Freedom Park 
and in the heritage sector more broadly, where their contributions and their 
suffering are largely considered too insignificant to be officially 
commemorated. A few white activists have indeed been included in the 
official commemorative effort, although mostly through naming processes, 
hardly through monuments. In part this is due to the TRC process and its 
focus on victims of ‘gross human rights violations’, as discussed in Chapter 
Three. But this lack is particularly problematic for Freedom Park with its 
specific objectives of reconciliation and nation-building, because 
reconciliation is widely thought to depend on an official recognition of loss, 
suffering and sacrifices. 
Who will visit Freedom Park?  
As a prime heritage site and visitor attraction, Freedom Park will inevitably 
compete with internationally known historical icons of apartheid oppression 
and resistance, notably the Robben Island World Heritage site, as well as 
newly created heritage developments like the ambitious proposed Freedom 
Tower in Port Elizabeth (Nelson Mandela Metro), which will be discussed in 
Chapter Ten. While it is unclear how many South Africans are likely to visit 
Freedom Park, it can be anticipated that the site is indeed likely to become a 
popular attraction for foreign tourists. The strategic link with the VTM 
promotes a visit of both sites to gain an ideologically and historically 
balanced heritage experience. Equally important but also problematic is the 
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fact that Freedom Park to some extent feeds into the popular Western 
fascination with exoticising stereotypes about the African ‘other’. It is likely 
to be attractive as an alluring, ‘authentically’ African monument, associated 
with the mystery of traditional healing rituals and ancestral spirits. It comes 
as no surprise that the 2002 survey found foreign tourists expressing 
considerably higher interest in visiting the Garden of Remembrance with the 
Isivivane than any of the other components of Freedom Park (Survey 2002: 
22). 
The 2002 survey included a market segmentation study, in which five 
main visitor or ‘consumer’ segments were identified, each of which would 
be likely to provide different types of experiences and facilities served to 
visitors through a different communicative approach. The largest anticipated 
visitor group is what the Survey calls ‘Peace and scenic lovers’ (38 percent), 
which includes people of all racial backgrounds. People in this group like 
visiting game parks and themed areas, but they enjoy a tranquil, uncrowded 
atmosphere and expect to find a range of essential facilities and amenities. 
This group is closely followed by ‘South African Heritage Stewards’ (34 
percent), predominantly black visitors who are interested in heritage for its 
intrinsic value, but who are also keen to see heritage as a strategic means of 
redressing the past and recognising those who made sacrifices.  
Such emotional attachment is the key factor that distinguishes members 
of this group from the next segment, the ‘Avid Scholars/Historians’ (9 
percent), a much smaller, generally younger, multiracial visitor group whose 
members are more interested in analysing the facts from a purely historical 
perspective (Survey 2002: 41). Many foreign tourists are also likely to fall 
within this group.27 Another segment is constituted by the ‘Entertainment 
Seekers’ (11 percent), who are predominantly higher income female visitors 
interested in an outing for the whole family and concerned about family-
oriented facilities. The group called ‘Tourists/Curiosity Train’ (8%) 
comprises predominantly black male, lower income people. Their interests 
are similar to those of the avid scholars group, but they are more concerned 
with the qualities of the place as a tourist attraction (ibid.: 35-43).  
These are mere projections, and other surveys would have to be 
conducted once Freedom Park is fully operational to ascertain more 
precisely what different visitor groups expect from the experience of the site. 
One is likely to find – as did the 2002 survey – that not all visitors or 
‘customers’ are motivated by the same reasons to come to the Park (ibid.: 
35) and neither will all visitors interpret the site and its varied components in 
                                                     
27  In other words, while the locals extolled above everything else the constant 
reminder of those who sacrificed for freedom, tourists were relatively more 
preoccupied with acknowledging the role of all those who were involved (Survey 
2002: 25). 
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the same way or as intended by the FPT. But one may ask a much more 
fundamental question: who is captured in such surveys? 
During my last visit to Freedom Park, in December 2008, I noticed a 
group of vagrants or homeless people who appeared to be living in an open-
air camp along the side of the road towards the entrance of Freedom Park. I 
wondered whether they had ever visited the nation’s most eminent heritage 
site up the road and, considering their raggedy appearance, how welcome 
they would have been made to feel. On the occasion of the same visit I 
become aware of the extent to which the construction site of the museum 
cuts into the residential area that borders on the Freedom Park site. Some 
residents have presumably lived here for a long time, but they are now being 
forced to resettle because their houses are earmarked for demolition to make 
way for the museum and its parking lot. I was told that these families had 
ignored the eviction notices served on them and were now facing legal 
action to evacuate their homes. Clearly this suggests that they will 
experience resentment and discontent in connection with the sacrifice 
expected of them for the sake of this ‘shrine of the nation’. The Freedom 
Park premises are surrounded by a high boundary fence and a private 
security company is employed to patrol the fence and secure the premises – 
possibly from attacks by reactionary political opponents, but much more 
likely from ordinary thieves and vandals.  
I want to refer back to my earlier discussion of vandalism and the 
suggestion that some people not only lack a sense of ownership of newly 
installed heritage sites but do not appear to share a sense of citizenship and 
belief in the narrative of the nation. Chipkin draws an important distinction 
between two kinds of political community, namely ‘citizens’ and ‘authentic 
national subjects’. The former are members of a democracy, not simply as a 
form of government, but rather as a society. The second refers to the nation 
as a particular kind of society defined by specific properties. The national 
subjects are the veritable bearers of the national mission, the community of 
true believers. Nation-building implies that some citizens are more 
authentically members of the nation than others (2007: 10, 14).  
I have earlier considered who among whites is considered an ‘African’ in 
Thabo Mbeki’s ‘I’m an African’ speech, but the same question still remains 
to be answered with reference to the black population. ‘Africans are 
authentically so when able to “see” themselves through liberated eyes’, 
argues Chipkin (2007: 102).28 This harks back to the notion of the nation 
                                                     
28  ‘So who is an African today? The African in a democracy is a new sort of being: 
an individual, free to belong or not belong to any group he/she sees fit. The 
democratic nation, therefore, is not simply a nation of multiple identities; it is a 
nation composed of individuals. But we recall that being African was intimately 
linked to combating racism and refusing apartheid and colonial social 
taxonomies. What this therefore means is that being an African, or being an 
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having emerged in and through the struggle for democracy, but it raises the 
central question about the meaning of freedom, i.e. who is truly liberated.  
Conclusion 
The issue of the excluded SADF veterans led to much debate about the core 
purpose of Freedom Park. In November 2007 an unnamed researcher was 
quoted by the Mail & Guardian as suggesting that Freedom Park must 
ultimately make a choice between reconciliation and commemorating 
struggle heroes, because the park’s current mandate is confused and 
inherently contradictory. Serote refuted such criticism, pointing out that 
‘[t]he contradiction exists in the nation’ (Ismail 2007).  
Although the Freedom Park heritage site should – in all fairness – not be 
judged before completion, one cannot help noting its inherent contradictions, 
ambiguities, inconsistencies, and unresolved challenges. The canonisation of 
the eight selected wars and conflicts has been questioned and criticised.29 
The definition of who deserves to be honoured for their contribution to 
freedom and humanity arguably lacks historical consistency. The professed 
’Africanness’ of the site contradicts the Eurocentric root of the concept as a 
whole and the western/international style elements of its design. The 
frequent reference to the emancipation of the ‘African voice’ raises 
questions about who is considered an African. It could be argued that Serote 
is to some extent right when he claims that the contradiction exists in the 
nation. Freedom Park represents the ‘essence of the nation’ – not in the sense 
in which the statement was presumably intended, but in the sense that the 
site is a mirror of precisely all of those racial and ideological tensions, 
contradictions and discords, challenges and unresolved dilemmas that 
characterise the real state of the post-apartheid nation at the present moment 
in time.  
The problem is that Freedom Park does not acknowledge these 
contradictions. It has not been conceptualised in such a way as to allow for 
multiple interpretations. It does not encourage different perspectives on the 
past. Even the prospect of future modifications to the park in accordance 
                                                                                                                            
individual, is contingent on something very special: being able to understand the 
racist power at work in apartheid and colonial taxonomies. Africans are 
authentically so when able to “see” themselves through liberated eyes. This, it 
appears, is the mark of authenticity’ (Chipkin 2007: 102). 
29  For instance, Warwick (2007a) notes that ‘[d]uring the early 1950s, dozens of 
South African Air Force personnel gave their lives in defence of South Korea’, 
but this war is eclipsed from the list of conflicts selected for commemoration at 
Freedom Park and their names hence do not appear.  
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with potential shifts in socio-political values is broached with caution.30 In 
keeping with my point in the previous chapter, thus far academic historians 
have been sidelined in the Freedom Park project (although it remains to be 
seen who will be invited to participate in the conceptualisation of the 
museum exhibition). Their narratives of complexities, ambiguities and 
gradations are often viewed with suspicion or as outright counter-productive. 
Referring back to Barthes, the FPT essentially wants to represent the 
‘blissful clarity’ of myth, i.e. a celebratory struggle history with a specific 
purpose, namely ‘symbolis[ing] the universality of connections among South 
Africans of all backgrounds and ages’ (Freedom Park brochure).  
Casting aside fundamental questions such as whether South Africa really 
needs a Freedom Park, and adopting a positive attitude and a long-term view 
towards the project, one might argue that the park has the potential to be 
adjusted to changing interpretations. As opposed to the Zimbabwean Heroes’ 
Acre and the self-aggrandising commemorative efforts of the African elite in 
some other African postcolonial states, which have remained largely 
unchanged since they were built, the social and political needs of future 
generations might lead to shifts in the interpretation of the park’s constitutive 
elements. The success of the Freedom Park as a site that South Africans truly 
identify with will, in my view, crucially depend on such openness of 
meaning. 
                                                     
30  Abrahams explains that Freedom Park makes allowance for future modifications 
and acknowledges that such changes are essential to ensure that the site remains 
meaningful for future generations. However, any such changes will affect only 
the exhibitions on display and the narratives told. None of the current structures 
or ‘fixtures’ are envisaged to be altered ever again and the key principles and 
values upon which the Freedom Park concept is based must always remain in 
place (personal communication 2008). 

  
8 
Celebrating ‘Mothers of the 
Nation’: The Monument to the 
Women of South Africa in 
Pretoria 
Introduction  
While providing a detailed investigation of the Monument to the Women of 
South Africa at Pretoria, this chapter discusses issues of gender within the 
commemorative effort of the post-apartheid order and more specifically 
examines the relationship between gender identity and conceptions of 
national identity. As stated earlier, the Women’s Monument (unveiled by 
Thabo Mbeki on 9 August 2000) commemorates the 1956 protest march to 
the Union Buildings in Pretoria and more generally honours the contribution 
of women to the liberation struggle. But as part of the National Legacy 
Project, the Women’s Monument also more broadly celebrates the role of 
women as ‘mothers of the nation’ through their contribution to the 
foundation of the new democratic order and expresses the constitutionally 
enshrined commitment of the national government and especially the ANC 
to gender equality.  
If the commemoration of the past is a mirror of the values of the present, 
the National Women’s monument makes a powerful statement for the 
recognition of women as equal partners in the attainment of liberation and 
proclaims the importance of women more generally. Yet, as media reports 
remind us daily, the sad reality is that the problem of gender discrimination – 
ranging from economic inequality to the abuse of women – has not been 
resolved or even adequately addressed in South Africa. While under 
apartheid the women’s fight for equality had to take a back seat behind the 
larger struggle for black liberation, which was perceived as being more 
important, during the immediate post-liberation period women’s issues were 
again subordinated to the new priorities of nation-building and racial 
reconciliation. Only in recent years can one discern a more concerted effort – 
both within civil society and the government – to push agendas of gender 
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equality and devise plans to address the persistent marginalisation and abuse 
of women (and children).  
This need for strategic intervention in the social ills of the present society, 
coupled with the forging of a new national identity based on values of non-
racialism and non-sexism, constitutes the context for the commemoration of 
past events involving women and the identification of female heroes selected 
as models for identification in the present. But I demonstrate in this chapter 
firstly that the post-apartheid practices of public commemoration throughout 
South Africa remain overwhelmingly male-dominated, and secondly that the 
few commemorative initiatives in honour of women, notably the National 
Monument for the Women of South Africa, promote a specific gender 
discourse in which women’s achievements and contributions are 
appropriated for wider societal and political goals and women’s identity is 
placed in the service of a particular vision of national identity.  
In its interrogation of questions relating to national identity this chapter 
follows on from the previous chapter’s investigation of the Freedom Park 
project. If the Freedom Park must in part be understood as a counterpart to 
the VTM, the new national Women’s Monument in Pretoria must be 
considered against the foil of the old National Women’s Monument, the 
Nasionale Vrouemonument, which Afrikaner Nationalists built on the out-
skirts of Bloemfontein almost 100 years earlier. Countering the 
exclusiveness of the old Women’s monument, the post-apartheid initiative 
intends to truly honour the epithet ‘national’ by commemorating the 
contribution of all women, irrespective of race, class, culture or political 
association. This chapter critically investigates how ‘different’ (in 
ideological and artistic terms) the new Women’s Monument really is. More 
precisely, I want to investigate to what extent this monument perpetuates or 
diverts from entrenched patterns of gendered memorialisation, what this 
monument can be thought to say about women and their role within the 
nation, how the monument might encourage new models of gendered 
identification, and also what new limitations, gender stereotypes and 
categories of exclusion it might be seen to create. 
Historical background of the 1956 Women’s March 
The 1952 Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act 
mentioned in Chapter Three stipulated that African women, who had until 
then largely been exempted from permit requirements, would also be forced 
to carry reference books at an unspecified future date. The government 
indeed began issuing permits to women in 1954 and reference books from 
1956, starting in the Western Cape and soon extending throughout the 
Union. Protests against the Native Laws Amendment Act followed imme-
diately, notably with the demonstration conducted by hundreds of African 
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men and women in Langa township outside Cape Town on 4 January 1953. 
The ANC Women’s League played a key role in organising the first non-
racial National Conference of Women, which took place in Johannesburg in 
April 1954 and led to the foundation of the non-racial Federation of South 
African Women, composed mostly of affiliated women’s groups, political 
organisations and trade unions (Schmidt undated: 2-4). 
The conference also led to the adoption of the ‘Women’s Charter’, a 
progressive emancipation document calling for the enfranchisement of men 
and women of all races and the removal of all laws and customs that denied 
women equality of opportunity in employment, equal pay for equal work, 
equal rights to property, marriage and children, etc. The charter, which was 
ultimately incorporated into the Freedom Charter adopted by the Congress of 
the People in Kliptown, concluded: 
We shall teach the men that they cannot hope to liberate themselves from the 
evils of discrimination and prejudice as long as they fail to extend to women 
complete and unqualified equality in law and practice … freedom cannot be won 
for any one section or for the people as a whole as long as we women are kept in 
bondage (quoted in Schmidt undated: 4).  
In succeeding years the Federation in conjunction with the ANC Women’s 
League focused on protesting the extension of pass laws to women, which 
they perceived as the ultimate symbol of their oppression. Passes would 
confine women and their children to the rural areas. Families would be torn 
apart when passes made it impossible for women to join their migrant labour 
husbands in the urban areas. Passes would prohibit women from pursueing 
income-generating opportunities in town to supplement their family’s 
insufficient livelihood gained from subsistence farming on increasingly 
exhausted or inferior agricultural land. Mostly, women were concerned 
about their children and who would take care of them if both parents were 
arrested and detained for pass law offences (Schmidt undated; Towards a 
Monument for the Women of South Africa undated: 3-5).  
Demonstrations outside government offices were organised in towns and 
cities around the country. The first national protest took place on 27 October 
1955, when 2000 women of all races marched on the Union Buildings in 
Pretoria. Many women belonged to the newly founded Black Sash, which 
had been organised as the ‘Women’s Defence of the Constitutional League’ 
in protest against the unconstitutional election of Senators in preparation for 
the National Party’s intended disenfranchisement of Cape ‘coloured’ voters. 
When Dr Verword, then Minister of Native Affairs, refused to receive a 
multiracial delegation, the women handed over a petition protesting a variety 
of apartheid laws to Ben Schoeman, then Minister of Transport. The 
marchers camped in the grounds of the Union Buildings for two nights 
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before ending their campaign in Johannesburg (Schmidt undated: 4-5, 7-11; 
Rogers 1956). 
In August of the following year, the Federation and the ANC Women’s 
League organised a similar but much larger demonstration, focused 
exclusively on the pass laws. Approximately 20 000 women from all over 
the country, representing all racial groups, assembled in the grounds of the 
Union Buildings. A delegation of nine spokeswomen, led by Helen Joseph 
(1905-92), Rahima Moosa (1922-93), Lilian Ngoyi (1911-79) and Sophie 
Williams (b. 1938) went into the Union Buildings with the intention to meet 
with Prime Minister Strijdom, who had however been notified of the 
women’s plans and clandestinely vacated the building. The women then left 
bundles of petitions with more then 100 000 signatures at the Prime 
Minster’s door. This was followed by a 30-minute silence and then the 
singing of freedom songs, including ‘Wathint’ abafazi …’, which had been 
composed specifically for the occasion by Durban-based activist Florence 
Mkhize (Schmidt undated: 5; Towards a Monument for the Women of South 
Africa undated).  
Although the women were not successful in achieving the desired repeal 
of the pass laws, the 1956 march is considered a mile-stone in the history of 
the anti-apartheid struggle. Due to traditional male attitudes towards the role 
of women in society, few men were prepared for the women’s militancy and 
their ability to organise a campaign of this magnitude. In fact, the husbands 
of some of those very same women now honoured for their courageous 
protest may well have objected to their wives’ participation in the march 
(Brooks 2003). The leadership of the ANC and the South African Congress 
of Trade Unions (SACTU) paid tribute to the women’s contribution and 
called upon men to respect women as equal participants in the liberation 
movement (Schmidt undated: 6). Although this strong official support for the 
women’s efforts and their goals of achieving gender equality has remained 
an ambiguous and incomplete project to the present day, the post-apartheid 
government’s initiative to establish a monument to the 1956 march and 
women’s contribution to the anti-apartheid struggle can be understood as a 
culmination of this process of paying tribute. Before considering the genesis 
of the Monument to the Women of South Africa, I want to briefly discuss the 
old national women’s monument, the Afrikaner Nationalist Vrouemonument 
in Bloemfontein, which must be taken into account as a conscious or 
unconscious reference point for the initiators and the designers of the new 
national women’s monument in Pretoria. 
Nasionale Vrouemonument in Bloemfontein 
Issues of gender and national iconography have become areas of increasing 
interest in studies of statuary and public monuments in recent years. 
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Although in many societies women served as the keepers of memory, the 
genre of official commemoration through public monuments was historically 
a male reserve. Gillis (1994: 10) observed that women, as well as members 
of ethnic minorities, often served as symbols of a ‘lost’ past, nostalgically 
perceived and romantically constructed, while their real lives were largely 
forgotten. The female body has extensively been used for allegorical 
representations, especially in ambitious national monuments, but women 
rarely appear as political or cultural leaders in public statuary (Johnson 1995: 
57). Where conventional monuments are indeed dedicated to women, they 
usually follow a collective rather than individual mode of commemoration 
and such tributes tend to be stereotypically gendered in a process that is 
often connected with nation-building. Women’s contributions are 
remembered largely in terms of sacrifice, a traditional female role (Gillis 
1994: 12; McDowell 2008).  
 
 
Photo 8.1 Nasionale Vrouemonument, Bloemfontein, unveiled in 1913.  
The 1913 Nasionale Vrouemonument in Bloemfontein, designed to 
commemorate the approximately 26 000 women and children who suffered 
and died in British concentration camps during the South African Anglo-
Boer War, is a classic example of this trend. Initiated in 1906 by the former 
Orange Free State President M.T. Steyn, the project was strongly supported 
by Emily Hobhouse, who had become a close ally of the Afrikaners due to 
her relentless efforts at bringing the plight of the Afrikaner women to the 
attention of the British. The main monument, consisting of a tall obelisk with 
a sculptural group and two relief plaques made by Anton van Wouw, was 
officially unveiled on 16 December 1913, but the commemorative precinct 
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evolved further during the following decades. The graves of three prominent 
men and two women were added from 1916-1955,1 a museum was built and 
three more bronze sculptural groups – designed by Danie de Jager – were 
erected on the expansive grounds between 1983 and 1994. 
As the monument complex stands today, all elements are carefully placed 
along a pre-determined path, describing for the visitor a journey through 
history. The story begins with an equestrian statue (unveiled in 1986) 
entitled ‘Afskeid (Farewell) 11-10-1899’, showing an energetic Boer on 
horseback bidding farewell to his wife and child on the eve of the war. The 
visitor then walks towards the obelisk and graves along a via dolorosa lined 
with plaques that specify the number of women who died in different 
concentration camps. Next in line is the bronze group Die Banneling (Exile), 
unveiled in 1983, which extends the theme of Boer suffering in British 
concentration camps to include men, namely prisoners of war in different 
camps around the world. The path terminates further up the hill at Die 
Bittereinder 31/5/1902 (unveiled on 31/5/1994), showing the Boer 
protagonist again, now exhausted, gaunt and dressed in rags, his horse 
emaciated, but having fought to the bitter end. Visitors can then proceed to 
the museum, which places the suffering of the women into the larger 
historical context of the South African Anglo-Boer war.  
Any visitor will quickly notice that the Vrouemonument, especially when 
including the museum and the three sculptural groups, is really more about 
men’s than about women’s experiences. Elsie Cloete’s (1992) analysis of the 
language and contents found in the commemorative publications on the 
monument finds that throughout the decades the National Women’s Monu-
ment served as an opportunity for Afrikaner men to make statements about 
women, defining and confining their role in Afrikaner society. A similar 
trend can be observed in the variegated aesthetic elements of the monument 
itself, in which women’s experiences are framed and women’s identities 
stereotyped in ways that support larger ideologically-charged readings of the 
Anglo-Boer war and associated visions of the Afrikaner ‘nation’. Although 
Grundlingh (2000) insists that such an interpretation is coloured by the role 
the monument played in Afrikaner Nationalist discourses only much later, 
the visual and textual messages of the monument speak for themselves. 
The relief plaques at the base of the obelisk, depicting emotional scenes 
of women’s suffering in the camps, represent women as passive victims and 
martyrs, but also celebrate their resilience. In the large sculptural group in 
the centre, a seated woman with bare feet and a look of sadness, despair and 
exhaustion on her face embraces a dead child in her lap in evocation of the 
lamenting Mary holding the deceased Son of God. The implied ‘message’ of 
                                                     
1  According to van Tonder (1961), the burials occurred as follows: 1916 President 
Marthinus Theunis Steyn; 1922 General Christiaan Rudolf de Wet; 1926 Emily 
Hobhouse; 1941 Dr J.D. Kestell; 1955 Rachel Isabella Steyn. 
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this sculpture with its carefully calculated religious overtones and Christian 
iconographic references is one of suffering and martyrdom, but also ultimate 
triumph. The standing woman next to her, upright and ‘properly’ dressed in 
Voortrekker clothes, including the ‘kappie’ or bonnet, which soon became 
the standard signifier of the traditional Afrikaner woman, speaks of women’s 
determination to survive for the sake of the volk. This sculpture is considered 
one of the earliest examples of visually representing the Afrikaner ideology 
of the volksmoeder, which emerged during the early 20th century and 
associates women with the domestic sphere and particularly with child 
rearing – not only as mothers to their own children, but as mothers of the 
nation (van der Watt 1996).2 The volksmoeder ideal was later articulated and 
reinforced in other public monuments, most notably in Van Wouw’s own 
later work at the foot of the VTM. 
The Women’s Monument does not commemorate named individuals but 
the collective suffering and victimisation of all women, and by extension the 
Afrikaner volk as a whole. As it is a national monument, it was felt that 
differences in terms of class, economic welfare, politics and religion must be 
transcended (Cloete 1992: 1). Instead, the women’s experiences are uni-
versalised and the women themselves are reduced to types, each closely 
allied with a functional role within the nation. Van Tonder (1961: 117) 
describes the Women’s Monument as ‘the most touching volksmonument in 
our country, a shrine for the Afrikaners’. The conceptualisation and imple-
mentation was hence a highly exclusive affair. Firstly, Steyn explicitly did 
not want the British to have any representation in the project. Secondly, it 
did not occur to anyone to involve or represent those many ‘coloured’ and 
black women who had also suffered in British concentration camps. 
Historical background of the Pretoria monument initiative 
In comparison with the exclusive and male-dominated process of 
establishing the Bloemfontein monument, the Pretoria project appears to 
have been marked by inclusiveness and transparency. An open design 
competition was held at the end of 1999, which drew over sixty entries from 
a variety of artists and architects, male and female, black and white. Before 
the competition a process of consultation with several women’s 
organisations (the Gender Commission, the ANC Women’s League, etc.) 
took place and workshops were run with mostly women artists to help 
                                                     
2  The volksmoeder, as an ideal vision of Afrikaner womanhood, was to a certain 
extent paradoxical. ‘[It] allowed women to be both active (like the courageous 
Voortrekker woman) and passive (like the silent victims of the concentration 
camps) as long as they acted in the domestic sphere or took up tasks associated 
with what were considered to be traditional feminine qualities – like the 
nurturing aspect of welfare work’ (van der Watt 1996: 54).  
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participants with little experience in public art projects. The jury, selected by 
the Deputy Minister of the DACST, Brigitte Mabandla, consisted of a 
racially diverse group of members, most of whom were women.3 The 
selected winning entry was created by a male architect, Marcus Holmes, and 
a female sculptor, Wilma Cruise (Callinicos, personal communication 2004; 
Coombes 2003). 
Initially, however, the DACST did not envisage organising a design 
competition, but intended to simply appoint an artist or artistic team. Jane 
Alexander and Noria Mabaso were identified as most appropriate for the task 
and the artists were requested to complete a working model in time for 9 
August 1998. The monument itself was meant to be unveiled in August 
1999. While Alexander asked permission to join the project team at a later 
stage due to prior commitments, Mabaso had in fact been commissioned to 
develop a sculpture on the theme of ‘Wathinta abafazi wathinta imbhokodo, 
uzokufa’ (sic).4 It is not clear precisely what led to the delay in the proposed 
implementation schedule and the decision to open up the opportunity for 
wider participation in this symbolic tribute, but one factor may have been the 
wider debate emerging within the government at the time around the need to 
re-interpret the Union Buildings as the seat of the nation’s executive powers. 
Union Buildings was designed to celebrate the achievement of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910 after years of strife, civil war and division amongst the 
settler population. But the reconciliation that took place in order to achieve this 
union excluded the majority of the population of South Africa, the blacks. The 
vision of the new state of that time was therefore narrow, racist and elitist. 
Clearly, the site will need to be reinterpreted in order to celebrate our newly 
democratic, inclusive state – in contrast to the older order – and to find a way of 
acknowledging the struggles that took place in order to achieve this.5  
In a memorandum dated 14 September 1999 the DACST sought approval 
from Cabinet to implement the relocation, re-contextualisation and/or 
replacement of artworks, visual symbols and memorials at the Union 
Buildings. Moreover, a visitor exhibition, information and tourist centre was 
to be established ‘to create a new identity appropriate to recent political 
changes and to represent the inclusive identity and ethos of the new 
                                                     
3  Adjudicators were Luli Callinicos, Bertha Gxowa, Rayda Becker, Bongi 
Dhlomo, David Brown, Patti MacDonald and Nazeem Mahetey (Mabandla 
2000). 
4  Progress Report: Women’s Monument Legacy Project. DG to the Minister, 
Undated, DAC, Women’s Monument, Vol. 2, file 6/16/9. 
5  Towards a monument for the women of South Africa (project briefing docu-
ment), Undated, DAC, Women’s Memorial, Vol. 4, file 6/16/9: 7. 
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democracy’.6 While the memorandum proposed that some of the existing 
artworks should be relocated and exhibited to the public in an appropriate 
venue, in future possibly the planned ‘Apartheid museum’ at Freedom Park, 
the removal or relocation of the plethora of exterior monuments and statues 
was deemed ‘neither practicable nor desirable’.7  
 
 
Photo 8.2 Central part of the Union Buildings in Pretoria with vestibule and 
amphitheatre. 
Instead it was suggested that the current imbalances in the commemoration 
of leaders and events in the grounds of the Union Buildings should be 
addressed ‘in a symbolic and cost-effective way’ (ibid.). Although the Task 
Team suggested that a statue of Nelson Mandela be commissioned and 
installed on the spot where he was inaugurated as president,8 a proposal that 
was never implemented, it is obvious that the National Monument to the 
Women of South Africa was the ideal (and especially ‘cost-effective’) 
solution to symbolically recoding the Union Buildings. The rededication was 
to be undertaken in three stages. Firstly, ‘a new name should be ascribed to 
the site which will honour the women of South Africa’. This was accom-
plished on 9 August 1998, when the amphitheatre was renamed Malibongwe 
Embokodweni (‘the place of the women’). Secondly, the competition for the 
                                                     
6  Shaping a new identity for the Union Buildings, Pretoria. Cabinet Memorandum, 
14 September 1999, DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 4, file 6/16/7. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid. 
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design of the Women’s Monument would be announced. And thirdly, the 
winning design would be implemented.9 
Countering the Vrouemonument  
The winning artists assert that their first and foremost concern was the 
creation of a work that would be conceptually and aesthetically different 
from the Eurocentric convention of commemorative public monuments in 
South Africa.10 This tradition was epitomised in their view by the VTM, the 
icon of conservative, white, patriarchal Afrikaner culture, which is within the 
sight line of the Union Buildings. In contrast with the tradition of individual 
hero worship so common in older monuments, the objective of the National 
Monument for the Women of South Africa was to celebrate the democratic, 
collaborative and communal nature of the event and the ordinariness of its 
actors. While both the VTM and the Bloemfontein Women’s Monument are 
bold, dominant constructions designed to command the surrounding 
landscape, the Pretoria Women’s Monument is as unobtrusive as possible. It 
is conceptualised as fitting deferentially into an existing space – the vestibule 
in the centre of the Union Buildings, where the women had congregated to 
hand over their petition – taking care not to disturb the acknowledged quality 
of this architectural master-piece by Herbert Baker.  
Instead of erecting a structure or creating a sculpture, the National 
Monument for the Women of South Africa utilises a rather small and humble 
‘found object’ as its centre-piece, namely a grinding stone or imbokodo, 
which is unpretentiously placed on the floor of the vestibule. As a symbol of 
nurture and reproduction, an icon of women’s culture, the imbokodo is an 
object used by women in every traditional African homestead to grind the 
maize, its anti-heroic stance stressing the ordinariness of the women to be 
honoured here. It also refers to the monument’s title, ‘Wathint’ Abafazi 
Wathint’ Imbokodo’ – ‘Strike the Woman Strike the Rock’ – derived from 
the song the women were chanting during the protest and serving as a 
                                                     
9  Towards a monument for the women of South Africa (project briefing 
document), Undated, DAC, Women’s Memorial, Vol. 4, file 6/16/9. 
10  This is also expressed in the team’s own report of the project: ‘We felt that 
whatever was done had to reflect that particular ability of women to organise 
democratically and communally. From the start we were clear as to what the 
monument would not be. It would not be a man-(or woman)-on-a-horse-on-a-
pedestal in the heroic (some would say fascist) mould. That sort of monument 
would nor suit the project conceptually, neither would it formally fit the 
indicated site in the vestibule of the Union Buildings’ (Cruise and Holmes 2000: 
32). 
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metaphor of women’s resilience.11 Highly symbolic and meaningful to the 
event, as a visual object the grinding stone is also easily accessible and anti-
elitist.12 Its being placed in the vestibule, the very centre of the Union 
Buildings, this once white, male political preserve, adds to its significance, 
making a bold statement about women’s equality (Becker 2000). 
 
 
Photo 8.3 National Monument for the Women of South Africa, Pretoria.Stairs 
with petition text. Photographed in 2002. 
                                                     
11  An interesting linguistic analysis of the translation of this motto has been 
conducted by Mdululi (1997). While the rock is also a symbol of solidity and 
unity, Mdululi highlights that the essential theme here is the petrification of the 
male hero in front of, or caused by, a woman’s body. Mdululi points out 
similarities with Irish myths and concludes (perhaps a bit rashly) that this is 
indeed a universal theme. Callinicos (personal e-mail communication 2004) 
furthermore points out that the word ‘rock’ is a rather inadequate translation for 
the grinding stone that the song refers to. The power of the imbokodo (which 
consists of both the stone and the receptacle) lies in the fact that ‘it has the 
power, over time and with skill, to crush, as the women warned the Prime 
Minister’ (ibid.). 
12  ‘The panel [of adjudicators] was of the opinion that the sculptural meaning of the 
centrepiece would be immediately understood by the public. The simplicity of 
the imbokodo, its traditional function and association with the nurturing role of 
women, particularly in the rural areas where it continues to be used daily, all 
combine to convey a direct and evocative message’. Findings of the 
Adjudication Panel for the Competition for the Monument to the Women of 
South Africa. DAC, Women’s Monument, Vol. 12, file 6/16/9.  
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The conceptual accessibility of the centre-piece is backed up by an audio 
component, whereby the line ‘Strike the Woman Strike the Rock’ is repeated 
in all eleven official languages ‘as if’, according to the artists, ‘the women 
are whispering down the tunnel of history’ (Cruise and Holmes 2000: 33; 
Cruise undated). The sound component is an unusual and unexpected aspect 
of the monument, which can be interpreted as alluding to the predominance 
of orality in African traditional culture and challenges the conventional 
predominance of the visual sense and the (voyeuristic) gaze, much in line 
with current trends in contemporary art production. It also serves as another 
device of inclusive identification, as it ‘addresses’ diverse audiences in their 
mother tongue. The text of the petition handed over by the women is 
mounted in metal block letters onto the steps of the grand flight of stairs 
leading up to the vestibule. 
 
 
Photo 8.4 National Monument for the Women of South Africa, Pretoria, 
imbokodo, photographed in 2002. 
Although the artists themselves never explicitly made this reference, I argue 
that the Monument to the Women of South Africa is an inclusive, post-
apartheid response to the exclusive Nasionale Vrouemonument (as well as 
the VTM and other Afrikaner Nationalist monuments), whose dominant 
visual signifiers it inverts. If the tall obelisk of the Bloemfontein monument, 
which Cloete (1992: 8) called ‘the transcendental signifier of a phallocentric 
volks-metaphysic’, can be interpreted as a male symbol, the grinding stone 
in Pretoria is a female symbol, a receptacle. Being small and placed on the 
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ground, it appears submissive, unobtrusive and unpretentious, just as the 
obelisk is ostentatious, domineering, commanding attention and power.13 
Yet the emphasis on ‘difference’ camouflages many discursive simila-
rities between the Nasionale Vrouemonument and the Monument for the 
Women of South Africa. For instance, both commemorate women 
collectively, in a societal context dominated by public monuments dedicated 
to named male individuals. Both monuments praise women’s virtues and 
contribution to the nation as defined by the socio-political values of the 
current order: in Bloemfontein as resilient mothers, in Pretoria as active 
participants and indeed initiators of resistance campaigns. The jury lauded 
the winning design for the way in which it celebrates ‘the agency of women, 
as evidenced by their courageous initiative in 1956’ (Callinicos, Jury report 
2000). In fact, many artists participating in the design competition focused 
precisely on this aspect, producing dynamic images of women with their 
arms raised, recalling the tired vocabulary of the heroic socialist monument 
tradition. One of the most outrageous entries (in my opinion) consisted of a 
realistically rendered nude female torso with broad hips topped by a 
disproportionately large clenched fist in lieu of a head.14 
Inclusions/exclusions 
Newspaper reports largely praised the Women’s Monument, hailing it as ‘the 
first of its kind in the country, and the first for all women’. Luli Callinicos, 
one of the competition judges, was quoted as saying that the monument was 
dedicated ‘to all women in civil society’ (Regchand 2000).15 Indeed the 
competition briefing document specified that the new monument should 
become a tribute to ‘the women of South Africa’ and Rayda Becker, another 
competition judge, explained with reference to the competition entry form 
that the site acknowledges ‘all the women of South Africa, black, brown and 
white’ (Becker 2000: 1). However, being a national heritage project and 
integrally linked with the post-apartheid foundation myth, the Pretoria 
Women’s Monument certainly does not represent ‘all women’, but all 
women who resisted apartheid and played a role in the meta-narrative of the 
struggle for liberation.  
Mirroring the exclusion of black women from representation in the 
Nasionale Vrouemonument, and in fact from the ‘nation’, the new 
Monument for the Women of South Africa implicitly excludes a 
considerable section of the (white) female population, namely all of those 
                                                     
13  See Luli Callinicos’ comment in note 10. The ‘rock’ component, loosely placed 
inside the shallow bowl, was missing when I first visited the monument in 2003.  
14  Some of the competition entries were published in Beeld, see Fourie (2000). 
15  Newspaper coverage of this monument includes Anonymous 2000; Rohan 2000; 
Fourie 2000; and Regchand 2000. 
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who actively supported the Nationalists, those who tacitly approved of racial 
discrimination, or those who didn’t condone apartheid but quietly enjoyed 
the personal privileges that the system reserved for them. As in the case of 
Freedom Park and other components of the National Legacy Project, these 
women are, however, invited to identify with the monument. By 
acknowledging and sympathising – even if only retrospectively – with the 
celebrated ‘mothers of the nation’ and the noble cause of their courageous 
protest, the monument offers all women (and men) a chance to share in the 
new narrative of the nation.  
While the cited exclusions are obviously justified and necessary to make 
the National Monument for the Women of South Africa meaningful as a 
tribute to the many courageous women who made sacrifices and took 
personal risks to resist oppressive apartheid legislation, other types of 
exclusions are more problematic. Despite aiming at accessibility and anti-
elitism, the monument is arguably quite restricted in its visual language and 
symbolism. For instance, the grinding stone is a reference solely to African 
culture and does not do justice to the remarkable show of unity between 
women of all racial backgrounds that characterised this historical event. 
Some critics also felt that the traditional, rural associations of grinding 
stones were limiting and did not represent the advances made by women 
since 1956 (Becker 2000: 8). The emphasis placed on the text component – 
not merely an inscription, but an integral part of the monument – excludes 
many of those very same people, whose mothers or grandmothers the 
monument is meant to honour. At the inauguration, a number of women 
criticised the monument’s lack of monumentality, suggesting that they either 
did not understand or appreciate the point about the work’s intimacy of scale 
and deliberately understated nature (Coombes 2003: 108).  
In comparison with the stunning computer-generated photographic 
impression of the model16 published in the architectural magazine SA 
Architect (Cruise and Holmes 2000), the visual experience of the National 
Monument for the Women of South Africa is highly disappointing. In plain 
daylight the stone is nothing more than a simple, ordinary object – 
unglamorous and hardly noticeable. It was immediately ridiculed by the 
media for its inconspicuousness and its iconographic references.17 As 
                                                     
16  The DACST had contracted the CSIR to design a computer-generated, three-
dimensional model of the competition entries set in the designated space 
(Anonymous 2000f). This was meant to assist adjudicators in their decision 
making process, but in the case of the winning design, it may actually have 
misled the jury.  
17  E.g. Bristow-Bovey (2000): ‘The dignitaries all trooped by to inspect the 
monument. I was eager to see it myself. Then I realized that I had been looking 
at it for 10 minutes without recognising it. It was a stone bowl on the floor. 
Inside the stone bowl was a rounded rock. An unsuspecting pilgrim looking for a 
monument might bark his shin on it and still be none the wiser. … I am not a 
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Callinicos concedes, the jury may not have realised that the item is perhaps 
too small-scale in relation to the vestibule space to have the desired impact 
(personal communication 2004).18 At the time of my first visit, it was 
furthermore soiled by the droppings of pigeons that nested in the 
loudspeakers above, and invited usage as an ashtray or rubbish bin. The 
sound component was soon turned off following complaints by office staff. 
‘It is nothing short of a disgrace’, lamented Wilma Cruise (personal 
communication 2003).  
Worst of all, although the site chosen for the monument is most apt in 
terms of the historical event it commemorates and can be considered a place 
of honour,19 it effectively precludes the monument from public accessibility 
since the introduction of new security measures shortly after its unveiling. 
Poor communication between the DACST and the Department of Public 
Works, which is in charge of the management of the Union Buildings, 
including the security arrangements, led to an embarrassing impasse in 
February 2000. Only days before the official announcement of the winners 
of the competition, initially scheduled for 29 February, DACST officials 
were informed that the site of the National Monument for the Women of 
South Africa and the project to shape a new identity for the Union Buildings 
was completely impractical in terms of security measures, which had already 
                                                                                                                            
woman, so I am possibly not qualified to speak, but I was a little surprised that 
the women’s monument is, in fact, a monument to making supper. The 
functionary [of the department of arts and culture] explained that making supper 
is symbolic of throwing off the shackles of the oppressor, among many other 
things, but the fact remains that the women of South Africa are being celebrated 
by a stone-age food processor. What will the next monument be? A frying pan? 
A broom?’ 
18  The report of the adjudication panel states: ‘The size and elevation of the central 
feature of the monument, the imbokodo should be further investigated with the 
view to its optimal elevation and display within the vestibule. Should a larger 
than normal size be decided on, this may necessitate a commissioned piece by a 
rural woman artist rather than a found object as suggested in the proposal’. 
Findings of the Adjudication Panel for the Competition for the Monument to the 
Women of South Africa. DAC, Women’s Monument, Vol12, file 6/16/9. Cruise 
recalls having officially been requested to raise the imbokodo before its 
installation, but she refused as this ran counter to her artistic intentions. In 2006 
she was again asked to raise and encase the monument, as well as possibly add a 
figurative element, but the artist firmly stood her ground (Younge and Cruise 
2008). 
19  ‘… it is appropriate to locate a national monument to women at the core of the 
democratically elected government’s buildings, and so place our women in a 
central place of acknowledgement’. Towards a monument for the women of 
South Africa (project briefing document). Undated, DAC, Women’s Memorial, 
Vol. 4, file 6/16/9: 6.  
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been planned for some time and were now going to be implemented.20 The 
DACST nevertheless proceeded with its plan to place the Women’s 
Monument in what was then declared a high security area. It was agreed that 
the monument could be visited under conditions of controlled access, but in 
practice this model has clearly failed. Unless security clearance is obtained 
prior to the visit, tourists, the general public and even the very women whom 
this monument is dedicated to are effectively excluded from viewing it.21 
Despite the artists’ good intentions, the Monument for the Women of 
South Africa ultimately strikes me as overly academic, rational, dry and 
‘belaboured’ in its eagerness to be different. Made by an academically-
trained female artist and an established architect, it is too obviously a 
textbook-like application of all of the basic tenets of post-structuralist theory, 
postmodernism and postcolonial discourses. One can also criticise the 
winning entry as a patronising attempt, emanating from privileged spaces, to 
speak on behalf of those less advantaged, whose voices remain silent. This is 
highlighted by comparison with some of the other competition entries, most 
notably the highly inclusive proposal by Andrew Lindsay.  
Lindsay’s competition entry envisaged working with as many women as 
possible, especially from rural areas and otherwise marginalised commu-
nities, who were to interpret the protest march in any medium, including 
mosaic, sculpture and even poetry. The best pieces would have been 
installed in the park in front of the Union Buildings – resembling a journey 
with stopping points, analogous to the journey the women took in 1956. As 
the intention was to make as many voices heard as possible in order for the 
work to become truly democratic, even some of the other competition entries 
could easily have been incorporated (Lindsay, personal conversation 2002). 
The jury indeed liked this proposal and recommended its implementation in 
the park in addition to the winning monument design for the vestibule, 
perhaps at a later date (Jury report 2000). Unfortunately, the DACST never 
followed up on this recommendation.22  
                                                     
20  Legacy Projects: Women’s Monument and the Shaping of a New Identity for the 
Union Buildings. Letter to Director-General by Officers concerned. Undated. 
DAC. Women’s Monument, Vol.7, file 6/16/9. 
21  At the time of the competition, the site was still generally accessible. Yet due to 
security concerns, the entire area was closed off shortly afterwards. Although 
visitors should theoretically be granted access after having identified themselves 
at the security gate, I personally encountered great difficulties when trying to 
visit the monument for the first time. A more recent attempt to visit failed 
completely when the person in charge of granting permission was on leave for 
the day. It can be assumed that visitors arriving in large groups will have even 
greater problems. Certainly, lack of knowledge about what procedures are 
required to gain access functions as a deterrent from visiting the monument. 
22  The panel of adjudicators also recommended that entry No 28, submitted by 
Anton Roodt, should be considered by the DACST as an additional companion 
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Under-representation of women’s contributions 
If one considers the Horse Monument in Port Elizabeth, the Police Dog 
Monument in Durban, and the Uppington Monument installed in honour of 
camels, one may get the impression that South Africans historically 
considered animals more worthy of public commemoration than women. 
Indeed, apart from statues of Queen Victoria, which are emblems of empire 
rather than public reminders of an extraordinary woman, virtually all public 
statuary in South Africa (as in other countries) represents male leaders. 
Among the few exceptions are statues of the remarkable wives of those 
leaders, notably Maria de la Queillerie, wife of Jan van Riebeck in Cape 
Town and, in Potchefstroom, Magdalena Retief, wife of the Voortrekker 
leader Piet Retief.23  
If this public landscape of memorialisation historically shaped by men 
around the memory of men was a symbolic manifestation of a patriarchal 
society, the post-apartheid state’s commitment to a society based on 
principles of gender equality should impact on the reshaping of the symbolic 
landscape. However, the vast majority of statues and portrait busts, 
memorials and monuments erected throughout the country remain dedicated 
to male political activists or resistance leaders. This raises the suspicion that 
the Pretoria Women’s Monument is primarily a patronising token gesture 
intended to ‘cover’ women’s contributions and implicitly exonerating those 
who promote gender-exclusive monument initiatives and masculine value 
systems.  
As stated earlier, the new South African Constitution, one of the world’s 
most liberal and progressive, places strong emphasis on gender equality. The 
ruling party has a historical and current commitment to women’s equality 
and various high-ranking political officials regularly speaking up on behalf 
of women’s rights. President Thabo Mbeki himself publicly acknowledged 
the need to pay tribute ‘to our mothers, sisters and daughters who were and 
                                                                                                                            
piece to the winning entry. It was recommended that Roodt rework the proposal 
for implementation at Strijdom Square, where it would have served to 
recontextualise the existing apartheid-era Strijdom monument. As the latter 
collapsed soon after – as mentioned in Chapter Five – nothing came of this 
recommendation. Women’s Monument Project: Ratification of the adjudicators’ 
recommendation’. Letter DG to Deputy Minister, 28 February 2000. DAC 
Women’s Monument, Vol.6, file 6/16/9; Findings of the Adjudication Panel for 
the Competition for the Monument to the Women of South Africa. DAC, 
Women’s Monument, Vol.12, file 6/16/9.  
23  Other examples include a simple monument in front of the N.G. church in 
Rouxville commemorating the Voortrekker heroine, Johanna van der Merwe 
(Nienaber and le Roux 1982), a statue of Nurse Henrietta Stockdale in Kimber-
ley, and a statue of a generic female teacher at a teacher training college in 
Pretoria.  
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are equal combatants for the all-round liberation of all our people’ (Rohan 
2000).24 But in reality South African society remains conservative and 
imbued with patriarchal values – among both the black and the white sectors 
of the population. Indeed, on the occasion of the official announcement of 
the competition winner in March 2000, the Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, 
Science and Technology, Brigitte Mabandla, acknowledged on behalf of the 
government that the ‘struggle for the emancipation of women still remains a 
great challenge’ and that the new monument ‘should serve not only as a 
celebration of our women folk’s contribution, but it must always be a 
reminder of the challenges that we face in advancing our agenda of women’s 
emancipation’ (Mabandla 2000). 
Despite much official talk to the contrary, contemporary South African 
society as a whole and black African society in particular are still based on 
patriarchal value systems and attached to stereotypical gender roles. These 
are often deeply rooted in African traditionalism and were carried over 
(albeit modified) into Black Consciousness ideology and African 
nationalism. As Chipkin (2007: 119) explains, when Steve Biko called the 
‘black man’ to action, ‘man’ is not meant to be a synonym for human 
being.25 Women could simply not be imagined or taken seriously as political 
activists. 
Despite this attitude, the South African anti-apartheid struggle was in fact 
distinguished by the high level of involvement of women in comparison with 
liberation wars in other countries, especially on the African continent. Yet 
the under-representation and even erasure of women’s contributions to the 
struggle can be found in a variety of forums and media – for instance in 
murals (Khan 2003), in films (Tomaselli 1996),26 or even in the TRC 
                                                     
24  He singled out stalwart women activists such as Dora Tamana, Lilian Ngoyi, 
Helen Joseph, Mary Moodley, Dorothy Nyembe, Ida Mntwana, Ray Alexander, 
Florence Mophosho, Ruth First and Albertina Sisulu (Rohan 2000). 
25  ‘Let us note that the frequent masculine injunctive “men” in Biko’s writings, 
above, is not just stylistic. “Man” is not a synonym for human being and a “black 
man” does not just signify a black human being. When Biko calls the “black 
man” to action, that is exactly what he means. In treating black alienation as an 
affair of white racism, or in Fanon’s terms, the “white gaze”, neither Biko nor 
Fanon take seriously or, for that matter, can take seriously the black woman. She 
is not simply produced and reproduced through a white gaze. She is 
overdetermined through a male gaze too. By making freedom, therefore, 
contingent on the dissolution of the white gaze, Black Consciousness (and 
Fanon’s “Third Worldism”) forsakes the woman to patriarchy. Indeed, Biko goes 
one step further. In returning to a “pure African culture” does he not, indeed, 
valorize patriarchy as a condition of freedom?’ (Chipkin 2007: 119). 
26  Coombes (2003: 106) notes that the lack of acknowledgement of women’s 
contributions to the liberation struggle has often struck her. She mentions the 
example of a planned film series, Women in the Struggle (directed by Barry 
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hearings as mentioned earlier (McEwan in Lester 2003; Ross, F. 2008).27 
The trend is not unique to South Africa. In the African-American context, 
scholars frequently criticise the marginalisation of women in past and 
current discourses relating to black emancipation. James (1999) points out 
that male activists tend to receive public recognition for their speeches, 
deeds and sometimes militant action in the African-American experience of 
the struggle for emancipation and liberation, while female activists, who are 
often more focused on social programmes, rarely become icons and tend 
rather to be viewed as appendages to male initiatives and endeavours. 
Unsurprisingly the memorialisation of the Civil Rights movement in the 
United States is developed around the ‘Great Man’ paradigm of history, in 
which women hardly feature (Dwyer 2006; Romano and Raiford 2006).  
Cloete (1992: 5) argues that the Nasionale Vrouemonument turns women 
into a muted group – ‘muted by the internalisation of the language used to 
describe them’, which focuses on their mental and physical frailty. Although 
the Pretoria Monument celebrates women, on the contrary, precisely for their 
agency and robustness, I argue that in a different way it also mutes women, 
because they now have been spoken for. The National Women’s Monument 
functions, as Spivak and Gunew expressed it in a different context, as a 
‘secure alibi’ to show that ‘we have covered that’ (quoted in During 1993: 
195). Being classified as a project of national significance, the Monument 
for the Women of South Africa becomes a convenient excuse for the under-
representation of women in local level commemorative tributes – as I have 
personally experienced in interviews and informal conversations with male 
political officials and community leaders. 
Criteria for heroism 
It is also striking to note how male-dominated many monument committees 
appear to be and how in that way past gender bias is invariably replicated, 
because men are primarily concerned about the recognition of their own and 
one another’s contributions. In the same manner, male values and criteria for 
heroism are being replicated. As Aleida Assmann (2003: 61) aptly puts it, 
‘greatness’ is a property invented by men for men. While women partici-
pated in all kinds of ways in the project of resistance against colonial and 
apartheid oppression, it remains largely men who determine to what extent 
                                                                                                                            
Feinberg in 1993/4), for which no funding could be found beyond the production 
of a ten-minute preview. 
27  Lester (2003: 611) discusses Cheryl McEwan’s research (in the same volume), 
which criticises the ways in which black women’s stories have been 
marginalised in the TRC process and her insistence that women’s representations 
of the past be given more prominence in the collective imagination of the post-
apartheid South African nation. 
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they will receive recognition and what kind of recognition, what deed 
deserves public acknowledgement, and which woman can be considered a 
hero. Men derive their terms of reference for such judgements from their 
own realm of experience, notably the traditionally male-dominated spheres 
of warfare and political activism. This is also mirrored in the TRC hearings, 
where the emphasis on ‘gross violations of human rights’ resulted in 
accounts of events that were heavily focused on the death, torture, abduction 
and damage to male activists, while women’s activities, contributions, 
suffering, the harm done to them and their children were largely excluded 
even when women themselves gave testimony (Ross, F. 2008: 239). 
This is also the reason why the ‘imagined community’ conjured up at 
Freedom Park has scores of ‘founding fathers’ but very few ‘mothers of the 
nation’. The symbolic representation of a progressively envisaged nation at 
Freedom Park is conservatively cast in the mould of a patriarchal convention 
promoting gender bias. The concept of creating a site in tribute to those who 
sacrificed their lives for freedom and humanity is ultimately derived from 
the historical tradition of war memorials and heroes’ acres, which honour 
death in the context of military conflict, and legitimate the loss of life by 
pointing to higher moral objectives. This discourse is extended at Freedom 
Park and adjusted to the needs of the post-apartheid state by celebrating 
political activism and passive resistance, but not (as the evidence on the Wall 
of Names shows) explicitly the vital supporting and nurturing roles 
frequently played by women. 
By conducting a protest march, drafting a petition and excelling in mass 
mobilisation, the women to whom the Pretoria Monument is really dedicated 
meet men’s criteria of being courageous resistance fighters. Women who 
have contributed in other ways – by nurturing the wounded, lending moral 
and emotional support to activists, or providing shelter to those on the run – 
are hardly acknowledged. Even those women who actively fought as MK 
soldiers, who led marches or spent time in prison, sometimes report 
resentment over marginalisation by their own comrades.28 In 1995 women 
from the ANC and other organisations severely criticised the organisers of a 
former Robben Island political prisoners’ reunion for the complete omission 
of women’s contributions to the liberation struggle (Coombes 2003: 105). As 
in Bloemfontein, the Pretoria Women’s Monument casts women in a 
particular role and locks them into a discourse not necessarily of their own 
making. Once again the women’s issue has been appropriated to serve a 
specific national political agenda, infused with the values of a patriarchal 
society.  
                                                     
28  This is described, for instance, by Emma Mashinini, political activist in the trade 
union (see Schalkwyk 2000: 288). Suttner’s (2008) new book on the ANC 
Underground also explores the role of women in the organisation and the 
discriminination, harassment and abuse they had to contend with.  
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Commemorating remarkable women throughout the nation 
Where else in South Africa can we find memorial tributes to memorable 
women? The proposed inclusion of Sarah Bartmann in the new Legacy 
Project was referred to in Chapter Six, but her memorialisation beyond the 
burial site poses unique challenges – both conceptually and formally. South 
African communities frequently consider a realistically rendered life-size 
bronze statue the most honourable form of enshrining the memory of 
respected persons, but in Sarah Bartmann’s case, this might constitute the 
ultimate affront, given the morally tainted history of her body cast and the 
circumstances of (and intentions behind) its production. Cape Town artist 
Willie Bester’s abstracted work entitled Sarah Bartmann (2000), welded 
together from an array of mechanical metal parts, acknowledges precisely 
the problematic nature of representing Bartmann and specifically the literal 
reproduction of her physical features. It remains to be seen what kind of 
memorial (if any) will eventually be installed to pay tribute to Sarah 
Bartmann and what will happen to her body cast, which was ceremonially 
clothed as an act of restoring her dignity on the occasion of her interment in 
2002. 
Sarah Bartmann has become a national icon, symbolising the innocence 
of the indigenous people versus the inhumanity of colonialism and the moral 
baseness of those professing to represent the ‘master-race’. The fact that 
Bartmann may have agreed to the exhibition of her naked body and accepted 
payment for the service does not diminish the violation of her dignity and the 
deplorable nature of her employer’s enterprise. But I cannot help thinking of 
those thousands of nameless female victims of slavery during Sarah 
Bartmann’s time and many decades before, who suffered unspeakable 
emotional and physical trauma, who were habitually raped by their masters 
for years on end, some of whom may have been forced to parade naked in 
front of their master’s friends at dinner parties, then perhaps gang-raped. 
Although the former slave lodge in Cape Town has been turned into a 
museum and the new slave memorial has recently been unveiled in Church 
Square, no memorial has yet been erected or proposed to pay specific tribute 
to these women, who in my view constitute the ultimate, silent victims of 
colonialism.  
During the first decade of democracy only one full-length, slightly under 
life-size statue dedicated to a woman was set up anywhere in the country, 
and this project was not a South African government initiative. I’m referring 
to the so-called ‘Lady in White’, unveiled on a site in the Durban harbour in 
1995, which commemorates the legendary South African artist, Perla Siedle 
Gibson (1888-1971), international concert soprano, classical pianist and 
portrait painter, who sang to the crews of ships coming into the Durban 
harbour during World War II. Improving the morale of countless service 
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men, she reportedly never missed a ship from April 1940 to August 1945, 
even on the day she was informed about the death of her eldest son in Italy.  
 
 
Photo 8.5 Lady in White, Durban, Harbour, unveiled in 1995. 
In 1991 her life story was published in England by Sam Morley, himself a 
war veteran, as a result of which the following year a party of 34 British war 
veterans travelled to Durban for a memorial service at the harbour pier. They 
initiated discussions with the harbour authorities about a monument and set 
up the Lady in White Monument Fund in 1992. Many British and some 
South African veterans contributed, as well as the Queen Mother. Durban-
based sculptor Barbara Siedle, Gibson’s niece, was commissioned to create 
the statue, which she largely based on photographs. On a state visit of Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip in March 1995 the statue was 
temporarily set up for a private viewing in the HMS ‘Britannia’ and later 
installed on T-jetty next to the Portnet offices, where it was unveiled on 15 
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August 1995 (Siedle personal communication 2005; Goodwin personal 
communication 2005; Durban’s Lady in White official brochure, undated).  
The ‘Lady in White’ constitutes an exceptional incident within the larger 
post-apartheid commemorative project and does not really represent its 
ethos.29 Since the Durban harbour, like the Union Buildings in Pretoria, has 
been cordoned off for security reasons, the statue is virtually inaccessible to 
the public today. However, Siedle is grateful that local authorities provided a 
site for the statue at all, which – she believes – would no longer be possible 
in the current political climate marked by African nationalism and concerns 
over ‘political correctness’ (personal conversation 2005).30  
It appears that there are more public markers dedicated to the memory of 
remarkable women in Durban, part of the eThekwini Municipality, than in 
any other city in South Africa, but upon closer examination each of these 
projects is problematic and ambiguous it its own right. The Wall of Hope or 
Memorial for Gugu Dlamini, the young woman who had helped educate 
local communities in Durban about HIV/Aids, is a case in point.  
When Dlamini publicly revealed her HIV positive status as part of a 
campaign of Acceptance and Disclosure in 1998, she was brutally assaulted 
by a mob, which resulted in her death on 14 December 1998 at the age of 36. 
On 1 December 2000, World Aids Day, Central Park in the heart of Durban 
was renamed in Dlamini’s honour and the memorial, initiated by the City 
Council31 and made by local artists Jeremy Wafer and Georgia Sarkin (with 
                                                     
29  The only commemorative project in honour of a woman that expresses the post-
apartheid city council’s ethos is a sculptural tribute to the late local ‘struggle 
hero’, Florence Mkhize. Mounted on a make-shift plinth, the approximately life-
size bronze bust (unveiled in 2005, and made by Zama Dunywa, a recent 
graduate from the Durban Institute of Technology), is inconspicuously set up, 
not in the public arena, but inside the waiting hall of the eThekwini city 
treasurer’s building in Smith Street renamed in Mkhize’s honour – formerly the 
Martin West building). Florence Mkhize or ‘Mam Flo’ had joined the ANC at a 
young age and later became a member of MK. In the 1996 local elections she 
was elected ward councilor for the township of Lamontville south of Durban 
(ANC KNZ 1999; Maphumulo and Kleinbooi 2005). 
30  If she is right, this could explain why the Portuguese community in Durban has 
been unsuccessful – despite much effort – in obtaining a public site for an over 
life-size bronze bust of Vasco da Gama, also made by Barbara Siedle and 
completed in 1997, which is still being stored at the Portuguese Club (Siedle, 
personal communication 2005; da Silva, personal communication 2005). 
31  Ngcobo (personal communication 2004) explains that the Provincial Department 
of Health was not involved in the project and the non-governmental organisation, 
People Living with Aids, was actually against the memorial. They tried to stop 
the initiative on the grounds that Dlamini was not really an Aids activist and she 
was not to be held up as a model because of her lifestyle (multiple partners, etc.). 
However, the council argued that the memorial does not commemorate how she 
lived, but how she died.  
CHAPTER 8 
 
256 
the participation of Bronwen Findlay and Jane du Rand) was conceived as a 
focal point in the rededicated park (Coombes 2003: 112; and original 
memorial dedication plaque).  
 
 
Photo 8.6 Wall of Hope (Gugu Dlamini memorial), Gugu Dlamini Park, Durban. 
Photographed in 2001. 
As in the case of the National Monument for the Women of South Africa, 
the artists rejected the notion of constructing an object in favour of creating a 
contemplative space, working with the land and shaping a mound out of 
earth. But because the city wanted ‘something more concrete, not so 
esoteric’ (Wafer, personal communication 2001), a commemorative wall, 
clearly inspired by the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (VVM) in Washington 
D.C., was added to cut into the mound. The completed memorial consists of 
a symmetrically descending, concave plastered wall encircling a mosaicised 
space into which an existing opaque circular skylight for the parking garage 
underneath is cleverly incorporated. The light adds a mysterious, perhaps 
spiritual element, especially at night when light shines through. According to 
Wafer it can be interpreted as ‘memory coming to light / shining through, 
but also suppressing of memory’ (Wafer, personal communication 2001). 
Anyone who has visited the VVM will recall the numerous flowers and 
other kinds of small offerings that people habitually leave behind at the base 
of the memorial wall. To encourage a similar practice at the Gugu Dlamini 
memorial, the wall was equipped with small projecting ledges, forming little 
niches for offerings, which were supposed to be collected regularly by staff 
from the nearby KwaMuhle Local History Museum. 
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Photo 8.7 Vandalized Gugu Dlamini memorial Durban. Photographed in 2007. 
However, nobody left such offerings, and the niches were instead used as 
stepping stones for climbing onto the memorial wall. Meanwhile, every 
single one of these ledges is broken off, suggesting acts of systematic and 
deliberate vandalism rather than accidental damage. In fact, by the end of the 
year 2004 virtually every aspect of the Gugu Dlamini memorial had been 
vandalised and there is persistent visual and olfactory evidence of the wall’s 
common usage as a public urinal. The removal of all of the text plaques has 
furthermore rendered the meaning of the memorial inaccessible. 
One might argue that such treatment speaks not only of disrespect and 
contempt, but represents a metaphorical act of violation that parallels the 
original killing of Dlamini. Clearly, for those responsible the stigma of Aids 
is far from broken as to them Dlamini symbolises shame, and vandalising 
her memorial is perhaps an attempt at obliterating her disgraceful memory. 
The so-called Wall of Hope, like the memorial for Amy Biehl, is hence an 
ambiguous marker, likely to rouse strong opinions and disconcerting senti-
ments among many viewers, albeit for different reasons.  
The Gugu Dlamini memorial must be understood in the context of South 
Africa’s unabated HIV/Aids crisis and President Thabo Mbeki’s reluctance 
to take decisive action on the issue. Although I’m digressing slightly here, I 
want to point out that despite the staggering number of people dying from 
Aids-related illnesses, there are only very few public memorials for Aids 
victims in South Africa today, all of which are small, cheap, inconspicuous 
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and ill-respected.32 Although the popular fight against the pandemic has 
appropriated the rhetoric of the liberation struggle (consider slogans such as 
‘Aids – the new Struggle’, or ‘Unite against Aids’), the symbolic level of 
public memory remains almost exclusively reserved for victims of the 
political struggle. Given Mbeki’s skepticism and denialist attitude towards 
the disease, notably his apparent belief that HIV does not cause Aids, the 
establishment of public markers in memory of Aids victims could be 
interpreted as an affirmation of mainstream discourses about HIV/Aids and 
hence as a political statement in opposition to the Presidency. One might 
imagine what kind of effect an Aids memorial similar in scale and stature to 
the Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum might have as a symbolic focus 
and geographical rallying point for groups such as the Treatment Action 
Campaign and other factions representing the interests of those affected by 
the disease, in mobilising their opposition to the government. 
Humility and other visual characteristics of women’s memorials  
Monuments and memorials always ‘speak’ to us through textual and visual 
signifiers, sometimes conveying ‘messages’ somewhat at odds with what 
they were intended to symbolise. Focusing on aesthetic issues, I briefly want 
to compare the Gugu Dlamini memorial with the Australian Servicewomen’s 
Memorial in the sculpture garden of the Australian War Memorial in 
Canberra. The garden contains a large number of war memorials relating to 
                                                     
32  In Cape Town, for instance, a small tombstone painted white with a red ribbon 
was set up in a flower bed in the Company Gardens. Next to the Electric 
Workshop in Newtown, Johannesburg, a simple Aids memorial wall was 
unveiled by Brigitte Mabandla on 1 December 1998 (Thom and Ndlovu 1998). 
In the centre an Aids ribbon frames a small relief of two hands caringly holding a 
third hand, a motif that freely adapts the popular conventional tombstone 
emblem of the wreath framing praying hands. Small bronze plaques have 
randomly been mounted onto individual bricks, inscribed by various people in 
different handwritings. Some contain generic messages (e.g. ‘In memory of all 
the children’), others seemingly address specific individuals, but ultimately 
always withholding their identity (e.g. ‘Dear Cyril. Rest in peace’ or simply 
‘Molefi’), a fact that conveys a sense of ambiguity and caution, perhaps fear. 
When construction work commenced adjacent to the Newtown Aids memorial a 
few years later, the site around the memorial was fenced in and used as storage 
for building materials and equipment. At a site visit in mid-2004, staff in the 
nearby restaurant was convinced that the memorial was still there, hidden from 
view by the timber enclosure, but it had in fact been completely dismantled some 
time before without anybody noticing. It is hard to imagine that this could have 
happened to a memorial dedicated to victims of apartheid repression. One gets 
the impression that this Aids memorial was not seen as important or imposing a 
moral duty of respect. 
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all international wars in which Australians were involved,33 but the 
Servicewomen memorial, unveiled on 27 March 1999 and made by Sydney 
sculptor, Anne Ferguson, specifically commemorates ‘all women who 
served, suffered and died in the defence of Australia’ (Australian 
Servicewomen’s Memorial website).  
A square concrete slab with a mosaic surface made of multi-coloured 
granite stones collected from all over Australia is intersected by a deep 
curved groove filled with water. According to the attached explanatory 
plaque, one side of the ‘river’ represents the pre-World War II period, where 
dark colours evoke the ominous clouds of war, while the other side 
represents service after 1945 with lighter colours referring to peace. While 
the website suggests that the mosaic platform ‘represents a carpet laid by 
women’ (ibid.), one may also be reminded of traditional Aborigine visual 
representations of ‘dreamings’ with their condensed (originary) 
representation of key features of the land. Visitors are invited to walk on the 
surface of the memorial, hence becoming part of this symbolic landscape 
and its (re)creation. 
It is possible, although perhaps unlikely, that the artists involved in the 
Gugu Dlamini memorial had seen images of the Australian Servicewomen’s 
memorial. However, astounding parallels emerge if one compares the latter 
with most other war memorials in the same garden and the Gugu Dlamini 
memorial (as well as the National Monument for the Women of South 
Africa) with other post-apartheid commemorative markers. It appears that 
whenever women are the subject of dedication, artists seek to express 
‘difference’ in their formal language and consciously try to transcend the 
time-honoured conventions of commemorative design, so intricately 
interwoven with the tradition of male-centered public memorialisation. As 
monuments the world over share common characteristics of design, a more 
comprehensive comparative study may find that women’s memorials 
likewise show affinities, including perhaps a trend towards understatement 
and humility: elements arranged low down on the ground, close to the earth, 
in contradistinction to the tradition of domineering (phallic) objects and 
structures; a penchant for working with the elements of nature; and a 
fondness for employing colourful surfaces, such as the mosaic, in allusion 
perhaps to traditional women’s crafts, such as quilting, embroidery and other 
types of handiwork.  
Like works of fine art made by women, especially first generation 
feminist artists, such formal characteristics are meant to celebrate what is 
perhaps perceived as honourable female qualities, but – possibly contrary to 
                                                     
33  Examples include ‘Bomber Command’ (Neil Dawson, 2005), a memorial 
commemorating members of bomber commands in WWII; or ‘Australian 
Serviceman’ (Ray Ewers, 1954; moved to the sculpture garden in 1995) 
commemorating the sacrifices of Australians in all wars.  
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the artist’s objective – also promote essentialism and stereotypes about 
women. In the case of the Monument for the Women of South Africa, a 
certain expectation of modesty and understatement was seen to be fitting for 
a monument dealing with ‘women’s issues’. This is evident from the NMC’s 
response to the DACST’s application (in February 1999) officially seeking 
permission to make changes to the Union Buildings as a registered national 
monument by adding the proposed women’s monument. The NMC, drawing 
on its ‘Criteria for the Evaluation of Changes and Related Interventions at 
National Monuments’, supplied the DACST with a list of specific guidelines 
for the conceptualisation of the women’s monument. With respect to scale, 
the NMC recommended: ‘The event that is to be commemorated deals with 
social, humane and women’s issues. An oversized monolith is considered 
inappropriate’.34  
Of course, critics deem an oversized monolith inappropriate for any 
commemorative task, but in South Africa greatness of scale is frequently 
considered a requisite for greatness of significance, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate. In the case of the Pretoria Women’s Monument, some viewers 
will understand and appreciate the artists’ intention behind the modest visual 
appearance, especially those with an intellectual and experiential background 
similar to that of the artists, but many others won’t, because their yardstick 
for an honorable form of memorialisation is the existing corpus of 
monuments and their established markers of monumentality and dignity. The 
point is that although monuments are works of public art, they are also 
clearly different from art, fulfilling a different societal function and 
frequently being measured according to different criteria.  
Conclusion 
The Monument for the Women of South Africa is a noteworthy and thought-
provoking work, important as a conscious attempt to seek a unique, creative 
design that would do justice to a new “Afrocentric” post-apartheid identity. 
The artists’ benchmark and reference point was the male-dominated tradition 
of monuments generally and in particular the Bloemfontein Women’s 
Monument, which represents both the old political order and the old social 
                                                     
34  National Monuments Council. Criteria for the Evaluation of Changes and 
Related Interventions at National Monuments. Letter by J.J. Bruwer, 18 February 
1999 with annexure, DAC, Women’s Mommerial (sic), Vol. 3, file 6/16/9. 
Incidentally, the same document emphasized that ‘it is strongly 
RECOMMENDED that the memorial or focal point of the memorial not be 
placed on the central axis. In many ways the Union Buildings is itself a pedestal 
that invites articulation of niches and plinths which flank staircases. 
Furthermore, the utilisation of existing “pedestals” could reduce the cost of the 
final product allowing funds to be spent more meaningfully elsewhere’.  
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order dominated by patriarchal values. The artists’ goal was to find a visual 
expression that would be as ‘different’ as possible from these examples in 
order to symbolise the novelty of the post-apartheid order with its ground-
breaking advancements in the field of women’s rights. Hence the appearance 
of the Pretoria Women’s Monument is more informed by creative practices 
and discourses in contemporary fine art than by entrenched conventions of 
monument design. However, ultimately the work remains a monument. It 
continues an established tradition and many of its conventions and 
properties. As Becker (2000: 9) aptly puts it, the Monument for the Women 
of South Africa is not quite a subversion of the monument genre but rather a 
rethinking of it.  
Unlike works of fine art made by women, women’s monuments, 
including those made by women, are not means of self-expression, grounded 
in women’s experience. Rather, they are primarily about women. Their 
visual and textual signifiers reflect and sometimes challenge particular 
discourses about women that circulate in society, usually in accordance with 
the intentions of those commissioning the monument. They reflect a sense of 
(interpreted) identity constructed through social relations of power and offer 
‘subject positions’ for individuals and groups. In this case, women and 
indeed citizens of all colour and conviction are invited to identity with the 
brave women of 1956 and respect the values they fought for. 
One might interpret the National Women’s Monument as a gendered 
adjunct to Freedom Park, balancing the latter’s unintentional but structurally 
determined gender bias and symbolising the inclusion of women in the 
narrative of the nation. As part of the National Legacy Project the Women’s 
Monument signals the government’s concern for gender equity, but there is 
also the peril of tokenism as the commemoration of women is ‘out-sourced’ 
to national level. If one compares the Pretoria monument as a national site of 
public tribute to the women of South Africa with other sites linked to the 
history of resistance and the anti-apartheid struggle, notably Robben Island, 
the preeminent site of struggle for male prisoners, one finds the latter to be a 
thriving national and international tourist destination while the former is 
virtually impossible to visit (Coombes 2003: 114). The same situation is 
echoed at the local level, where commemorative tributes to women – as far 
as they exist at all – are often difficult to access, rarely feature in tourist 
brochures and draw little media attention in comparison with other ‘struggle’ 
memorials. 
Despite essentially serving a male-dominated political agenda, any wo-
men’s monument makes a contribution towards the representation of women 
in the grand scheme of national commemorative endeavours. It does 
represent women’s experiences, however biased, and it does give women a 
voice, however marginal. In short, it is better than nothing. But even if there 
were more women’s monuments or opportunities to set up works of public 
art made by women that genuinely expressed women’s experiences, the 
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impact of such works would still be mediated by their positioning in a 
patriarchal society. As Gayatri Spivak aptly observed in a different context, 
giving the Other a chance to ‘speak’ is only one side of the coin. It still 
depends on who will listen (Spivak and Gunew 1993: 195). Discourse is 
always determined by the dominant position, and South Africa has a long 
way to go before achieving gender equality.  
  
9 
Africanising the Symbolic 
Landscape: Post-Apartheid 
Monuments as ‘Critical 
Response’ 
Introduction 
Although the elimination of a contested commemorative object may 
eventually curb public awareness of the person or event it represents, as 
Zeller (2000: 214-5) shows with reference to German colonial monuments, 
public memory cannot be erased by removing statues and memorials. 
Iconoclastic measures also inevitably and usually permanently erase the 
opportunity for the public to critically engage with the respective monument, 
its one-sided representation of the past and its political message. In this 
chapter, I want to elucidate the post-apartheid strategy of balancing the 
existing heritage landscape in South Africa and interrogating biased 
historical narratives through the establishment of new monuments placed in 
deliberate juxtaposition with existing markers. One important consequence 
of the new heritage legislation and the cautious, conservationist approach 
towards colonial and apartheid era heritage is that the continued presence of 
‘white’ monuments and the effective limitations of their adaptation to the 
symbolic needs of the new order justified and indeed encouraged the 
installation of new symbolic markers. Official pro-monument discourses 
insinuate that if the overwhelming bulk of commemorative markers erected 
by the old order cannot be replaced, it must be complemented with new 
statues and monuments representing previously marginalised groups, which 
will ‘correct’ or counter the biased historical discourses espoused by the old 
markers. 
This chapter begins with a detailed discussion of the Blood River/Ncome 
monument and museum,1 tracing its genesis and establishing its significance 
                                                     
1  In archival records, the Ncome project is referred to in various ways, e.g. as a 
‘Wall of Remembrance Monument’, a ‘Monument of Reconciliation’, and the 
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as a model and trend setter in the region and indeed in the country for the 
principle of countering existing, often contested monuments. The Ncome 
project has not only attracted extensive media interest but also considerable 
local and international scholarly attention (e.g. Dlamini 2001 and 2008; 
Girshick 2004; Schönfeldt-Aultman 2006). Dlamini and Gershick have 
closely analysed this monument and museum in the context of the Legacy 
Project and the coalition politics of the time, notably the tension between the 
ANC and its national agenda of reconciliation and nation building versus the 
IFP and partisan Zulu nationalist aims. I want to take a step further back in 
the genesis of the Ncome project and add another dimension to the complex 
interplay of political forces that in my opinion have played a key role in the 
emergence of Ncome. It will become evident that the dynamic which 
unfolded over the commemoration of this famous battle several years before 
the Legacy Project came into being had a defining influence on the wider 
politics of memory in post-apartheid South Africa and particularly in KZN 
up to the present day.  
When it became clear that the newly established museum at Blood River 
would not sufficiently represent the Zulu perspective on the famous battle, 
Ncome was implicitly developed as a counterpoint or a ‘critical response’ to 
the existing Blood River monument. Although the concept of the monument 
as a ‘critical response’ differs from the conception of the ‘counter-
monument’ (as defined by Young), both types of commemorative 
intervention share a crucial dependence on the ideologically charged 
narrative of a specific existing monument as reference point. Unlike the 
counter-monument, monuments as critical response are also inspired by the 
physical presence and aesthetic appearance of the existing monument, which 
they emulate, often literally imitate, despite claims to originality and 
‘difference’. 
This observation leads me to a consideration (in the second half of this 
chapter) of other examples of new monuments in KZN and elsewhere in the 
country. I want to highlight the complex and contradictory relationship 
between the desire to Africanise the symbolic landscape, which one might 
expect to include a search for African models of memory practice and 
African-based creative formats or visual languages, and the compelling 
power and anxious tenacity of the Eurocentric model and Western-
dominated conventions of monument design. I argue that the continued 
presence of existing monuments not only impacts on the ideological 
meaning of the new commemorative markers, but also on their design. The 
desire to effectively ‘counter’ a contested monument or statue implicitly or 
explicitly prompts those who initiate such responses to insist on similarity 
                                                                                                                            
‘Battle of Blood River/Ncome Monument’. The museum is sometimes referred 
to as an interpretation centre.  
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and correspondence of design, while simultaneously connecting with African 
roots and validating African traditional memory practices.  
 
 
Photo 9.1 Blood River Monument, Battlefield of Blood River/Ncome, near 
Dundee. Oxwagon laager, unveiled in 1971. 
 
Photo 9.2 Ncome Monument, Battlefield of Blood River/Ncome, near Dundee, 
unveiled 1998.  
CHAPTER 9 
 
266 
In other words, the mimicry frequently criticized in the consideration of 
post-apartheid commemorative monuments is in fact an integral and 
necessary part of their meaning within the framework of their intended 
ideological purpose.  
The Battle of Blood River and its commemoration 
When in February 1838 the Voortrekker leader, Piet Retief, tried to secure a 
treaty with the Zulu king Dingane (also spelled Dingaan) to obtain land for 
white settlement, he was killed in controversial circumstances at the royal 
residence in Mgungundlovu. Warfare broke out between the Zulus and the 
Voortrekkers in which the latter approached the reputable and experienced 
commando leader Andries Pretorius (1798-1853) for assistance. Pretorius 
arrived in Natal on 22 November and immediately made preparations for a 
carefully planned punitive counter-attack against the Zulus, who had been 
trying to stop the advancing Trekkers. As he considered it too dangerous to 
engage the Zulus on their own ground, he decided to advance with 64 trek 
wagons, carrying only supplies and ammunition, which could be arranged in 
a defensive, fortified laager formation. Religious services were held twice a 
day to spiritually strengthen the commando and assert that the Voortrekkers 
were God’s chosen people in a holy cause. On 9 December the famous 
covenant was made at Danskraal, asking for divine assistance in the 
impending battle against the heathen Zulu force in exchange for a binding 
obligation to build a church in God’s honour and hold the day of victory 
sacred for all times (Laband 1995: 97-102; Mountain 1999: 108-11; Report 
of panel of historians 1998).  
The Trekkers arrived on the banks of the Ncome/Blood River on 15 
December and established their laager in a strategic spot, well protected on 
the eastern side by the river and on the southern flank by a deep donga. In 
the evening the Voortrekkers held a service, sang psalms and renewed the 
Vow in anticipation of the imminent attack. In the early morning of 16 
December, a Sunday, the Zulus advanced to attack from the south-east. The 
Zulu attack formation commonly employed at the time mimicked the shape 
of a horn with the young amabutho on the wings advancing fast to encircle 
the enemies, and the older, more experienced warriors of the chest engaging 
them in battle. Despite their overwhelming manpower, the Zulus, equipped 
with spears and cowhide shields, had no chance against the superior 
weapons technology and firepower of the Voortrekkers. By about 11 a.m. 
the futile Zulu assault began to break down and Pretorius rode out with a 
mounted force of about 160 men in pursuit of the withdrawing Zulus. Many 
were killed while trying to hide in the river. The resulting bloodshed 
prompted the Voortrekkers to name the stream Blood River. In the end over 
3000 Zulus lost their lives in the battle, excluding those who would have 
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died later of their wounds, while the Voortrekkers recorded only three men 
injured and no deaths (ibid.).  
The historical context that led to the Battle of Blood River, the precise 
details of the fighting formations and the course of the battle, and especially 
the significance of the battle for both Voortrekkers and Zulus have long been 
subject to interpretation and different ideological viewpoints. Most publicly 
available and officially endorsed historical narratives produced during the 
previous era represent the events exclusively from the Voortrekker 
perspective. Zulu perceptions of the battle, mostly passed on orally, were 
largely suppressed – a neglect that the Ncome project was meant to redress.2 
But it is important to note that the hegemonic Afrikaner account of the 
historical events and especially the significance of the battle had already 
been fundamentally challenged from within the Afrikaner community years 
before the advent of the post-apartheid era.3 
Nevertheless, the commemorative effort on the battlefield, as it unfolded 
over many decades, was determined by the traditional, conservative Afrika-
ner interpretations. Especially during the apartheid era, the Covenant and the 
Battle of Blood River were vigorously promoted as milestones in the histo-
rical consciousness of Afrikaners, and they still arouse strong emotions 
among some. In fulfilment of their promise, the Voortrekkers built the 
Church of the Vow in Pietermaritzburg in 1840, the anniversary date of the 
great victory was held sacred, and the battle site of Blood River was 
considered hallowed ground. In 1866 concerned members of the Afrikaner 
community erected the first permanent commemorative marker, a small 
cairn, which was followed by a larger cemented, pyramidal cairn in 1938. By 
                                                     
2  Various volumes of the Stuart Archive testify to the range of different stories that 
were once told about Ncome. Yet, as John Wright suspects, this variety has since 
been narrowed down to a few formulaic statements as the history of Ncome and 
King Dingane become political battlegrounds (personal e-mail communication 
2008). Ironically, the construction of the monument and museum, I argue, further 
assists this reductionist process, as certain versions are authorised over others 
and officially institutionalised. 
3  The different ideological positions are summarised in the Report of a panel of 
historians (1998) assembled by the DACST for the purpose of developing the 
historical framework of the Ncome project. The traditional interpretation of the 
battle holds that ‘the Voortrekker victory at Blood River saved the Great Trek; 
Blood River was the birthplace of the Afrikaner people; Blood River was a battle 
between Christianity and barbarism and a victory for Christianity over barba-
rism; the battle of Blood River was a miracle, with God intervening to save the 
Voortrekkers and proving that He was on the side of the Voortrekkers; the vow 
is binding on all Afrikaners up to the end of days’ (ibid.: 1). The new 
interpretations developed by Afrikaner historians such as van Jaarsveld and van 
Aswegen largely demythologise the battle, place it into a broader historical 
context and challenge all the fundamental points of the traditional interpretation. 
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that time Blood River had become one of Afrikanerdom’s holiest shrines, 
closely allied – historically, ideologically and aesthetically – with the Voor-
trekker Monument in Pretoria and the Church of the Vow. Plans for a much 
more impressive monument were investigated, leading to the unveiling – in 
1947 – of the life-size granite ox-wagon monument sculpted by Coert 
Steynberg. 
This monument had to be moved in 1971 (apparently much lamented by 
Steynberg) to make room for a new, even more ambitious commemorative 
effort: the life-size, recreated ox-wagon laager monument of Andries Preto-
rius, for which Blood River is now best known. Unveiled on 16 December 
1971, but fully completed only many years later, the monument (designed by 
Cobus Esterhuizen) consists of 64 bronzed cast-iron wagons, placed in a D-
shape (later re-arranged as a circle) around the original 19th century cairn. 
While Steynberg’s granite version of the symbolic ox-wagon was slightly 
stylised as a necessary concession to the medium, the bronze wagons were 
indeed facsimiles of the real wagons, modelled on the Johanna van der 
Merwe centenary wagon, which had participated in the symbolic re-
enactment of the Great Trek in 1938. In a quest to further enhance their 
realism, all of the ox-wagons were equipped with real lanterns (later 
replaced by electrical lights) which could be lit at night. Furthermore, 
replicas of Pretorius’ gun, Ou Grietje, were cast and placed in the openings 
(van Tonder 1961 and 1975; Oberholster 1972; Rankin 1988).  
Blood River museum initiative  
In the context of the post 1994 re-shuffle of the museum administration field, 
the state-funded Voortrekker Museum in Pietermaritzburg was temporarily 
put in charge of the Blood River monument site, which had originally been 
owned by the Dutch Reformed Church. Management immediately decided to 
upgrade the monument site by adding a museum which would include 
various visitor amenities. The KZN Regional Office of the NMC considered 
an application with plans for the proposed new development towards the end 
of 1994 and promptly rejected it. The proposed museum or visitor centre, 
reportedly designed as a British-style medieval fortress with towers and 
battlements, was ‘entirely inappropriate for the site’, explained NMC 
Regional Manager, Andrew Hall, because ‘developments on battlefields and 
similar sites should be as unobtrusive and understated as possible’.4 This 
statement is rather ironic in view of the earlier-mentioned ostentatious 
                                                     
4  Letter from Andrew Hall (NMC Regional Manager KZN) to the Director of the 
Voortrekker Museum (Pietermaritzburg), 15/12/94, SAHRA Head office, file # 
9/2/447/1, Vol. 4. 
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monument developments that the NMC had previously approved for 
installation on this battlefield site. 
Significantly, Hall went on to suggest that the funds available for this 
project should rather be utilised to purchase the other portion of the 
battlefield on the opposite (eastern) bank of the river, ‘thereby attaining an 
ability to portray the Zulu role in the battle’ (ibid.). This would foster a 
‘better’ (read ‘more inclusive’) interpretation of the history of the Province 
and create facilities relevant to the development of the heritage tourism 
industry, as well as being in ‘the spirit of the times’ (ibid.), i.e. the 
impending socio-political changes and associated revaluing of long-
neglected African perspectives on local history.  
While the western bank of the river belonged to the province of Natal, the 
eastern bank was part of the ‘homeland’ of KwaZulu, where heritage 
conservation was administered by the KwaZulu Monuments Council 
(KMC), but the amalgamation of the two conservation bodies was already 
anticipated at the time. The director of the KMC, Barry Marshall, had 
apparently long cherished the idea of building a Zulu counterpart to the 
Blood River monument, and was therefore highly supportive of Hall’s 
proposal. However, divergent visions existed about the symbolic signifi-
cance of the proposed development among various individuals in the two 
conservation agencies and associated heritage bodies. Some saw it as an 
opportunity to make a Zulu nationalist statement, while others wanted it to 
symbolise reconciliation in line with national policy goals (Hall, e-mail 
communication 2007). These developments constituted the first concrete 
steps in building a Zulu counterpart to the Afrikaner Nationalist monument 
and, more importantly, the beginning of what soon became a key strategy in 
the post-apartheid politics of remembrance throughout South Africa.  
At a meeting on 1 February 1995, members of the NMC considered a 
revised design for the museum building on the Voortrekker side of the 
battlefield, prepared by renowned architect Hannes Meiring. Compared to 
the initial British-style medieval fortress proposal, Meiring’s blueprint drew 
on North African and Ndebele architectural sources of inspiration, presum-
ably in an attempt to ‘Africanise’ the building and make it more relevant in 
terms of the ‘spirit of the times’. But the KZN Plans Committee of the NMC 
again deemed this proposal unsuitable for aesthetic reasons, as it was not 
unobtrusive enough and the specific African references were considered 
unsuitable for a building on this site.5 Meiring eventually produced an 
acceptable design (Letter Hall to Meiring 9/2/1995), consisting of a one-
story red-brick building with sparse detailing and a flat roof. (The currently 
                                                     
5  ‘The current design was not suitable. A new design of which the principle was 
that the structure should be part of the landscape rather than deriving inspiration 
from any cultural context would be likely to find acceptance’ (Minutes of the 
KZN Plans Committee 1995). 
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visible hipped roof and gable were added years later.) Although the 
committee had in principle been in favour of the proposed development, 
because it acknowledged that the site was in need of tourist facilities, a more 
fundamental issue had been opened up by the projected museum, quickly 
creating avid media attention (e.g. Chothia 1995). 
The controversy revolved around the fact that a considerable amount of 
money, mostly financed by the Voortrekker Museum and the FAK, was 
about to be spent on a commemorative development at Blood River, an 
emotionally and politically sensitive site, to represent narrow, sectarian 
interests.6 This furthermore occurred at a time of significant socio-political 
changes, in the context of which familiar historical narratives and their 
public representation were already becoming subject to critical re-
assessment. As Hall cautioned in a letter to the Director of the NMC:  
We are coming under increasing pressure from the Province, Zulu leadership, the 
IFP and the Kwazulu Monuments Council, to use the NMC’s powers to make 
those sponsoring the development re-evaluate it in light of the concerns of a 
community broader than that which they represent (Letter dated 14/2/95).  
Simultaneously, the Director of the FAK intervened in the matter and urged 
Hall and the provincial Plans Committee to approve the plans. Hall 
advocated that the issue be addressed at the NMC policy-making level and 
suggested that a broad process of consultation with other cultural formations 
and communities be instituted before the proposed development should be 
permitted to proceed (Letter Hall to Director NMC 14/2/95 and e-mail Hall 
20 April 2007). 
Hall then informed Meiring of the required community consultation 
exercise and advised that the KMC had pointed out the need to add ‘some 
sort of Zulu focus’, most likely a statue, but the nature of it ultimately to be 
decided upon through the consultation process (Letter Hall to Meiring 
16/3/95). Following a meeting of various stakeholders on 14 September 
1995 it was resolved that the Stigting vir die Bloedrivier-Gelofteterrein 
(hereafter Bloedrivier Stigting), a heritage foundation established to manage 
the site, 7 would build a large indlu (round thatched hut) on either side of the 
Coert Steynberg ox-wagon monument, which could be used by the local 
                                                     
6  The building was to cost around one million rand, which equates to 
approximately US$ 140 000 at the current exchange rate. 
7  According to Cecilia Kruger (personal communication 2008), Blood River was 
handed over to the FAK when the Voortrekker Museum could no longer accept 
responsibility for its management due to lack of funds (the Dutch Reformed 
Church had determined that the site might never be sold, but could be handed 
over to a not-for-profit Section 21 Company). Since heritage management was 
not the focus of the FAK, they established the Stigting vir die 
Bloedriviergelofteterrein for this purpose. 
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community either to sell crafts or for exhibition purposes. This directly 
foreshadows details of the later Ncome project, where two such huts are now 
found in front of the entrance more or less for these purposes. However, the 
indlu was considered a temporary solution to the issue of Zulu symbolism 
and in the medium term the Bloedrivier Stigting was requested to commit ‘a 
fair sum of money’ towards the erection of ‘a large work of public art’.8 
Although the inclusion of a Zulu symbol was now a condition of the permit, 
it soon became clear that the Bloedrivier Stigting would not be prepared to 
spend enough money on this to produce a significant icon. Arguably this fact 
later contributed to the national government’s decision to finance the Ncome 
project through inclusion into the National Legacy Project, hence turning a 
provincial initiative into a national venture. 
In a faxed letter to Barry Marshall (dated 21/9/1995), Hall highlights the 
need to extend the boundaries of the officially protected battlefield across the 
river and emphasises the desirability of a future re-interpretation of the entire 
site, which would in effect give previously marginalised communities a 
chance to have a say in the creation of the museum exhibition.9 This was 
significant, because it would invariably lead to a more inclusive and 
balanced representation of this contested battle than if stakeholders of the 
Afrikaner perspective were exclusively in charge. The museum building – 
incidentally referred to as an interpretation centre, just as the Ncome 
museum was also initially conceptualised as an interpretation centre – was 
by now almost completed and two bronze plaques, one in Afrikaans and one 
in isiZulu, were affixed on either side of the entrance. The inscription of the 
plaques refers to reconciliation between Zulu and Afrikaner and the 
unveiling of the Zulu plaque by a prominent Zulu-speaking representative of 
the KZN government10 in November 1995 presaged the emerging role of this 
battlefield site as an icon of reconciliation at a time when the National 
Legacy Project was still in its conceptual stages. Even the idea of creating a 
physical link between the two sides of the battlefield was discussed at the 
time.  
Ncome’s inclusion in the National Legacy Project  
Although the NMC had pushed the project in a specific direction, no further 
steps were taken to implement the plans and communications exchanged 
                                                     
8  Faxed letter Hall to Henno Cronje (dated 10/10/95).  
9  See faxed letter Hall to Barry Marshall (dated 21/9/95). 
10  Prince Vincent Zulu, KZN Minister of Education and Culture, was invited to 
attend the unveiling, but sent Dr Khanyile as a representative. The Afrikaans 
plaque was unveiled by Rev. Henno Cronje, Chair of the FAK. 
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earlier.11 No members of the Zulu community or historians representing the 
Zulu perspective on the battle were involved in the exhibition of the newly 
opened museum, which predictably depicted the battle exclusively from the 
Afrikaner perspective. No steps were taken towards the construction of a 
bridge, and no Zulu statue was erected. Amazingly, by the end of 1998 the 
NMC had still not declared the eastern side of the battlefield a national 
monument. This was in fact accomplished only on 11 December 1998 after 
intense pressure from the DACST, following Ncome’s inclusion in the 
National Legacy Project (e.g. letter Havemann to Hofmeyer 21/8/1998). 
I have explained in Chapter Six how the Blood River/Ncome project was 
added to the portfolio of Legacy Projects, following a discussion between 
the DG and the Minister. In terms of the coalition politics of the early post-
election period, it is important to note that Mtshali was a senior member of 
the IFP in the ANC-led GNU, but unlike Ngubane he was also a prominent 
Zulu nationalist who was keen on promoting Zulu culture and the notion of a 
proud Zulu nation. He had apparently picked up the idea of the Ncome 
project directly from Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but Bongani Ndhlovu, Curator 
of the Ncome Museum, importantly adds that Mtshali had grown up in the 
Ncome area (in Kingsley) and was likely to have a personal interest in the 
project and its anticipated economic and development benefits for ‘his’ area 
(e-mail communication 5 March 2008). 
Girshick (2004: 26) suggests that Mtshali seized the opportunity to ‘make 
an historical end run around what he saw as an ANC “cabal” in the Ministry 
who were trying to force their own partisan monuments through’. This 
assessment illustrates the intensely political nature of decision-making about 
heritage and links with my earlier discussion about the objection of 
opposition parties to the dominant role of the ANC in representing and 
appropriating the past. But in addition I want to suggest that the lack of 
effort on the Afrikaner side to represent Zulu perspectives on the battle and 
the absence of a substantial move towards a re-interpretation of the biased 
historical narrative (as foregrounded by Hall and others) must have been a 
strongly contributing factor in Mtshali’s decision to include Ncome in the 
National Legacy Project and endow it with relatively substantial funding. 
The prioritisation and fast-tracking of this project was inevitably prompted 
by the upcoming 160th anniversary of the battle on 16 December 1998. 
Based on the supreme significance attached to the Battle of Blood River, 
Afrikaner Nationalists had always considered the 16th of December a holy 
day, initially called Dingaan’s Day.12 It is important to note that the post-
                                                     
11  This might in part be due to the fact that Andrew Hall, who had been a driving 
force in the negotiation with the stakeholders of the Blood River museum 
initiative, left the regional office of the NMC around this time. 
12  It was later renamed the Day of Covenant (1952) and since 1980 it has been 
celebrated as the Day of the Vow. 
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apartheid government did not eliminate the date from the newly devised list 
of public holidays after 1994, but rather renamed it the Day of Recon-
ciliation.13 This was particularly apt, because the 16th of December was also 
the day that the ANC in alliance with the Communist Party had chosen in 
1961 to launch its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, marking the beginning 
of the armed struggle.14 It was logical that the battlefield associated with this 
key date should now become a symbol of reconciliation – in the narrow 
sense between the two warring parties of the past (Zulus and Voortrekkers), 
and in a broader sense between black and white in the present – to supersede 
or redress the divisive historical moments which that date had traditionally 
marked.15 From this perspective, the Ncome project fitted well into the 
National Legacy Project and it may not have been obvious from the start that 
the project would eventually be seen to promote an exclusively Zulu ethnic 
cause, in conflict – as Dlamini, Girshick and Schönfeldt-Aultman argue – 
with the government’s inclusive agenda of national unity.  
Ncome as a symbol of reconciliation  
The processes that occurred during the following period of intense activity in 
the run-up to the anniversary date have been traced in detail by Dlamini 
(2001) and Girshick (2004). Mtshali appointed Musa Xulu, also an IFP 
loyalist, as Deputy-Director General of the DACST and made him ultimately 
responsible for the Legacy Project and specifically Ncome. He set up the 
Blood River/Ncome Steering committee, bringing together a diverse group 
of heritage and museum officials, academics, representatives of various 
cultural foundations and local tribal authorities. Several sub-committees 
were established, including one focused on devising the conceptual 
framework, another attending to the architectural design and construction of 
the monument, and another to the planning of the public unveiling 
ceremony. Although various tensions and divisions manifested themselves in 
                                                     
13  Ultimately, this provides ultra-conservative Afrikaners with the opportunity to 
carry on commemorating the date in their accustomed way as the Day of the 
Vow. 
14  The ANC’s political appropriation of the battle is detailed by Sithole (2008). 
15  Although not part of the Legacy Project, one might, in comparison, similarly 
consider the case of the new memorial and museum at Sharpeville. The 21 
March, the day previously commemorated (especially by members of the PAC) 
as ‘Sharpeville Day’, was included in the official list of public holidays as 
‘Human Rights Day’. Consequently, the new commemorative structure (erected 
mostly with government funding) was called ‘Sharpeville Human Rights 
Precinct’ (rather than Sharpeville memorial) and meant to symbolise a broader, 
national agenda of human rights values in addition to the specific historical 
circumstances of the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960. 
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meetings and communications, the project eventually took shape through the 
process of negotiation among members of these different sub-committee 
groups (Girshick 2004: 26). 
The committee work engendered various proposals about how the project 
would express its intended message of reconciliation. Not only would the 
development of a parallel structure to the overall site create aesthetic and 
conceptual balance, but the reconciliation was to be emphasised also through 
symbolic architectural signifiers. The most important element in this regard, 
both in symbolic and practical terms, was the proposed foot bridge linking 
the two sections of the battlefield, which would encourage visitors to 
experience both perspectives on this contested battle. Furthermore, the un-
veiling ceremony on the day of the 160th anniversary was intended to 
become a public show of reconciliation with prominent representatives of 
the Afrikaner and Zulu constituencies in attendance. 
Most importantly, the DACST assembled a diverse panel of academic 
historians, representing different intellectual and ideological standpoints, and 
tasked them with developing a historical account that would ‘reconcile’ 
divergent interpretations of the battle.16 Within an allocated time frame of 
only one month the appointed academics were supposed to ‘hold several 
meetings amongst themselves; conduct some preliminary research aimed at 
establishing the fundamental facts; if necessary pay a visit to the site; 
reconcile their views; compile a document, outlining the new intellectual 
framework’, and present it to the Minister by 23 July 1998.17 By 7 July some 
members of the panel were still unsure about the nature of the required 
document. In response to Prof Maphalala’s question whether the document 
was supposed to reflect the different views on the battle in one single 
document, Xulu stressed the need to produce a synthesised narrative in 
which different perspectives were ‘put together’ and reconciled after ‘fierce 
debate’. He added that ‘cabinet demands quick action on this issue’ and that 
                                                     
16  On 30 October 1998 a Seminar on the Re-interpretation of the Battle of 
Ncome/Blood River was held at the University of Zululand, where a number of 
academics presented papers (J. Carruthers, J. Laband, J. Sithole, L. Mathenjwa, 
J. Grobler, M. Kunene, J.J. Guy, F. Pretorius, J.S.H. Maphalala). Only two 
reports about the significance of the battle (by Laband and Grobler respectively) 
are still among the DAC’s files. Blood River, no Vol#, file 6/16/8. Progress 
Report on Legacy Project: Income – Blood River. See also Dlamini 2001.  
17  Quoted from Musa Xulu. Legacy Project: Blood River Memorial. Towards the 
re-interpretation of history. Undated. Laband file. PMB Archives. At a meeting 
on 25 May 1998, Xulu explained that the brief of the panel of historians would 
be ‘To put into the correct perspective what has already been written about the 
Battle of Blood River; to ensure that this research becomes the basis for future 
research in [the] cultural and political history of this county; to emerge with a 
focused and more intellectual interpretation’. 
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the purpose of the paper would be to ‘inform government and enable it to 
have a perspective, informed by historians’.18 
The prominent role the panel of historians played in developing the 
intellectual framework for the Ncome project may appear to contradict my 
earlier point about the side-lining of academic historians in the development 
of new heritage sites, but the Ncome case and the parameters set for the 
historians’ involvement is precisely indicative of my argument. Instead of 
organising a conference open to all historians and other academics with 
interest and expertise in the battle and its representation and commemoration 
in a post-apartheid context, the DACST invited a handful of selected 
academics to work under the pressure of time and conduct a debate the 
outcomes of which had been pre-determined by the government. As the short 
time frame prohibited undertaking any new research, the task was really one 
of synthesising existing ideological perspectives on the battle and reworking 
its symbolic meaning in the interest of specific political needs, notably 
reconciliation and nation-building. One could argue that the government 
engaged and utilised professional historians to assist with and lend 
legitimacy to the process of turning history into heritage. 
One might draw parallels here with what Azaryahu (2003) calls 
‘commissioned memory’ in the context of the ‘reorientation’ of the 
Buchenwald memorial site, the former Nazi concentration camp near 
Weimar. After German reunification in 1990, the East German paradigm of 
commemoration – focused on socialist resistance heroes and martyrs – was 
largely discredited in a state now dominated by West German authorities and 
alternative interpretations of the past. The government appointed a carefully 
selected panel of historians and tasked them with the development of a new 
symbolic meaning of this emotional site, relevant for a unified Germany. 
Azaryahu shows that 
… [g]iven the composition and concerns of the commission, the cultural 
production of the Nazi past was bound to conform with the dominant West 
German paradigm of memory as a juxtaposition of victims (most notably of 
Nazi-perpetrated genocide) and (German) perpetrators (2003: 11). 
The same procedure was applied in Berlin in 1993-4 in the context of the 
renaming of East Berlin streets. Commissioned memory, argues Azaryahu 
(2003: 17), is a strategy to direct memory formation while disguising the 
agency of the state, because public credibility was derived from the allegedly 
objective academic expertise.  
Back in South Africa, M. Kunene and C. Hamilton, both members of the 
academic panel of historians, produced a three-page document entitled 
                                                     
18  Minutes of the Meeting held on 07 July 1998, Re: Re-interpretation of the Battle 
of Income – Blood River, Laband file, PMB Archives. 
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‘Reconceptualising Monuments’ in which they ask challenging questions 
about the impending task of commemorating the battle of Blood 
River/Ncome.  
We are then faced with the question: why commemorate this battle? In 1998 this 
is by no means a simple question to answer. Do we wish to revisit the site to 
reverse the claim to racial domination and settlerism? For those for whom the 
symbolic laager is a bitter symbol of settler conquest: how would they want to 
remember the battle? … Do we wish to celebrate war, and especially a war 
between blacks and whites, whatever the heroicism on either side? Do we want 
to produce a monument that lends itself to use as political propaganda? (Kunene 
and Hamilton undated: 1, 2). 
Such critical comments could be interpreted as undermining the govern-
ment’s intention to build a Zulu monument at Ncome and the pre-determined 
outcome of academically bolstering the need for such monument. This was 
presumably not what the DACST expected from members of its appointed 
panel and it is not surprising that these comments had little impact on what 
was to be developed with great urgency during the following couple of 
months.  
Essentially, the Blood River/Ncome project was affected by precisely the 
same dilemma that I have highlighted for Freedom Park, namely the 
potentially contradictory objectives of reconciliation in the interest of nation-
building and the proud celebration of heroes who fought for resistance 
against oppression. The entire Ncome project, I argue, including the 
development of its historical framework, the conceptualisation of the heri-
tage site, the architectural signifiers of the completed monument, the 
museum exhibition, and the commemorative function on the day of the 
160th anniversary was characterised by this ambiguity, which opens up 
contradictory avenues for interpretation.  
Ncome as response to Blood River 
Dolf Havemann, Deputy Director of the Heritage Section of the DACST and 
in charge of supervising the Ncome planning process, conceived of the idea 
that the envisaged Wall of Remembrance should take the shape of the much 
celebrated horn-like Zulu attack formation, izimpondo zenyathi (horns of the 
buffalo), commonly used by the Zulus at the time and widely, although 
probably erroneously, believed to have been introduced by King Shaka. A 
few artists were invited to compete for the design of the monument, but its 
basic shape was never open for negotiation.19 Hall (e-mail communication 
                                                     
19  Although the architectural plans (now housed at the SAHRA head office in Cape 
Town) were drawn up by Pretoria-based architect, André Kriel, the initial design 
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2007) remarks that a monument/museum building of this kind was very 
much in line with the experience and expertise of Havemann, who had 
worked in the field of museum services under the old regime for many years.  
Some viewers may appreciate the concept of an architectural shape with 
recognisable references to Zulu cultural icons as a (re)conciliatory gesture. 
But others, especially perhaps older people, may perceive it as a patronising 
and even racist signal, because during the heydays of apartheid, government-
funded architectural developments in the ‘homelands’ (e.g. universities, 
administration buildings and especially any buildings with a ‘cultural’ 
purpose) were frequently designed to include ‘tribal’ iconographic 
references. In the heartland of KwaZulu for instance, the architecture of the 
KMC office and museum at Ondini outside of Ulundi (built in the 1980s) is 
inspired by a Zulu homestead, or umuzi, and the roof of the adjacent 
amphitheatre takes the shape of a traditional cowhide shield. The state 
presumably promoted this design approach to increase the level of 
identification that ‘homeland’ citizens would develop with ‘their’ 
institutions, as well as to imprint a discernible mark of difference onto the 
contemporary built landscape.  
But while an ethnically explicit approach to architectural design was 
certainly familiar territory to Havemann and perhaps others on the 
committee, I suspect that it was also precisely the narrative quality and 
explicitness of the Afrikaner Nationalist laager monument on the other side 
of the battle that prompted the Ncome Steering Committee to favour a 
narrative structure over an abstract memorial marker or a plain Wall of 
Remembrance. If the Blood River monument literally depicts the Voor-
trekker battle formation on the one side of the river, the shape of the Ncome 
monument likewise represents the Zulu fighting formation on the other side.  
The Ncome monument’s one-story structure consists of two roughly 
parallel plastered and painted masonry walls, describing a semi-circular 
‘horn’ shape, while the ground plan of the museum space inside recalls the 
shape of a shield. Metal shields with painted cowhide patterns representing 
the different regiments that fought in the battle are also mounted along the 
‘horn’s’ convex centre part, facing the Boer laager in a simulated front. The 
ox-wagon has become a key icon of Afrikaner culture (symbolising a home, 
a fortress and a church, according to the Blood River museum exhibition) 
and the strategically placed wagons played an important role in the 
Voortrekker victory. Likewise, certain animal horns are highly symbolic in 
traditional Zulu culture. Cattle horns, for instance, are linked with ancestral 
beliefs. The horns of the sacrificial cattle are traditionally placed on the hut 
of a deceased person and fulfill a commemorative function. The Zulu battle 
formation imitating the horns of the buffalo has not only become legendary 
                                                                                                                            
for the Ncome monument was made by Dolf Havemann’s son, who immediately 
produced a model and later happened to win the competition (Girshick 2004). 
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within Zulu culture, but is inter-culturally associated with the success and 
efficiency of the 19th century Zulu military machine.20  
In comparison, the expansive, dynamic architectural shape of the Ncome 
monument itself suggests Zulu aggression, while the bronze laager at Blood 
River looks defensive. This is in line with historical accounts of the battle, 
but it may also be seen to reinforce stereotypes of Zulu militarism and 
violence, while (unintentionally) bolstering conservative Afrikaner dis-
courses of a peaceful volk forced to defend itself against Zulu aggression. 
Although the Zulus lost the battle, the Ncome monument’s mise-en-scène of 
the historical battle formation can be interpreted as a celebration of Zulu 
military prowess, perpetuating common stereotypes about the ‘proud warrior 
nation’, simultaneously feared and admired. In that sense seems to be rather 
ironic that Mr Mtshali said at the opening ceremony: ‘Today’s event marks 
freedom from the yoke of many years of the divisive symbolism and 
dangerous stereotyping’ (quoted in Khumalo 1998).  
Museum exhibition 
The museum exhibition, which opened only a year later was developed 
under great pressure of time and was presented in a haphazard manner. For 
example, artefacts were displayed without labels indicating dates or regional 
provenance. Only one of the four glass cases displayed information on the 
battle. The rest contained Zulu ethnographic material such as weapons, 
beadwork, pottery, and baskets. They were borrowed from various museums 
in KZN and did not necessarily represent the specific styles and shapes 
typical for the region around Ncome. The emphasis on ethnographic material 
shifted attention away from the humiliating military defeat to a proud 
celebration of Zulu tradition and culture, represented as homogeneous, fixed 
and static, much in line with stereotypical tourist imagery (Girshick 2004: 
30-1; Dlamini 2001: 134). 
The museum exhibit of the battle itself, argues Dlamini (2001), did not 
reflect the findings of the collective report worked out by the academic panel 
                                                     
20  The inscribed shield in the centre carries an image of the Zulu headband worn by 
warriors, which mimics the laurel wreath on conventional Western war 
memorials. Below is the inscription ‘iMpi yase Ncome’ (the Zulu name of the 
battle) and the poetic verse: ‘Vezi, people will die, but their praises will remain, 
and mourn for them, where their homes used to be’. The last line implies that the 
fallen Zulus used to live around here, thus establishing a claim to the land in 
response to a long history of Afrikaner claims to the contrary. A more general 
reference to ‘redress’ can be found in the narrow passage between the two 
curved walls of the structure. The architectural shape here recalls the famous 
monument of the ‘Great Zimbabwe’ ruins, thus boldly reclaiming the heritage of 
this early civilisation, long presumed to be of white origin, for black Africans.  
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of historians, but was rather primarily guided by the radical Zulu nationalist 
interpretation of one member of the panel, namely Jabulani Maphalala (IFP), 
a Zulu nationalist historian from the University of Zululand. Maphalala was 
also extremely close to Xulu, who had become very involved and influential 
in the running of the Ncome project and made some crucial decisions 
including, in July 1999, the resolution to change the initially envisaged 
interpretation centre into a museum on Zulu culture (Girshick 2004; Hall e-
mail communication 2007). Dlamini (2001) argues that Xulu was key to the 
‘Ncome contradiction’, i.e. the project’s appropriation by Zulu nationalist 
forces, which succeeded in exploiting a national resource for the advance-
ment of partisan ethnic identity discourses, thereby contradicting the aims of 
the Legacy Project (2001: 132). While officially espousing the national 
government’s goal of reconciliation, Girshick (2004: 26) agrees, Mtshali’s 
main concern was to promote a particular Zulu version of the historical past 
and the notion of a heroic Zulu nation, much in line with IFP ideology.  
But considering the matter from an ANC perspective, one could also 
argue that by including Ncome in the National Legacy Project the ANC-led 
national government with its aims of national unity, non-racialism and non-
sectarianism ultimately retained some control over the site and what it 
should symbolise. This effectively pre-empted the IFP-led provincial 
government from devising its own commemorative venture at this 
contentious site, as happened, for instance, at the nearby battlefield of 
Isandlwana. Here, Amafa initiated a memorial similarly honouring the 
previously unrepresented Zulu dead with funding raised from the traditional 
Zulu leadership (Zwelethini 1999). Amidst much praise the project (unveiled 
in 1999) was also criticised, namely for fostering partisan ethnic identity 
discourses, the Zulu nationalist cause and IFP political party agendas, 
instead of representing a commemorative ‘message’ with which all South 
Africans could identify.21  
Furthermore, the fact that the Ncome monument/museum was designed 
to become an independent national museum, administered and managed 
directly by the DACST, indicates that the national government wanted to 
remain in charge of this important heritage site and keep it out of the sphere 
of influence of partisan forces. Due to logistical and funding difficulties, 
however, the government requested the Voortrekker Museum in Pieter-
maritzburg to administer Ncome. (This was intended as a temporary 
                                                     
21 ‘Why is a monument that celebrates Zuluness – not blackness, not South African-
ness, but distinctly Zuluness – being unveiled in the heart of a region that is 
being ripped apart by internecine violence’, asked Alex Dodd (1999) on the 
occasion of the official unveiling, which took place only months before the 
elections. She insinuates that the high-level appropriation of the new memorial 
for the Zulu nationalist cause was an attempt by the IFP to please the local voting 
community, known to consist overwhelmingly of IFP supporters. 
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measure.) Significantly, the Voortrekker Museum itself, which had 
previously focused exclusively on Afrikaner history, was by then in the 
process of transforming itself into an inclusive museum with exhibits 
representing all sectors of the local population.  
The initial exhibition inside the Ncome museum, which was so roundly 
criticised by both Dlamini and Girshick, was soon changed, not least perhaps 
as a result of the turbulent internal politics within the DACST.22 Much of the 
originally displayed ethnographic material has been removed and the focus 
is now on the representation of the battle and the historical circumstances 
that surrounded the conflict. Along the left-hand wall of the museum a 
combination of glass cases and larger objects on open display are arranged 
under the following headings: Amabutho – Age regiments; Women at War; 
Medicinal Plants; Traditional Weapons; and Sotho Material Culture. The 
inclusion of the role of women and the display on Sotho culture arguably 
pre-empt critiques about an ethnically and gender-exclusive perspective. The 
right-hand side contains small artefacts in continuous glass cases with ample 
explanations on labels and text panels, detailing the historical context of the 
Zulu kingdom, the events leading up to the battle, and the course of the 
actual battle.23 
The final glass case before the exit, dedicated to the Dingane-Retief 
agreement, is arguably the most important display in contesting the 
Afrikaner version of the battle. A copy of the alleged treaty between Piet 
Retief and the Zulu king is shown with the accompanying text questioning 
how the latter, who was illiterate, could have signed his name ‘King 
Dingaan’.24 This particular display is significant firstly in terms of its 
content, because it discredits a piece of paper that has long played a crucial 
                                                     
22  When Ben Ngubane returned to the Ministry (in 1999), he clashed badly with 
Xulu and his adherents. Xulu was suspended (in mid-2000) and subsequently 
dismissed on charges of misconduct, while Havemann left soon after (Hall e-
mail to author, April 20, 2007; SA Government Information 2000).  
23  Topic headings are as follows (from the entrance): The Zulu kingdom and its 
political framework. Life in KwaZulu. Healers. King-in-council. NoMgungu-
ndlovu. Royal Palace. Protection. Causes of the Ncome War. Retief’s arrival. 
Death of Retief. Aftermath of Retief’s death. The Zulus prepare for war. Women 
in the war. Regiments leaving. Women’s Drift. Attack. Dingane passed away. 
Dingane Retief agreement. 
24  Captions and labels in the display case entitled ‘Dingane Retief agreement’ read 
as follows: ‘King Dingane was illiterate, and land in the Kingdom of KwaZulu 
was indivisible and could not be partitioned into farms. Land was regarded as an 
important resource given to the people by God. It was only the King who could 
give people residential sites’. ‘Amakhosi, i.e. “chiefs” in the 1880’s were putting 
crosses when they signed but here it is said that Dingane signed the document. 
Does this make sense?’ ‘Did he really sign or is this a fake signature?’ 
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role in legitimising Afrikaner claims to the land.25 Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, it makes a fundamental point about historiography and its 
methodology in direct response to the Blood River museum.  
Both the exhibition and the video in the Blood River museum were 
changed in 2002 after the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria took over the 
administration and management of Blood River.26 Wall panels with images 
and abundant text are mounted all along the walls and a display case with 
various artefacts occupies the centre of the room. The exhibition and the 
video now acknowledge the existence of other perspectives on the battle and 
its historical context, although there is still an unmistakable subtext 
privileging the traditional Afrikaner version. In part this is achieved by 
emphasizing that the Afrikaner narrative of the battle is based entirely on 
‘written sources’, presumed to be reliable and accurate (according to an 
older, Western school of thought), while the Zulu version is based on oral 
history, and by implication must therefore be largely fictitious. 
In their predominantly one-sided, nationalist orientation, both museums 
nevertheless remain skewed reflections of each other. In fact, the new 
commemorative development at Ncome echoes its existing ideological 
counterpart at Blood River in almost every respect. Although members of 
the Steering committee had proposed that Ncome should not become a 
monument in the conventional, western sense, but rather a place of 
pilgrimage which would serve the local community both culturally and 
economically (Girshick 2004: 26-7), the end result is just as much a 
monument as the bronze laager on the other side of the river. Virtually every 
facility and activity offered on the one side is replicated on the other. For 
instance, just as the Blood River site is used for Afrikaner cultural events, 
especially on 16 December, various Zulu (and Sotho) cultural activities are 
performed at the Ncome site.27 A kind of flower and herb garden can be 
                                                     
25  The official Blood River guide book (published in 2000 and reprinted in 2007) 
reproduces the hand-written treaty document and spells out its exact wording. 
The introductory paragraph explains that ‘in this treaty Dingane ceded all the 
land between the Tugela and the Umzimvubu rivers to the Boers’ (d’Assonville, 
V.E. 2007: 10). 
26  Several other changes were made to the site, including the modification of the 
roof of the museum building, the upgrading of the on-site tourist accommodation 
and the caravan park, as well as the installation of an automatic access gate to the 
fenced-in site. The older version of the video was still sold in the museum shop 
for a few years subsequently (but not any more). 
27  According to the information brochure (2004), the most important annual event 
at Blood River is the Vow commemoration on 16 December, which includes a 
church service and listening to the history of the battle as told by historians. 
Traditional Voortrekker activities such as baking bread, fixing wagon wheels or 
horse riding are also demonstrated. Cultural events at Ncome include monthly 
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found on both sides of the river, and the cairn on the Blood River battlefield 
finds its counterpart in a newly established cairn or isivivane at Ncome, 
where each visitor is requested to add a stone. Blood River offers tourist 
accommodation, and similar accommodation is currently under construction 
at Ncome.28 In 2004 the Voortrekker Museum published a visitor informa-
tion brochure on the ‘Ncome-Blood River Heritage Site’, a simple photo-
copied A4 folded leaflet, which provides all of the relevant information for 
Blood River on the one side and for Ncome on the other.  
Ncome: success or failure?  
‘Two monuments at the site of the battle, commemorating the participation 
of both sides, will complete the symbolism’, said a satisfied Lionel Mtshali 
at the opening of the Ncome monument in December 1998 (quoted in 
Schnehage 1998). Some might, however, rather agree with Jabulani 
Maphalala’s view (personal interview 2005) that the Ncome monument on 
the other side of the river constitutes an ‘apartheid-style solution’ to the 
problem of publicly commemorating a contested battle. To him the very 
existence of the Ncome monument/museum testifies to the failure of this 
Legacy Project’s reconciliatory aim, because the two monuments, facing 
each other like two hostile camps, ostensibly perpetuate old divisions. 
Indeed, the construction of Ncome as an entirely separate monument and 
museum was ultimately the result of a failure to modify the existing 
commemorative site at Blood River to be more inclusive, and notably to 
represent a re-interpreted battle narrative in the newly established Blood 
River museum.  
Much has been made of the fact that the pragmatically and especially 
symbolically significant foot bridge between the two sides of the battle field 
was never constructed. In fact, the sight of the unutilized concrete pylons 
already constructed in the river brazenly highlights the absence of the bridge 
up to the present day. A range of different reasons for the delay has been 
suggested, but ultimately, as Maphalala aptly put it, ‘the bridge must start in 
the mind’ (personal interview 2005). The problems and contradictions 
surrounding the Ncome project are evidence of the continuing tensions 
between the utopian vision of a non-racial society, at peace with the world 
and itself, and the daily reality of a deeply divided society, segments of 
which are highly defensive and adamantly resistant to change and 
reconciliation, despite the national government’s efforts in that direction. 
                                                                                                                            
performances of isiZulu and seSotho traditional songs, as well as displays of 
traditional isiZulu/Sotho food, dress and dances.  
28  More precisely, at the time of writing (February 2008), earthworks for such 
accommodation facilities have been completed, as well as paving and parking 
bays, but actual construction has not yet started. 
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The unveiling ceremony of the Ncome monument on 16 December 1998 
revealed precisely these fissures. The occasion was marked by lavish 
festivities attended by thousands of people, which included many dignitaries, 
traditional leaders (amaKhosi), representatives of various Afrikaner organis-
ations, international tourists and foreign media representatives. Many of the 
speeches and statements delivered on that occasion focused on reconciliation 
between Afrikaner and Zulu people as the primary objective and significance 
of the new monument, and prominent representatives of both constituencies 
engaged in symbolic gestures of reconciliation.29  
But the festivities were also marred by interference from Afrikaner right-
wingers, who displayed their strong disapproval and resistance to the notion 
of reconciliation (Milazi 1998). This overture was followed, during 
subsequent years, by occasional incidents of racial discrimination against 
black visitors by white racists, especially on the public holiday of 16 
December, the Day of Reconciliation, which sometimes escalated into 
outbursts of hatred and abuse (e.g. Courier 2004). Since the Voortrekker 
Monument took over the administration of Blood River, the two museums or 
the two sides of the same battlefield are now administered by separate 
entities, one arguably associated with inclusiveness and transformation, the 
other with an ideologically repositioned, albeit still exclusive Afrikaner 
identity.  
Despite this, I believe the Ncome project in general and the specific 
question of whether or not it achieved its officially intended objective should 
not be judged too quickly. To what extent monuments and memorials can 
contribute to reconciliation is in any case difficult if not impossible to 
measure. It must be acknowledged that reconciliation is always a long-term 
process or a work in progress, and that different viewers or groups of 
stakeholders might perceive the project and its success differently. More-
over, Girshick (2004) rightly raises the question of whether reconciliation 
and redress are indeed always compatible goals. One might say that at 
Ncome a bold statement of resistance, reflecting a radical Zulu nationalist 
perspective, might be necessary in order to achieve a balanced representation 
of the past and an effective counterpoint to the conventional Afrikaner 
version of the battle, which can be considered radical in its own right.  
                                                     
29  ‘Freedom Front leader Constand Viljoen and Blood River Foundation Chairman 
Hennie de Wet crossed from the Afrikaner monument to the Ncome monument 
on the other side of Blood River, to extend the hand of goodwill and 
reconciliation’ (Bishop 1998).  
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Multiple interpretations 
However, as much as I agree that one can plausibly interpret Ncome as a 
Zulu nationalist statement, it is important to emphasize that this is not the 
only meaning of Ncome. For instance, while the iconographic references 
support a reading of both monuments as two hostile camps facing each other 
and frozen in time, some visitors may also interpret the widely opened U-
shape of the Ncome monument/museum as an embracing form reaching out 
to the other side in a gesture of reconciliation. Likewise, not all visitors will 
interpret the museum displays in the same manner and much depends on the 
narrative and attitude of the on-site guide and especially the guide that any 
visiting groups may bring along. In short, I argue that a potential ambiguity 
pervades many aspects of the project, opening up a possible multiplicity of 
interpretations and meanings, a potentiality which can be considered an asset 
and which decisively impacts on the question of whether or not the project 
was a success in terms of its stated objectives.  
Schönfeldt-Aultman (2006), although unequivocally endorsing the 
interpretation of Ncome as a Zulu nationalist statement, makes an important 
contribution to the debate by illustrating the possibility of multiple 
interpretations. The author engages with the politics of representation and 
specifically with an examination of Zulu identity through the visual 
signifiers of the monument structure and the museum exhibition. He includes 
a detailed and very personal interpretation of various aspects Ncome, 
including the colour, shape and position of the building and the multiple 
meanings it communicates to him about Zulu identities (2006: 222).  
For instance, the author contemplates the possibility of a symbolic 
meaning of the pinkish colour painted on the exterior of the plastered 
building. Noting that the same colour frequently appears in Zulu beadwork, 
pottery and other crafts produced by women, he suggests that ‘the colour 
may be intended to call attention to women’s role in Zulu society’ (ibid.). He 
then considers the meaning of pink in Zulu beadwork, which he says 
(drawing on Hilgard S. Schoeman) alludes to  
… poverty, laziness, high birth and rank, oath, and promise. Thus the colour 
simultaneously symbolises the significant role of women in the Zulu warrior 
nation, the still poor rural Zulu people, the royal blood and identity claims of 
Zulus, and a new covenant to a new South Africa (ibid.).  
The author carries on relating pink to ‘the red blood bled by Zulus and … 
slightly sunburned white skin’ (ibid.: 223), based on which he develops 
some thoughts about Zulu and Afrikaner identity.30  
                                                     
30  My own speculation about the choice of the pink-reddish colour is that it may 
have been inspired by the red face-brick finish of the Blood River museum on 
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Not everyone will consider these suggestions plausible. Some may find them 
far-fetched or even completely outlandish, but the example illustrates the 
range of personal interpretations that are possible when an individual 
encounters a museum or in fact a cultural product of any kind. It illustrates 
the potential for an accidental accrual of meaning(s) that can never be 
controlled or predicted and that may contradict or subvert the originally 
intended meaning. The issue of communication and multiple interpretations 
in the museum and heritage context has gained much attention in scholarship 
internationally (e.g. Mason 2005) and has influenced scholarly work on 
museums in South Africa (e.g. Coombes 2003; Rassool 2006; Witz 2006). 
The ensuing understanding of the audience (or the tourists) as consumers 
and, more importantly, producers of meaning represents a paradigm shift 
away from the central role of the curator or, as in the case of Ncome, the 
institutional-political forces that initiate and shape the project and its 
meaning. 
Recalling Harrison’s concept of the ‘expansionary contest’, the Ncome 
project, as well as Freedom Park and a host of other new post-apartheid 
monuments installed in deliberate juxtaposition with older markers, 
challenges historical narratives once officially sanctioned, and implicitly 
contests identity discourses once associated with these monuments. One 
might say the aim of the new, competing identity symbols was indeed to 
neutralise or displace the existing ones without physically destroying them. 
To some extent this strategy has succeeded as both the Blood River and the 
Voortrekker Monument have been ideologically repositioned and their 
management now officially dissociates itself from the exclusive, racist 
discourses defended by the minute ultraconservative Afrikaner community. 
Although this process was driven from within the constituency that these 
monuments presumably represent, the impetus clearly came from the outside 
– a response to pressures induced by the advent of a new socio-political 
order. 
On the other extreme of the spectrum, however, the construction of post-
apartheid counterparts made the continued existence of the Afrikaner 
monuments possible and even desirable. Both the Blood River Monument 
and the VTM are now receiving government subsidies and the sites have 
been ideologically repositioned (although arguably less successfully so in the 
case of Blood River) to form popular tourist attractions. The lack of physical 
changes has allowed them to retain their integrity and their originally 
                                                                                                                            
the other side of the river. It must be considered that the colour has probably 
faded somewhat over the years and may originally have appeared more reddish 
than pink. In South Africa plastered sections of a brick building are sometimes 
painted in reddish colour if the intention is to blend in the two or aesthetically 
minimize the difference.  
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intended meaning as identity symbols in the eyes of the conservative 
minority. 
Countering contested heritage  
As the material evidence of newly unveiled (ignoring the proposed) monu-
ments and statues increases at a phenomenal rate throughout the country, it is 
striking to note how many of these commemorative ventures fit the pattern 
of strategic juxtaposition. I argue that all of these new monuments are more 
or less purposefully conceptualised in response to the discursive meaning, as 
encapsulated in visual signifiers and textual inscriptions, of the related 
existing symbolic markers. The new monuments highlight absences of 
representation and break the monologue of the official historical record. 
They pose counter-narratives to exclusive interpretations of the past and re-
inscribe a history previously invalidated. In each case, the new 
commemorative object derives part of its intended meaning from the 
presence and specific ‘message’ of the older monument. I maintain that apart 
from the ideological content of the new counterpart, its mere presence opens 
up new discourses which invariably affect the existing older monument, 
possibly subverting but at least inflecting its intended meaning.  
There are of course examples in other countries, notably in the United 
States, where public monuments and statuary representing previously 
marginalised sectors of the population (notably African-Americans, Native 
American Indians and women) have been installed in recent years to render 
the existing symbolic landscape more multifaceted and discursive, and to 
challenge the hegemony of existing commemorative markers. I have referred 
to the Arthur Ashe statue in Richmond, Virginia, before, but despite the 
statue’s challenge to the racist ideological values of the Confederacy, the 
tennis star does not belong to the same historical context or conceptual 
category as the military leaders that populate the symbolic landscape of 
Monument Avenue. In other words, the Arthur Ashe statue does not tell ‘the 
other side’ of the Confederate story, but an altogether different (although in 
some ways related) story.  
In other southern states, too, ‘black heritage’ has officially been added to 
‘white heritage’ through the public monuments that celebrate influential 
leaders of the Civil Rights movement, or mark sites where race riots took 
place, or testify to other key events in the history of African-American 
emancipation (Romano and Raiford 2006).31 Although they are not 
                                                     
31  Especially since the early 1990s, a substantial effort has been made in this 
regard. Examples of such sites include the Martin Luther King Jr National 
Historic Site in Atlanta; the Benjamin Elijah Mays National Memorial at 
Morehouse College in Atlanta; the Rosa Parks/Bus Boycott Historical 
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necessarily placed in the immediate vicinity or with direct conceptual 
reference to a specific older monument, in the broader sense these additions 
certainly respond to the distortions of and absences from the symbolic 
landscape that have become contested as a result of shifting power relations 
and identity discourses. An excellent example in another part of the country 
is the memorial at the Battle of Little Bighorn in Montana, South Dakota, the 
Native Indian response to the famous late 19th century memorial at Last 
Stand Hill, which pays tribute to Custer’s Last Stand. 
The South African approach to reshaping the commemorative landscape, 
it seems to me, is inspired by such precedents but applies the principle far 
more consciously and systematically, not least perhaps because the 
commemorative effort is directed by the state. From national to local level 
one can detect a determination to seek out opportunities for complementing 
old with new monuments, juxtaposing one set of symbols and values with 
another, establishing an historical and conceptual relationship between old 
and new, and reaching out in reconciliatory gestures and building 
metaphorical bridges.  
Monuments as critical response versus ‘counter-monuments’ 
In his seminal article on the ‘Counter-Monument’, James E Young (1992) 
discusses examples from Germany that involve the matching of war 
memorials, perceived to glorify war and propagate imperialist values, with a 
‘critical comment’ in the form of a ‘counter-monument’. Based on his 
definition, the term counter-monument is now commonly understood as 
referring to a structure or artistic work that not only confronts an existing 
monument, highlighting its bias and challenging its intended ‘message’, but 
also fundamentally contests or interrogates the tradition, conventions and 
functions of monuments and memorials.  
Examples include Esther Shalev-Gerz and Jochen Gerz’ 1993 Memorial 
against fascism in Hamburg-Harburg or Horst Hoheisel’s Memorial in front 
of the City Hall in Kassel (1987). These counter-monuments seek to invert 
the basic characteristics of a conventional monument. Both Gerz and 
Hoheisel, for instance, counter the visibility and durability of the 
conventional monument with a structure that disappears into the ground and 
is no longer visible. Jochmann (2001: 23) sums up Young’s position on the 
counter-monument, as espoused in various publications, thus. The counter-
monument seeks to provoke. It demands interaction. It is not fixed, but 
meant to change constantly. It asks to be touched, even violated or 
vandalized. Rather than claiming eternal presence and visibility, it is meant 
                                                                                                                            
Monument in Montgomery, Alabama; or the Civil Rights Memorial in the same 
city. 
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to make itself invisible or even destroy itself. The invisibility of the counter-
monument, or the effort required in detecting a trace of it, turns 
remembering into an active, conscious process and prompts questions not 
only about the memory of the event commemorated there but about memory 
itself. 
From such fundamentally negating works, which could also be called 
‘anti-monuments’, another type of counter-monument or counter-memorial 
is sometimes distinguished, exemplified by Alfred Hrdlicka’s well-known 
Hamburg Memorial against War and Fascism (1986; incomplete), which 
formulates a critical response to an existing war memorial on the site 
(erected in 1936).32 A more recent example is Jenny Holzer’s ‘Black 
Garden’ in Nordhorn, Germany (Sachs 2000). Although these examples do 
not seek to invert the basic prerogatives of the memorial tradition, they must 
be classified as works of public art, not as commemorative monuments. 
They usually represent one individual artist’s personal vision in critically 
commenting upon an existing monument, and do not have a memorialising 
function in their own right. This is what distinguishes them fundamentally 
from the current post-apartheid commemorative practice in South Africa.  
Although they are also often referred to as ‘counter-memorials’ or 
‘counter-monuments’ (especially in the media), post-apartheid commorative 
markers are always conventional monuments in their own right. They don’t 
question the monument genre as a medium of commemoration – on the 
contrary, they affirm it. The new monument may interrogate the existing 
marker’s intended message, perhaps undermining its credibility, but it 
essentially respects the integrity of the older monument and acknowledges 
its validity as a potentially important symbol for a specific community. In 
that sense it seeks to foster reconciliation rather than to provoke 
confrontation.  
Imitating western models of commemoration 
The notion that a material object such as a monument can come to stand for 
memories and thus prolong or preserve such memories, theoretically 
indefinitely, is based on the Western tradition of memory (Forty 1999). The 
concept of statues on pedestals and solid commemorative monuments and 
memorials is deeply rooted in Western culture. European culture, based on 
                                                     
32  The terms ‘counter-monument’ and ‘counter-memorial’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably and at other times distinguished in a confusing manner. 
According to Jochmann (2001) in German the distinction is drawn between 
‘Gegendenkmal’ and ‘Gegen-Monument’. This cannot be accurately translated 
into English as the two German words largely signify the same in English, which 
confirms the point I made in the Introduction about the importance of language 
in defining different types of commemorative structures. 
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the Greco-Roman heritage, was distinguished historically by its emphasis on 
the individual’s relationship with the physical and cultural environment. The 
human sense of constant transformation and change fostered the need for 
symbols of stability or permanence in the external world. This trend had a 
far-reaching impact on many aspects of Western culture, including art, 
architecture and the formation of cities (Koshar 2000: 292). It is epitomised 
in the commemorative monument, made of the most durable material 
available or affordable to its initiators. The commemorative monument is the 
penultimate symbol of stability and permanence as it is established precisely 
with the intention of preserving specific memories for eternity, thus 
enshrining a specific set of (present) values as normative for future 
generations. In the broader context of the commemorative politics of a 
particular nation-state, the values encoded in the officially endorsed memory 
landscape serve as a basis upon which the dominant socio-political order 
rests, thus presumably ensuring its own stability and permanence. 
As said earlier, the practice of erecting commemorative monuments and 
statues was exported to various parts of the world, including South Africa, 
through European colonialism, and often pursued quite vigorously in an 
attempt at inscribing settler-dominated histories. In the current post-
apartheid context, which is characterised by claims of support for the 
‘African Renaissance’ and indigenous knowledge systems accompanied by a 
climate of widespread critique targeted at the country’s entrenched 
Eurocentric cultural practices, the enthusiastic push for installing public 
monuments and bronze statues imitating Western, Eurocentric, or Victorian 
models attracts much academic critique (e.g. Nettleton 2003; Maré 2002 and 
2002a; Küsel in SAHRA Monuments project report 2003). Some even 
advocate an immediate moratorium on the construction of new monuments 
on the basis that such objects have never been part of African culture and are 
completely inappropriate in the current post-apartheid South African context. 
Instead, it is suggested, more suitable (presumably ‘Afrocentric’) ways 
should be found to symbolically represent and memorialise the sacrifices, 
values and achievements of the new order. This may not necessarily involve 
the construction of tangible objects but could include the dedication of 
buildings or bursaries to past leaders, as well as works of creative art or 
ephemeral performance-type phenomena in allusion to traditions of oral 
history and indigenous memory practices. Before I engage with what I 
perceive as the flaws in this position, I want to interrogate its key point of 
contention, namely the imitation of colonial monument conventions.  
There are, of course, compelling pragmatic reasons for imitating, or 
rather continuing, established traditions of public memorialisation. The 
urgency with which new monuments are perceived to be needed precludes 
the time-intensive (and perhaps impossible) task of finding an original, 
unprecedented aesthetic, or an altogether different commemorative practice, 
perhaps derived from indigenous traditions, yet modern and inclusive. Once 
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the medium has been adopted, a more or less conventional style and 
iconography are likely to follow, as anywhere in the world the public 
monument tends to be a conservative genre. New monuments often recycle 
the visual language, the conceptual formulae and aesthetic strategies of 
acclaimed older models. Famous international examples serve as sources of 
inspiration or emulation and are adapted for local needs (Michalski 1998).  
Emulation may not be intended. In fact it may even be explicitly rejected 
in theory, as in some cases in South Africa, but it nevertheless occurs in 
practice, unwittingly or unconsciously. Nnamdi Elleh observed the same 
trend in the architectural design and urban planning of new post-colonial 
African capitals, where builders often believed they were ‘producing the 
antithesis of the colonial legacy, yet they tended to recoup all of the 
characteristics of the colonial projects’ (Elleh quoted in Peffer 2004: 96). 
Sculptors, architects or designers who conceptualise and physically create 
monuments are influenced by the formal and informal training they received 
in the past,33 by their personal or mediated experiences of contemporary and 
historical examples encountered in their surrounding or elsewhere in the 
world, and – not least – by current discourses and international trends in art 
and design.34 Today modern information technology allows images of 
famous memorials from all around the world to be obtained at the touch of a 
button. The many glossy magazines and academic journals in the fields of 
art, architecture and design disseminate images of new memorials in the 
global arena, and the accessibility of international air-travel facilitates first-
hand experience of such structures.35 All of these factors contribute to the 
                                                     
33  For instance, descriptive naturalism as the preferred style for post-apartheid 
monuments has always been favoured in South African monumental sculpture 
(Rankin 1991) and a sense of continuity with this tradition is not least provided 
through institutions of formal training and through the employment of certain 
architects and sculptors who are often awarded public commissions based on 
their reputation and prestige.  
34  This is by no means a new phenomenon. One might consider, for instance, the 
formal parallels between the South African Voortrekker Monument, the German 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal and the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. 
Michalski’s (1998) survey of monuments in the 19th and 20th centuries includes 
numerous examples of the international recycling of commemorative forms and 
concepts, sometimes even affecting monuments that represent opposite 
ideological values. It was common that monument designers, especially 
architects in charge of large and prestigious commemorative structures, would 
travel to other countries in search of inspiration and consult illustrations in a 
variety of publications. 
35  Top management officials and project leaders from the Freedom Park Trust, for 
instance, have undertaken a number of exploratory trips to visit monuments, 
memorials and museums in Europe, the United States and other parts of the 
world to gather information and gain a personal experience of state-of-the-art 
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fact that certain types of commemorative vocabulary and symbolic strategies 
gain international currency and hegemony.  
Thornton (1996: 139) maintains that one of the most profound conti-
nuities connecting the postcolonial state with the colonial one is found in the 
resilience of administrative practices. Although frequently being ‘culturally 
revalued’ in the post-colony, the appropriation of the colonial administrative 
forms can be defined as one of the hallmarks of the post-colony. Monuments 
– sometimes funded by the private sector or civil society, but endorsed and 
administrated by local or national government structures – could in this 
sense be interpreted as a conventional form of administering (i.e. managing, 
controlling and institutionalising) public memory, a conventional form 
which was introduced by the coloniser and is now being continued, albeit re-
valued.  
The field of postcolonial studies offers more distinctly politically or 
ideologically motivated explanations for the trend towards imitation of 
colonial models, which commonly manifests itself in previously colonised 
societies after the attainment of independence. A frequently cited argument 
for such mimicry, especially the postcolonial order’s tendency to replace the 
envied yet despised symbols of the coloniser with similar symbols of its 
own, draws on René Girard’s (1987) concept of ‘mimetic desire’. The 
previously oppressed have an urge to ‘get even’ with those who have 
oppressed them. Girard saw this coveting and attempting to emulate an 
object of desire produced by the model group as a potentially violent 
process, whereby the model is eventually eliminated out of the desire to 
appropriate its identity (Girard 1987; Maré 2002 and 2002a).  
This reasoning insinuates that the trend towards imitation of established 
models is a characteristic behaviour found specifically in previously colo-
nised societies. But historical evidence shows that the appropriation of 
forms, styles and symbols associated with the past order, building on 
existing traditions, is general commemorative practice among all peoples 
(Koshar 2000: 118). During the early Christian period, for instance, artists 
habitually appropriated the style and much of the iconography of established 
pagan art traditions to express new religious values. The Soviet Union 
vigorously embraced academic realism, a style promoted by the late 19th 
century bourgeoisie, to express distinctly anti-bourgeois ideological values 
in its public art and sculptural monuments.  
Drawing on foundational texts of postcolonial theory, notably The 
Empire Writes Back by Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (1989) and De-
scribing Empire by Tiffin and Lawson (1994), a related although less 
vindictive perspective can be proposed. The notion of ‘writing back’ evoked 
in these texts involves the appropriation and utilisation of the coloniser’s 
                                                                                                                            
commemorative structures in the international arena, which might be useful for 
the conceptualisation and design of Freedom Park. 
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language for the purpose of articulating subversive messages of resistance or 
countering the biased record. ‘Just as fire can be fought with fire, textual 
control can be fought with textuality’, explained Tiffin and Lawson (1994: 
10) about one of the primary strategies of postcolonial response. The 
postcolonial agent can express him/herself in similar ways, appropriating the 
same means utilised by the coloniser in order to ‘write back’ or ‘de-scribe’.36 
Applied to the field of public commemoration, one might say, the 
postcolonial or post-apartheid society imitates or appropriates the comme-
morative language (the solid monument as medium and the specific 
conventions of its visual and textual language) of the coloniser or apartheid 
oppressor to ‘write back’ or ‘describe’, to counter the latter’s ideology or 
‘correct’ its biased representations.37  
Lüsebrink (1999: 417-8) explains that postcolonial historical conscious-
ness is often constructed as a counter-discourse to the colonial representation 
of local history, driven by heroic leaders (Replikstruktur). As the coloniser 
used statues to parade his heroes, the post-colonial society identifies its own 
heroes and likewise celebrates them through statues in a deliberate or 
subconscious act of appropriating the coloniser’s own visual and 
commemorative ‘language’. Harrison’s (1995) concept of ‘innovation 
contests’, the competitive creation of traditions and symbolic forms in 
competition with the symbols of another, specifically a (previously) 
hegemonic order, also applies here. As Harrison (1995: 263) states, 
there is at any particular time, a more or less agreed minimal complex of 
symbols that a political entity should have in order to be understood as a nation 
state or, indeed, even to be understood as a political movement having 
aspirations to nation statehood. 
In other words, the new socio-political order in South Africa needs 
monuments to be taken seriously as a nation state, because establishing 
monuments (just as designing a flag or coat of arms, adopting a national 
anthem, or inventing other national symbols) is a time-honoured, 
internationally accepted practice in representing a nation or political entity. 
Harrison (1995: 262) emphasizes that innovation contests are always 
based on the similarity of symbols.  
                                                     
36  Wallace (1990: 126-7) reminds us that ‘blacks have “imitated” white Western 
languages, literatures, religions, music, dance, dress and family life, but with a 
“signifyin’” difference’. 
37  This strategy rests on the premise that the binary nature of colonial discourse is 
ambiguous and may even be self-contradictory. The prime example of such 
active rewriting of existing ‘texts’ is Sexwale’s re-interpretation of the 
Voortrekker Monument discussed earlier. Here, the postcolonial agent creates 
his/her own voice by appropriating the coloniser’s discourse and subverting or 
inverting it.  
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The point is that the act of producing these representations is not only an 
assertion of an identity separate from other clans; it is also an assertion of 
equality with these other clans and a newly-created symbol must therefore 
resemble the corresponding symbols of rival groups and belong to the same 
genre, as well as differ from them. 
Just as making the new monuments ‘different’ from the existing ones in 
some important way is a necessary strategy, so imitating western 
commemorative models and notably those derived from the colonial / 
apartheid past is as much a strategy necessary to rendering the new symbols 
legitimate, authentic and authoritative. Designing these important symbolic 
structures in any other way, especially if that implies less durability, 
visibility, monumentality or (perceived) dignity, might be a statement of 
their diminished importance (Ross, personal communication 2003-04).  
This perspective explains why many people’s idea of a ‘proper 
monument’ is a highly conventional granite memorial or a realistically 
rendered bronze statue on a pedestal. Through time-honoured usage in 
colonial monuments, bronze as the preferred material for sculptural 
monuments, in particular, has acquired a symbolic value, which is not only 
desirable, but largely non-negotiable as the guarantor of dignity and status.38 
A strong sense of competition and comparison between the commemorative 
products of the old regime and those representing the new order pervades 
many new monument proposals and designs.39 Expectations of dignity, 
monumentality, longevity and grandeur, as frequently expressed in 
monument proposals, clearly reveal an aspiration to emulate the visual 
appearance of the commemorative markers of the previous era.  
Some examples of monuments as critical response: battlefield 
memorials 
As a result of South Africa’s volatile history, many battles have been fought 
throughout the country, including the Xhosa border wars, the Anglo-Zulu 
                                                     
38  Given the material value of bronze and the frequency with which such sculptures 
are vandalised or completely removed for their scrap metal value, one could 
argue that the authorities would be well advised to encourage an exploration of 
other materials or the use of a fiberglass imitation of bronze. However, I believe 
that there would be strong resistance to such suggestions, because the inferiority 
of the medium would be perceived as an insult to the hero to be honoured. 
39  The Provincial Leader of the ANC and KZN Minister of Transport at the time, 
S’bu Ndebele, for instance, urged that a ‘lasting monument’ should be erected in 
honour of the local Indian community in Durban. ‘Just as we have a monument 
for the 1820 British settlers in Grahamstown, the Indian community, too should 
be similarly honoured’ (Ndebele quoted in Yoganathan 2000; my emphasis). 
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wars, the Voortrekker wars against the Ndebele and the Zulus, and the 
(South African) Anglo-Boer War. Parallelling the case of Blood River, on 
virtually every battlefield in the country the visitor encounters one or more 
memorials, in some cases even elaborate monuments and museums, 
celebrating the victory or mourning the losses of exclusively white 
combatants. Following the Ncome model, other battlefields in KZN have 
since been equipped with memorials dedicated to the formerly unrepresented 
Zulu warriors. This measure is meant not only to redress past bias but also to 
provide a more meaningful visitor experience. Monuments are photogenic 
visual markers and natural focal points for tourists. They can assist the 
visitor in visualizing the course of the battle, hence contributing to ‘bringing 
history alive’. They provide a sense of tangible experience where there is 
objectively nothing to see.  
The most notable example is the new memorial at Isandlwana, described 
earlier, which commemorates the fallen Zulus in the famous Anglo-Zulu 
battle of 1879, in which the British army, led by Lord Chelmsford and 
equipped with Martini Henry rifles, was defeated by 24 000 Zulu warriors in 
the service of King Cetshwayo equipped with the iklwa stabbing spear 
(Laband 1995). Despite this glorious victory, the Zulus probably suffered 
much higher casualties than the British and could ultimately not stop the 
expansion of British colonisation and the occupation of their land – 
including that of the very battlefield. Over the years, several plain memorials 
were set up in different locations on the battlefield to commemorate the 
fallen British soldiers,40 of which there were over one thousand.41  
The new Zulu memorial was unveiled by King Goodwill Zwelethini on 
21 January 1999, the day of the 120th anniversary of the battle (Gowans 
1999; Anonymous 2001b; Dodd 1999; Zwelethini 1999). It consists of a low 
circular concrete base upon which four traditional headrests and a Zulu isiqu 
made of bronze are placed.42  
                                                     
40  Different constituencies erected these memorials over time. A few of them 
commemorate named individuals, others a specific group of people. For instance, 
one was set up in 1913 by ex-members and members of the Natal Mounted 
Police and Natal Police, and another in 1969 by the Old Boys of Pietermaritz-
burg High School (Maritzburg College) to commemorate their fallen fellows of 
decades past. The Historical Monuments Commission furthermore erected an 
inscribed battlefield marker explaining the significance of the battle (undated).  
41  Laband (1995: 227) reports that the British dead numbered 52 officers, 727 white 
and 471 black troops. The number of dead Zulus is more difficult to ascertain. 
There were certainly no less than 1000 immediate casualties, although many 
more died later of their injuries (ibid.: 229). 
42  Incidentally, the curved shape of the Isandlwana memorial can also be read as 
referring to this battle formation (Gowans 1999; Swart, personal conversation 
2005). Swart himself agrees with this reading, but insists that he was not 
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Photo 9.3 Battlefield of Isandlwana (near Dundee). Example of several 
memorials erected in honour of British colonial victims of the battle. 
Although the precise meaning of the isiqu (plural: iziqu) appears to be 
disputed,43 the artist understood the item to be a traditional recognition for 
bravery awarded by the king to warriors who had excelled in battle (Swart, 
telephonic interview 2005). This interpretation is also disseminated by the 
on-line African History Encyclopaedia and was picked up by the media, 
thereby implying that the isiqu is a kind of Zulu equivalent to the Victoria 
Cross awarded to British soldiers (Dodd 1999; Gowans 1999; African 
History Encyclopaedia). 
Be that as it may, the new memorial makes reference to Zulu military 
prowess without reiterating the clichéd image of the warrior figure with 
assegai and shield.44 It seeks out a relationship with the existing memorials 
and endeavors to respond to them in equivalent terms.  
                                                                                                                            
influenced by the Ncome monument, which he saw for the first time only years 
after its completion. 
43  Jeff Guy considers ‘the dynamic range of interpretations attached to these 
wooden beads, together with the extraordianary variety of meanings invested in 
them in different historical contexts and across cultural boundaries’ (2008: 193).  
44  Swart (telephonic interview 2005) recalls that some members of the Monuments 
Council wanted precisely such as statue. 
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Photo 9.4 Memorial to the fallen Zulu warriors of the Battle of Isandlwana, 
unveiled in 1999. Isandlwana Battlefield (near Dundee). 
In his speech at the unveiling of the memorial King Zwelethini described the 
new memorial as a combination of Zulu symbolism with an essentially 
European commemorative medium, that of bronze sculpture.45 
One might say, in other words, a western form has been filled with 
African content, or an old Eurocentric medium has been appropriated by a 
new Afrocentric order to express its own values and identity. Compared with 
the monumental project at Ncome, it is striking to note the small scale and 
unobtrusive appearance of the new Isandlwana memorial. One might be 
forgiven for overlooking it while driving around the battle site. I argue that 
at Isandlwana, as at Ncome, the specific visual appearance of the existing 
commemorative markers precipitated the scale, form, iconography and 
symbolism of the ‘African response’. At Isandlwana the unassuming, self-
effacing nature of the British memorials could be complemented with a low-
key, humble counterpart, while the large-scale, brash, Afrikaner Nationalist 
monumental effort at Blood River required a bold, conspicuous response. 
                                                     
45  See Zwelethini (1999: 4). Although the famed tradition of Ife and Benin bronzes 
proves that both the medium of lost-wax technique bronze cast and the sculptural 
style of naturalism or idealized realism were not as unknown to sub-Saharan 
Africa as previously thought, it is true to say that the genre of realistically 
rendered bronze sculpture is a Western tradition introduced to Southern Africa 
through colonialism, where it remained for a long time associated with the 
commemorative ventures and artistic endeavours of the white population. 
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Influenced by the Isandlwana project and roughly equal in size, a bronze 
memorial for the fallen Zulu warriors was installed at Rorke’s Drift in 2005, 
made by Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall next to the memorial for the British victims of 
that battle.46 In Grahamstown, the Egazini monument (unveiled 24 February 
2001) represents the Xhosa combatants of the Battle of Grahamstown (1819) 
and makes reference to a small colonial memorial marker, although not 
being directly visually juxtaposed.47 At Ambush Rock, between Greytown 
and Keate’s Drift in KZN, a memorial unveiled on 16 December 2000 is 
dedicated to the Zulu victims of the 1906 Bhambatha Rebellion, an event 
that constituted one of the last collective acts of Zulu resistance against the 
state and marked the beginning of the systematic impoverishment and 
marginalisation of the Zulu population in colonial Natal. Although not set up 
in the immediate vicinity, the black polished granite stele responds to the 
presence of a very similar memorial (made of sandstone) about ten kilo-
metres down the same road, which commemorates the police officers who 
died in the line of duty as they were fighting off the Zulu rebellion headed by 
Chief Bhambatha of the Zondi (Zondi 1998).  
Public statuary as critical response 
Since the time of the ancient civilisations one of the most respected modes of 
paying tribute to individual leader figures has been the placement of their 
likenesses, cast in bronze or carved in marble, in a public place of honour, 
notably as a point de vue in a public space. It serves to distinguish an 
extraordinary individual from ‘ordinary’ persons, literally placing him or her 
(mostly him) on a pedestal, as a model for present and future generations to 
‘look up’ to. In South Africa, bronze statues of liberation struggle activists, 
resistance leaders and African chiefs are currently being erected throughout 
the country and often deliberately positioned in the immediate vicinity of a 
specific colonial or apartheid-era statue, or responding in more general terms 
to the presence of such public statuary in the surrounding environment.  
The symbolic reshaping of Botha’s Park in Durban, where the Heroes’ 
Monument proposal was never implemented, took a new turn when Arthur 
Konigkramer, editor of the Zulu language newspaper, Ilanga, and formerly 
head of the KMC, approached the Premier of KZN, S’bu Ndebele, with a 
                                                     
46  This memorial, installed in January 2005, consists of a realistic rendering of a 
mound of Zulu shields topped by a gracefully reclining leopard (a symbol of 
royalty). In the very centre of the monument – as if growing out of its midst – is 
a buffalo thorn tree, which is associated with traditional Zulu spiritual beliefs and 
funeral rituals. The same tree has also been planted next to the Isandlwana 
memorial (Hall 2003). 
47  For a critical analysis of the Egazini project see Wells 2004; for press coverage 
see Anonymous 2000a; 2000b; Williams and Surmon 2001. 
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new idea. He suggested that the Louis Botha statue be ‘countered’ with a 
statue of King Dinuzulu – of similar size, on a plinth of similar height, 
dressed like Botha in military uniform, reportedly Dinuzulu’s most favoured 
outfit.48 Dinuzulu (also spelled Dinizulu) ka Cetshwayo (1868-1913) was a 
well-known royal of the Zulu ‘nation’, who had a special relationship with 
Botha throughout his lifetime. For instance, Botha had helped Dinuzulu to 
restore his claim as paramount chief of the Zulus in 1884 and when Botha 
became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in 1910 one of his first 
acts was to release Dinuzulu from prison, where he had begun serving a 
four-year term for his role as instigator of the Bhambatha Rebellion in 1909 
(Standard Encyclopedia of Southern Africa). Following a competition held 
in 2005, the new statue was installed in October 2006, but unveiled only on 
20 September 2008.49 It highlights the intersections between the two 
contemporaries and by extension symbolises the interweaving of the 
historical past and the destiny of white and black people in the region and in 
the country.  
In the same manner, Konigkramer proposed to complement the marble 
statue of Queen Victoria in front of the Legislative Assembly in the new 
provincial capital of Pietermaritzburg with a similar statue (also in marble) 
of King Cetshwayo (1826-84) as her contestant and arguably her equal in a 
different context (Peters 2005; Theron 2006). Not only do such statues 
endorse their subject as counter-hero and open up a discursive reading of the 
narrative embodied by the corresponding white leader’s effigy, but they also 
officially install these individuals as significant actors in the public history of 
the place and even the narrative of the nation. The selection of individuals 
deemed worthy of such extraordinary public tribute is hence a way of 
                                                     
48  In the same vein, the marble statue of Queen Victoria outside the Legislature in 
Pietermaritzburg was to be countered with a similarly sized marble statue of 
King Cetshwayo (Olifant 2006). 
49  Peter Hall won the 2005 competition for the Dinuzulu statue, while the base, 
shaped like a Zulu ‘beehive hut’ in reference to Zulu tradition, was designed by 
local architect, Erhard Huizinga. The statue remained carefully wrapped up in 
hessian sacking and watched over by a 24-hour security guard for almost two 
years. Official reasons for the long delay point to the difficulty of finding a 
suitably symbolic date and securing the availability of officials and prominent 
leaders, but the media reported that certain ANC councilors in the eThekwini 
municipality had objected to the statue’s inferior height compared with the one 
of Louis Botha (Goldstone 2008). The statue was initially meant to be funded 
through donations and the Premier, S’bu Ndeble, acknowledged several 
prominent members of the political leadership as having pledged specified 
amounts between R1000 and R15000 towards the statue in his budget speech in 
April 2005 (Ndebele 2005). The statue was eventually produced at a cost of 
R600 000, but it is not clear which portion thereof (if any) was indeed financed 
through donations. 
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assembling a lineage of preferred founding fathers (and theoretically 
mothers) defining an ancestry – not in biological, but in ideological terms – a 
chosen genealogy as a foundation for the construction of a preferred 
community and national identity. 
 
 
Photo 9.5 Bronze statue of Steve Biko, City Hall, East London, unveiled in 
1997. 
On 12 September 1997, then President Nelson Mandela unveiled a bronze 
statue of Black Consciousness leader, Steve Biko (1946-77), in front of the 
City Hall in East London (now part of the Buffalo City Municipality) to 
commemorate the 20th anniversary of Biko’s death in police custody 
(Anonymous 1997a).50 The statue, made by Naomi Jacobson, was initially 
                                                     
50  Biko grew up in Ginsberg township outside King William’s Town. At age 16 he 
went to study at Lovedale Institution along with his older brother Khaya, but 
both were soon expelled on account of Khaya’s political involvement. Biko 
finished his studies at St. Francis’ College in Natal and entered the University of 
Natal Medical School in 1966. After initially joining the National Union of 
South African Students (NUSAS), a multiracial anti-apartheid group, he founded 
the all-black South African Students Organisation (SASO) in 1968. He travelled 
throughout the country training students and expressing his views on Black 
Consciousness, the belief that black South Africans must overcome the mentality 
of oppression as a prerequisite for liberation. In 1972 he left the university 
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planned to stand directly in front of the entrance to the City Hall, a space 
occupied by an equestrian bronze memorial, erected in 1908 (made by 
W.Reynolds-Stephen) in honour of the British regiments of the South 
African Anglo-Boer War (Van Tonder 1971 and 1975). The latter sculpture 
depicts a generic young British soldier, a scout, his exploring look focused 
on the horizon. Public protests about the envisaged displacement or 
replacement of this memorial resulted in the decision to set up the Biko 
statue a few meters away at the corner of the City Hall. Both statues are 
elevated above street level on high plinths, facing the same direction, with a 
similar look of commitment and assertiveness on their faces. The strategic 
positioning, the use of the same commemorative medium (a bronze statue on 
a pedestal) and the same style (academic realism, slightly abstracted in the 
case of Biko) emphasise that they are equal in importance and dignity. It is 
precisely through such imitation that the challenge to the hegemonic 
discourse represented through the existing statue is made effective.  
The new statue was privately initiated by Biko’s friend, Donald Woods, 
who originally approached the City for permission to set up the sculpture 
next to East London’s most important bridge, which he proposed to 
simultaneously rename in Biko’s honour. The Council enthusiastically 
embraced the idea of the statue and immediately offered the site in front of 
the city hall, the most prestigious and symbolic public space in the city. 
Woods recalls:  
I flew from Johannesburg to East London and met with the mayor, deputy mayor 
and key heads of department of the city in what was now, change of all changes, 
an ANC-governed city. They were strongly supportive and I was thrilled when 
they said they would like to locate the statue right in front of the city hall – the 
most prominent site in the city. I was moved, and said this was the perfect place, 
and that the only reason I had asked for the bridge site was because I hoped this 
might cause them to rename the bridge. At this the mayor said: ‘We can do that 
too! We’ll call it the Biko Bridge and have the renaming done on the same day 
the statue is unveiled’. From that moment the East London City Council were the 
epitome of energy, enthusiasm and efficiency on the question of the Biko statue 
(Woods 2000: 204-5). 
The Council’s fervour in implementing the privately initiated statue project 
is reminiscent of the Hector Pieterson case and finds parallels elsewhere, for 
                                                                                                                            
without obtaining a degree and devoted himself to community work and political 
activism. He helped found the Black Peoples Convention (BPC), which was 
aimed at extending SASO’s work beyond the student population. In 1973 the 
government placed banning orders on Biko and other SASO leaders. After the 
1976 Soweto Uprising, police intensified their harassment of Biko. He was 
detained several times under the Terrorist Act, tortured and eventually killed in 
police custody (Tuttle in Appiah and Gates 1999: 233). 
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instance in the Nelson Mandela statue proposal in Port Elizabeth, which is 
discussed in the next chapter. By honouring Steve Biko in this way, the 
ANC-dominated municipality of Buffalo City implicitly laid claim to the 
Biko heritage and made a political statement about the broader ideological 
context in which it wanted to be seen. Dead people come with a curriculum 
vitae, a résumé, or rather several possible résumés, argues Verderey (1999: 
28-9), which in turn lend themselves to analogy with other (living) people’s 
résumés. Statues can be strategic means of tying the past to the present and 
publicly proclaiming the identification of present elites with selected 
deceased leaders and past elites, in whose name the former purport to act, or 
who lend themselves to be appropriated for the advancement of present 
political agendas.51  
The presence of the Biko statue, its style and its positioning, are highly 
symbolic and exemplary of the process of reshaping landscapes of memory 
in South Africa. Biko complements and diversifies the city’s ‘ancestry’ 
without replacing it. He has moved in to join the ranks of heroes, but not 
without contestation.52 The statue’s privileged position in front of the city 
hall establishes a strong link between Biko and the current Buffalo City 
municipality, indeed turning Biko into an iconic symbol associated with the 
city – perhaps to the detriment of nearby King William’s Town, where Biko 
lived and where he is buried. This kind of appropriation of ‘struggle icons’ 
and resistance heroes for the purpose of reshaping identity and establishing 
an attractive ‘image’, which can furthermore be exploited for destination 
branding and tourism marketing, is a growing trend among municipalities in 
South Africa, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
                                                     
51  This is aptly illustrated when high political officials have themselves photo-
graphed next to the immortalised likeness of their ‘chosen ancestor’ on the 
occasion of the official unveiling: President Thabo Mbeki, for instance, posed for 
the Sunday Times standing next to the bronze Albert Luthuli in KwaDukuza, 
with whom he amicably joined hands (Anonymous 2004a). A month later 
THISDAY newspaper published a similar photo showing Mogale City mayor 
Lenstwe Mokgatle giving a power salute to the 2.5m bronze statue of Kgosi 
Mogale wa Mogale (Anonymous 2004).  
52  Shortly after its official unveiling, the statue was repeatedly subjected to attacks 
of vandalism by the AWB. The City Council came out strongly in support and 
defence of the statue. Local newspapers even reported that the City Council in 
fact considered hiring a security guard – recalling images of bodyguards or a 
guard of honour – to watch over the statue on a long-term basis (Anonymous 
1997; 1997c; 1997d). 
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Conclusion 
Public officials claimed – as reflected in archival documents and the media – 
that an intervention in the memory landscape at Blood River was ‘needed’, 
because the fallen Zulu warriors had never officially been commemorated on 
this famous battlefield. One wonders what might have happened if a Zulu 
memorial, a simple stele, had swiftly been erected without much ado 
somewhere on the expansive battlegrounds. Interestingly, this option was 
never considered, neither by those defending the status quo at Blood River, 
nor by those pushing for Zulu representation – not even after conservation 
authorities had advocated establishing ‘some sort of Zulu focus’ on the 
battlefield. In my view, it was not considered because the Blood River 
museum initiative had raised the stakes beyond a level that could be 
addressed or rather redressed with a memorial. 
As stated earlier, Girshick argues that Ncome was initially planned to 
become a memorial but then turned out to be a monument on account of 
powerful Zulu nationalist forces steering the process in a particular direction. 
I would argue that Ncome became a monument, at least in part, because 
there is a brash monument, not a solemn memorial, on the other side of the 
river. The museum, not initially planned but spontaneously added in 
response to the space that emerged inside the curved walls of the monument 
design, likewise became a reality, at least in part, because there was a 
museum on the other side of the river, which needed to be countered in both 
physical and ideological terms. 
Extending Maphalala’s critique of the Ncome project and reconnecting to 
my point about the Freedom Park project, I want to suggest that the 
increasingly popular pattern of building ‘separate but equal’ symbolic 
representations of black heritage opposite those of white heritage smacks of 
apartheid-style solutions, especially when coupled with racially or ethnically 
defined notions of ‘community’. A similar point has been made for the 
‘multicultural adjustment’ of exhibitions in South African cultural history 
museums (Rassool, Witz and Minkley 2000; Rassool 2001). However, I also 
believe that some of these monuments, including Ncome, may be very 
important and meaningful to many individuals and communities – despite 
the critique that academics and opponents might levy against them.  
The demonstration effect of statues and monuments erected by white 
communities as a time-honoured form of public tribute, compounded by the 
continued presence of a substantial body of such monuments in the public 
arena, surely contributes to the new order’s desire to respond in ‘equivalent’ 
terms. In other words, a hospital named after Nelson Mandela does not have 
the same symbolic impact as a statue of Mandela in an urban environment 
dominated by statues dedicated to white leaders. Arguing (as some critics 
do) for a moratorium on new public monuments because they were never 
part of African culture implicitly limits the contemporary African population 
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– never mind the racially and culturally diverse South African citizenry – to 
the boundaries of an ill-defined African tradition and fixes their cultural 
practices in the past. If it is widely accepted that African culture even in the 
most remote rural areas has dynamically changed and been hybridized, if not 
completely westernised, why should new monuments as symbolic cultural 
products not be allowed to reflect just that? 
What is important though – and largely lacking in the current enthusiastic 
embrace of the monument genre – is the promotion of a critical 
understanding of the historical tradition, the ideological functions and 
inherent characteristics of monuments: their persuasiveness and 
manipulative nature, for instance; their propensity to represent simplified, 
biased interpretations of the past; their discursive exclusions and hegemonic 
tendencies. In the current South African context, the concept of monuments 
as critical response may be very effective as a highly visible, easily 
accessible, symbolically powerful strategy of addressing the biased heritage 
landscape, but it ultimately fails to acknowledge the true complexity of the 
post-apartheid socio-political context and local identity politics. Below the 
veneer of inclusiveness, most post-apartheid monuments endorse simplistic 
dichotomous notions of blacks and whites as former enemies to be 
reconciled, ignoring much more complex historical lines of division, some of 
which still prevail in the socio-political landscape of the present. This may 
partially account for the alienation felt by the ‘vandals and vagrants’ 
mentioned earlier, and more generally, the frequent lack of identification and 
contestation even among ‘the people’ for whom the new monuments were 
primarily installed. 

  
10 
Commodification, Tourism and 
the Need for Visual Markers  
Introduction 
Previous chapters have focused on monuments and memorials as symbolic 
entities, whose intended meanings underscore or challenge the dominant 
discourses of the cultural landscapes they inhabit; or as commemorative 
beacons responding to the political, cultural and psychological needs of the 
society that installs them. Monuments are such familiar and commonplace 
elements, especially in the urban environment, that one tends to overlook 
them completely; yet for the culturally or historically interested visitor, 
monuments often stand out. In their silent yet blaring manner, monuments 
address the visitor and announce what is significant about the locale. They 
are visual markers attracting and directing the tourist gaze. In present-day 
South Africa, where both national legislation and local policies emphasise 
sustainable heritage conservation allied with community economic develop-
ment, tourism becomes a central motivating factor for the construction of 
monuments. If one believes public statements by government officials and 
press reports, it is anticipated that virtually all new monuments and 
memorials will attract scores of tourists, thereby functioning as catalysts for 
infrastructure development, employment creation, income generation and 
poverty alleviation to the benefit of previously disadvantaged communities.1  
This chapter focuses on the link between monuments and tourism, i.e. the 
ability of monuments to become tourist attractions, to serve as focal points of 
the tourist’s experience of a cultural landscape, to commodify complex 
historical circumstances and personalities through transformation into 
recognisable icons, to assist in the branding of destinations, to create 
memorable and reproducible visitor experiences along with the sale of 
merchandise, but also to create visual imaginaries of the past and of the 
                                                     
1  To refer to but a few examples of such press reports, see Bishop 1998 about 
Ncome; Edwards 2000 about Sharpeville; Mkhize 2001 about monuments in 
Durban; Moya 1997 about Soweto; and Koch 1999 about the Samora Machel 
memorial. In a similar vein, see also Goodenough 1996.  
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nation, that gain authority through tourist consumption. This chapter does 
not aim to conduct a strategic impact analysis of monuments or attempt to 
measure their concrete economic impact based on the evaluation of solid 
quantitative data. Such research still needs to be conducted and is 
methodologically not unproblematic. Rather, what interests me here is how, 
precisely despite the absence of such research, claims about economic 
benefits are regularly utilised to support heritage ventures that essentially 
serve other goals. Based on selected case studies, this chapter therefore 
focuses on political discourse and the ways in which heritage tourism can 
support (and sometimes undermine) cultural policy, serve (sometimes 
disguised) political agendas, and entrench particular readings of the past.  
Tourism, heritage and identity 
The official end of apartheid ushered in a growth period for tourism, 
including international tourism, assisted by the depreciation of the rand in 
relation to major western currencies, the country’s increasing exposure to a 
globalising world, the international media attention paid to the ‘new’ South 
Africa, and the general euphoria for Nelson Mandela’s ‘rainbow nation’. 
Many foreign tourists arrived to be part of the experience of a crucial 
historical moment and look in on a society in transformation – long closed 
off through stigma yet well known through the media – while concurrently 
enjoying the country’s legendary scenic beauty and recreational oppor-
tunities.  
The ANC-led government’s shift towards economic principles favouring 
liberal market policies presumes that poverty eradication and economic 
development will result from economic growth, including that generated 
through tourism. Hence the government strongly promotes tourism as a 
panacea for all ills and many communities perceive tourism, often 
uncritically embraced, as the only viable option for their economic 
development. The niche area of cultural and heritage tourism, comprising 
township tours, cultural villages, battlefield tours, festivals and traditional 
ceremonies, markets and craft fairs, art, craft and architecture, dances and 
even literature, appears to hold particular promise for the previously 
marginalised population, because attractions can be structured around 
existing activities, often requiring little capital investment, while simulta-
neously boosting community pride.  
The growing academic literature on the tourism phenomenon increasingly 
highlights common misconceptions about tourism, ‘the tourists’, and their 
purported desires. Grundlingh (2006) points out that the current focus on 
tourism in post-apartheid South Africa has erroneously led scholars to 
dismiss tourism before 1990 as inconsequential. His important contribution 
to the historiography of tourism in South Africa traces trends in international 
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tourism arrivals since World War II and explores how tour operators and 
tourism officials marketed and presented the destination to the outside world 
throughout the tumultuous apartheid period against the foils of violent 
political protest on the one hand and prevailing, media-supported stereotypes 
of the ‘primitive’ and exotic African on the other.  
Tourism development is generally believed to require conditions of peace 
and stability, yet tourism in South Africa is thriving despite a staggering rate 
of violent crime, regular incidents of social unrest and the escalating 
HIV/Aids pandemic. This observation prompts Kapstein (2007) to place 
some aspects of South African tourism (especially township tours) in the 
context of an international penchant for adventure tourism, risk tourism or 
extreme tourism, where visitors are drawn to ‘controlled-edge’ experiences 
in demilitarised war zones and other sites associated with risk and danger. 
The author also criticises the prevailing lack of attention to domestic tourists, 
to ‘the postcolonial native’ who now increasingly tours his or her own 
nation. The common assumption in much of the tourism literature is that ‘the 
tourist’ is always an outsider emanating from countries of the western 
developed world, who wants to visit ‘a new place in order to experience the 
new, the exotic, the erotic, and now the dangerous’ (Kapstein 2007: 110).  
In South Africa (as in many other countries) the number of domestic 
tourists indeed far exceeds that of foreign arrivals. According to SA Tourism 
2006, 7.369 million foreign tourists visited South Africa in 2005, mostly 
from the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States (in that order), 
staying for an average of eight nights. In comparison, during the same period 
36.2 million domestic tourist trips were recorded with an average of four 
nights in length. The main domestic source markets are the provinces of 
KZN, Gauteng and North West. Although by far the majority of foreign 
tourists come from the western developed world, there is an increasing 
inflow of tourists from the developing world, especially neighbouring 
countries (e.g. Zimbabwe, Mozambique), other African nations (e.g. Nigeria, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo) and further afield (e.g. Korea, India).  
Tourism tends to be associated primarily with economic issues, but what 
interests me more is the political dimension of tourism, in which, I argue, 
monuments play a key role, tying economic benefits to socio-political 
agendas. Several scholars, employing a variety of disciplinary perspectives, 
have explored the nexus between tourism, representation, national or 
community identity construction and political discourses (e.g. Grundlingh 
2006; Hottola 2006; Kapstein 2007; Rassool and Witz 1996; Witz, Rassool 
and Minkley 2005). Tourism not only represents but actively constructs and 
commodifies cultures, focusing on unique identities and historical traditions 
which are often consumed in a context of unequal power relations.  
Heritage tourism produces images of the past that may reflect distorted or 
reductionist interpretations in the interest of creating an inspiring narrative. 
As tourism actively appropriates the memory landscape, emphasising some 
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memories and downplaying others, history is framed in a particular way, 
often in line with destination branding efforts and hegemonic political 
discourses. The close connection between tourism and political discourse in 
the arena of heritage is moreover illustrated in the association of museums 
and heritage sites with issues of national identity and other socio-political 
debates within society. Moreover, the development and interpretation of 
heritage as a tourist attraction is regulated through state cultural policy, and 
the ways in which different places present themselves and are marketed as 
destinations are increasingly important in local cultural policy (Butcher 
2006; Koshar 2000: 296; Rassool and Witz 1996). 
In a 1998 article entitled ‘Building a nation through our heritage’, Valli 
Moosa, then South African Minister of Tourism and Environmental Affairs, 
poignantly links heritage, tourism, and economic development with the 
wider project of nation-building and identity construction in a post-apartheid 
society. Referring to three new world heritage sites in South Africa declared 
in 1998, Moosa said:  
They are symbols or icons of what we as a nation can feel justifiably proud about 
in the world. We must take them and boldly start to project ourselves as a nation 
internationally whether through promoting investment or marketing tourism … 
We have to start working on a consensus of how we see and want to build our 
nation … The manner in which we do this cannot be separated from the process 
of nation building. We cannot say that our campaign to market SA to potential 
British tourists can be separated from nation building (Moosa 1998).  
This echoes what Themba Wakashe (1994: 36), national co-ordinator for 
Arts and Culture South Africa (ACSA), said right at the beginning of the 
post-apartheid era: ‘We also have to show and tell the world how we want to 
be seen, how we are forging a new nation ...’. The state promotes heritage as 
a vehicle for nation-building and directs the establishment of symbolic 
markers in order to reshape the nation’s identity and control the represent-
ation of a contested past, but monuments and heritage sites are also very 
consciously built as tourist attractions and perceived as mechanisms for 
community economic development. Through monuments a new identity is 
portrayed to the outside world, and increasingly to the touring nation itself.  
Tourism as a lifeline for contested heritage 
Hewison’s (1987) now widely used term ‘heritage industry’ is meant to 
capture the close alliance between the preservation of the past and the 
economic benefits derived from this preservation for those in the present. 
Cultural heritage, argues Hewison, has become a product – preserved, 
framed, marketed to ‘consumers’, and in competition with other such 
products. In the socio-economic context of Britain in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s, marked by rapid de-industrialization, heritage came to play a strategic 
role in economic development mostly through cultural tourism (Urry 1990). 
Heritage-induced tourism can resolve the conflict between conservation and 
development, as the success of the international ‘waterfront phenomenon’ 
demonstrates. South Africa followed the trend when the V&A Waterfront in 
Cape Town was developed in the early 1990s.2 This venture has proven so 
successful that it is now being replicated in other coastal cities, notably 
Durban and Port Elizabeth.  
Compared to the situation in Britain, the conservation issue in South 
Africa is complicated by the fact that the majority of the population 
frequently perceives architectural structures and sculptural objects of the 
colonial and apartheid eras as ‘white heritage’, the preservation of which 
may not be deemed necessary or even desirable. Those who do care for the 
conservation of colonial heritage are often forced to find ways of making 
these sites useful and financially self-sustainable to ensure their survival. ‘If 
monuments pay they stay’, quipped Leo van Schalkwyk (1995) from the 
KMC, in the context of the old battlefield memorials at Isandlwana. 
Similarly, Denver Webb (1997), focusing on the Eastern Cape region, 
suggested that new meanings must be attached to old monuments. While 
some of them may be ‘recycled’ into useful facilities for local communities 
(e.g. turning old mission stations into community centres), it is anticipated 
that for others the emerging tourism industry will help make conservation 
‘useful’. 
The frequent invocation of tourism, especially cultural and heritage 
tourism, as a potential life-line for embattled colonial heritage in a contested 
landscape of memory is not entirely unfounded. Tourism statistics show that 
in the developing world a large section of foreign arrivals emanate from the 
respective country’s former colonial power. French tourists travelling to 
Algeria or Germans visiting Namibia are without doubt attracted to the 
architectural remnants and other traces testifying to the presence and 
activities of their forefathers. British tourists in South Africa are frequently 
interested in the battlefields where their heroic ancestors fought and perhaps 
lost their lives in serving the British Empire. Werbner observed a striking 
boom in colonial nostalgia throughout postcolonial Africa (1998: 1), 
                                                     
2  Cape Town-based architect, Revel Fox, known for his advocacy of architectural 
conservation, conjures up the financial benefits of conservation through tourism 
for ‘those who remain unconvinced by the educational, cultural and aesthetic 
arguments’ (1994: 27). Speaking from an urban planning perspective, he advises 
the creation of clusters or precincts within the city in order to preserve individual 
objects of special significance in a larger and more meaningful context and to 
provide a holistic visitor experience for the tourist. Ideally these clusters should 
eventually become economically self-sustaining.  
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fortifying the argument of those who see tourism as a neo-colonial pheno-
menon.  
In comparison with recreational tourists, cultural and heritage tourists are 
commonly believed to have a higher level of education and ‘cultural capital’ 
(Ritzer and Liska 1997; Craik 1997). Their presumed interest in a holistic, 
politically balanced, or contextualised representation of the past motivates 
them to visit diverse and contradictory sites as avenues leading to an 
understanding of the complex realities that have shaped a country’s history 
and its people. In this context, even sites and monuments associated with 
ideological causes no longer shared or even explicitly despised may be 
significant points of attraction for both domestic and international visitors. 
Various Afrikaner Nationalist monuments (notably the VTM, Blood River 
and the Taalmonument at Paarl) are now managed and marketed as 
educational sites that open up a perspective on the historical viewpoint of a 
minority. The interpretation of these sites – as the discussion of the VTM 
case study in Chapter Five illustrated – must walk a tight rope between 
defending a particular community perspective while simultaneously 
indicating that this community has shifted away from the radical ideologies 
that prompted the construction of these monuments in the first place.  
Spirit of eMakhosini: Intangible heritage and the need for visual 
markers 
Chapter One explained that the new heritage legislation promotes a holistic 
approach to heritage management, whereby conservation in the Western 
tradition, focused on the physical site and especially its tangible, material 
remains, is coupled with the preservation of intangible heritage often 
associated with the history and culture of the African and other previously 
marginalised communities. Intangible heritage includes cultural beliefs, 
traditional customs and rituals, aspects of oral tradition and local memory, 
marked or unmarked burial sites, places associated with important events or 
leaders, and features of the land with mythical or religious significance. As 
the significance of intangible heritage is primarily based on community 
values, rather than defined by experts, this can be interpreted as a 
progressive move, potentially empowering to previously disadvantaged 
communities, shoring up pride in their traditions and establishing a sense of 
ownership in their cultural heritage.  
But the strongly promoted focus on the neglected intangible heritage of 
marginalised communities poses considerable challenges for both the 
conservation management sector and especially the tourism industry, 
because oral tradition, ephemeral cultural phenomena and the ‘people’s 
history’ have often produced few material remains to attract potential 
tourists. Tourism thrives on visual experiences, on tangible, material objects, 
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on attractive visual markers upon which the voyeuristic gaze, supported by 
the camera, can be fixed (Urry 1990). Commemorative monuments, 
memorials and public statuary are in part established to fill this gap, to 
translate intangible into tangible heritage, as I want to illustrate with the case 
of the new Spirit of eMakhosini monument near Ulundi in KZN. 
Throughout the world, royal burial grounds and sepulchral structures tend 
to be accorded special status and significance, often constituting tourist 
attractions and inspiring awe on account of their infusion with myths and 
legends or a residual sense of might and splendor. The Zulu kingdom is 
arguably the most widely known African monarchy internationally and it is 
currently the only one still existing as a political entity (although primarily 
of symbolic significance) within the constitutional frame of the Republic of 
South Africa. Many members of the Zulu royal family lie buried in a 
forested valley near Ulundi, the eMakhosini Valley, now considered the 
heartland of the Zulu clan, its place of origin and last resting place of its 
early kings.3  
The provincial tourism authority, working hand-in-glove with the 
heritage sector headed by Amafa, discovered the valley’s unique cultural and 
heritage tourism potential, which is now part of the eMakhosini Ophathe 
Heritage Park, and considered the ‘Cradle of the Zulu Nation’.4 While the 
aspect of the origin relates to the established international fame of the 
‘Cradle of Humankind’ at Sterkfontein, one of South Africa’s World 
Heritage sites, the sacred royal burial ground emulates the famed Valley of 
the Kings in Egypt. However, no pyramids are to be found here apart from 
the small pyramidal cairns that dot the valley floor, often quite inaccessibly 
hidden amidst dense vegetation. In other cases, the memory of a burial site 
lives on merely in a place name or local oral history. Amafa, in consultation 
with members of the local community and the Zulu Royal House, recently 
proposed the upgrading of these royal graves, but in a suitably sensitive 
manner, respecting the existing character of the burial site. Tourists will be 
allowed access only in small groups under strictly controlled conditions and 
in the presence of a community guide (van Vuuren, personal e-mail 
communication 2006).  
However, there was a need for an easily accessible, imposing physical 
marker and attraction point for casual cultural tourists, often arriving by the 
                                                     
3  The only Zulu king whose supposed burial place has been marked with a highly 
public western-style memorial is that of Shaka Zulu in KwaDukuza (Stanger). It 
was commissioned by the Zulu people under King Solomon in the 1930s and 
consists of a commemorative urn on an inscribed pedestal (Oberholster 1972).  
4  The address prepared by Amafa for the occasion of Prince Buthelezi’s unveiling 
of the monument reads: ‘The eMakhosini-Ophate Heritage Park has great 
economic importance for the region and South Africa as a whole. It is destined to 
become one of our country’s major tourist attractions’ (Speech Buthelezi 2003). 
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busload on their way to nearby game reverses. For this purpose, Amafa 
facilitated the construction of the new Spirit of eMakhosini monument, 
unveiled on 3rd May 2003 by Prince Gideon Zulu and King Goodwill 
Zwelithini – members of the royal Zulu house – alongside Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, who is himself affiliated with the royal clan. Called kwaNkomba 
(nkomba means ‘to show’) the impressive sculptural monument scenically 
overlooks the valley off the main road, situated on a hill allegedly used 
traditionally as a viewing platform for reconnaissance and observation. Now 
the hill has become a viewing platform for tourists, facilitating their gaze 
into the historical valley and drawing attention to the significance of this 
cultural landscape without actually entering or disturbing it. An inter-
pretation centre with essential tourist amenities is currently being added to 
the site. 
The centrepiece of the monument is a gigantically enlarged traditional 
Zulu beer pot or ukhamba, made in bronze by local sculptors, Nkosinathi 
Khanyile and Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall. According to van Vuuren (personal e-mail 
communication 2006), the icon of the pot was chosen because it is an object 
found in all households – from kings to commoners, from Africa to Europe. 
However, in this specific context, a more ethnic and gender exclusive 
reading arguably presents itself, as the object is strongly associated with both 
ancestor worship and traditional practices of male bonding.  
A series of small bronze relief plaques (made by a group of mostly young 
black artists based in Durban under the coordination and supervision of 
Khanyile5) encircling the base depict scenes from traditional Zulu life. They 
project the viewer into an imaginary past replete with all the well-known 
stereotypical icons: the Zulu warrior, the bare-breasted maiden, and the 
submissive married woman preparing food or serving her husband.6 At the 
base of the pot is a head ring or inkatha (after which the IFP takes its name), 
a tightly plaited coil made from grass that was traditionally employed to 
carry heavy loads on the head. As I was told by the official on-site guide that 
it symbolises unity or ‘the coming together of all races’ – an interpretation 
which inscribes the monument with a reconciliatory, inclusive meaning 
somewhat at odds with my earlier interpretation of a rather exclusive ethnic 
and gender iconography and symbolism.7 The beer pot is encircled by 
                                                     
5  Names of artists as indicted on the plaques (in random order): Lindelani Ndinisa; 
E.D. Mthethwa; Nhla Goge; F.R. Mapumulo; Raksha Gobardan; S.P. Madlala; 
Dumisani S.; Lalelani Mbhele; S. Belle; S.S. Cele; Joseph Manana. 
6  Discussions of these and similar images among Zulu mother-tongue students at 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal regularly reveal high levels of identification 
and pride, even among emancipated, westernized, urban black females, who 
commonly understand such representations as respectable symbols of ‘culture’.  
7  Van Vuuren (personal e-mail communication 2006) clarifies that within Zulu 
tradition the inkatha symbolises unity because it was made from grass and other 
items from across the kingdom. The king would sit on it during times of strife, 
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aluminium casts of seven different animal horns (e.g. rhino, kudu, nyala), 
which look like giant pointers into the surrounding landscape and represent 
(in a non-specific, symbolic way) the kings who are buried in the valley 
below.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the officially endorsed representation of cultural 
heritage in this and other commemorative monuments manifests striking 
parallels with the rearrangement and reauthorization of the past in South 
African history museums. Soudien (2005) distinguishes different approaches 
currently dominating the field of museum exhibitions in South Africa, one of 
which is the Nostalgia Style. Driven by discourses of nostalgia, this usually 
narrow, ethnically based exhibition style provides an unsullied, innocent 
representation of the past. Strongly supported by the tourism industry, it 
promotes tropes of timeless beauty and offers ‘authentic’ representations of 
what life was like in the past, suggesting that remnants can still be found in 
modern descendants. The same pattern can be observed in cultural villages, 
observed Witz, Rassool and Minkley (2001). 
Exploiting the aura and mystique commonly associated with royal graves, 
the Spirit of eMahkosini monument conjures up a sense of grandeur about 
these early Zulu kings and their noble subjects. This not only serves as a 
springboard for the appreciative perception of the Zulu ‘nation’ today, but 
also potentially triggers further interest in Zulu heritage sites and cultural 
tourism products, of which an increasing number is being developed 
throughout the province, conveniently supporting TKZN’s destination 
branding effort and its much publicised slogan that refers to KZN as the 
‘Zulu Kingdom’.8 The most recent and most extraordinary proposal involves 
the construction of a gigantic statue of King Shaka along the coastline north 
of Durban. Current plans to restock the eMakhosini Ophathe Heritage Park 
with game and Nguni cattle, protect and restore indigenous vegetation and 
rebuild Mgungundlovu, the massive royal capital of Zululand during the 
                                                                                                                            
implying that should the king be removed, unity would be under threat. The 
interpretation provided by the guide must be seen in this context. The inkatha is 
different from the ‘isicoco’, a male head ring that was traditionally permanently 
woven into the hair as a symbol of seniority (Turner, personal e-mail 
communication 2008).  
8  Mthethwa (2008) illustrates the tensions and contradictions that arise from this 
branding effort for the small Thembe community at Kosi Bay in northern KZN. 
Although this community never accepted integration into the Zulu ‘nation’ and 
has retained its language and distinct ethnic identity to the present day, many 
members did accept the tourist description of their area as a typical ‘tropical Zulu 
outpost’ throughout the 1980s and 90s for the sake of the revenue it generated 
(ibid.: 500). More recently, however, local identity politics have resurfaced, es-
pecially in the context of land claims and the establishment of the Great St Lucia 
Wetland Park as a World Heritage Site, which has substantially increased 
tourism to the area.  
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reign of King Dingane on the fringe of the valley,9 can be interpreted as an 
attempt to reconstruct an entire cultural landscape and recreate a past era of 
lost glory, not least for the sake of capturing the imagination of tourists and 
fostering their fantasies about encountering the ‘authentic’ historical traces 
of the mighty Zulu nation.  
The commemoration of a magnificent past, about which historical details 
are blurred but sketchily survive in oral traditions and local myths, can also 
be a source of pride and inspiration for locals, for whom such validation of 
their cultural heritage and traditional value systems is implicitly championed 
as a backbone for moral regeneration. Jan Assmann (1999: 29) calls this 
familiar pattern, found in many societies in the world, Mythomotorik – a type 
of remembrance focused on an unrecoverable past, which becomes glorified 
as a Heroic or Golden Age to serve as a counter-image to the negativity of 
the present. Such remembrance provides the energy for and functions as a 
motor for the creation of a new and better order. The vigorous embrace of 
highly stereotyped images of King Shaka and the Zulu people, images often 
based on colonial invention and reinforced by apartheid ideologues,10 also 
reflects an escape from the uncertainties and instability associated with post-
apartheid identity discourses. 11 
As much as the official conservation of intangible heritage is considered 
empowering for local communities, Keitumetse (2006) demonstrates in her 
case study of burial customs among the Batlokwa people in Botswana (near 
Gaberone) that the practice can also lead to the disempowerment of local 
people. The formal inventorisation of intangible heritage sites and practices, 
a necessary precondition for their conservation and management, inevitably 
                                                     
9  The entire settlement, consisting of the royal residence and military barracks, is 
thought to have housed approximately 7000 people. Dingane abandoned 
Mgungundlovu in 1838 when the Boers advanced to take revenge for the Zulu 
attacks on Bloukrans and Weenen. The king had ordered that all huts be burnt 
down, and the fire baked the mud-and-dung floors of the homesteads, which are 
currently being excavated. Archaeological excavations have also uncovered 
charcoal remains of the enclosure’s outer palisade, as well as other important 
components within the kraal. While a small part of the settlement, mainly the 
huts in the royal section, have already been restored and made accessible to 
visitors, the current initiative is aimed at restoring the entire expanse of the 
massive royal enclosure (Derwent 2006: 6). 
10  Much has been written about images of Shaka Zulu and the mythologising of 
Shaka in South African history (notably Hamilton 1998; Wylie 2000 and 2006). 
See also John Wright’s (2008) informative chapter on Zulu identity in changing 
historical contexts. 
11  Adding a party-political dimension to this equation, one might furthermore 
suggest that the investment in the historically significant past of the Zulu 
kingdom allows the IFP to recapture in the symbolic realm what ground it lost in 
political power since the ANC won the provincial elections in 2004.  
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takes away part of the power these sites and practices derive from their 
secrecy and sometimes inaccessibility. Cultural brokers and individuals or 
communities charged by traditional authorities to take care of the intangible 
heritage resource sometimes lose out when formal heritage management 
structures take over and new rules of management and visitation are intro-
duced.  
A similar pattern might emerge in the eMakhosini Ophathe Heritage 
Park, but there is also the potential for new cultural brokers to emerge in the 
shift towards commodification and some existing role players might reinvent 
themselves in the face of new opportunities associated with the emergent 
cultural and heritage tourism sector. This is especially true for young people, 
as a comparison with a case study from Namibia illustrates. Although being 
influenced by Western values and American hip hop culture, youths in 
Namibia show marked interest in indigenous traditional culture and the 
performance of revived or reinvented indigenous cultural practices, often as 
a result of their involvement in cultural tourism (Fairweather 2003). It 
remains to be seen how young Zulu people, some of whom now are now 
academically trained in Cultural and Heritage Tourism, will in future deal 
with the commercial pressure for pandering to tourist expectations about the 
exotic African ‘primitive’ and some communities’ own embrace of 
stereotypical notions of identity and static conceptions of their culture.  
  
Nelson Mandela as a tourist attraction: Freedom Statue in Port 
Elizabeth 
Having a name associated with one of the most respected and well-known 
personalities on earth is any marketer’s dream. There is therefore a strong view 
that the future branding and positioning of the [Nelson Mandela] Metro could be 
based on the characteristics associated with Nelson Mandela. He represents a big 
part of South Africa’s political heritage and people would want to learn more 
about him and his emergence as a world figure. This powerful name should 
creatively be used to build a powerful and credible identity for the new Metro 
(Heath 2004: 155). 
The city of Port Elizabeth, nicknamed ‘the Windy City’, has never ranked 
among South Africa’s foremost tourist attractions. It is usually considered 
either the end point of the popular Garden Route (to the south) or the starting 
point of the pristine Sunshine Coast (to the north) and its scenic hinterland, 
but not much of a destination in its own right. Written off as ‘the Ghost of 
the Coast’, the area’s image reached an all-time low in the 1980s, both from 
an investment and tourism point of view. However, the city identified 
tourism as the most promising replacement industry and decided to invest in 
strategic marketing and appropriate tourism development from the late 
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1980s. Although Port Elizabeth has an attractive coastline and beaches with 
ample recreational opportunities, hosts a number of well-attended sports 
events (especially water sports), boasts a rich history and diverse cultures, 
and features some nature-based attractions nearby (e.g. Addo Elephant 
Park), the city has always lacked a true magnet or ‘must-see’ attraction 
(Heath 2004).  
Entirely new opportunities opened up when the larger region around Port 
Elizabeth was named ‘Nelson Mandela Bay’ in December 2000, 
administrated by the ‘Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality’ (Nelson 
Mandela Metro, NMM).  
Nelson Mandela is still South Africa’s foremost icon, much beloved and 
respected internationally and nationally across the racial spectrum. His name 
is also one of the best recognised ‘brands’ in the world. Port Elizabeth has no 
special association with Nelson Mandela, but the city was quick to ‘grab’ 
this foremost icon of the Struggle before anyone else thought of the strategic 
move. Tourism has fuelled a sense of competition between cities and 
localities throughout South Africa, which has urged marketing strategists to 
focus on – and if necessary invent – difference and uniqueness. Much has 
been written about the ways in which cities invent or elaborate distinctive 
self-images as place selling strategies (Jacobs 1996: 33) and monuments, I 
argue, can play a key role in this process. Monuments and statues narrate 
difference and create a perpetual visual display of the symbols and icons 
associated with the city’s chosen self-image. 
In search of innovative tourism draw-cards, the NMM developed the 
Boardwalk Casino and Entertainment World along the beachfront, and plans 
for a state-of-the-art wildlife theme park (Madiba Bay Project) are being 
discussed, but the local tourism authority’s most promising strategy is seen 
in capitalising on the Mandela icon. A year after the renaming of the area, 
the media announced an extraordinary proposal for a gigantic Mandela 
statue, developed by a local business executive, Kenny McDonald from 
Lighthouse Advertising (Rogers 2001; Madwara and McDonald 2001). 
McDonald soon linked up with a local black empowerment partner, former 
councillor Mandla Madwara, to form a company called Freedom Enterprises, 
which planned to implement the project on a public-private partnership 
basis. The proposed ‘Statue of Freedom’ was to emulate New York’s famous 
Statue of Liberty, but exceed its model in height by almost 20 metres 
(proposed height of statue 65 meters, plinth 40 metres). Like the latter, the 
colossal statue (popularly known as the ‘Mandela statue’ or ‘Madiba statue’) 
was to stand at the entrance to the harbour at Port Elizabeth.  
Initial newspaper reports published a preliminary sketch drawn by Simon 
Legras from the same advertisement company, depicting Mandela with his 
right arm raised on a high pedestal surrounded by eight reclining lions (one 
might be reminded of the Rhodes Memorial at Cape Town) (van Heerden 
2001; van Niekerk 2001; Matavire 2002). Objections to the symbolism of 
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the proposed clenched fist prompted a change of design to an open hand, 
while the figure of a little girl with a bowl was added to give the statue 
structural support at the bottom. The maquette for the revised sculpture was 
made by sculptor Maureen Quin, from the nearby town of Alexandria. 
The statue was intended to become one of the country’s foremost tourist 
attractions. Initial plans envisaged that the statue would rotate and be 
equipped with all of the trappings of a commercial tourist enterprise 
according to western standards, including a restaurant and a wax museum à 
la Madame Tussaud’s in London (van Heerden 2001). The statue itself was 
to be part of a much larger development which by the end of 2002 was to 
include ‘the Freedom Statue itself, the international Freedom Museum, Long 
Walk to Freedom Avenue, a cruise liner terminal, residential marina, a five-
star hotel, retail centre and an international convention centre’, all of which 
would cost an estimated R2 billion (Matavire 2002; see also Matavire 
2003c).  
From the time of its initial announcement the statue project remained in 
the public eye and attracted an endless flow of reporting in the media, 
especially from the Eastern Province’s primary newspaper The Herald (a 
keyword search for ‘Mandela statue’ in the newspaper’s online archive 
yielded 3469 results by November 2004!). Even the BBC sent a TV news 
crew to report on the statue initiative and the controversy around it in 
December 2002 (Matavire 2002a). From the start, public opinion about the 
project was extremely divided, drawing fierce criticism and ridicule from 
some – a few readers associated it with an early April Fool’s Day joke (e.g. 
‘Cynthia’ 2001; ‘Cymru’ 2001) – and vigorous support from others. Dissent 
prevailed also within the ANC, with senior members attacking each other 
through the press, despite the national structure having officially sanctioned 
the statue (Galloway 2004).  
Mandela himself, according to his late biographer Anthony Sampson, 
was not keen on the statue initially, because he insists on having been part of 
a group and because he is concerned about the kind of personality cult that 
has characterised public memorialisation of leader figures in other African 
countries (Anonymous 2002). Eventually the anticipated commercial spin-
offs appear to have convinced Mandela to endorse the project, as did various 
other members of the anti-apartheid struggle. At the end of 2003, however, 
the Mandela Foundation once again raised serious concerns about the size of 
the statue. ‘The foundation wants to distance itself from something similar to 
the statues of Lenin or Saddam’ (Madwara quoted in Matavire 2003f). 
While some were concerned about the aesthetic aspects of the project – 
considering it ‘too vulgar’ (Gush 2002), or rejecting its obvious imitation of 
the Statue of Liberty (Anonymous 2001d) – most critics worried about high 
costs. Although funding was to be procured through the private sector and 
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other outside sources,12 many people felt that the money would better be 
spent on housing, healthcare, welfare, education, crime prevention, or other 
such priorities.13 Paradoxically, supporters too focused on money, using the 
project’s anticipated commercial spin-offs, mostly through tourism, as their 
strongest argument.14 The business sector, in particular, firmly rallied behind 
the initiative. In early projections the number of visitors who would be 
attracted by the statue was estimated at an utterly ridiculous figure of 5000 
per day (Philp 2002). This projection was later scaled down to about 500 per 
month (Matavire 2002a).15 Most reports, however, refrain from mentioning 
figures, preferring instead to claim that the statue would establish the NMM 
as a world-class tourist destination. In short, the Mandela statue is really 
about big business. The international, iconic status of Nelson Mandela is to 
be unabashedly exploited to attract and generate cash for municipal and 
provincial coffers, but also for selected private businesses, notably Freedom 
Enterprises.16 
The Freedom Statue project swiftly moved towards final approval during 
the course of 2004, perhaps spurred on by the 10-years-of-democracy 
celebratory spirit (Matavire 2003; 2004; 2004a; Madwara and Williams, 
personal communication 2004). Following an international design 
competition, the statue has however metamorphosed into a Freedom Tower, 
a steep pyramidal structure in which various leaders of the anti-apartheid 
struggle will be honoured alongside Mandela and the visitor will experience 
a symbolic journey from darkness to light.17 Although the public description 
                                                     
12  For instance, the French government was supposed to be approached for funds in 
reminiscence of their donation of the Statue of Liberty to the United States at the 
end of the 19th century. 
13  See e.g. Haddon (2002); ‘Cynthia’ (2001); ‘Veritas’ (2002); and ‘Concerned 
Ayesha’ (2003). 
14  Anonymous (2003a); Schoeman (2003); Gutsche (2002); Matavire (2003e). 
15  Such extremely divergent estimates show that the attractiveness of the statue to 
tourists might be based more on emotionally clouded perceptions and wishful 
thinking than on any scientific basis. One can also sometimes observe com-
pletely unrealistic expectations about the benefits that tourists would bring to the 
city. For example, one reader maintains that each tourist arriving on a cruise ship 
would spend an average of US$1000 per day in Port Elizabeth (Wiblin 2002). 
16  Not surprisingly, most matters of dispute that arose over the course of the past 
years in connection with the statue were in some way about money. They 
included an extended row over the awarding of the tender for the feasibility 
study; failure of the provincial government to pay for the feasibility study; some 
wrangling over ownership of the site; and not least the artist’s claim for payment 
for the City’s appropriation and use of her design. Anonymous (2004b); 
Madwara (2003); Oosthuizen (2004); Matavire (2003a; 2003b; 2003d; 2003g); 
Mokeli (2004). 
17  Details of its conceptualisation are not yet finalised, but the winning design by 
Equilibrium Studios, chosen out of 107 entries from around the country, 
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of the project points only to the great pyramids of Egypt as sources of 
inspiration, it is obvious that the tower structure was equally (if perhaps 
unconsciously) motivated by the notion of countering the tower-type 1820 
Settler Monument in Port Elizabeth itself. Unveiled in 1923 in honour of the 
British settlers as ‘founding fathers’ of the city and the region, the 
‘Campanile’ has formed a prominent landmark at the entrance to the harbour 
ever since. It must have been perceived as dominating the city’s skyline in 
the early 20th century, as the envisaged new tower will probably do in the 
NMM of the early 21st century, and Hatfield (1967: 49) refers to the 
Campanile as a unique structure, ‘a sort of poor man’s Taj Mahal … and a 
Mecca of all tourists’ in its heyday.  
Despite reminders from critics that megalomaniac monuments are 
internationally recognised hallmarks of fascist dictators and totalitarian 
regimes, supporters insist that greatness of spirit and deed must be expressed 
through vastness of scale and ‘greatness’ of design. The project’s mission to 
become an international icon of freedom and one of South Africa’s foremost 
prospective tourist attractions are perceived to demand impressive, cleverly 
designed and ambitiously engineered signature structures of truly monu-
mental proportions. As a ‘modern interpretation of the great pyramids of 
Egypt’, the Freedom Tower will emulate, at the southern tip of the continent, 
this internationally recognised icon of ancient high civilization in the north 
of Africa. Its construction is meant to become a masterwork of the modern 
world, just as its model was one of the Seven Wonders of the ancient world, 
hence – if one believes the promoters of the initiative – rivalling the 
international fame of one of the world’s most prominent heritage attractions 
and tourist sites. At the time of writing, the implementation of the Freedom 
Tower initiative had been placed on hold indefinitely due to various 
logistical problems, notably the requirement of a major reconfiguration of 
the harbor area. Incidentally, since the concept of a monumental Mandela 
statue has been converted into a tower design, the idea of a gigantic statue 
along the South African coastline has re-emerged in KZN more recently in a 
proposal for an even more outlandish statue in honour of King Shaka. 
Initiated by the Ilembe District Municipality for a site near the Tugela River 
mouth, ca 90km north of Durban, the proposed landmark statue is almost 
identical with the initial Mandela statue proposal in virtually every respect. 
At 106 metres, it is envisaged as becoming the world’s highest statue 
(exceeding the Statue of Liberty by 13m). The bronze sculpture would be 
situated on a three-story podium with various amenities, including ‘a 
museum, conference centre, an upmarket “ethnic” hotel with world class 
                                                                                                                            
envisages a 122 foot tall structure in the shape of a steep, spiralling pyramid. The 
interior offers space for museum exhibits on Mandela’s life and the anti-
apartheid struggle, as well as possibly various tourist amenities (Anonymous 
2005c). 
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finishes, a shopping centre, restaurant and art and craft stalls’. Envisaged to 
be completed in time for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the statue was meant to 
become a ‘must-see’ tourist attraction with an estimated 4000 visitors a day 
and ‘the most visited and photographed landmarks (sic) in Africa’ (concept 
proposal, quoted in Cole 2007; see also Anonymous 2006). The estimated 
costs of R200 million for the statue itself and R1,2 billion for the 
development as a whole were expected to come from the private sector. The 
investment was said to generate an estimated 24,76 percent return during the 
first year, rising to 32 percent by the fourth year. Paralleling the Mandela 
statue experience, during the weeks following the official announcement of 
the initiative on 3 August 2007, the Daily News carried a number of letters to 
the editor ridiculing and disparaging the statue idea, and comments of a 
similar nature quickly accumulated in the blog space of the paper’s on-line 
version. 
Other Mandela statue initiatives 
The Freedom Statue project was preceded and without doubt in part inspired 
by another large-scale private-sector monument initiative in honour of 
Mandela, which had created much controversy when it was first made public 
in 1996. The project became popularly known as the ‘Mandela’s Hand’ 
monument, because it envisaged a giant bronze cast of Mandela’s hand 
breaking through prison bars.18 The 23-metre (some sources say 33-metre) 
high sculpture, envisaged for a hill site outside Pretoria (some sources 
suggest Robben Island) was to be privately funded by businessmen Solly and 
Abe Krok at a cost of R50 million (some sources say R60 million) and 
sculpted by Danie de Jager, an artist closely associated with the 
commemorative endeavours of the apartheid regime (see also his 
involvement in the Nasionale Vrouemonument described in Chapter Eight).  
The project drew an unprecedented amount of debate and criticism.19 The 
Natal Witness thought the controversial proposal was an April Fool’s Day 
joke (Munusamy 1996; Oosthuizen 1996), and South African cartoonist 
Zapiro (Jonathan Shapiro) ridiculed it in the Mail & Guardian. The concept 
is ‘in the best tradition of fascist South African monumental kitsch’, 
commented Robert Greig (1996), Arts Editor of the Sunday Independent, 
and with respect to its tourism potential Marilyn Martin, director of the 
South African National Gallery, added in a letter to the Director General of 
the Office of the President that tourists would indeed flock to see the 
                                                     
18  In a Mail & Guardian article the project is described as being made of welded 
copper plates rather than bronze cast (Beresford 1996).  
19  See for instance Anonymous (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1996d; 1996e; 1996f); 
Beresford (1996); Greig (1996); Rossouw (1996); Vanderhaeghen (1996); 
Dubow (1996). About the monument initiative see also Coombes (2003). 
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monument, but to laugh at South Africans’ naivety and philistinism, not to 
share in their liberation through a work of art (Letter Martin to Gerwel 
2/4/1996; Vanderhaeghen 1996). 20 
Apart from its aesthetic and scale, the project was slammed for a number 
of other reasons, including its high expense, its lack of transparency, its lack 
of public participation and consultation, and most notably for ethical 
problems concerning its initiators. The latter point referred to the perceived 
‘mismatch’ between the person to be commemorated and the persons in 
charge of creating and sponsoring the monument. The project was 
considered to be ‘contaminated’ through de Jager’s involvement and the fact 
that the Krok brothers had made part of their business fortune from skin-
lightening creams, which made their sponsorship for a project of this nature 
inappropriate and ethically questionable in the public opinion (Coombes 
2003; Letter DG to Minister 13/3/1997).  
The Mandela Hand proposal was shelved completely, but despite efforts 
by the Nelson Mandela Foundation and other stakeholders to defend and 
control the public representation of Madiba, both private and public sector 
constituencies keep seeking opportunities to exploit the man’s international 
iconic status and instant recognition value.21 It is perhaps no coincidence that 
the first Mandela statues emerged in the commercial arena on sites 
associated with trade and tourism. One of the very first examples was the 
roughly life-size bronze statue made by Phil Minnaar, which was unveiled in 
1998 in Hammanskraal, a small township north of Pretoria. The statue forms 
the focal point of Mandela Square, a new tourist-oriented urban development 
at the fringe of the town next to the new municipal offices, comprising a 
series of craft stalls along a new street, very obviously laid out for coaches. 
Here tourists can shop for snacks and curios, watch the crafters at work, and 
                                                     
20  Members of the South African art world condemned the proposal in terms of its 
aesthetic. ‘That monumental arm that is supposed to symbolise freedom, bursting 
through prison bars, is it waving or drowning? In its overblown, vein-bulging 
literalism, it is an echo of all that is bad in the discredited rhetoric of totalitarian 
art’, said Neville Dubow (1996) from the Michaelis School of Art in Cape Town. 
The fact that the arm was meant to be based on an actual cast of Mandela’s arm 
furthermore prompted him to draw comparisons with the Victory monument in 
Baghdad (commemorating Iraq’s victory over Iran), which is based on enlarged 
bronze casts of Saddam Hussein’s right forearm (ibid.; see also Michalski 1998). 
In the South African context, some might also be reminded of the controversial 
colonial practice of making body casts of San/Bushmen people, upon which 
many well known ‘statues’ or dioramas – most notably that of Sarah Baartman – 
are based. 
21  According to Verne Harris (2007) from the Nelson Mandela Foundation, during 
the first nine months of the year 2007 the Foundation received over 4000 
requests for endorsement (e.g. use of Mandela’s name, image, etc.). 
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take a picture of the Mandela statue,22 which, as the City of Pretoria/ 
Tshwane’s publicity brochure on township tourism hyperbolically claims, 
‘… now features in every tourist’s photo album all over the world and 
should be seen by every visitor to the region’ (undated: 35).  
 
 
Photo 10.1 Bronze statue of Nelson Mandela, Hammanskraal, unveiled in 1998. 
In March 2004 a more than double life-size bronze statue made by Hattingh 
and Maponyane was unveiled in Sandton Square, now renamed Nelson 
Mandela Square, a secluded open-air piazza inside an up-market shopping 
centre in the heart of Sandton, north of Johannesburg. While the statue at 
Hammanskraal portrays Mandela in a formal posture, solemnly taking his 
oath of office at the beginning of his presidential term, the Sandton statue is 
based on the popular image of the relaxed, laughing and dancing man of the 
people. Critics have condemned the re-branding of the square as one of the 
worst excesses of capitalist commercial exploitation and the statue has 
drawn much criticism from the art community, notably on account of its 
poor craftsmanship (Corrigall 2007: 15). Nevertheless, it continues to 
fascinate visitors, many of whom have themselves photographed next to it.  
 
                                                     
22  Ironically, the statue is set up facing south, which forces the photographer to 
shoot against the sun for most of the day, making it almost impossible to take a 
decent picture other than of Mandela’s backside.  
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Photo 10.2 Bronze statue of Nelson Mandela, Nelson Mandela Square, Sandton 
(Johannesburg), unveiled in 2004. 
In the present context of South Africa’s eagerness to attract foreign 
investment and tourism, flashing the Mandela card presumably projects a 
confident image of peace and stability to the international audience of 
foreign public officials and private sector delegates who regularly descend 
on Sandton for conventions and business summits. The statue of Mandela, 
‘man of the people’, has essentially become a kind of décor that lends a local 
flavour to the international-standard shopping experience at this high-class 
commercial site, from which ironically the majority of ‘the people’ are 
implicitly excluded.23 
Despite efforts to prevent Mandela from being turned into a commodity, 
such initiatives and their strong association with tourism and commercial 
enterprise carry the danger of trivialising the man’s role and personality and 
preparing the way for his likeness to be turned into an item of kitsch. In the 
NMM, tourism authorities are seeking ways of developing the destination 
brand by linking well-known characteristics of Mandela with already 
established positive attributes associated with the city or the region. It has 
been suggested, for instance, that Port Elizabeth’s eagerly nurtured image as 
the ‘friendly city’ can be enhanced by creating a new logo, used on stamps 
                                                     
23  When I visited the statue a few months after its unveiling, I found it telling that 
the black garage attendant working right outside the shopping complex reported 
he had never seen this tribute to what might be expected to be ‘his hero’, because 
he believed he would not be allowed to ‘go in there’. 
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or seals of approval, that resembles Mandela’s smiling face (Heath 2004: 
152).  
A few other proposals for Mandela statues have been received by the 
Nelson Mandela Foundation over the years, including some from 
opportunistic foreigners who would like to associate their name with a 
highly visible monumental tribute to a world-famous man. In December 
1998, for instance, Edward T Breathitt, an American sculptor based in 
Arizona, in partnership with Michelle Maddox, Director of the SATEX-US 
Development of Operations, approached the South African authorities with a 
proposal for a US$200 million Freedom Park on Robben Island, which 
would contain a 72-foot Nelson Mandela sculpture and additional 
commemorative structures and statues to portray the anti-apartheid 
struggle.24 In response, the initiators were informed of the Government’s 
National Legacy Project, which already included a Freedom Park. Had the 
initiators conducted more thorough research on current issues in post-
apartheid heritage conservation, they might have understood that the 
development of a statue park on Robben Island was unlikely to be deemed 
desirable.  
In May 2000, Godfrey Lencwe from Pat Voice Promotions in Diepkloof 
wrote to Nelson Mandela to request permission (and implicitly funding) to 
build a life-size sculpture of Madiba. 
It is unfair to see a prestigious and a person of such noble character such as he 
not having a symbolic monument placed in honour of him for history sake (sic.). 
This not only plays a major role in increasing tourist revenue, but gives an 
opportunity to build a better rememberance (sic) of what our country was and an 
update of what it is.25  
What this clumsily phrased letter reveals is not only how some ordinary 
people are beginning to make their voices heard and seek to actively 
participate in heritage conservation and the creation of symbolic markers, 
but also how they are beginning to understand the ‘use-value’ of heritage 
and the opportunities, not least in economic terms, that heritage can 
provide.26 
                                                     
24  Letter Carol Steinberg to Ahmed Kathrada, ‘Estimated $200 Million Project on 
the establishment of a Freedom Park and the Development of a 72 foot Nelson 
Mandela Sculpture on Robben Island’, 3/12/1998, DAC, Freedom Park Project, 
Vol. 3, file 6/16/4. 
25  Letter Godfrey Lencwe to Dr Nelson Mandela. ‘Request to build a monument 
sculpture for Dr. Mandela’, 22 May 2000, DAC, Legacy Committee and 
General, Vol. 6, file 6/16/7. 
26  In July 1997, Harare-based Project Director SuSu Lavelle of the company 
Phoenicia proposed a research project for establishing the Madiba Theme Park, 
which was envisaged to greatly contribute to tourism. Letter SuSu Lavelle to 
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Another proposal for a Mandela statue emerged from the members of 
Parliament in mid-2003, when the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly 
(Ms B. Mbete) requested advice from the DAC on the most suitable location 
for such a statue. The DAC supplied some guidelines, including the 
requirement ‘that the statue fit into an existing tourism node’27 and produced 
a complex scoring model according to which different potential sites should 
be rated and their suitability assessed. While nothing came of this initiative, 
a very small number of Mandela statues and busts have indeed been 
established, for instance one in Kempton Park, one in Paarl and one at the 
V&A Waterfront in Cape Town, where Mandela forms part of an ensemble 
of South Africa’s four Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. (The other three are 
Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, Former State President FW de Klerck, 
and Nkosi Albert Luthuli.)  
Sponsored by the V&A Waterfront and the Western Cape Province, the 
latter initiative was originally intended to be completed by 2004 in 
celebration of ten years of democracy, but its unveiling was delayed to 16 
December 2005 in celebration of ‘South Africa’s process of reconciliation 
and nation building’ (according to the inscription on the site). It constitutes a 
rather unusual sculptural tribute because the statues, made by acclaimed 
South African artist Claudette Schreuder,28 are more clearly works of public 
art than monuments in the conventional sense. But Schreuder’s popularly 
accessible, somewhat caricaturist style and the commercial environment of 
the tourist-dominated waterfront once again contribute to turning Mandela 
and his fellow laureates into entertaining, commodified icons enhancing the 
up-market shopping experience. 
                                                                                                                            
Ahmed Kathrada, ‘The Madiba Theme Park – A Research Project’, 1 July 1997, 
DAC, Legacy Committee and General, Vol. 2, file 6/16/7. The stated aims of the 
project were to honour Nelson Mandela’s legacy, to promote the welfare of the 
aged and children, and to cultivate quality tourism in South Africa. Strangely, the 
narrative of the proposed park was based on ‘a science fiction novel depicting 
alien animals, characters and robotics aimed for children’ (ibid.).  
27  Letter Alicia Monis to Rani Naiker, ‘Statue of former President Nelson Mandela 
to be commissioned by Parliament’, 19/6/2003, DAC, New Legacy Project, No 
vol. #, file 6/16/7. Mbete’s letter also requested information on the government’s 
current policy on the relocation of existing statues. On the latter point, the DAC 
responded that ‘Government does not have a policy with regard to the relocation 
of statues, and specifically those of previous heads of state. However, a general 
understanding exists that Government does not relocate or in any way alter exist-
ing monuments and statues’. 
28  Both Schreuder and Noria Mbasa were commissioned for this work, but they 
opted to produce separate pieces. Mbasa, renowned for her wood sculptures, 
made the work ‘Peace and Democracy’, which was set up in front of the four 
bronze sculptures by Schreuder. 
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Why have so surprisingly few statues of Nelson Mandela been erected by 
now? One might suggest that South Africa is opting to follow the model of 
western democratic nations, which – by and large – tend to abstain from the 
production of statuary tributes to living persons, especially political figures, 
but Mandela was always implicitly exempted from that rule. Rather, I 
suggest, Mandela statues are relatively scarce precisely on account of the 
widely acknowledged stature of and respect for the man, broadly shared 
across the racial, ethnic and even ideological spectrum. Mandela arguably 
constitutes South African’s only truly shared heritage. This places special 
demands on the representation of that heritage, which many believe must be 
protected from exploitation and appropriation by sectarian interests. 
Depending on where it is located, who made it or who sponsored it, a statue 
may be perceived as allowing certain individuals or communities to draw 
undue advantages from or lay special claim to the Mandela heritage. 
Although the Nelson Mandela Foundation fiercely protects the Mandela 
image, it can be anticipated that a flood of proposals for Mandela statues and 
indeed an entire Madiba ‘heritage industry’ will spring up when this 
extraordinary man has passed away.  
Regardless of the broad-based admiration for Mandela, we must remain 
critically aware of how the need for commodification and the strategic 
exploitation of Nelson Mandela and other struggle icons promotes the 
reduction of complex events and multifaceted personalities to one-
dimensional images and recognisable signs. As the symbolic lives of 
publicly venerated heroes supersede their real lives, excessive glorification, 
sanitisation and suppression of unsuitable aspects of their actions and 
personality can lead to a veritable process of sanctification. In a context 
where the writing of public biographic history easily becomes hagiography, 
heroes are effectively shielded from criticism, and even academic historical 
research exposing ambiguities and contradictions can be regarded a 
traitorous act. 
Monuments and the symbolic reshaping of the urban 
environment  
‘Tourists do not come here to see a mini London but an African city and how 
its people live. We need to Africanise the city’, said Thembinkosi Ngcobo, 
eThekwini’s Executive Director of Parks, Recreation and Culture, when he 
argued that the city of Durban needs new monuments (Ngcobo cited in 
Mkhize 2001). The practice of establishing public monuments and statuary 
in urban centers appears to be a growing phenomenon in many countries, 
including some of the poorest of African nations. As in South Africa, these 
monuments are often initiated by the state and serve a dual purpose: the 
endorsement and communication of specific value systems or redefined 
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notions of identity in line with government policies, and the creation of 
tourist attractions and associated destination marketing.  
In Mali, for instance, as in other African countries, historical memory was 
traditionally encoded primarily in oral and performative acts, but between 
1995 and 2002 the national government, under then president Alpha Konaré, 
invested in a large-scale public monument programme, concentrated in the 
capital city, Bamako. The initiative constituted ‘a concerted effort to 
refashion the visual and symbolic landscape of the city in the popular 
imagination’ (Arnoldi 2003: 56). As commonly seen in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the sculptural and architectural monuments, over 25 of them in total, 
represent key events in the country’s history, and especially the movement 
for independence. Some relate to African philosophy or cosmology. Others 
portray important leader figures. All of them express the government’s 
vision of specific national values, notably patriotism, civilisation and 
nationalism. But another important aim of the Bamako monument program-
me was the beautification of the city and the desire to portray a sense of 
cosmopolitanism in emulation of other world capitals, notably Paris (ibid.).  
In his analysis of road monuments in Nigerian cities Oha observed that 
‘the city (re)constructs itself to be seen, and also speaks to its inhabitants and 
visitors through what it makes them to see’ (2000: 33). Public monuments 
and statues as ‘sights’ are persuasive, iconic cultural artefacts in the 
(artistically redrawn) landscape of the city. They commodify the city by 
advertising in their mute ways its character and cultural values (ibid.: 37). 
Monuments command attention, especially from visitors unfamiliar with 
them and their urban context. They make visible – through symbols and 
images – what is deemed important; and they assist in the creation of a sense 
of uniqueness that distinguishes the city as destination from its competitors.  
Statues and name changes: Tshwane 
In this context of national and regional competition between towns and 
cities, the appropriation of well-known iconic leaders and the construction of 
monuments in their honour can be an important strategy of attracting 
visitors. Who succeeds in the competitive race for the exploitation of the 
most desirable icons, which city or community manages to claim which hero 
for the dual purpose of redefining identity and attracting visitors, is 
increasingly becoming a matter of power – not only political power but also 
economic power. Echoing the case of the Mandela statue initiative in the 
NMM, in other cities and towns statue proposals have likewise been 
strategically linked with name changes. In the Northern Cape city of 
Kimberley, for example, now called Sol Plaatje municipality, a statue of the 
African writer and political activist, Sol Plaatje, was produced in 1998, but 
its public installation has been delayed ever since due to political 
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controversy and discussions over the preferred site.29 In Mogale City, 
formerly called Krugersdorp, a statue of the important local chief, Kgosi 
Mogale wa Mogale, has been set up in front of the city hall, thus making the 
new name seem potently official, following a familiar pattern introduced 
through the colonial tradition.  
 
 
Photo 10.3 Bronze statue of Kgosi Mogale wa Mogale, Krugersdorp (Mogale 
City), unveiled in 2004. 
In 2002 the Northern Province officially changed its name to Limpopo and 
the provincial government immediately embarked on a controversial drive to 
change names of towns and cities throughout the province in an attempt to 
‘indigenise’ the cultural landscape. In some cases names reverted to 
supposedly pre-colonial place-names and in other cases they now enshrine 
the memory of important traditional leaders or ‘warrior kings’. The historical 
Voortrekker town of Louis Trichardt is now called Makhado, for instance, 
and a public bronze statue of King Makhado was unveiled there in Septem-
                                                     
29  At the time of writing the statue is still stored in the William Humphreys Art 
Gallery in Kimberley, but in 2008 a new bronze statue of Sol Plaatje was cast. 
He is depicted as a vigorous agitator with clenched fist, a detail that caused fierce 
controversy. Although already installed on its plinth, the statue was never 
unveiled. It was dismantled immediately afterwards and has been stored away 
ever since (Chonga 2008).  
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ber 2005, immediately to be vandalised with spray-painted references to 
ultraconservative Afrikaner political symbolism (Hlatshwayo and sama-
Yende 2005). 
By far the most controversial name change proposed thus far is the 
renaming of South Africa’s capital, Pretoria, as Tshwane, reportedly the 
name given to the area by local black communities before the Voortrekkers 
established the town they called Pretoria after their leader Andries Pretorius 
in 1855. The wider, integrated municipal area which comprises the current 
city of Pretoria and all surrounding townships had already been named the 
City of Tshwane Municipality in December 2000, but the most recent dissent 
refers to the proposed renaming of the actual core city, which was officially 
approved by the Council on 5 December 2005.30 Space does not allow me to 
engage with the heated, often emotionally charged debate over the name 
change, the controversial research conducted to investigate its desirability, 
the divergent opinions about the meaning of the name Tshwane, or the 
petitions and court hearings associated with this contentious proposal. 
Among the reasons cited by opponents of the name change for their 
opposition to it were the cost factor and the implications for tourism, notably 
the damaging impact on the destination branding effort, but the key issue 
remains centered on Afrikaner identity and heritage.  
While the controversial debate was continuing, the consolidation of the 
name Tshwane was taken forward on a different front, namely through the 
fast-track production of a 3m bronze statue of Chief Tshwane, unveiled in 
July 2006 in front of the city hall. When the proposal was first tabled in the 
Metro Council, two months after the council vote on the name change, no 
reference was made to the problematic issue of the envisaged name change 
for Pretoria. Rather, the primary rationale for the erection of the statue was 
the official acknowledgement in the public memory landscape of a cultural 
heritage predating the arrival of whites in this area. Secondly, it was pointed 
out that the Chief Tshwane statue would contribute towards tourism and 
economic development, following the model of Mogale City, where the new 
statue had allegedly become ‘a major draw card for local and international 
tourists’ (Council Minutes 20 May 2005).  
                                                     
30  This was first officially decided with the Council vote on 8 March 2005. The 
decision created much controversy and debate. For media reports refer to 
Anonymous 2005; 2005a; 2005b. For detailed information and analysis see 
Jenkins (2007). In response to the furore, the Minister of Arts and Culture, Pallo 
Jordan, intervened in the matter and put a final decision about the name change 
on hold, pending further consultation. At the time of writing, the name Tshwane 
has not yet been officially approved at ministerial level, but it has gained 
currency in practice at various levels.  
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Photo 10.4 Bronze statue of Chief Tshwane, City Hall, Pretoria (Tshwane), 
unveiled in 2006.  
Like the name change, the statue proposal led to much disagreement in the 
Tshwane Metro Council, as well as public debate and pressure from ordinary 
residents of the city. One of the key issues was whether or not Chief 
Tshwane had ever existed. According to oral history sources, chief Tshwane 
was the son of Mushi, chief of a small tribe that moved from Zululand to the 
area east of Pretoria during the early 19th century. He is later believed to 
have moved from there to the banks of a river which he called Tshwane after 
his son, and the whole area became known as Tshwane (Council Minutes 20 
May 2005).31 It is hardly surprising that a Chief Tshwane does not feature in 
many written versions of the local history, given the ideological agendas and 
interests of those in power to record and write such history. But in May 2005 
the Mail & Guardian reported under the headline ‘Who the hell was 
Tshwane anyway?’ that two Ndebele chiefs, King Makhosoke II and King 
Mayisha III, also said that they had never heard of a Chief Tshwane, despite 
the fact that the name is linked to Ndebele tribal dynasty. They suggested 
that Pretoria should rather be named Musi or KwaMyamana (Anonymous 
2005; Jenkins 2007: 159). The fact of the matter is that the presence of the 
                                                     
31  According to press reports (Hlahla 2006), the current representatives of the 
Tshwane royal house ‘obtained oral information from their grandfathers and 
verbal and written information through the late Tom Andrews, who was a 
founder member of the Names Society of Southern Africa and the Pretoria 
Historical Society’.  
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statue now gives legitimacy, increased power and possibly future resources 
to the remnants of the so-called Tshwane Royal House, to the detriment of 
other potential contestants, for instance, said Ndebele chiefs.  
At the statue’s unveiling the chairman of the Tshwane Royal House, 
Phistos Tshwane, was quoted as saying: ‘We’ve heard arguments that Chief 
Tshwane never existed. But the fact that we are here (at the unveiling), 
shows he did (Hlahla and SAPA 2006). A council official added to this as he 
unveiled the statue on behalf of the mayor: ‘In this statue, we can see and 
feel the pulse of our history beating. We can see how far we’ve come to 
building ourselves as a nation’ (ibid., see also Hlahla 2006). In other words, 
the tangible presence of the statue legitimates claims to the existence of the 
man, implicitly supports the case of those in favour of the name change, and 
progressively constitutes a building block in the development of a new 
(Afrocentric) nation.  
Created by Pretoria sculptor, Angus van Zyl Taylor, at a cost of R 900 
000, the bronze statue of Chief Tshwane shows a middle-aged standing male 
on a high plinth. According to information provided by the Tshwane Metro 
council and cited in the media, his face and physical build are generic, with 
features considered typical of a Tswana/Ndebele male, and he is clothed in 
the traditional costume and accessories of a headman or chief of the 17th and 
18th centuries (Hlahla 2006). The chief is caught in a spontaneous-looking 
pose of readiness with a determined look on his face. The style, materials, 
and scale of both sculpture and plinth are clearly inspired by the two existing 
statues in the same public space, namely those of Andries Pretorius (on 
horseback) and his son, former ZAR President Marthinus Wessel Pretorius. 
Among the different locations that were initially considered for the new 
statue, Pretorius square was a preferred option, because  
… the accommodation of a new statue in honour of Chief Tshwane – in juxta-
position (sic) with the statue of Andries Pretorius after whom Pretoria was 
named – has powerful reconciliation potential. … The square could possibly be 
renamed Tshwane square, since it is rightly the square of the City of Tshwane. 
The precinct is of course within a most prominent and dignified location which is 
frequented by large numbers of tourist bus operators (Council Minutes 20 May 
2005).  
When Arnoldi (2003) interviewed people in Bamako to canvas public 
opinion about the new monuments and statues, many were supportive, 
describing the monuments as attractive landmarks and good for tourism, but 
critics considered them a waste of resources and expressed concern over an 
emerging personality cult. In South Africa one might find similar responses, 
but there is almost always another layer of complexity in evidence, namely 
one determined by racially based allegiances. If the name change was 
already a sore point for many Pretoria residents, the statue and its bold 
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affirmation of the existence of the African chief was too much for the ultra 
conservative white minority. Only one week after its unveiling the statue of 
Chief Tshwane was vandalized, evidently by white right-wing extremists,32 
and such attacks have recurred on numerous occasions ever since. 
But opponents also hail from the black community. One wonders how 
many share the sentiments of a black security guard working in city hall, 
who was outraged about the statue and railed against it as a ‘waste of 
money’ in the face of ‘people going hungry’ (site visit in January 2007). For 
those in support of the statue, however, the historical facts surrounding Chief 
Tswhane, including the question of his very existence, are arguably less 
important than the symbolic value of the name and the statue as a powerful 
assertion of a new Afrocentric identity, as well as the public representation 
of counter-narratives contesting the Eurocentric discourses which have so 
long dominated the public arena.  
Conclusion 
Based on the international recognition value of historical personalities and 
key events in South African history, post-apartheid monuments are widely 
anticipated to become powerful drawcards for foreign visitors, whose 
perceived economic power is in turn expected to lead to development and 
income generation for impoverished local communities. Yet, virtually no 
research has been conducted to ascertain to what extent new monuments, 
once completed, indeed attract tourists and – if they do – who precisely 
benefits and in what way. I would venture to suggest that by and large the 
tourist potential and especially the supposed community empowerment 
outcomes of post-apartheid commemorative monuments are vastly over-
rated. The tourism argument is conveniently mobilised to legitimate projects 
primarily driven by psychological, social and especially political agendas.  
However, some heritage developments around monument sites are 
without doubt successful tourist attractions and have become focal points in 
local community development (e.g. the Hector Pieterson memorial). If 
tourist interest exceeds expectations a host of problems can result, typically 
pitching heritage conservation forces against the tourism sector and 
economic forces. While the former attempts to preserve the authenticity of 
the site or protect the integrity of a historical personality from excessive 
commodification, the latter is forever intent on maximizing the number of 
visitors, developing essential amenities and utilising the iconic status of the 
                                                     
32  The colours of the old South African flag (blue, white and orange) were spray-
painted onto the sculpture along with the letters BB, used during the apartheid 
era to denote ‘Black Bastard’. There were also signs that the culprits had 
urinated around the statue and on the plinth (Nthite 2006). 
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heritage resource for purposes of branding and commercial exploitation. The 
most significant example within the heritage field (although not involving a 
commemorative monument) is Robben Island, where key stakeholders worry 
about the impact of the overwhelming tourist interest since the island first 
opened for public visits on 1 January 1997.33 As the cultural and heritage 
tourism sector in South Africa expands, more monuments and heritage sites 
are likely to be privately initiated, implicitly promoting the sponsor, but 
ostensibly empowering the community. This trend is likely to open up a 
minefield of contestation and conflict over memories and their 
representation, especially when powerful commercial interests backed by 
private investment funds push for a particular interpretation of the past 
against ideological agendas endorsed by the state or those held by relevant 
stakeholders.  
What is most disturbing about heritage tourism in my own experience is 
the fact that historical ‘knowledge’ is increasingly transferred and acquired 
through the products of the heritage tourism sector. In a societal climate 
where the academic study of history is on the decline and where the majority 
lacks a culture of reading, heritage tourist sites with their easily compre-
hensible, simplified narratives of the past, constitute an attractive, easily 
accessible and visually orientated means by which especially the youth and 
school children on field trips can ‘learn’ about ‘history’. This is 
accompanied by a trend – prevalent even among university students – 
towards a somewhat gullible absorption of information and a lack of critical 
distance towards whatever ‘the authorities’ have chosen to present to the 
public. This attitude is unlikely to change, as long as the state, directed by 
the ruling party, has a vested interest in protecting political memory, and 
especially the heritage of the Struggle.  
                                                     
33  Robben Island reportedly attracts well over 300 000 people per year 
(Anonymous 2004c). In response to this popular interest, the maximum number 
of daily visitors to the island initially recommended by heritage management 
structures was considerably increased and crucial tourist amenities, such as a 
curio shop selling Robben Island branded souvenirs, were added (Coombes 
2003).  

  
 
Conclusion 
It is no coincidence that the practice of erecting public monuments and 
statues gained popularity in Europe during the Enlightenment and Romantic 
periods and began to flourish tremendously during the course of the 19th 
century in conjunction with the emergence and development of the nation 
state. National monuments are closely associated with the belief in the idea 
and ideal of the ‘nation’. They celebrate foundational moments and enshrine 
heroic leaders in the chosen narrative of the nation. In the spirit of liberal 
humanism, local monuments and statues of respected personalities, both 
from the political arena and from the field of arts and culture, champion 
morally elevated causes and contributions encapsulating national values to 
serve as models of aspiration and identification.  
In Europe and elsewhere in the world the end of the nation state has long 
been predicted, yet the concept of the nation remains strong and is often 
shored up in response to new configurations of political administration and 
economic organisation, accompanied by the threat of cultural homo-
genisation through globalisation. Monuments and memorials are frequently 
dismissed or ridiculed – memorials have been called ‘dumping ground for 
wreaths’ (‘Krantzabwurfstelle’) in Germany (Kirsch 2003) and monuments 
are ‘nothing but big nationalistic phalluses’, quipped Alex Dodd (1999) in 
the South African context – yet their popularity is thriving throughout the 
world. Monuments and memorials, along with museums and other products 
of the heritage sector, are established to assert specific political and cultural 
values, but also (in some countries more so than in others) to come to terms 
with previously denied, neglected or shameful aspects of the past.  
In this international context, the South African government’s vigorous 
investment in the commemorative sector, often castigated by critics, is 
neither unusual nor surprising. Just as the newly established democracy in 
South Africa and the government’s project of building a non-racial 
multicultural nation are influenced by international models of governance 
and societal politics, the products of the commemorative sector, too, draw 
inspiration from past and present trends in international practices of 
memorialisation. ‘Show me who your friends are and I tell you who you 
are’, says an old proverb. With some caution, one might go so far as to say 
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that South Africa’s closest political and economic allies within the 
international community of nations also provide the most dominant models 
for both the treatment of contested heritage and the construction of new 
monuments and memorials.  
In societies undergoing fundamental socio-political change, the imme-
diate post-change period is often characterised by a desire to demonstrate a 
marked break with the past, accompanied by a radical iconoclastic onslaught 
on the symbolic reminders of that past. In Germany during in the immediate 
post-World War II period, for instance, persistent talk about Zero Hour 
(Stunde Null) was meant to indicate a complete new beginning, but in 
hindsight this concept has been largely discredited and historians today 
instead highlight the continuities with the past. Similarly, in many post-
socialist societies in Eastern Europe the persistent continuities with the old 
order are sometimes seen as more striking than the disruptions thereof 
(Verdery 1999: 24). South Africa has been admired for the miracle of its 
‘soft revolution’, the negotiated transition of power. In this spirit the post-
apartheid government has largely refrained from radical measures and acts 
of retribution, including radical measures taken against existing monuments 
as symbolic representations of the old order. In a sense South Africa is 
caught in a delicate balancing act between continuity and discontinuity, an 
emphasis on a radical break with the past and a simultaneous continuity with 
it in the interest of reconciliation, the cultivation of its international image, 
and the principles of the new Constitution.  
This balancing act is reflected in its monuments, which both continue and 
emulate the commemorative practices of the past and emphasise their 
discontinuity from the latter. In other words, the postcolonial/post-apartheid 
heritage, while officially positioned in ideological opposition to the 
colonial/apartheid heritage, is in reality often characterized by a complex and 
sometimes symbiotic interweaving with the latter. As McEachern (2002: 1) 
observed, the South African imaginings of the post-apartheid nation, in the 
media and elsewhere, are themselves deeply grounded in the colonial 
experience and the apartheid past, and the state-endorsed nationalism of 
Afrikanerdom is being replaced with the state-endorsed nationalism of the 
liberation movements, notably the ANC.  
‘Dying for the revolution also draws its grandeur from the degree to 
which it is felt to be something fundamentally pure’, notes Anderson (1983: 
132). Commemorative monuments are a means of upholding the aura of 
‘purity’ and disinterestedness of the cause for which people died and 
ensuring that the history of this ‘revolution’ is remembered untainted. Post-
apartheid monuments (and the heritage sector in general) strive to represent 
the South African success story, the miracle of a peaceful transition of 
power, inspiring narratives about resistance against oppression and injustice 
and the ultimate attainment of freedom. These monuments testify to the 
inherent humanity of the black people of South Africa, their idealism and 
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hope, but also their resilience and power to change the conditions under 
which they live. This is important for the sake of the new nation, restoring a 
sense of dignity to the previously marginalised and forging a positive model 
of national and especially community identification. It is also important for 
the sake of the world, counteracting historically rooted stereotypes of racial 
inferiority, violence and anarchy, which are still perpetuated in the 
prevailing Afro-pessimist attitudes. ‘Ours is a narrative that has captured the 
imagination of the world. How we resolve the problems of racism, bigotry 
and economic inequality in our country will be an example to the world 
community’, stated a press report about the development of Freedom Park 
(Mamaila 2000). One might say the ‘liberal dream of history-making’ is 
South Africa’s contribution to the world. Although the tendency to 
romanticise the past, sanitise history, omit ambiguities and contradictions, 
and suppress unwanted memories is considered common in heritage 
internationally, in the South African case it is not least motivated by the 
desire to present to the world a moving, coherent narrative of moral 
excellence that supports (rather than stains or destroys) the celebrated 
success story.  
There is certainly no shortage of critics – covering the racial and socio-
economic spectrum – of the current post-apartheid commemorative effort. 
Some view the construction of monuments as a waste of public resources. 
Others consider them mere government propaganda and are concerned about 
the selective and biased representation of the past. Others again believe that 
the construction of new monuments falls short of truly transforming the 
heritage landscape. Yet others take issue with their aesthetic design and 
deem inappropriate the specific visual language in which new commemorat-
ive markers speak to the nation and the world. However, there is also 
widespread support for new monuments on multifarious grounds and from a 
variety of quarters. Nothing would be further from the truth than to suggest 
that post-apartheid monuments are merely imposed on the populace from 
above. Some may even argue that an endorsement by those wronged in the 
past lifts any monument above the critique emanating from scholars, tourists 
or members of privileged communities. Nevertheless, I believe that a critical 
analysis of the post-apartheid commemorative effort is valid and important, 
because the memory landscape not only symbolises and represents but 
actively constitutes and authorises interpretations of the past and the role that 
different individuals and communities played in it.  
Every act of official remembrance is accompanied by countless acts of 
damnatio memoriae – the obliteration of memories that are not aligned with 
the authorised narrative of the past. In this sense, monuments always 
empower some and simultaneously disempower others, even within the same 
(e.g. previously marginalised) community. In the South African context, as 
evidenced in this book, the struggle over the ownership and control of 
memory and especially key icons of the Struggle is only just emerging, often 
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strongly aligned with party-political allegiances. As said earlier, to some 
extent such contestation and debate can be considered a normal and indeed 
desirable practice in a democratic, multicultural society, but in South Africa 
monuments and memorials are generally built to accomplish very explicit 
aims around representation and empowerment, and any evidence of the lack 
of a sense of ownership and identification throws a questionable light on 
these objectives and the public funds that have been spent on the venture. 
Burke (2005) observed the strongly instrumentalist nature of public 
debate around monuments in South Africa. The government invests in 
monuments to achieve specific objectives, hence justifying allied 
expenditure. To some extent, the notion of making an input at a particular 
cost to attain a specified set of outcomes is generic to nation states. But in 
South Africa, the government tends to assume a particularly strong and 
somewhat paternalistic role, where government officials see themselves as 
public representatives who must develop strategies and make decisions on 
behalf of and in the interest of ‘the people’ who elected them. This occurs in 
a context where the majority of the population – owing to a long legacy of 
marginalisation and disempowerment – strongly relies on the government to 
provide development and services, and where individuals often lack the 
capacity and experience to actively participate in decision-making processes 
and especially to take initiative and follow through with the implementation 
of proposed projects, including those in the heritage field. 
It can be anticipated that the dominant role of the state in the develop-
ment of new monuments and heritage sites will wane over time. Private 
sector initiatives, such as the Sunday Times Heritage Project, are likely to 
proliferate with the increasing trend towards the commodification and 
commercial appropriation of icons of the struggle. More desirable would be 
a stronger contribution from community organisations and possibly a 
funding model based on public subscriptions. This is obviously contingent 
on economic growth and more widespread prosperity among the South 
African population, as well as on capacity building, a strengthening of civil 
society and a firm entrenchment of the new democratic order. It is also 
contingent on a truly shared identification with the very concept of monu-
ments as lasting, solid objects, which I argue does not sufficiently prevail at 
the present moment, or the development of alternative, more meaningful 
commemorative practices to replace or complement monuments. More 
importantly, perhaps, it is contingent on a more widespread identification 
with the narrative of the nation and the development of a genuine sense of 
citizenship. 
Along with these changes one may anticipate a waning emphasis on 
political memory and a gradual shift from the current almost exclusive focus 
on political leaders (including tribal chiefs) and activists of the struggle to 
the public memorialisation of prominent figures from the wider fields of arts, 
culture, science or even the economic arena. Also likely to diminish is the 
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present urgency to commemorate historical events and campaigns related to 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid resistance, when all major events are 
‘covered’ and large numbers of victims are acknowledged through various 
types of tributes.  
International examples illustrate that problems often occur when the 
process of public memorialisation commences very shortly after a tragic 
event (e.g. the Oklahoma Bombing or the 9/11 Attack on the World Trade 
Centre in the United States) or relatively soon after a war or a decisive 
historical era has come to an end (e.g. the ‘troubles’ in Northern Ireland). In 
such contexts, many principle role players, participants, victims or other 
stakeholders are still alive, the memory of events is still vivid in their minds, 
and they may have vested interests in and conflicting opinions about how the 
past should be represented. If this suggests a less hurried, more considered 
and longer-term approach to the transformation of the official memory 
landscape, it does not take into account the psychological need for 
monuments and memorials. The rush for memorialisation is frequently an 
integral part of the desire for healing and establishing the truth, because 
commemoration involves the development of a coherent narrative, which 
helps people to understand what happened and to come to terms with the 
past. Through commemoration the memory of an event becomes 
institutionalised, hence allowing people to attain a sense of control over it. In 
South Africa there is an additional factor warranting the current sense of 
urgency in establishing monuments, memorials and statues, namely the long 
deferment of such official memorialisation in a context where people were 
implicitly prevented from establishing permanent, official commemorative 
markers in public spaces immediately after the events occurred.  
As stated earlier, monuments and memorials are habitually legitimated as 
tributes to those who died or in honour of those who made an important 
contribution in the past, but in reality monuments are primarily built for the 
sake of the living, and for future generations. Monuments are attempts at 
irrevocably anchoring selected interpretations of the past for future 
generations. They are stages for the enactment of public commemoration, for 
the dramatisation of the past, for the telling of emotional narratives and their 
transferral to the younger generation, hence controlling how those in the 
future will perceive the past and the role that specific communities, 
organisations, political parties and individuals played in it. ‘Whoever 
manages ceremonies (public ritual) in the most effective way, so that adult 
generations enact and embody their policy aspirations in the most 
emotionally significant way for children’ – observed Tomaselli et al. (1996: 
53) – ‘has the best opportunity of securing the symbolic ground for the next 
generation’.  
Considering the important role accorded to the youth as the intended 
audience for post-apartheid monuments, it is somewhat ironic that young-
sters (in my observation) are often particularly disinterested in and ignorant 
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of the new symbolic markers in their midst. Youngsters are also rarely 
invited to contribute to the design of these structures (among the exceptional 
cases is the Solomon Mahlangu statue discussed in Chapter Four). Not only 
should we ask to what extent monuments are really meaningful and 
attractive to the younger generation, but also what else could be done to 
preserve, and not least to problematise, the memory of the past and 
effectively pass it on to a generation for whom the apartheid period is 
already ancient history, whose general political apathy, lack of interest in 
(and knowledge of) history and waning sense of enthusiasm for national 
holiday celebrations (even Youth Day) are frequently lamented.  
Monuments always represent and to some extent construct group 
identities. They can represent existing communities, but they also have the 
potential to introduce new discourses and forge new group identities around 
them. Various scholars problematise the fact that heritage in post-apartheid 
South Africa tends to celebrate exclusive, racial or ethnically based 
‘community’ identities, thereby ironically fortifying the fixed and often 
artificially constructed identity categories promoted during the colonial and 
apartheid eras. To some extent, monuments and memorials too follow this 
trend (e.g. the Ncome project or statues of tribal chiefs). Whether such 
initiatives are likely to achieve their purported reconciliatory aim or rather 
replicate separatism and foster division is a matter of debate and remains to 
be seen.  
However, this book has also shown that many monument initiatives 
explicitly attempt to bridge community boundaries by focussing on historical 
events that involved multi-racial role players. They aim to provide symbols 
of identification for diverse viewers across racial and ethnic lines, 
encouraging people to think of themselves as South Africans first, and only 
in the second instance as Indian, Zulu, Xhosa, or Afrikaner. Such monu-
ments are designed to serve as an integrating force even for those who had 
no personal involvement in the events or once occupied the opposite 
ideological ground. The latter are invited to empathise and encouraged to 
identify with morally superior values, thereby allowing them to have a sense 
of belonging and a share in what purports to be the internationally celebrated 
South African success story.  
How successful this strategy is likely to be in a context where the vision 
of a unified nation still clashes with the reality of the persistent divide 
between black and white and the ambiguous positioning of the Indian and 
‘coloured’ minorities in relation to an increasingly hegemonic African 
nationalism remains to be seen. Of concern is also the increasingly violent 
xenophobic treatment of the sizable and growing African immigrant 
population, which supports McEachern’s (2002: 1) criticism that South 
Africa attempts to construct the nation as a territorially grounded unity, 
while globalisation encourages other kinds of collective identities, transcend-
ing national boundaries. In fact, it is precisely on the basis of a shared 
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heritage, especially in the Southern African region, that the existing state 
entities could be reconstituted as truly African states, but the firm belief in 
the nation-state as a bounded territory, irrespective of its arbitrariness and 
colonial origin, in South Africa and all African countries, renders this option 
impossible. Perhaps the current investment in monuments is a temporary 
phenomenon which is motivated by the desire to address specific 
psychological, social and political needs. After all, how else can one redress 
the overwhelmingly skewed heritage field, the blatant absences of 
representation in the South African landscape of memory? Focusing on the 
museum as a site of cultural representation, Rogoff (2002: 64) proposes that 
we must move beyond ‘the supposition that absences need to be 
compensated for by the constitution of symbolic presences, and beyond the 
understanding that memory can directly or indirectly be recovered’. This, 
she concludes, leaves us with the uneasy task of working and living with 
absence. Rather than focusing on compensatory projects of replacing voids, 
Roggoff suggests that the museum should move to a performative approach 
in which loss is enacted and made manifest from within the culture that has 
remained a seemingly invulnerable dominant (ibid.).  
Rogoff refers to societies, in which the previously absent or marginalised 
culture still constitutes a minority (e.g. Australia, North America, some 
European countries), unlike South Africa, where the previously marginalised 
is now the dominant power. However, a useful lesson that might be drawn 
from her argument is her advocacy for a shift away from the symbolic object 
and current strategies of compensatory visibility to a focus on alternative 
approaches that deal with the effects of past elisions and distortions of 
history on all cultural groupings. The current approach of ‘redressing’ or 
‘correcting’ the memory landscape in the museum, as well as in the field of 
public commemoration in South Africa, without doubt succeeds in achieving 
a ‘feel-good’ mood for its initiators and selected audiences, especially during 
the official unveiling and on other celebratory occasions. But can such 
structures really atone for the absences and injustices of the past? Are 
monuments and memorials perhaps mere trappings, covering up for the lack 
of truly meaningful symbols of integration and identification? 
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Table of Post-Apartheid Monuments, Memorials and Public 
Statuary 
Place Province Description Date Artist/architect/ 
Designer 
Remarks 
 
 
Alice  
Amatole District Municipality 
Eastern Cape Nkonkobe Garden of 
Remembrance 
2003   
Bethal  
Gert Sibande District Municipality 
Mpumalanga Bronze statue of Gert Sibande  2008 Angus van Zyl 
Taylor 
 
      
Bethlehem, 
City Hall  
Free State Youth Memorial 2001   
      
Bisho  
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Bisho Massacre Memorial 1997   
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Bizana 
OR Tambo District 
Eastern Cape Oliver Tambo bust  2002   
Bizana area 
OR Tambo District 
Eastern Cape Oliver Tambo Garden of 
Remembrance 
2007   
      
Bloemfontein, 
Botshabelo  
Mangaung Municipality  
Free State Youth Memorial 2002   
Bloemfontein 
City Centre 
Mangaung Municipality 
Free State Poelanong - Cleansing, Healing 
and Reparation Memorial 
2003 Roodt Partnership Linked to Freedom Park 
initiative 
      
Bulhoek  
Chris Hani District Municipality 
Eastern Cape Bulhoek massacre memorial 2001   
      
Bumbane 
King Sabata Dalindyebo Local 
Municipality 
Eastern Cape Bust of King Sabata Dalindyebo 2006   
      
Burgersdorp 
Gariep Municipality  
Eastern Cape Ikusasa Lethu (Our Future) 
Heritage Memorial 
2001   
      
Cape Town  
Athlone  
Western Cape Trojan Horse memorial plaque 1995   
Cape Town 
Company Gardens 
Western Cape Aids Memorial Undated   
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Cape Town  
Gugulethu 
Western Cape Memorial for Amy Biehl Undated   
Cape Town  
Athlone  
Western Cape Trojan Horse memorial 2000 Tyrone Appollis Removed 
Cape Town 
Gugulethu 
Western Cape Memorial for the Gugulethu 
Seven  
2000 Lungile Maninjwa  Removed  
Cape Town 
Gugulethu 
Western Cape Memorial for the Gugulethu 
Seven 
2005 Donovan Ward & 
Paul Hendricks 
 
Cape Town  
Athlone 
Western Cape Trojan Horse memorial 2005 ACG Architects 
 
 
Cape Town 
V&A Waterfront 
Western Cape Nobel Peace Prize Laureates 2005 Claudette Schreuder 
& Noria Mbasa 
 
Cape Town 
Athlone 
Western Cape Robert Waterwitch & Coline 
Williams Memorial 
2005 Guy du Toit & Egon 
Tania 
Removed and re-
installed 
Cape Town 
City Centre 
Western Cape Memorial for Cissie Gool  2007 Ruth Sacks Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town 
Gordon’s Bay 
Western Cape Memorial for Ingrid Jonker  2007 Tyrone Appollis Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town 
Kalk Bay 
Western Cape Memorial for Olive Schreiner 2007 Barbara Wildenboer Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town 
City Centre 
Western Cape Memorial for Abdullah Ibrahim 2007 Mark O’Donovan & 
Francois Venter 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town  
Newlands 
Western Cape Memorial for Basil d’Oliveira 2007 Donovan Ward Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town  
Youngsfield 
Western Cape Memorial for the First Trans-
Africa Flight 
2007 Strijdom van der 
Merwe 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
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Cape Town 
City Centre 
Western Cape Race Classification Board 
memorial 
2007 Roderick Sauls Sunday Times Heritage 
Project, Removed 
Cape Town 
University of Cape Town 
Western Cape Memorial for Reverend Isaac 
Wauchope 
2007 Madi Phala Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town, 
City Centre 
Western Cape The Purple Shall Govern 2007 Conrad Botes Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Cape Town 
City Centre 
Western Cape Slave memorial 2008  Wilma Cruise and 
Gavin Younge 
 
      
Cradock 
Chris Hani District Municipality 
Eastern Cape Memorial for the Cradock Four 2000   
      
Blood River/Ncome Amajuba 
District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Ncome monument and museum 1998  National Legacy Project 
Isandlwana 
Umzimyathi District Municipality  
KwaZulu-Natal Isandlwana battlefield memorial  1999 Gert Swart  
Rorke’s Drift  
Msinga Muncipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Rorke’s Drift battlefield 
memorial 
2006 Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall  
      
Durban  
Harbour 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of the Lady in 
White  
1995 Barbara Siedle  
Durban 
Wentworth 
Ethekwini Muncipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Plaque commemorating Nelson 
Mandela’s visit 
1995   
Durban KwaZulu-Natal Bronze bust of Vasco da Gama (1997) Barbara Siedle  Not publicly installed; 
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Ethekwini Municipality currently in storage  
Durban  
Gugu Dlamini Park 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Gugu Dlamini  
 
2000 Jeremy Wafer & 
Georgia Sarkin with 
Bronwen Findlay & 
Jane du Rand) 
Severely vandalized 
Durban  
Gugu Dlamini Park 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Aids Ribbon 2000  Installed on top of the 
‘Pleasure Dome’ 
fountain  
Durban 
Chatsworth 
Ethekwini Municipality  
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi  
2001 Maria Smith 
Williams 
 
Durban  
City Hall 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Starwalk (King Cetswhayo 
African Image Awards) 
2001  Slightly extended in 
subsequent years 
Durban  
Umbilo 
Ethekwini Municipality 
 
KwaZulu-Natal Resistance Park 2002 Architecture: Ravi 
Jhupsee. Relief 
sculpture made in 
India by Shree 
Kumar 
Fenced in at a later stage 
Durban 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Prophet Isaiah 
Shembe  
(2004) Andries Botha, Greg 
Streak & Peter 
‘Abbo’ Hall 
Not publicly installed; 
currently in storage 
Durban 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of John Dube  (2006) Andries Botha Not publicly installed; 
currently in storage  
Durban 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Nelson 
Mandela 
(2006) Andries Botha & 
Ledelle Moe  
Not publicly installed; 
currently in storage  
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Durban 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Dorothee 
Nyembe 
(2006) Andries Botha  Not publicly installed; 
currently in storage  
Durban 
Botha’s Park 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of King Dinuzulu 2008  Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall Completed and installed 
in 2006 
Durban  
Hillary 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Bessie Head 2008 Jane du Rand Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Durban 
KwaMashu 
Ethekwini Municipality  
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Ladysmith Black 
Mambazo 
2008 Magwa Langa Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Durban 
International Convention Centre 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Albert Luthuli (2008)  Nontobeko Ntombela 
and Monli Mdanda 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project; not publicly 
installed, currently in 
storage  
Durban 
International Convention Centre 
Ethekwini Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Papwa Sewgolum (2008)  Sharlene Khan Sunday Times Heritage 
Project; not publicly 
installed, currently in 
storage  
      
East London  
City Hall 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Bronze statue of Steve Biko 1997 Naomi Jacobson  
East London 
Duncan Village  
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Duncan Village Massacre 
memorial 
2008 Maureen Quin  
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East London 
Beach Front 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Multicultural Man 2006 Francesco Perilli Donation from Italy 
East London 
Beach Front 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Eastern Cape Heroes Park 2005   
East London 
City Hall 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Memorial for Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu 
2007 Anton Momberg  Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
East London 
Beach Front 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Eastern Beach 2007 Zach Taljaard Sunday Times Heritage 
Project, removed after 
vandalism; in storage 
East London 
Mdantsane 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Happyboy Mgxaji 2007 Andrew Lindsay & 
Luyiso Makilipi 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
East London 
Museum 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Coelacanth 2007 Graham Jones Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
East London 
Egerton Station Mdantsane 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Egerton Bus Boycott memorial 2005   
      
Ginsburg  
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Bronze bust of Steve Biko 1997 Naomi Jacobson  
      
Giyani  Limpopo Statue of King Nghunghunyani 2005   
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Greater Giyani Municipality 
      
Glencoe 
Glencoe Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial stone for Mahatma 
Gandhi 
1993   
      
Graaff-Reinet 
Camdeboo Municipality 
Western Cape Khoisan Genocide Memorial  
 
2005   
Grahamstown  
Makana Municipality 
Eastern Cape Egazini monument 2001 Herholdt & Wagner 
Architects 
 
      
Greytown 
uMvoti Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Statue of King Dinuzulu  2007   
      
Greytown area 
uMvoti Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Ambush Rock memorial 2000   
Greytown area 
uMvoti Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bambatha memorial  2008 Angus van Zyl 
Taylor 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
      
Hammanskraal 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Nelson 
Mandela 
1998 Phil Minnaar  
      
Hankey 
Kouga Municipality 
Eastern Cape Grave site of Sarah Baartman 2002   
Howick  
Umgeni Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Nelson Mandela capture site 1996   
      
TABLE OF POST-APARTHEID MONUMENTS 
 
 
381
Ixopo  
Sisonke District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Alan Paton 2008 Andrew Verster Sunday Times Heritage 
Project; not yet installed, 
currently in storage 
      
Johannnesburg 
Orlando West 
Soweto 
Gauteng Hector Pieterson memorial 
stone 
1992 
 
 In 2001 incorporated into 
the new Hector Pieterson 
memorial and modified  
Johannesburg 
Kagiso 
West Rand 
Gauteng Kagiso Monument 1993 Johannesburg, 
West Rand, 
Kagiso 
Kagiso Monument 
Johannnesburg 
Avalon Cemetery 
Soweto 
Gauteng Memorial for the SS Mendi 1995   
Johannesburg 
Sebokeng 
Gauteng Memorial for Christopher 
Nangalembe 
1996   
Johannesburg  
Braamfontein Cemetery 
Gauteng Memorial for Enoch Sontonga  1996 William Martinson  
Johannesburg 
Kempton Park 
East Rand 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Mandela with 
two children 
Undated   
Johannesburg 
Thembisa 
East Rand 
Gauteng Garden of Remembrance 
(Heroes monument) 
1998   
Johannesburg  
Katlehong 
East Rand 
  
Gauteng Katlehong Memorial 1998   
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Johannesburg 
Thokoza 
East Rand 
Gauteng Thokoza Memorial 1999   
Johannnesburg 
Orlando West 
Soweto 
Gauteng Hector Pieterson memorial and 
museum 
2001/ 
2002 
Mashabane Rose 
Architects 
 
Johannnesburg  
City Centre 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi 
2003 Tinka Christopher  
Johannnesburg  
Sandton 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Nelson 
Mandela 
2004 Kobus Hattingh and 
Jacob Maponyane 
 
Johannesburg 
Kliptown 
Soweto 
Gauteng Walter Sisulu Square of 
Dedication (Freedom Square) 
2005 StudioMas Architects  
Johannnesburg  
Newtown 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Brenda Fassie 2006 Angus van Zyl 
Taylor 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg  
City Centre 
Gauteng Simakade (John Vorster Square 
memorial) 
2006 Kagiso Pat Mautloa Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg 
City Centre  
Gauteng Duma Nokwe memorial 2006 Lewis Levin Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg  
Braamfontein 
Gauteng Memorial for Raymond 
Dart 
2006 Marco Cianfanelli Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg 
Fordsburg  
Gauteng Memorial for Mohandas 
‘Mahatma’ Gandhi 
2006 Usha Seejarim Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg 
Jabavu 
Soweto 
Gauteng Memorial for Teboho Tsietsi 
Mashinini 
(June 16 memorial) 
2006 Johannes Phokela Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
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Johannnesburg 
Mzimhlope 
Soweto 
Gauteng Memorial for Lilian Ngoyi 2006 Stephen Maqashela Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg 
Orlando East 
Soweto 
Gauteng Memorial for Bethuel 
Mokgosinyana 
(Orlando Pirates)  
2006 Sam Nhlengethwa Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Johannnesburg 
Rosebank 
Gauteng The Sunday Times Centenary 
memorial 
2006 Theresa-Anne 
Mackintosh 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
      
Kimberley 
Sol Plaatje Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Sol Plaatje 
(seated) 
1998 Johan Moolman Never installed, currently 
stored in local art gallery 
      
Kimberley 
Sol Plaatje Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Sol Plaatje 
(seated) 
1998 Johan Moolman Never installed, currently 
stored in local art gallery 
Kimberley 
Galeshewe 
Sol Plaatje Municipality 
Northern Cape Mayibuye memorial 2002 Clive van den Berg   
Kimberley  
City Centre 
Sol Plaatje Municipality 
Northern Cape Malay Camp memorial 2006   
      
King William’s Town Zinyoka  
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Memorial to Benjamin John 
Peter Tyamzashe 
2005 
 
  
King William’s Town 
City Centre 
Buffalo City Municipality 
Eastern Cape Memorial for the Prophetess 
Nonthetha Nkwenkwe 
2007 Lynnley Watson Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
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Krugersdorp  
City Hall 
Mogale City Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Chief Mogale 
wa Mogale  
2004 Adam Madabe  
      
Ladysmith  
City Hall 
Emnambithi Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Mahatma Gandhi 1993 J.S. Thulsie  
Ladysmith 
Emnambithi Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Freedom Monument 1999   
      
Libode 
Nyandeni Great Place 
Nyandeni Local Municipality 
Eastern Cape King Victor Poto Ndamase 
memorial 
2005   
      
Louis Trichard/ Makhado 
Vhembe District Municipality 
Limpopo 
 
Statue of King Makhado 2005   
      
Matatiele  
Matatiele Muncipality 
Eastern Cape Maseru Massacre memorial    
      
Mbuzini  
Nkomazi Muncipality 
Mpumalanga Memorial for Samora Machel 1998 Jose Forjaz Architect  
Middelburg 
Kwanonzame  
Chris Hani District Municipality 
Eastern Cape Memorial for the Middelburg 
three 
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Nkandla 
Nkandla Muncipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for Inkosi Sigananda 
Shezi 
   
      
Orania 
(Municipality disputed) 
Northern Cape Koeksister monument 2003 Jan-Otto du Plessis  
      
Paarl  
Drakenstein Prison 
Drakenstein Municipality 
Western Cape Bronze statue of Nelson 
Mandela 
2008 Jean Doyle  
      
Pietermaritzburg 
City Centre 
Msunduzi Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Mahatma 
Gandhi 
1993 Phil Kolbe  
Pietermaritzburg  
City Hall 
Msunduzi Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Carbineer’s Garden of Peace 2004   
Pietermaritzburg,  
Imbali 
Msunduzi Municipality  
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for  
Mandela’s speech in Imbali 
2008 Gert Swart Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
      
Pniel  
Stellenbosch Municipality 
Western Cape Ubuntu memorial 2007   
      
Port Durnford  
uThungulu District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial for King Cetshwayo 2004   
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Port Elizabeth  
New Brighton 
Nelson Mandela Metropole  
Eastern Cape Memorial for the  
SS Mendi 
1997  Restoration of older 
(1937) memorial 
Port Elizabeth  
New Brighton 
Nelson Mandela Metropole 
Eastern Cape Emlotheni Memorial Park or 
Heroes Acre (Vuyisile Mini 
Memorial) 
1998   
Port Elizabeth 
New Brighton 
Nelson Mandela Metropole  
Eastern Cape Memorial for Lumkile “Sheya” 
Kulati  
2001    
Port Elizabeth  
Harbour 
Nelson Mandela Metropole 
Eastern Cape Freedom Tower (2005) Equilibrium Studios Competition in 2005 
Construction not yet 
begun 
Port Elizabeth 
New Brighton  
Nelson Mandela Metropole 
Eastern Cape Memorial for Raymond 
Mhlaba 
2007 Mxolisi ‘Dolla’ 
Sapeta & 
Andrew Lindsay 
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Port Elizabeth 
St.George’s Park  
Nelson Mandela Metropole  
Eastern Cape Memorial for Athol Fugard 2007 Mark Wilby Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
Port Elizabeth 
New Brighton  
Nelson Mandela Metropole 
Eastern Cape George Pemba memorial 2007 Andrew Nhlangwini  Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
      
Pretoria  
Mamelodi 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Umkhonto memorial 1991  Slightly relocated in 
context of recent 
upgrading of the site 
Pretoria  
Mamelodi Cemetery 
Gauteng PAC memorial 1992   
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Tshwane Municipality 
Pretoria  
Mamelodi 
Tshwane Municipality  
Gauteng Stanza Bopape memorial 1998   
Pretoria 
Attridgeville 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Memorial for the SS Mendi 1998  Original bronze sculpture 
stolen and replaced with 
fiberglass copy 
Pretoria 
Union Buildings Tshwane 
Municipality 
Gauteng Monument for the Women of 
South Africa 
2000 Wilma Cruise & 
Marcus Holmes  
 
No longer accessible 
Pretoria 
City Centre 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Monument to Refugees from 
East Germany  
2001   
Pretoria  
City Centre 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Jacaranda monument 2002   
Pretoria 
Mamelodi 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Solomon 
Mahlangu  
2005 Angus van Zyl 
Taylor 
 
Pretoria 
City Hall 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Bronze statue of Chief Tshwane 2006 Angus van Zyl 
Taylor 
 
Pretoria 
Salvokop 
Tshwane Municipality 
Gauteng Memorial to the SADF Veterans 2007  Privately initiated 
‘counter memorial’ 
Pretoria 
Salvokop 
Gauteng Freedom Park 2009 Mashabane Rose, 
Mpheti Morejele and 
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Under construction 
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Queenstown  
Chris Hani District Municipality 
Eastern Cape Enoch Mgijima memorial 
(Bulhoek Massacre) 
2007 Mgcineni Sobopha & 
Michael Barry  
Sunday Times Heritage 
Project 
      
Richmond  
Richmond Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial to the Richmond 
Twelve 
2006 Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall  
      
Sebokeng 
Vaal Triangle 
Emfulemi Local Muncipality 
Gauteng Nangalembe Night Vigil 
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1996   
      
Sharpeville  
Emfulemi Local Municipality 
Gauteng Human Rights Precinct 
(Sharpeville Massacre memorial 
and museum) 
2002 Gabriel Greeff 
architect 
 
      
Stanger / kwaDukuza 
Ilembe District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Memorial to the Train Disaster 
Victims 
2002   
Stanger / kwaDukuza 
Ilembe District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Bronze statue of Albert Luthuli 2004 Gert Swart National Legacy Project 
      
Tjate 
Greater Sekhukhune District 
Muncipality  
Limpopo Statue of King Sekhukhune I 2004   
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Uitenhage 
KwaNobuhle 
Nelson Mandela Metropole 
Eastern Cape Langa Massacre memorial 2000  Upgrading currently 
underway 
Ulundi area 
Zululand District Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Spirit of eMakhosini Monument 2003 Peter ‘Abbo’ Hall & 
Nkosinathi Khanyile  
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